Edwina, lIST,
On my understanding of what Gary R said I don't think there is a
substantive difference here. You have what I think are inessential
flourishes on Peirce's view. You may not see them as inessential because
of your pansemiotism, but I see no good reason to push semiotics back all
the
Dear Gary,
This corresponds to my understanding. I think it also corresponds to what
I have been saying about the incapacity to experience "bare"
icons. More diaphanous is possible, but absolute fades to nothing. That
each category serves as a representamen is what I understand to allow the
conne
Edwina wrote:
"As for ALL the universal categories in every phenomenon (082614-1)
- I don't see that - - "
Then you do not see what Peirce is saying, or you see what he is saying
but disagree with him for your own personal reason. Even I, a novice in
semiotics, picked this up very early in may
Thanks for your comments, Ben - And, see my responses interleaved:
-
-
>>1) BEN: Edwina, you said that Gary's calling the sign priman or first
confines it.
"After all, if the representamen relation can be in a mode of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness...then how
Edwina, list,
Responses interleaved.
On 8/25/2014 7:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>BEN - I'll try to respond below...
-
>>1) BEN: Edwina, you said that Gary's calling the sign priman or first
confines it.
"After all, if the representamen relation can be in a mode of
Firs
BEN - I'll try to respond below...
-
1) BEN: Edwina, you said that Gary's calling the sign priman or first
confines it.
"After all, if the representamen relation can be in a mode of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness...then how can you confine it to 1ns, as you do below?"
EDWINA
Edwina,
You wrote:
Please, Gary, don't move into personal insults. I am not a 'speed reader'
and I object to your characterizing me as such.
Ha! You who never personally insult. . . Anyhow, I AM a speed read, I spent
many years studying to be one (including working with several instructors,
usin
Edwina, you said that Gary's calling the sign priman or first confines it.
"After all, if the representamen relation can be in a mode of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness...then how can you confine it to 1ns, as you do
below?"
Or if you're distinguishing between representamen and representa
Please, Gary, don't move into personal insults. I am not a 'speed reader' and I
object to your characterizing me as such.
I think I have a legitimate set of points - which I explained to Ben, and to
you. Just discuss the points; namely, that I think there is a difference
between the semiosic p
Ben,
Thanks for this post which included some quotations I hadn't seen before
and certainly haven't studied. Your post supports and expands my expressed
views (expands them even for me!)
And rather than rejecting this analysis--which is Peirce's!--out of hand
and without studying, I would suggest
Ben, now I'm confused. Where did I say that a sign (which I consider a triadic
set of Relations) is 'priman' or first, i.e., confined to Firstness in all
respects? I certainly don't agree with that - there is only one Sign (triad)
whose three Relations are all in a mode of Firstness. The other
I disagree with you, Gary. The Representamen relation is not the same as
'representation'. The sign is a triad and can indeed be called a
'representation'. The sign, which is a triad, is composed of three Relations:
the Object Relation, the Representamen Relation and the Interpretant Relation.
Edwina, list,
I don't understand why you speak of _/confinement/_. To say that a sign
is priman, or is a first, in some sense, is not to say that it is
confined to firstness in all respects.
["Lectures on Pragmatism," CP 5.43, Quote]
The particular categories form a series, or set of se
Gary R,
My [biosemiotics:6117] sent off just before I read your post agrees with you.
I think the triad of 1ns, 2ns and 3ns has a dual aspect which may be
called X and Y, Yin and Yang, formal and material, phenomenal and
ontological, or syntactic and semantic, etc.
With all the best.
Sung
_
Edwina, Helmut, list
As I've argued my position repeatedly in the past, all I'll add to what
I've already said is that, for Peirce, the interpretant is itself a
representamen as is the object (immediate object).
CP 1.339. The easiest of [the ideas in which Thirdness is predominant]
which are of p
How does the pragmatic maxim apply to this discussion? And to be fair how
does it (the maxim) apply to the texts of CSP that have to do with
categories. It seems to me what he calls categories are in many cases best
understood as we comprehend utilities - useful programs for dealing with
specific i
Jeff, list,
Well, it looks like I retract not tomorrow, like I predicted, but today.
I wanted to distinguish capacity or capability for inference, from
validity of inference. But...
http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/deduction
[Peirce in letters to F. A. Woods, 1913, CP 8.385-387. Quo
As I keep pointing out, I consider it a serious error to confuse Peirce's
linear order of the processing semiosis of the triad (moving from Object via
Representamen to Interpretant and also, within the mediative Representamen
reasoning, to Object to Interpretant)..as having anything at all to d
Helmut,
I think what you are pointing to as the "overall role" of the interpretant
as 3ns is reflected in this passage:
CP 2.274. A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable
of determining a Third, called it
Hi, Jeff, list,
To start with, I go on at sufficient length below, that I'll almost
certainly be prepared to retract one or another claim by tomorrow! That
said
I suppose that some of what I cited has to do with determining the
validity of "chalkboard" arguments, but the argument for the
Post : C.S. Peirce • Syllabus • Selection 1
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/08/24/c-s-peirce-%e2%80%a2-syllabus-%e2%80%a2-selection-1/
Posted : August 24, 2014 at 11:00 pm
Author : Jon Awbrey
Peircers,
Returning to a text of Peirce that often comes to mind whenever I think on
the relationsh
(I forgot to send this email off last night.
Undistorted tables are attached,.)
Gary R, Phyllis, lists,
Would it be possible that Peirce had two sets of Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness in mind without naming them ? Let us call them X and Y triads.
The basic difference between these triads
To add another twist, isn't it the case that deduction determines non-local
necessary conclusions while induction is strictly local? That is, in my view,
deduction provides a general rule that is valid and thus necessary in ALL
cases, regardless of spatial and temporal domain. Induction, on the
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