[PEIRCE-L] The Classification of Sciences and Scientific Research, was Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Gary Richmond]

John, Jon, Gary F, Edwina, List,

I don't believe that it is in any way controversial that not only Peirce,
but virtually every serious scholar makes a distinction between theory and
practice and, likewise, between pure and applied mathematics.

Here I'd like to comment on the later distinction (i.e., between pure and
applied mathematics); but rather than offering abstract definitions of
these, to emphasize the legitimate interest of many folk on this list in
the importance of real world applications of mathematics and science,
I'll instead quote from a college website commenting on how pure and
applied mathematics are distinguished in their undergraduate degree
programs. These simple summaries are meant to help students decide which
major (pure or applied mathematics) to enroll in.

Edwin Ding, PhD, an associate professor in the Department of Mathematics,
Physics, and Statistics at APU, noted that the mathematics major focuses on
pure mathematics. He explained that pure mathematics deals with the
theoretical side of math and has a greater concentration on proofs,
theorems, and abstract concepts.

“The applied math major, on the other hand, focuses more on applying
analytical/computational math techniques to solve real-world problems in
different fields,” said Ding. These fields can include actuarial science,
biology, physics, computer science, and statistics. According to Ding,
“Both majors start with the foundational courses, such as calculus sequence
and ordinary differential equations, and go into different specializations
later on.”
https://www.apu.edu/articles/the-difference-between-mathematics-degrees-applied-math-vs-pure-math/


What it seems to me that De Tienne emphasizes in that aspect of his
presentation having the purpose of positioning pharneroscopy within
Peirce's *Classification of Sciences*, a work, btw, of *Science of Review*,
concerned with sciences *qua* scientific *disciplines *as distinct from how
the knowledge of each of these will be employed in the actual work of any
given scientist or group of sciences.

So, if one wants to prepare for work in, for example, biology, a student
would most likely want to have and, indeed, need to have some training in
several sciences in addition to biology, for example, in mathematics,
logic, chemistry, etc. But her more advanced training would *emphasize* the
distinctive research characters (methodology) of the science of biology, a
science which she may have a burning interest in which may eventually lead
to her making important discoveries in it.

As I see it, Peirce's *Classification of Sciences* is principally devised
to point to the specific *subject matter* of individual sciences as they
have already been developed, but equally importantly, may be developed, and
will be researched by generations of future scientists with special
interests in particular sciences*. Of* course these interests and abilities
may not be limited to a single science, may even encompass many sciences
(Peirce was himself certainly an authentic polymath). And while preparatory
studies for one to become, say, a chemist or a psychologist may overlap to
some (small) extent, yet as their individual educations broaden and deepen,
their scientific training and, of course, ultimately their scientific
practice, *will diverge* considerably. Naturally it is not unheard of for,
say, an accomplished botanist to also be an expert anthropologist. But if
so, that scientist must make deep and serious studies of both those
sciences, and likely much, much more.

It is likely that programs in any scientific discipline will most likely
require students to take courses in mathematics and logic, perhaps the
history of science, etc. But once they are actively working in their
special fields, if they continue as research scientists they will likely
want to make significant progress in their respective field(s), to
"further" them, as the English idiom would have it. For, as Peirce comments:


Science is not a fixed, unchangeable body of propositions. After a thousand
years the general face of science may be modified past recognition. 1899 | From
Comte to Benjamin Kidd | CN 2:214

Thus, science "consists in a *disposition* of living men" and women
actively working in various scientific disciplines, genuine science being the
work and research of those trained in and engaged in the various scientific
disciplines.

CSP: Science is research; and research is science, from the first moment
when the researcher casts aside all desire to prove his present opinions
right, and burns with ardent desire to find out wherein they are wrong. Science
thus consists in a disposition of living men. . .


Peirce continues in this passage to note that for contemporary,  active,
*developing* research that "the true divisions of science will be those
which divide living men.: 1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter II. Prelogical
Notions. Section I. Classification of the Sciences | MS [R] 426:12

Thus, he brings together these 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[John F. Sowa]

Jeff, Edwina, Gary F, Jon AS, List,

On this issue, I agree with
Jeff that the support of the sciences
(all of them) was uppermost in
Peirce's mind.  But I admit that a
more explicit statement of the
issues would have been desirable.

JBD:  I have yet to see an
explanation of Peirce's phenomenology that
does what I think needs to
be done--which is to provide an adequate
account of how an analysis
of the elemental features of experience
will enable scientific
inquigorers better to identify and correct for
observational errors,
frame questions, conceive of the space of
possible hypotheses,
develop informal diagrams, determine appropriate
forms of measurement
for given phenomena, and articulate formal
mathematical models for
competing hypotheses.

I suspect that Peirce considered that his
emphasis on diagrams and
diagrammatic reasoning would be sufficient
to explain the major goals
of phaneroscopy:  interpret experience in
representations that would
be suitable for both formal and informal
reasoning.  I also believe
that other hypoicons could also serve as a
supplement for the more
informal asoects, Arbitrary images, for
example, can represent
continuous patterns.

JBD:  Gary F
was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that
Gary and I
may have some disagreements.

I started to write a note in
reponse to some points that Gary F made
in a note last wek.  But I
was sidetracked by some other issues.

In the following point,
Gary is responding to a note in which I quoted
seven paragraphs by
CSP and two by Cornelis de Wall.  For all nine
quotations and my
summaries of each, see
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/diagrams.txt

GF:  why [do] you bother to repeat all this, since it’s all been said
before and nobody has questioned any of it.  The only question I have
is why you insert “phaneroscopy” in your new subject line, as there
is
nothing in the entire post about “phenomenology/phaneroscopy in
particular,” because there is nothing in it that differentiates
phaneroscopy from “Peirce's thought in general.”

First, I'm
glad that we all agree on those nine poins.  But Gary R did
question
that note.  He accused me of putting too much emphasis on
diagrams --
because, as he said, diagrams are the foundation of my
research on
conceptual graphs.  I wanted to emphasize that I learned
the
importance of diagrams from Peirce.

GF:  It’s a good summary of
the role of diagrams in Peirce’s thought,
but it does nothing to
explain the unique role of phaneroscopy in his
classification of
sciences or in his philosophy.

Second, I wanted to emphasize
that the central role of phaneroscopy is
the transition from
experience to diagrams.  Contrary to ADT's slide
25, there is no
transition out of mathematics, since diagrams can (a)
relate
experience to any pattern or structure of any branch of science
or
common sense, (b) allow mathematics and formal logic to be applied
to
any and every representation of 1-ness, 2-ness, and 3-ness, and (c)
furnish all the data required for the normative sciences to evaluate
the truth or relevance of hypotheses (guesses) to diagrams from
memories, reading, or dialogues with other people.

GF:  What
does make [phaneroscopy] unique is precisely the subject of
the
current “slow read” of ADT’s slides.

Third, I have read each of
the slides from ADT's original and from
each of the transcriptions. 
I believe that he has made many important
points.  But as I showed
about slide 25, he could have made his
presentation more precise and
more general if he had recognized the
role of diagrams.  In short,
phaneroscopy is the process of mapping
experience to diagrams that
can be interpreted by all later sciences.
The normative sciences
evaluate them by the criteria of esthetics,
ethics, and truth.  That
is the role of methodeutic.

Finally, ADT's phrase "the
rest of us" suggested that Peirce's
mathematics is inadequate to
support common sense.  Yet every textbook
from elementary school to
the most advanced research is illustrated
with diagrams, which could
be mapped to and from EGs.  In particular,
the diagrams that
linguists use to represent the syntax and semantics
of ordinary
languages have a direct mapping to and from EGs.  I also
believe that
some kinds of diagrams can even represent the exotic
languages that
Dan Everett has studied.

John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Edwinia, List:

I concur with you assertion below, but this view in inadequate to separate the 
dramatic differences between CSP’s notion of logic from classic logic and more 
importantly, why he choose to follow a semiotic path to ground his logic rather 
than the classic path of antecedents to consequences and / or syllogisms and 
/or Boolean logic and /or set theory? 

So, the challenge to interpretations of philosophy goes far deeper than this 
view suggests...

> On Aug 30, 2021, at 8:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Therefore ... the mathematician is not working as an isolate, indifferent to 
> whether his theories are relevant in the 'real world'  but -  as in the 
> example of Peirce - is quite capable of using abstract AND practical theories 
> in his work. Some people might be more comfortable in the abstract vs the 
> practical and vice versa but the point is - to differentiate between the 
> Agent and the Subject matter.
> 
> 
My personal experience is that the view of mathematics held by a mathematician 
matches the personal philosophy of the mathematician, usually in very occult 
ways.  However, occasionally, the forms of the subject matter dominates the 
deeply abstract roots of mathematical structures.  CSP falls into this latter 
category, he is very transparent on which subject matter he rests his pragmatic 
mathematics and logics on. The truth functions of the trichotomy rest on the 
realism of the illations, relations, and calculations of the natural sciences.

This point of view is not restricted to any one profession. Human individuality 
is not dissolved when on adopts a profession.  Think about professional 
philosophers….  :-) 

Cheers
Jerry 

 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Gary: 

Excellent post.  Thank you!
Below, I will postulate how Gary’s interpretation of this semantic distinction 
illates to syntactical distinctions of the natural philosophy of the natural 
sciences and natural diagrammatic mathematics resting on CSP’s notion of the 
symbolic relationships between icons and rhema.

This is of particular importance in view of the foundations of CSP’s notions of 
foundations of arguments (the linguistics of the trichotomistic descriptions of 
phenomena resting on semiotics).   

In the view of alternative views of Husserl / Cantor and Frege that dominate  
the axiomatic structures of nominalism, the contrasts and comparisons of 
meanings of the two quasi-parallel notions, phenomenology and phaneroscopy.

In particular, it not merely separates two philosophical perceptions of numbers 
and continuity, it widens the gap between truth functions based on the 
languaging of the definitions of the trichotomistic terms and the truth 
functions resting on the Whitehead and Russell’s notion of mathematical logic.

Further, this distinction in meaning is highly relevant to the contradictions 
of “liar’s paradox” of Russell (along with his notion of atomic and molecular 
sentences) and the realism of CSP composing  categorical "molecular sentences” 
by compounding Rhema and Decisions.
  
CSP’s logical compositions of arguments from rhematic terms and dicisignated 
terms can be used to define symbols and lattices of symbols representing 
legisigns because the truth of arguments rests on icons, not axioms. This view 
is constructed from the composition of atoms into categories of molecules.

The notions of scientific imagination necessary to relate the mathematical 
operations relating semiosis to the enumerable forms representing legi-signs 
cohere smoothly with diagrammatic forms would be specific examples of 
phaneroscopy.   

Perhaps someone who understand the meaning of the “contradictory term” of 
“phenomenology”, could imagine a counter-example relevant to the logics of the 
natural sciences?

Cheers

Jerry 



> On Aug 30, 2021, at 7:26 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> John, I am aware that some scientists use the word “phenomenology” in 
> reference to “The division of any science which is concerned with the 
> description and classification of its phenomena, rather than causal or 
> theoretical explanation.” The Oxford English Dictionarycites both Whewell and 
> Hamilton as using the word in that sense in the 19th century, so it would not 
> surprise me if Peirce also used the word that way in 1878, especially in a 
> non-philosophical context.
> 
> I see I have failed to persuade you that Peirce’s use of the word from 1902 
> on referred to a radically different practice, but what persuaded me was a 
> close reading of Peirce’s work that uses the word specifically in reference 
> to a science which is neither a normative nor a special science, but provides 
> a formal grounding for those sciences in terms of the “formal elements” of 
> the phenomenon/phaneron. That he felt forced to change the name of this 
> science to “phaneroscopy” in 1904 is, to me, even more compelling evidence of 
> that he was referring not to “a division of any science” but to “the most 
> primal of all the positive sciences” (CP 5.39, 1903). But I won’t try to 
> change your mind, certainly not by quoting more of Peirce. I will simply have 
> to accept that what you call “phenomenology” or “phaneroscopy” is not what I 
> refer to by those terms when I am trying to mirror Peirce’s usage of them, or 
> when I am using them in any philosophical context. 
> 
> I’ll just go back to the discussion of ADT’s slides now, with that in mind. 
> We are getting close to the end of the slow read, but there are still some 
> issues to be resolved concerning the practice of phaneroscopy.
>  
> Gary f.
>  
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
>   > On Behalf Of John F. Sowa
> Sent: 30-Aug-21 00:16
> To: Jon Alan Schmidt  >
> Cc: Peirce-L mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
>  
> Jon AS, Gary F, List,
> 
> We must always distinguish the subject matter of any science from the
> people who (a) develop the science or (b) apply the science.
> 
> The dependencies among the sciences, which Comte noted and Peirce
> adopted after reading Comte's classification, show how each science
> depends on principles from the sciences that precede it.
> 
> But most people who develop or use any science are not aware of the
> Comte-Peirce classification.  I recall that Gary F said that the
> dependencies in the development seemed to be circular.  And I
> agree.  In their daily work, everybody, including professional
> mathematicians, are free to use any knowledge they acquired in any
> way from any source.  Remember Archimedes' Eureka moment, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Jerry, list

1] You wrote: . "The truth functions of the trichotomy rest on the
realism of the illations, relations, and calculations of the natural
sciences."

Yes, I very much agree.

2] And, you wrote: "This point of view is not restricted to any one
profession. Human individuality is not dissolved when on adopts a
profession.  Think about professional philosophers….  :-) "

And I very much agree with this as well. It's why I keep emphasizing
that an explanation of 'What Peirce wrote' - is an interpretation,
operating within a triadic semiosic process and thus, affected by the
Interpreter's own 'human individuality'.

Edwina
 On Mon 30/08/21  4:31 PM , Jerry LR Chandler
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com sent:
 Edwinia, List:
 I concur with you assertion below, but this view in inadequate to
separate the dramatic differences between CSP’s notion of logic
from classic logic and more importantly, why he choose to follow a
semiotic path to ground his logic rather than the classic path of
antecedents to consequences and / or syllogisms and /or Boolean logic
and /or set theory? 
 So, the challenge to interpretations of philosophy goes far deeper
than this view suggests...
 On Aug 30, 2021, at 8:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
 Therefore ... the mathematician is not working as an isolate,
indifferent to whether his theories are relevant in the 'real world' 
but -  as in the example of Peirce - is quite capable of using
abstract AND practical theories in his work. Some people might be
more comfortable in the abstract vs the practical and vice versa but
the point is - to differentiate between the Agent and the Subject
matter.
 My personal experience is that the view  of mathematics held by a
mathematician matches the personal philosophy of the mathematician,
usually in very occult ways.  However, occasionally, the forms of the
subject matter dominates the deeply abstract roots of mathematical
structures.  CSP falls into this latter category, he is very
transparent on which subject matter he rests his pragmatic
mathematics and logics on. The truth functions of the trichotomy rest
on the realism of the illations, relations, and calculations of the
natural sciences. 
 This point of view is not restricted to any one profession. Human
individuality is not dissolved when on adopts a profession.  Think
about professional philosophers….  :-) 
 CheersJerry 


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[gnox]

Jeff, List,

I did notice, Jeff, that your usage of "phenomenology" is very close to
John's - that is, it agrees with the "general" definition of the word that I
quoted from the OED, as opposed to the "Philosophy" definition given there,
which is much more detailed - but i won't try to persuade you, any more than
i did John, that Peirce's definitions are more philosophical than general. I
also noticed your reference to the "distinction between the phenomenological
and nomological phases of inquiry," but i don't see the relevance of that
distinction to phenomenological practice as Peirce defined it, so i don't
intend to argue that point either.

JD: I have yet to see an explanation of Peirce's phenomenology that does
what I think needs to be done--which is to provide an adequate account of
how an analysis of the elemental features of experience will enable
scientific inquirers better to identify and correct for observational
errors, frame questions, conceive of the space of possible hypotheses,
develop informal diagrams, determine appropriate forms of measurement for
given phenomena, and articulate formal mathematical models for competing
hypotheses.

GF: I don't think Peirce's phenomenology does that, so i certainly can't
provide "an adequate account of how an analysis of the elemental features of
experience" does that kind of thing. Some phenomenologists in the Husserlian
tradition do try to give an account of how phenomenology can inform
psychology in those ways; one example is Gallagher and Zahavi, The
Phenomenological Mind (3rd edition, 2021). But i don't see Peirce giving any
such account for his phenomenology. If his phenomenology were more concerned
with the material elements (or material categories) of phenomena, it might
be possible to talk about "phenomenological phases of inquiry" within the
special sciences, but Peirce says quite explicitly and consistently that his
phenomenology/ phaneroscopy is concerned only with the formal elements and
not the material elements of the phaneron. I have seen no text by Peirce
suggesting that his phenomenological method can be of any direct assistance
to special sciences such as astronomy, biology or psychology in the ways you
list above.

Some of these distinctions verge on hairsplitting, so i can easily see how
Jon A.S. could be in general agreement with both posts (yours and mine).
That's why i would rather not spend more time arguing over these
distinctions, which may turn out to be more verbal than pragmatic. The
outcome would make no difference to my practice of phaneroscopy, or anyone
else's, as far as I can see.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: 30-Aug-21 14:20
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

 

Hi Jon, Gary F, John Sowa, List,

 

Jon says:  "I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and
Jeff."

 

Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the main
"business" of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of
applying phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences. Given the fact
that Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and
I may have some disagreements. 

 

At this stage, the question of how our interpretations may differ is still
somewhat unclear, at least to me. As such, I was inviting Gary F to say more
about where he disagrees with Sowa (and Smyth and me). Where do you stand on
the apparent disagreement?

 

Let me try to formulate the disagreement in clearer terms. When it comes to
aims of Peirce's phenomenology one might hold that:

 

1.  The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of
conscious human experience. The many aspects of consciousness are
particularly puzzling, so we need phenomenology as a grounding theory for
explanations of consciousness.
2.  The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of
the elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of
scientific intelligence. An account of the elemental features in
experience--both material and formal--will be helpful for the practice of
analyzing scientific observations of any sort of phenomena. Better analyses
of the phenomena that are part of our common experience will be important
for philosophical inquiry because we are highly prone to observational error
in philosophy, and we are often at a loss as to how to make measurements of
these phenomena and how to formulate plausible explanations. Most
importantly, an account of the elemental forms of experience will put us in
a better position to frame scientific questions and more clearly comprehend
the space of possible hypothetical explanations. As such, a Peircean
phenomenology will be similarly helpful in the special sciences, especially
where there are disputes about (1) the proper forms of measurement of the
phenomena and/or (2) the plausibility of various hypotheses. 

 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

JD: Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the
main "business" of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the
practice of applying phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences.
Given the fact that Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it
appears that Gary and I may have some disagreements.


Gary F. can correct me if I am mistaken, but I understood his disagreement
with John to be primarily over *distinguishing *"pure"
phenomenology/phaneroscopy as a positive science in its own right, situated
between mathematics and the normative sciences in Peirce's classification,
from its applications in the other positive sciences.

GF (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00390.html): That
he [Peirce] felt forced to change the name of this science to
“phaneroscopy” in 1904 is, to me, even more compelling evidence of that he
was referring not to “a division of any science” but to “the most primal of
all the positive sciences” (CP 5.39, 1903).


You can correct me if I am mistaken, but I understood you to be agreeing
with Gary F. on this point, rather than John.

JD (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00393.html): For
my part, I think the point is important for understanding the business of
the Peircean phenomenologist--especially when it comes to the application
of the "pure" theory of the formal elements in experience to scientific
questions in the normative sciences, metaphysics and the special sciences.


In any case, neither Gary F. nor John said anything whatsoever about
consciousness in their latest posts, so I am not sure which List members
you perceive as advocating your #1 below. Even the subtitle of Atkins's
book refers to analysis *and *consciousness, not analysis *of *
consciousness.

JD: Having said that, I have yet to see an explanation of Peirce's
phenomenology that does what I think needs to be done--which is to provide
an adequate account of how an analysis of the elemental features of
experience will enable scientific inquirers better to identify and correct
for observational errors, frame questions, conceive of the space of
possible hypotheses, develop informal diagrams, determine appropriate forms
of measurement for given phenomena, and articulate formal mathematical
models for competing hypotheses.


To clarify, are you suggesting that this is "what needs to be done" by
phenomenology/phaneroscopy *according to Peirce*, or is it your own
proposal? Here I am inclined to agree with John.

JFS (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00361.html): The
analysis and evaluation of truth, bias, and prejudice is a task for the
normative sciences. A psychologist might discover evidence of unconscious
bias. But the use of that evidence for evaluating truth would be a task for
methodeutic, not phaneroscopy.


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 1:20 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Hi Jon, Gary F, John Sowa, List,
>
> Jon says:  "I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and
> Jeff."
>
> Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the main 
> "business"
> of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying
> phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences. Given the fact that
> Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and I
> may have some disagreements.
>
> At this stage, the question of how our interpretations may differ is still
> somewhat unclear, at least to me. As such, I was inviting Gary F to say
> more about where he disagrees with Sowa (and Smyth and me). Where do you
> stand on the apparent disagreement?
>
> Let me try to formulate the disagreement in clearer terms. When it comes
> to aims of Peirce's phenomenology one might hold that:
>
>1. The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of
>conscious human experience. The many aspects of consciousness are
>particularly puzzling, so we need phenomenology as a grounding theory for
>explanations of consciousness.
>2. The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of
>the elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of
>scientific intelligence. An account of the elemental features in
>experience--both material and formal--will be helpful for the practice
>of analyzing scientific observations of any sort of phenomena. Better
>analyses of the phenomena that are part of our common experience will
>be important for philosophical inquiry because we are highly prone to
>observational error in philosophy, and we are often at a loss as to
>how to make measurements of these phenomena and how to formulate
>plausible explanations. Most importantly, an account of the elemental

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Jeff, list,


You said:


Jeff D:

My assumption is that those who are having disagreements on this list about
how to apply Peircean phenomenology to positive questions in the normative
sciences and metaphysics are engaged in honest disagreements.

The fact that we sometimes appear to be working at cross-purposes applying
pragmaticist methods is something we're trying to sort out by talking it
through. Otherwise, there is not much hope of learning one from another.


I agree.

For it must be true that

“Pragmatism maintains that in those cases the disputants must be at
cross-purposes.”


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 2:53 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jerry,
>
>
> Let me offer a brief response to the rhetorical points you make at the end
> of your post. You say:
>
>
> Jerry R:  I see the answer as being obvious.
> Jeff D:  I don't think the answer as to what Peirce's view is concerning
> the real business of the phenomenology is obvious. If it were obvious,
> intelligent people wouldn't have disagreements about the matter.
>
> Jerry R:  We do what Peircean phenomenologist would do, *amirite*?
> Jeff D: My aim is to learn how to employ the methods Peirce recommends in
> philosophical inquiry. Given the challenges involved in doing it well,
> especially when it comes to phenomenology, I am often concerned that I
> misunderstand what it is that I'm supposed to be doing at each step in my
> inquiries about any positive question in philosophy. If the questions
> weren't so hard, and if there weren't so many competing hypotheses, things
> would be easier. As it is, I find myself struggling to ensure that I'm on a
> productive track.
>
> Jerry R: For we boast ourselves to be Peircean phenomenologist!
> Jeff D:  I'm trying to learn to do it better. It is not clear that I'm
> doing it well.
>
> Jerry R:  And what we do, *as* Peircean phenomenologist, must be *right*,
> amirite?
> Jeff D: I don't assume Peirce must be right about how we should practice
> phenomenological inquiry. He is fallible, as am I. Having said that, I've
> studied other methods in philosophy, including those recommended by Plato,
> Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, Quine, Goodman, Sellars, van Frassen, etc.
> Thus far, I've found limitations in their methods that are hard to fix.
> Thus far, Peirce's methods seem more promising. Having said that, I'm
> always looking for ways in which the methods I'm using might be refined and
> improved. I'm fairly confident Peirce was moved by the same aim of
> improving his methods.
>
> Jerry R: For we *cannot* be at cross-purposes because we are Peircean
> phenomenologist.
> Jeff D: My assumption is that those who are having disagreements on this
> list about how to apply Peircean phenomenology to positive questions in the
> normative sciences and metaphysics are engaged in honest disagreements. The
> fact that we sometimes appear to be working at cross-purposes applying
> pragmaticist methods is something we're trying to sort out by talking it
> through. Otherwise, there is not much hope of learning one from another.
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> --
> *From:* Jerry Rhee 
> *Sent:* Monday, August 30, 2021 12:29:50 PM
> *To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
>
>
> Dear Jeff, list,
>
>
> Thank you for making manifest where the disagreement lies.
>
> For it is obvious to me, as it must be for you,
>
> that it is inconsistent to agree with you
>
> and to agree with Gary *at the same time*,
>
>   -which is asserted by the speaker who says, ’I agree with Gary and
> Jeff’,
>
> which is what JAS has said,
>
> when you agree with John but disagree with Gary.
>
>
> “I didn’t presuppose that!”
>
>
> That is, JAS has said (more or less but not exactly),
>
> “I didn’t presuppose that the main “business" of the
> Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying
> phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences is:
>
>
> 1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of
> conscious human experience.
>
> 1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of the
> elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of
> scientific intelligence.”
>
>
> (for where and when, *exactly*, does Peirce say this? Please state the
> reference and year)
>
>
> So then, what *needs* to be done?
>
> What, here, is *necessary* to make philosophical inquiry more rigorous
>
>* in order to* ultimate aim?
>
>
> I see the answer as being obvious.
>
> We do what Peircean phenomenologist would do, *amirite*?
>
> For we boast ourselves to be Peircean phenomenologist!
>
> And what we do, *as* Peircean phenomenologist, must be *right*, amirite?
>
> For we *cannot* be at cross-purposes because we are Peircean
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jerry,


Let me offer a brief response to the rhetorical points you make at the end of 
your post. You say:


Jerry R:  I see the answer as being obvious.
Jeff D:  I don't think the answer as to what Peirce's view is concerning the 
real business of the phenomenology is obvious. If it were obvious, intelligent 
people wouldn't have disagreements about the matter.

Jerry R:  We do what Peircean phenomenologist would do, amirite?
Jeff D: My aim is to learn how to employ the methods Peirce recommends in 
philosophical inquiry. Given the challenges involved in doing it well, 
especially when it comes to phenomenology, I am often concerned that I 
misunderstand what it is that I'm supposed to be doing at each step in my 
inquiries about any positive question in philosophy. If the questions weren't 
so hard, and if there weren't so many competing hypotheses, things would be 
easier. As it is, I find myself struggling to ensure that I'm on a productive 
track.

Jerry R: For we boast ourselves to be Peircean phenomenologist!
Jeff D:  I'm trying to learn to do it better. It is not clear that I'm doing it 
well.

Jerry R:  And what we do, as Peircean phenomenologist, must be right, amirite?
Jeff D: I don't assume Peirce must be right about how we should practice 
phenomenological inquiry. He is fallible, as am I. Having said that, I've 
studied other methods in philosophy, including those recommended by Plato, 
Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, Quine, Goodman, Sellars, van Frassen, etc. Thus 
far, I've found limitations in their methods that are hard to fix. Thus far, 
Peirce's methods seem more promising. Having said that, I'm always looking for 
ways in which the methods I'm using might be refined and improved. I'm fairly 
confident Peirce was moved by the same aim of improving his methods.

Jerry R: For we cannot be at cross-purposes because we are Peircean 
phenomenologist.
Jeff D: My assumption is that those who are having disagreements on this list 
about how to apply Peircean phenomenology to positive questions in the 
normative sciences and metaphysics are engaged in honest disagreements. The 
fact that we sometimes appear to be working at cross-purposes applying 
pragmaticist methods is something we're trying to sort out by talking it 
through. Otherwise, there is not much hope of learning one from another.

--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jerry Rhee 
Sent: Monday, August 30, 2021 12:29:50 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide


Dear Jeff, list,


Thank you for making manifest where the disagreement lies.

For it is obvious to me, as it must be for you,

that it is inconsistent to agree with you

and to agree with Gary at the same time,

  -which is asserted by the speaker who says, ’I agree with Gary and Jeff’,

which is what JAS has said,

when you agree with John but disagree with Gary.


“I didn’t presuppose that!”


That is, JAS has said (more or less but not exactly),

“I didn’t presuppose that the main “business" of the Peircean phenomenologist 
when it comes to the practice of applying phenomenology to questions in the 
positive sciences is:


1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of conscious 
human experience.

1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of the 
elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of scientific 
intelligence.”


(for where and when, exactly, does Peirce say this? Please state the reference 
and year)


So then, what needs to be done?

What, here, is necessary to make philosophical inquiry more rigorous

in order to ultimate aim?


I see the answer as being obvious.

We do what Peircean phenomenologist would do, amirite?

For we boast ourselves to be Peircean phenomenologist!

And what we do, as Peircean phenomenologist, must be right, amirite?

For we cannot be at cross-purposes because we are Peircean phenomenologist.


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 1:20 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Hi Jon, Gary F, John Sowa, List,


Jon says:  "I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff."


Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the main 
"business" of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of 
applying phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences. Given the fact 
that Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and I 
may have some disagreements.


At this stage, the question of how our interpretations may differ is still 
somewhat unclear, at least to me. As such, I was inviting Gary F to say more 
about where he disagrees with Sowa (and Smyth and me). Where do you stand on 
the apparent disagreement?


Let me try to formulate the disagreement in clearer terms. When 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Jeff, list,


Thank you for making manifest where the disagreement lies.

For it is obvious to me, as it must be for you,

that it is inconsistent to agree with you

and to agree with Gary *at the same time*,

  -which is asserted by the speaker who says, ’I agree with Gary and Jeff’,

which is what JAS has said,

when you agree with John but disagree with Gary.


“I didn’t presuppose that!”


That is, JAS has said (more or less but not exactly),

“I didn’t presuppose that the main “business" of the
Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying
phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences is:


1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of
conscious human experience.

1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of the
elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of
scientific intelligence.”


(for where and when, *exactly*, does Peirce say this? Please state the
reference and year)


So then, what *needs* to be done?

What, here, is *necessary* to make philosophical inquiry more rigorous

   * in order to* ultimate aim?


I see the answer as being obvious.

We do what Peircean phenomenologist would do, *amirite*?

For we boast ourselves to be Peircean phenomenologist!

And what we do, *as* Peircean phenomenologist, must be *right*, amirite?

For we *cannot* be at cross-purposes because we are Peircean
phenomenologist.


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 1:20 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Hi Jon, Gary F, John Sowa, List,
>
>
> Jon says:  "I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and
> Jeff."
>
>
> Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the main 
> "business"
> of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying
> phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences. Given the fact that
> Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and I
> may have some disagreements.
>
>
> At this stage, the question of how our interpretations may differ is still
> somewhat unclear, at least to me. As such, I was inviting Gary F to say
> more about where he disagrees with Sowa (and Smyth and me). Where do you
> stand on the apparent disagreement?
>
>
> Let me try to formulate the disagreement in clearer terms. When it comes
> to aims of Peirce's phenomenology one might hold that:
>
>
>
>1. The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of
>conscious human experience. The many aspects of consciousness are
>particularly puzzling, so we need phenomenology as a grounding theory for
>explanations of consciousness.
>2. The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of
>the elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of
>scientific intelligence. An account of the elemental features in
>experience--both material and formal--will be helpful for the practice
>of analyzing scientific observations of any sort of phenomena. Better
>analyses of the phenomena that are part of our common experience will
>be important for philosophical inquiry because we are highly prone to
>observational error in philosophy, and we are often at a loss as to
>how to make measurements of these phenomena and how to formulate
>plausible explanations. Most importantly, an account of the elemental
>forms of experience will put us in a better position to frame scientific
>questions and more clearly comprehend the space of possible hypothetical
>explanations. As such, a Peircean phenomenology will be similarly
>helpful in the special sciences, especially where there are disputes about
>(1) the proper forms of measurement of the phenomena and/or (2) the 
> plausibility
>of various hypotheses.
>
>
> Consider the subtitle of Richard Atkin's recent work on Peirce's
> phenomenology:
>
>
> Atkins, Richard Kenneth. *Charles S. Peirce's Phenomenology: Analysis and
> Consciousness*. Oxford University Press, 2018.
>
>
> The subtitle might lead one to think that (1) is the right approach to
> understanding the business of doing phenomenology. As such, the main
> advantage of getting the right theory of phenomenology is that we will then
> be able to formulate better metaphysical explanations of human
> consciousness. As I've indicated earlier, I think this approach is based on
> a misunderstanding of Peirce's phenomenology. I do not mean to suggest that
> Richard Atkins is committed to (1) and rejects (2). I'll let him speak for
> himself.
>
>
> Having said that, I have yet to see an explanation of Peirce's
> phenomenology that does what I think needs to be done--which is to
> provide an adequate account of how an analysis of the elemental features
> of experience will enable scientific inquirers better to identify and
> correct for observational errors, frame questions, conceive of the space
> of possible 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations

[Jon Awbrey]

Cf: Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • Discussion 13
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/08/30/semiotics-semiosis-sign-relations-discussion-13/

Re: Category Theory
https://categorytheory.zulipchat.com/#narrow/stream/233104-theory.3A-logic/topic/sign.20relations
::: Peiyuan Zhu
https://categorytheory.zulipchat.com/#narrow/stream/233104-theory.3A-logic/topic/sign.20relations/near/251113234
::: Henry Story
https://categorytheory.zulipchat.com/#narrow/stream/233104-theory.3A-logic/topic/sign.20relations/near/251115511

Zulip Inivitation Link:
https://categorytheory.zulipchat.com/join/uez4ystfwhbwazggfurgxkm7/

Dear Peiyuan, Henry …

Way back during my first foundation + identity crisis I explored every
alternative, deviant, non-standard version of logic and set theory
I could scrape up — I remember saying to one of my professors,
“How come we’re still talking about logical atoms in the quantum era?” —
and he sent me off to read about quantum logics, which had apparently
already fallen out of fashion at the time.  Remarkably enough, I did
find one Peircean scholar who had done a lot of work on them, but
they didn’t seem to be what I needed right then.

My present, still pressing applications require me to start from much more
elementary grounds, stuff I can build up from boolean sources and targets,
universes with coordinate spaces of type (Bⁿ, Bⁿ → B).

Regards,

Jon
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Jon, Gary F, John Sowa, List,


Jon says:  "I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff."


Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the main 
"business" of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of 
applying phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences. Given the fact 
that Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and I 
may have some disagreements.


At this stage, the question of how our interpretations may differ is still 
somewhat unclear, at least to me. As such, I was inviting Gary F to say more 
about where he disagrees with Sowa (and Smyth and me). Where do you stand on 
the apparent disagreement?


Let me try to formulate the disagreement in clearer terms. When it comes to 
aims of Peirce's phenomenology one might hold that:


  1.  The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of 
conscious human experience. The many aspects of consciousness are particularly 
puzzling, so we need phenomenology as a grounding theory for explanations of 
consciousness.
  2.  The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of the 
elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of scientific 
intelligence. An account of the elemental features in experience--both material 
and formal--will be helpful for the practice of analyzing scientific 
observations of any sort of phenomena. Better analyses of the phenomena that 
are part of our common experience will be important for philosophical inquiry 
because we are highly prone to observational error in philosophy, and we are 
often at a loss as to how to make measurements of these phenomena and how to 
formulate plausible explanations. Most importantly, an account of the elemental 
forms of experience will put us in a better position to frame scientific 
questions and more clearly comprehend the space of possible hypothetical 
explanations. As such, a Peircean phenomenology will be similarly helpful in 
the special sciences, especially where there are disputes about (1) the proper 
forms of measurement of the phenomena and/or (2) the plausibility of various 
hypotheses.


Consider the subtitle of Richard Atkin's recent work on Peirce's phenomenology:


Atkins, Richard Kenneth. Charles S. Peirce's Phenomenology: Analysis and 
Consciousness. Oxford University Press, 2018.


The subtitle might lead one to think that (1) is the right approach to 
understanding the business of doing phenomenology. As such, the main advantage 
of getting the right theory of phenomenology is that we will then be able to 
formulate better metaphysical explanations of human consciousness. As I've 
indicated earlier, I think this approach is based on a misunderstanding of 
Peirce's phenomenology. I do not mean to suggest that Richard Atkins is 
committed to (1) and rejects (2). I'll let him speak for himself.


Having said that, I have yet to see an explanation of Peirce's phenomenology 
that does what I think needs to be done--which is to provide an adequate 
account of how an analysis of the elemental features of experience will enable 
scientific inquirers better to identify and correct for observational errors, 
frame questions, conceive of the space of possible hypotheses, develop informal 
diagrams, determine appropriate forms of measurement for given phenomena, and 
articulate formal mathematical models for competing hypotheses.


All of this is part of what is necessary to make philosophical inquiry more 
rigorous--i.e., mathematical as a science.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Monday, August 30, 2021 10:35 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

John, Edwina, List:

ET (to JFS): Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree.

I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff. As in the 
case of pure mathematics, Peirce's phenomenology/phaneroscopy is a distinct 
science in its own right, with its own purposes and subject matter, and must be 
carefully distinguished from its applications within the other positive 
sciences, including logic as semeiotic, metaphysics, and the special sciences.

ET: I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the subject matter of a 
science from the agent-who-works with that subject.

Just to clarify, where Peirce states that the mathematician frames a pure 
hypothesis and draws necessary conclusions from it without inquiring or caring 
whether it agrees with the actual facts or not, I understand him to be 
primarily talking about the subject matter rather than the agent-who-works. In 
other words, "mathematician" here simply means "practitioner of (pure) 
mathematics." Someone who does inquire and care about such things might be a 
self-described 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, List

1] I don't see the point of your long paragraph about the duality of
'subject matter' and 'agent'. John's point was that the same agent is
quite capable of, and usually does, engage in a synechistic
interaction of pure and applied reasoning. So- your separation of the
'self-described mathematician' as someone who is not engaged in 'pure
mathematics' misses the point of scientific reasoning and continuity.
[See 1.55-62].

2] As for De Tienne's linearity - I see it in his separation of pure
and applied practices - and his 'emphasis on X-science FOLLOWS
Y-science,  his terms of 'prior, precede, after, 'transition out of
it', 'what follows', transition from, 'steps', 

I prefer the complex networking of Peirce's continuity/synechism,
where despite the sciences each having distinct subject matter and
methods, nevertheless, they are intimately networked with each other
and one doesn't 'transition' out of them. 

Now, you my consider my views of De Tienne's outline as 'an
emotional rant, empty complaint, baseless' - all terms you have used
against me - but - those are my opinions. 

Edwina
 On Mon 30/08/21  1:35 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 John, Edwina, List:
 ET (to JFS): Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree.
 I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff. As
in the case of pure mathematics, Peirce's phenomenology/phaneroscopy
is a distinct science in its own right, with its own purposes and
subject matter, and must be carefully distinguished from its 
applications within the other positive sciences, including logic as
semeiotic, metaphysics, and the special sciences.
 ET: I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the subject matter
of a science from the agent-who-works with that subject.
 Just to clarify, where Peirce states that the mathematician frames a
pure hypothesis and draws necessary conclusions from it without
inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not, I
understand him to be primarily talking about the  subject matter
rather than the agent-who-works. In other words, "mathematician" here
simply means "practitioner of (pure) mathematics." Someone who does
inquire and care about such things might be a self-described
mathematician, but is not engaged in pure mathematics as defined by
Peirce within his classification of the sciences. After all, Peirce
himself was an accomplished mathematician, but was not doing pure
mathematics during his phaneroscopic, logical, metaphysical, and
scientific investigations. In those contexts, he was instead 
applying mathematics as a phaneroscopist, logician, metaphysician,
and scientist, respectively.
 ET: This also suggests, to me, that thought is far more complex and
networked than the linearity offered by De Tienne.
 Please elaborate on this remark. Where exactly does André state or
imply that thought is simple and linear, rather than complex and
networked? 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 8:05 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
John, List

Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree.

I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the subject matter of
a science from the agent-who-works with that subject.

Therefore, to set up mathematics/AND mathematicians, as De Tienne
seems to do, as alienated from other sciences, and requiring a
Move-On situation is illogical. And this is exactly what a number of
us have been critiquing about De Tienne's outline.  

Therefore - as John points out, the mathematician is not working as
an isolate, indifferent to whether his theories are relevant in the
'real world'  but -  as in the example of Peirce - is quite capable
of using abstract AND practical theories in his work. Some people
might be more comfortable in the abstract vs the practical and vice
versa but the point is - to differentiate between the Agent and the
Subject matter.

This also suggests, to me, that thought is far more complex and
networked than the linearity offered by De Tienne.  

Again, thanks to John for pointing this out.

Edwina 


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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► 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, Edwina, List:

ET (to JFS): Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree.


I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff. As in the
case of pure mathematics, Peirce's phenomenology/phaneroscopy is a *distinct
*science in its own right, with its own purposes and subject matter, and
must be carefully distinguished from its *applications *within the other
positive sciences, including logic as semeiotic, metaphysics, and the
special sciences.

ET: I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the *subject matter* of a
science from the *agent-who-works* with that subject.


Just to clarify, where Peirce states that the mathematician frames a pure
hypothesis and draws necessary conclusions from it without inquiring or
caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not, I understand him to
be primarily talking about the *subject matter* rather than the
*agent-who-works*. In other words, "mathematician" here simply means
"practitioner of (pure) mathematics." Someone who *does *inquire and care
about such things might be a self-described mathematician, but is not
engaged in *pure *mathematics as defined by Peirce within his
classification of the sciences. After all, Peirce himself was an
accomplished mathematician, but was not doing *pure *mathematics during his
phaneroscopic, logical, metaphysical, and scientific investigations. In
those contexts, he was instead *applying *mathematics as a phaneroscopist,
logician, metaphysician, and scientist, respectively.

ET: This also suggests, to me, that thought is far more complex and
networked than the linearity offered by De Tienne.


Please elaborate on this remark. Where exactly does André state or imply
that thought is simple and linear, rather than complex and networked?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 8:05 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> John, List
>
> Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree.
>
> I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the subject matter of a
> science from the agent-who-works with that subject.
>
> Therefore, to set up mathematics/AND mathematicians, as De Tienne seems to
> do, as alienated from other sciences, and requiring a Move-On situation is
> illogical. And this is exactly what a number of us have been critiquing
> about De Tienne's outline.
>
> Therefore - as John points out, the mathematician is not working as an
> isolate, indifferent to whether his theories are relevant in the 'real
> world'  but -  as in the example of Peirce - is quite capable of using
> abstract AND practical theories in his work. Some people might be more
> comfortable in the abstract vs the practical and vice versa but the point
> is - to differentiate between the Agent and the Subject matter.
>
> This also suggests, to me, that thought is far more complex and networked
> than the linearity offered by De Tienne.
>
> Again, thanks to John for pointing this out.
>
> Edwina
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, John S, List


It is worth noting that Richard Smyth, who is a respected Peirce scholar, makes 
the same point in his monograph Reading Peirce Reading that John S has raised. 
In fact, he points out that the distinction between the phenomenological and 
nomological phases of inquiry was fairly well established in the sciences of 
physics and astronomy, and that Peirce may have been influenced by Herschel's 
phenomenological work in astronomy.


For my part, I think the point is important for understanding the business of 
the Peircean phenomenologist--especially when it comes to the application of 
the "pure" theory of the formal elements in experience to scientific questions 
in the normative sciences, metaphysics and the special sciences.


The main difference between the practice of phenomenology in the cenoscopic and 
the idioscopic sciences is that the former is focused on the analysis of 
observations made as part of our common experience, while the latter is focused 
on specialized observations that are often made with tools such as telescopes 
and microscopes. As Peirce notes, the fact that we are so familiar with common 
experience makes the practice of phenomenology in the cenoscopic sciences 
especially difficulty. This is due to the fact that we wear glasses colored by 
deeper assumptions, and it can be quite challenging to see the phenomena 
afresh--with the eyes of an artist.


In both cases, the practice of phenomenology is done for the sake of making 
more exact analyses of observations of reproducible phenomena--which is done 
for the sake of identifying and correcting for observational errors, 
determining the appropriate form of measurement, framing questions, developing 
informal diagrams of the problems, formulating competing hypotheses, 
articulating formal models, etc. Figuring out what might gained from the more 
exact analyses of the phenomena that have been observed for the sake of these 
abductive activities is no small feat.


That, at least, is what I see Peirce doing over and over again in his inquiries 
in logic, metaphysics. He often begins by pointing out that other philosophers 
have been mislead by an inadequate analysis of the phenomena in question--or 
have failed to pay attention to features in our experience that are clearly 
relevant to the question at hand.


Yours,


Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Monday, August 30, 2021 5:26:00 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology

John, I am aware that some scientists use the word “phenomenology” in reference 
to “The division of any science which is concerned with the description and 
classification of its phenomena, rather than causal or theoretical 
explanation.” The Oxford English Dictionary cites both Whewell and Hamilton as 
using the word in that sense in the 19th century, so it would not surprise me 
if Peirce also used the word that way in 1878, especially in a 
non-philosophical context.
I see I have failed to persuade you that Peirce’s use of the word from 1902 on 
referred to a radically different practice, but what persuaded me was a close 
reading of Peirce’s work that uses the word specifically in reference to a 
science which is neither a normative nor a special science, but provides a 
formal grounding for those sciences in terms of the “formal elements” of the 
phenomenon/phaneron. That he felt forced to change the name of this science to 
“phaneroscopy” in 1904 is, to me, even more compelling evidence of that he was 
referring not to “a division of any science” but to “the most primal of all the 
positive sciences” (CP 5.39, 1903). But I won’t try to change your mind, 
certainly not by quoting more of Peirce. I will simply have to accept that what 
you call “phenomenology” or “phaneroscopy” is not what I refer to by those 
terms when I am trying to mirror Peirce’s usage of them, or when I am using 
them in any philosophical context.
I’ll just go back to the discussion of ADT’s slides now, with that in mind. We 
are getting close to the end of the slow read, but there are still some issues 
to be resolved concerning the practice of phaneroscopy.

Gary f.

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 30-Aug-21 00:16
To: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide


Jon AS, Gary F, List,

We must always distinguish the subject matter of any science from the
people who (a) develop the science or (b) apply the science.

The dependencies among the sciences, which Comte noted and Peirce
adopted after reading Comte's classification, show how each science
depends on principles from the sciences that precede it.

But most people who develop or use any science are not aware of the
Comte-Peirce classification. 

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 35

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. Since the 
word “manifest” is a key word in Peirce’s “etymological definition” (slide 34), 
De Tienne poses here a number of questions dealing with the ambiguities of that 
word, in order to help readers disambiguate the word “phaneron,” i.e. direct 
attention to the object of that sign. He does not give explicit answers to 
these questions, as each user of the word has to work out his own answers based 
on his reading of Peirce (especially the other definitions of “phaneron” which 
will follow shortly). 

Gary f.

 



 

Text: This is a good place to discuss how manifest the phaneron is ...

Seeming vs. appearance: are they the same?

Manifestation: manifesting or manifested?

Is the manifest obscure?

Is the manifest an indeterminate manifold?

What about the continuous stream of manifestation (or presencing)?

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, List

Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree.

I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the subject matter of
a science from the agent-who-works with that subject.

Therefore, to set up mathematics/AND mathematicians, as De Tienne
seems to do, as alienated from other sciences, and requiring a
Move-On situation is illogical. And this is exactly what a number of
us have been critiquing about De Tienne's outline. 

Therefore - as John points out, the mathematician is not working as
an isolate, indifferent to whether his theories are relevant in the
'real world'  but -  as in the example of Peirce - is quite capable
of using abstract AND practical theories in his work. Some people
might be more comfortable in the abstract vs the practical and vice
versa but the point is - to differentiate between the Agent and the
Subject matter.

This also suggests, to me, that thought is far more complex and
networked than the linearity offered by De Tienne. 

Again, thanks to John for pointing this out.

Edwina
 On Mon 30/08/21 12:15 AM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Jon AS, Gary F, List,
 We must always distinguish the subject matter of any science from
the
 people who (a) develop the science or (b) apply the science.
 The dependencies among the sciences, which Comte noted and Peirce
 adopted after reading Comte's classification, show how each science
 depends on principles from the sciences that precede it.
 But most people who develop or use any science are not aware of the
 Comte-Peirce classification.  I recall that Gary F said that the
 dependencies in the development seemed to be circular.  And I
 agree.  In their daily work, everybody, including professional
 mathematicians, are free to use any knowledge they acquired in any
 way from any source.  Remember Archimedes' Eureka moment, when
 he discovered a new mathematical principle while taking a bath.
 But a pure mathematical theory, as abstracted from its original
 discovery, is independent of any features from its origin.  Its
 principles then become available for any science of any kind.
 JAS:  I will only add that unlike the mathematician, the
 phenomenologist does inquire and care whether a given hypothesis
 agrees with the actual facts or not.
 But we must distinguish the subject matter of mathematics and
 phenomenology from the people who develop and use them.  All people
 have all their knowledge available at all times.  Peirce was a
 polymath.  At one moment, he could apply pure mathematics while
 analyzing experience.  But in the next moment, he could use
normative
 principles to evaluate the results.  Then he could apply those
results to
 a problem in physics.  For a case study, see his Photometric
 Researches, or the excerpts I posted at
 http://jfsowa.com/peirce/PRexcerpts.pdf
 JAS:  I will only add that phenomenology is not limited to
experience
 in the strict sense of that in cognition which is forced upon us by
 the outer world of existence, it also encompasses the inner world of
 imagination and the logical world of mathematics.
 Yes.  Experience includes sensations from external sources as well
as
 anything from memories, imagination, or internal proprioception.
 Mathematical experience is a kind of imagination.  A chess expert
can
 play a good game blindfold.  And mathematicians can do the algebra
or
 the geometry in their heads.
 GF:  John says, “The special sciences depend on phenomenology for
the
 raw data and on mathematics for forming hypotheses.” But we have
 previously agreed that in Peirce’s hierarchy of sciences, each
science
 depends on those above it for principles, while the higher levels
can
 and often do get their raw data from those below.
 Please see pages 1 to 3 of PRexcerpts.pdf.  Peirce published that
book
 in 1878, more than 20 years before his classification of the
sciences.
 On page 1, he begins with a discussion of principles that could be
 called informal phenomenology. on page 2, he introduces the
distinction
 between phenomenal light (as it is experienced) from noumenal light
 (as it really is).  On page 3, he cites results by physicists Newton
 and Maxwell.
 In citing results by other physicists, he is practicing methodeutic
in
 evaluating the results of his phaneroscopy with the results that
other
 scientists had derived by their observations.
 Summary:  All our knowledge about anything is ultimately derived
from
 our experience (by formal or informal methods).  Much of that
 experience includes communications from other people who derived
their
 knowledge from their own experience or from their experience in
 communications with other people who ,,,
 When you trace all the sources of your knowledge of any kind from
any
 source, it all comes directly or indirectly from somebody analyzing
experience.

John 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology

[gnox]

John, I am aware that some scientists use the word "phenomenology" in
reference to "The division of any science which is concerned with the
description and classification of its phenomena, rather than causal or
theoretical explanation." The Oxford English Dictionary cites both Whewell
and Hamilton as using the word in that sense in the 19th century, so it
would not surprise me if Peirce also used the word that way in 1878,
especially in a non-philosophical context.

I see I have failed to persuade you that Peirce's use of the word from 1902
on referred to a radically different practice, but what persuaded me was a
close reading of Peirce's work that uses the word specifically in reference
to a science which is neither a normative nor a special science, but
provides a formal grounding for those sciences in terms of the "formal
elements" of the phenomenon/phaneron. That he felt forced to change the name
of this science to "phaneroscopy" in 1904 is, to me, even more compelling
evidence of that he was referring not to "a division of any science" but to
"the most primal of all the positive sciences" (CP 5.39, 1903). But I won't
try to change your mind, certainly not by quoting more of Peirce. I will
simply have to accept that what you call "phenomenology" or "phaneroscopy"
is not what I refer to by those terms when I am trying to mirror Peirce's
usage of them, or when I am using them in any philosophical context. 

I'll just go back to the discussion of ADT's slides now, with that in mind.
We are getting close to the end of the slow read, but there are still some
issues to be resolved concerning the practice of phaneroscopy.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 30-Aug-21 00:16
To: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

 

Jon AS, Gary F, List,

We must always distinguish the subject matter of any science from the
people who (a) develop the science or (b) apply the science.

The dependencies among the sciences, which Comte noted and Peirce
adopted after reading Comte's classification, show how each science
depends on principles from the sciences that precede it.

But most people who develop or use any science are not aware of the
Comte-Peirce classification.  I recall that Gary F said that the
dependencies in the development seemed to be circular.  And I
agree.  In their daily work, everybody, including professional
mathematicians, are free to use any knowledge they acquired in any
way from any source.  Remember Archimedes' Eureka moment, when
he discovered a new mathematical principle while taking a bath.

But a pure mathematical theory, as abstracted from its original
discovery, is independent of any features from its origin.  Its
principles then become available for any science of any kind.

JAS:  I will only add that unlike the mathematician, the
phenomenologist does inquire and care whether a given hypothesis
agrees with the actual facts or not.

But we must distinguish the subject matter of mathematics and
phenomenology from the people who develop and use them.  All people
have all their knowledge available at all times.  Peirce was a
polymath.  At one moment, he could apply pure mathematics while
analyzing experience.  But in the next moment, he could use normative
principles to evaluate the results.  Then he could apply those results to
a problem in physics.  For a case study, see his Photometric
Researches, or the excerpts I posted at
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/PRexcerpts.pdf

JAS:  I will only add that phenomenology is not limited to experience
in the strict sense of that in cognition which is forced upon us by
the outer world of existence, it also encompasses the inner world of
imagination and the logical world of mathematics.

Yes.  Experience includes sensations from external sources as well as
anything from memories, imagination, or internal proprioception.
Mathematical experience is a kind of imagination.  A chess expert can
play a good game blindfold.  And mathematicians can do the algebra or
the geometry in their heads.

GF:  John says, "The special sciences depend on phenomenology for the
raw data and on mathematics for forming hypotheses." But we have
previously agreed that in Peirce's hierarchy of sciences, each science
depends on those above it for principles, while the higher levels can
and often do get their raw data from those below.

Please see pages 1 to 3 of PRexcerpts.pdf.  Peirce published that book
in 1878, more than 20 years before his classification of the sciences.
On page 1, he begins with a discussion of principles that could be
called informal phenomenology. on page 2, he introduces the distinction
between phenomenal light (as it is experienced) from noumenal light
(as it really is).  On page 3, he cites results by physicists Newton
and Maxwell.

In citing results by other physicists, he is practicing methodeutic in
evaluating the results of his phaneroscopy with the