that the noumenal does not consist of "creations of the understanding" as
claimed by Kant in the passage quoted below, but of intelligible reality
The mistake Kant makes, in my opinion, and the opinions of many a philosopher
(as people here will know), is to try and qualify the noumenal. He is
Jon, List
It is deductively valid if you fill in the gap re thing in itself, which I have
done/explained/qualified within the various formalism. It just assumes basic
knowledge of that.
JAS: "As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is not whether the finite
community of humans can ever
Jack, List:
I appreciate the summary as requested, but that argumentation is not
deductively valid. Indeed, our impressions of things are not identical to
those things (they are signs of them), and those things in themselves are
as they are regardless of our impressions of them (dynamical
Jeff, List:
Admittedly, I have not read a lot of Kant, so I am mostly just agreeing
with Peirce that "the absolutely incognizable has no meaning because no
conception attaches to it. It is, therefore, a meaningless word; and,
consequently, whatever is meant by any term as 'the real' is cognizable
Jon, List,
1. Things impress upon me,
2. My impressions of those things are not those things.
3. If 2, and I don't see how we can deny that, then
4. such things exist in themselves regardless of how they impress upon us.
5. Thus, we cannot cognize that which necessarily exist in themselves,
Hi Jon,
Which claim about the "thing in itself" in Kant do you take to be mistaken? Can
you put it in clear terms and tell me where he makes the claim? I'd be
interested in knowing where you think he goes wrong in more precise terms.
As I've suggested before, one of Kant's main aims in the
Jack, List:
Again, if the "thing in itself" can be inferred, then it can be represented
and is not incognizable after all. So, Peirce was right and Kant was wrong.
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
Jack, List:
What Peirce specifically denies is that there is any *incognizable* "thing
in itself." If your alleged "proof" merely demonstrates that it must be
inferred, then it must be capable of representation after all--as the
conclusion of a deductive, inductive, or abductive argument--and
The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would
be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry
by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no.
Yes, to this I go directly. I say I have proven Kant is correct here via the
Jon, List,
I am using Kant's term, and much of Kant, but deviating where the logic
justifies deviation. That the thing in itself exists and refers to incognizable
but necessarily "proven" (via inference and deduction) "essence" is no wide
departure from Kant. Prolgeomena, the most readable of
Jack, List:
"Value" is a relatively unambiguous term in mathematics, but not in
philosophy/metaphysics, and certainly not in your alleged "proof." For
example, reviewing earlier posts, I still honestly have no idea what you
mean by the "value" derived by a human, bird, snail, or worm from an
Jon, list,
That's a fair point - I shouldn't assume everyone has such an accout.
I do believe the terminology is clear and consistent - enough for computational
AI to understand the logical formula and break it down into suitable natural
language descriptions. We can overdo "definitions", too,
Jack, List:
An OpenAI account is required for the link, which I do not have. If you
sincerely desire my feedback on your alleged "proof," then please provide
your summary (formal argumentation) in a List post. Note that even if its
conclusions are deductively *valid*, it is not *sound *unless all
Dear Jon/Helmut and List,
https://chat.openai.com/c/3d2e555a-cd5a-4ff5-8e34-8bd153ca2865
The above is but a summary of the "proof". It is, as far as I can make it, the
simplest means of sharing at this moment in time. The logical series is
accurate - that is, it is ontologically consistent and
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