Jon, List, I am using Kant's term, and much of Kant, but deviating where the logic justifies deviation. That the thing in itself exists and refers to incognizable but necessarily "proven" (via inference and deduction) "essence" is no wide departure from Kant. Prolgeomena, the most readable of all Kant's works, would, in places, put it precisely as that. Which is part of the task I have when engaging in natural language descriptions. Now, that there is a thing in itself, of this kind, which must necessarily be inferred is something Peirce denies (calling Kant a confused realist, though he also "more than" admired him).
As for value, Jon, just swap it out for "meaning" (the meaning derived or found within any experience whatsoever which becomes "value" when delimited for sake of clarity). Though it can always be more concise. As for Essence - I mean noumenal. I say nothing of it except that it - the noumenal thing in itself - must now, when I have set the proper parameters with feedback given from various quarters, be inferred to exist via the formalisms I employ. That is, I claim here that I have proven the core part of Kant's thesis whilst my own does not necessarily have to stay within the Kantian limits but does, as you rightly point out, have to properly situate the Kantian thesis before departing. On that, I agree absolutely. Best Jack ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 7:32 PM To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: "Value" is a relatively unambiguous term in mathematics, but not in philosophy/metaphysics, and certainly not in your alleged "proof." For example, reviewing earlier posts, I still honestly have no idea what you mean by the "value" derived by a human, bird, snail, or worm from an "interaction." You seem to be talking about different representations, which are not "values" in ordinary parlance. If you are not using Kant's well-established philosophical definition of "thing in itself," nor the even longer-established philosophical definition of "essence," then it is problematic for you to be employing those particular terms, especially since you claim to be linking them in a novel way. As Peirce wrote with characteristic bluntness, "whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the act with contempt and indignation" (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903). Moreover, if all you are really seeking to demonstrate is that no actual representation is ever a complete representation of its object, then that would be utterly uncontroversial, at least among Peirceans. As I have said before, this directly corresponds to the distinction between the immediate object (as represented in this sign) and the dynamical object (independent of any representation). The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. Thanks, Jon On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 12:38 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie<mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, list, That's a fair point - I shouldn't assume everyone has such an accout. I do believe the terminology is clear and consistent - enough for computational AI to understand the logical formula and break it down into suitable natural language descriptions. We can overdo "definitions", too, if you ask me. You're right insofar as all predicates require clear situation, and I think no one disagrees, but whilst value is broad, it is also fairly concise (i.e., the value of 3+3= "6", here it has "result-value" of simple mathematic, as R-V). You could go ad nauseum about whether the "value" of 3+3=6 ought to be broken down infinitely and ascribed new terminologies here and there. And that's a fair line of engagement - it's just not necessary in the proof I here submit (will submit -CHATGPT). On the other hand, I am open to making it as robust as possible and putting it to all stress tests, thus it can never be too precise, perhaps, which is the value of submitting such things here. Yes, as for "thing in itself" and "essence" - you are of course correct. However, I am not following Kant, entirely, but updating him. Making that link as novel (but merited) contribution. As to its acceptance, I genuinely await a long back and forth as to the entire structure and premis(ses) of the series/argument/conclusion (as such is necessary). I will fetch a summary and argument-treatment for you, though, - thanks again for offering to critique. Best Jack ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 6:30 PM To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: An OpenAI account is required for the link, which I do not have. If you sincerely desire my feedback on your alleged "proof," then please provide your summary (formal argumentation) in a List post. Note that even if its conclusions are deductively valid, it is not sound unless all its terminology is clear (not vague) and consistent (not equivocal), and all its premisses are true. I suspect that there will continue to be disagreement, especially about that last requirement. One immediate comment is that "thing in itself" and "essence" are not synonymous as employed historically within philosophy/metaphysics. Demonstrating that every dynamical object of a sign has an "essence" that makes it what it is would not be the same as demonstrating that it is ultimately an incognizable "thing in itself." Like "value," these terms seem to be central to your "proof" and thus need rigorous definitions for how they are being used in this particular context. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 12:02 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie<mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Dear Jon/Helmut and List, https://chat.openai.com/c/3d2e555a-cd5a-4ff5-8e34-8bd153ca2865 The above is but a summary of the "proof". It is, as far as I can make it, the simplest means of sharing at this moment in time. The logical series is accurate - that is, it is ontologically consistent and derives the necessary existence of the "thing in itself" qua "essence" (as "X"). These formalisms, logical, I have been engaging with now for a long time. I publish soon - but am happy to provide overview, done as quasi-Socratic-heurism with CHATGPT, prior to that publication (as any criticisms from this list would be well received by me - that is, to refine my argument, particularly that natural language component wherein I'll have to synthesize vast amounts of Hume/Kant/Hegel (and more, with Peirce obviously being present). Best wishes Jack
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