from:"Helmut Raulien"

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-20 Thread Helmut Raulien

Follow-up:

Please tell me, if it is not ok. to write a follow-up this way.

Well, I think it is possible to have a table of ten classes of relations, with close analogy to Peirce´s table of ten classes of signs. Maybe it not even is an analogy, but just a renaming. But I think, it makes clear, that you can use Peirce´s semiotics for systems theory and relations theory.

In the horizontal direction, instead of the correlates S, S-O, S-I relations, you have composition, determination, and classification. In the vertical direction you have the three kinds of each of these. These three kinds are, according to the categories, a qualitative kind, an actual (spatial/temporal) kind, and a mediative, functional kind.

Or maybe it would be better (initially just because of analogy, later, due to examples it may turn out to be better), to call the horizontally arranged elements composition, composition-determination-relation, and composition-classification-relation.

The way, ten classes of relations are possible, is the same way as with Peirce´s signs-table.

That is all, very simple. A paper about that so far would just be a plagiarism, but maybe later I will deliver some examples. Then we will see, whether the renamed table makes sense, or the known signs-table would do as well for these.

Best regards, Helmut

18. April 2024 um 16:44 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien"

Dear All, Supplement:

I want to add, that my classification of relations is not an arbitrary idea, but it is derived after the Peircean categories: Though Peirce said, that composition is thirdness, I think that is because it is a relation. But, if i classify it as a kind of relation, I do so calling it firstness in this respect, determination 2ns, and classification 3ns. I did so, because a composition is the same from any point of view. Determination, 2ns, is different from two points, that of the determining agent and that of the determined one. And it might be regarded actual, even brute somehow. Classification has, maybe in different ways like the interpretant, three points of view, e.g. subclass, superclass, reason for classifying. And it has to do with mediation and representation somehow.

I further have catergorally classified composition in 1ns.: Composition of traits, this is 1ns, because you might also call it composition of qualities (this might even be better anyway). Spatiotemporal composition is 2ns, it suits to reaction and actuality. Functional composition is 3ns, it suits mediation. More specificly, these are 1ns of 1ns, 2ns of 1ns, 3ns of 1ns (because composition is 1ns).

How to further classify determination and classification I have not satisfyingly worked out yet. At the end there would result a table like that of the sign classes. Maybe it is even more general, because I think, that a sign is a composition (of sounds, patterns,...), an object a determining agent, and an interpretant a classification. Or you might say so about the three correlates sign, sign-object-relation, sign-interpretant relation.

The starting point of all this was Stanley N. Sathe´s paper "Salthe12Axiomathes", in which he described composition and subsumption as the two kinds of systems hierarchy. Subsumption, I think, is the relation between super- and subset in a classification. Or maybe it just is classification.

I hope, that with this analysing tool, derived from the Peircean categories, it is possible to specify relations, e.g. tell, what involution exactly is in some certain case, e.g. the way a sign triad involves the three correlates exactly is, that the triad´s quality is composed from the qualities of the correlates (qualities-composition, was traits-composition, you see for me the communication with you all helps).

Best regards, Helmut

Jon, List,

my ideas are all very tentative. Maybe composition, determination, classification are the three kinds of relation? These three kinds each have three kinds again, e.g. composition may be one of traits, spatiotemporal, or functional. So it might be possible, to talk more specificly, instead of saying "relation of relations of relations" e.g.: The ten classes of signs is (are as a whole) a classification of compositions of classes. More specifically, the first classification is a double one: ten possible classes versus 17 impossible ones, and the ten possible ones are further classified. The composition is the relation of the three correlates, this is a traits-composition, not a spatial one, as the DO is not close, and not a functional one, because the three correlates donot have a function, the function is irreducibly that of the triad. The last classification is having picked each correlate out of three respectively possibilities.

I have called it "traits-composition", not "properties-comp.", because in English "property" has two meanings, trait and ownership. It means, that not th

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-19 Thread Helmut Raulien

supplement: I just googled involution, but it is something medicinical. So what´s the noun of to involve, is it involution, involvement, or involvation?

Jerry, List,

yes, but all that doesn´t mean, that there isn´t a sharp distinction between classes. It just says, that classes can involve each other. But there still isn´t a gradient between the involving and the involved class, and neither one between two parallelly involved classes. The gradient is the degree of involution (quantitative), but not between the characteristics of e.g. indexicality and symbolicity (qualitative). For example, if there is a book about frogs with a chapter about toads in it, the topic is frogs, but the book involves toads, then there still is a sharp distinction between frogs and toads.

Best regards, Helmut

19. April 2024 um 05:22 Uhr
Von: "Jerry LR Chandler"

List, Jon:

On Apr 16, 2024, at 1:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.

According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or symbolic than another sign--especially since all symbols involve indices and icons, and all indices involve icons. Moreover, a sign can be predominately iconic while still having indexical and symbolic aspects, or predominately indexical while still having symbolic aspects. On the other hand, both tones as "indefinite significant characters" and types as "definitely significant Forms" are embodied in tokens, such that every type involves tokens (its instances) and every token involves tones. Most (maybe all) of the other eight trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies are sharp distinctions, although the necessitant typically involves the existent and the possible, and the existent involves the possible. For example, every sign must be either a seme, a pheme, or a delome; but all delomes involve phemes and semes, and all phemes involve semes.

Returning to the 1868 metaphysical definition of substance, one can attempt to ascribe names to substances following the rhetorical guidance that would presumably follow from the agency of these manufactured descriptors. Note the three distinctions that CSP hypotheses for his metaphysics.

For example, I could attempt to assign the names of the ordered sequence of saturated hydrocarbons, methane, ethane, propane, butane, pentane, hexane, septane, octane, nonane, decane, and so forth. (It is probable that CSP was aware of the relative compositions of these (the first ten) saturated hydrocarbons.). The molecular formula are given by the general formula, C(n)H(2n+2).

Each of these substances has properties related to temperature, such as melting point or boiling point and flammability.

Each of these substances has a graph, a specific graph of the arrangement of the (n) + (2n+2) atoms in a pattern that was determined by methodologies of chemical ANALYSIS and SYNTHESIS. Furthermore, in the late 1890’s, CSP produced a research article on acetylene, a related hydrocarbon that indicated he was knowledgable of the state of the art.

Can you create any correlates between the categories ( 9, or 10, or 66 or any other integer) of the semantics you appear to believe in? Or, are semantics merely rhetoric semantics for the sake of argument that can not be related to substances?

More generally, from a philosophical point of view, when and how will such terminology generate the agency need for pragmatic work of symbolic agency?

Cheers

Jerry

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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-19 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jerry, List,

Best regards, Helmut

19. April 2024 um 05:22 Uhr
Von: "Jerry LR Chandler"

List, Jon:

On Apr 16, 2024, at 1:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.

Each of these substances has properties related to temperature, such as melting point or boiling point and flammability.

More generally, from a philosophical point of view, when and how will such terminology generate the agency need for pragmatic work of symbolic agency?

Cheers

Jerry

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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-18 Thread Helmut Raulien

sign's genuine dyadic relations with its (dynamical) object and (final) interpretant. Together, these three trichotomies result in ten sign classes, not "compositions of classes"--one class of qualisigns (later tones), three classes of sinsigns (tokens), and six classes of legisigns (types); three classes of icons, four classes of indices, and three classes of symbols; six classes of rhemes (later semes), three classes of dicisigns (phemes), and one class of arguments (delomes). In his 1906-1908 taxonomies, Peirce adds trichotomies for the other five correlates, the sign's genuine dyadic relation with its dynamical interpretant, and the genuine triadic relation. Together, these ten trichotomies would result in 66 sign classes upon being arranged in their proper logical order of determination, but Peirce himself never did this.

 


HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.


 

According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or symbolic than another sign--especially since all symbols involve indices and icons, and all indices involve icons. Moreover, a sign can be predominately iconic while still having indexical and symbolic aspects, or predominately indexical while still having symbolic aspects. On the other hand, both tones as "indefinite significant characters" and types as "definitely significant Forms" are embodied in tokens, such that every type involves tokens (its instances) and every token involves tones. Most (maybe all) of the other eight trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies are sharp distinctions, although the necessitant typically involves the existent and the possible, and the existent involves the possible. For example, every sign must be either a seme, a pheme, or a delome; but all delomes involve phemes and semes, and all phemes involve semes.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt






 


On Tue, Apr 16, 2024 at 11:33 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




 


Jon, List,

 

you wrote:

 

"Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901)."

 

I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three relations. Therefore e.g an index doesn´t come alone, it cannot be a "pure" one. So I donot see a point in guessing, what a pure icon would be like, it is not possible, can not exist. Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of three classes. so a sign triad it is a composition of classes. But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.


 

Best regards, Helmut







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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-17 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, List,

I have called it "traits-composition", not "properties-comp.", because in English "property" has two meanings, trait and ownership. It means, that not the relation, but only the traits of the relation are composed of the traits of the correlates. Same with spatiotemporal and functional.

Well, this is tentative, an idea of which I am not sure whether or not it would be good to further pursue it. It makes everything more complicated, but maybe it is complicated?

Best regards, Helmut

16. April 2024 um 20:10 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"

Helmut, List:

HR: I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three relations.

According to Peirce, the genuine triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating has three correlates--the sign, its (dynamical) object, and its (final) interpretant. This relation is irreducibly triadic, such that it is not composed of its constituent dyadic relations, although it involves the genuine dyadic relations between the sign and its external correlates--its dynamical object, its dynamical interpretant, and its final interpretant.

HR: Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of three classes so a sign triad it is a composition of classes.

According to Peirce, there is no trichotomy for the sign's relation with itself. In his 1903 taxonomy, the first trichotomy is for the sign itself as a correlate, while the second and third trichotomies are for the sign's genuine dyadic relations with its (dynamical) object and (final) interpretant. Together, these three trichotomies result in ten sign classes, not "compositions of classes"--one class of qualisigns (later tones), three classes of sinsigns (tokens), and six classes of legisigns (types); three classes of icons, four classes of indices, and three classes of symbols; six classes of rhemes (later semes), three classes of dicisigns (phemes), and one class of arguments (delomes). In his 1906-1908 taxonomies, Peirce adds trichotomies for the other five correlates, the sign's genuine dyadic relation with its dynamical interpretant, and the genuine triadic relation. Together, these ten trichotomies would result in 66 sign classes upon being arranged in their proper logical order of determination, but Peirce himself never did this.

HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Apr 16, 2024 at 11:33 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

Jon, List,

you wrote:

"Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation w

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-16 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, List,

you wrote:

"Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901)."

I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three relations. Therefore e.g an index doesn´t come alone, it cannot be a "pure" one. So I donot see a point in guessing, what a pure icon would be like, it is not possible, can not exist. Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of three classes. so a sign triad it is a composition of classes. But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.

Best regards, Helmut

, 15. April 2024 um 19:47 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"

Helmut, List:

HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned about using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by Peirce--while such a possible sign must be embodied in an existent token in order to act as a sign, it is never itself "an actual material sign."

HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree with the gist of it in accordance with synechism.

HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or".

Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901).

HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if".

Determination in sign classification can be described using if-then, but not rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a necessitant, then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be in any of the three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be either existent or possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible, the the next is also a possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a symbol can be an argument, dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign or rheme; and an icon is always a rheme.

HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns).

Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks it can be so composed has overlooked the fact that composition is itself a triadic relationship, between the two (or more) components and the composite whole" (CP 6.321, c. 1907).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 11:18 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

List,

I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-15 Thread Helmut Raulien

supplement: thinking about it, I am not clear anymore, if composition "is"or"". Also classification is not simply "either-or", this either-or only applies to parallel classes, but between a class and a subclass it seems more complicated. How exactly, that is how to translate composition, determination, and classification into logic (e.g. Boole, EG, EntG, Venn) I haven´t worked out yet. I even don´t know, whether it is translatable at all, as propositional logic to me seems to suit classification, but not composition. Maybe an Euler-diagram is good for composition? But how to translate one into EG?

List,

Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

"But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today."

Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or, as a matter of retrospection, in the past.

In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes, there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns).

Best regards

Helmut

Gesendet: Sonntag, 14. April 2024 um 03:21 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa"
An: "Edwina Taborsky" , "Jon Alan Schmidt"
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Ahti Pietarinen" , "Francesco Bellucci" , "Anthony Jappy" , "Nathan Houser"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

Edwina, Jon, List,

Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across.

ET: I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues. No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in particular, in the scientific disciplines.

JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species.

JAS: Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them.

Yes, of course. As Edwina wrote, everybody knows that. And that is why Peirce's advice is irrelevant for subjects that are so precisely definable that there are national and international committees that set the standards for them.

But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today.

JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that the new term 'phaneroscopy' is correct, but there is enough overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.

JAS: Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out...

Please note what I was trying to say. I just finished writing an article with the tite "Phaneroscopy: The Science of Diagrams". That article will appear in a book with the title "Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy". For that purpose, Peirce's subtle distinction is important, and I emphasized that distinction in my article.

But I'm not convinced that Peirce made a good decision in coining the new term. There is a considerable overlap between the two words, and most people won't get the point. In fact, I have seen many Peirce scholars lumping the two words in one phrase "phenomenology and phaneroscopy". I wonder whether they could explain the difference if anyone asked them. Since the word 'phenomenology' is so much more common, very few people will ever learn or use Peirce's word.

I believe that Peirce's theories

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-14 Thread Helmut Raulien

List,

Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

Best regards

Helmut

Edwina, Jon, List,

Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across.

ET: I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues. No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in particular, in the scientific disciplines.

JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species.

JAS: Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them.

JAS: Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out...

I believe that Peirce's theories would be easier for teachers to explain and students to learn if he had NOT coined the word 'phaneroscopy'. It would have been better to say that the subject of phenomenology addresses three major issues: (1) the analysis of external phenomena; (2) the analysis of the internal phaneron, and (3) the relations of each to the other, to the world, and to the experiencer.

I use the word phaneroscopy because it is essential to explain Peirce's writings. But I strongly suspect that more people (including Peirce scholars) would get a better understanding of his intentions if he had not coined that word.

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-05 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, List,

I think, "classification" has two meanings: The classifying act, where causality goes along with temporality, and second the state of classes in the present, like a snapshot, where so there cannot be a temporality. But in this latter definition too, causality is detectable, because it is inherited, due to the preceding classifying act.

For example, if you look at the x-ray-snapshot of a fish, there is a spine. If it is a fish, it is a vertebrate. "Vertebrate" determines "fish", because if it would not have a spine, it would not be a fish. But the temporal development of a spine, that has classified "fish" away from "snail" (just a guessed example) has happened some million years ago.

Best, Helmut

05. April 2024 um 03:07 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

I will try to answer in pints:

On Apr 4, 2024, at 8:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Edwina, List:

In light of our longstanding and all-too-often contentious disagreements about Peirce's speculative grammar, I generally prefer to refrain from direct engagement these days, but I have decided to make an exception in this case. Hopefully, I will not regret it.

ET: I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’ or ‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that ‘logically constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent to other forces- otherwise - how would it function as that constraint?

Again, we are discussing an abstract classification of signs that utilizes a series of different trichotomies, not the concrete process of semiosis that consists of a series of different events. To say that one trichotomy follows another is merely to say that classification in accordance with the first trichotomy logically constrains classification in accordance with the second trichotomy. If we assign numbers to the universes--1 for possibles, 2 for existents, and 3 for necessitants--then the number assigned for each subsequent trichotomy must be equal to or less than the number assigned for the preceding trichotomy.

1] I’m afraid that I don’t see why or how an ‘abstract classification of signs’ can differ from the outline of the pragmatic/concrete process of semiosis.

Again - who and how and why ‘assign’ ‘universe/categorical modes to the interpretants?

ET: And, to my understanding, JAS’s definition of the Interpretants includes an assumption that each is also in a different categorical mode, ie, as he says: possible-existent-necessitant [for Immediate/Dynamic and Final]. But this is not found in Peirce’s outline of the ten classes.

No, this is a misunderstanding of my position. It confuses the phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating (one sign, two objects, three interpretants) with the classification of signs in accordance with Peirce's 1908 taxonomy using ten trichotomies for those six correlates and their four distinct relations as divisions into three universes (possibles, existents, necessitants). These are two different applications of Peirce's three universal categories (1ns, 2ns, 3ns).

2] I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the’ phaneroscopic analysis differs from the ‘classification of signs’.

ET: And, for an Interpretant to function as ‘constraint’ would mean that the Interpretant would have to be in a mode of 3ns, [understood as a necessitant] but, if we consider the ten classes, then, we find that ONLY ONE of the ten has the Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. The others - six are in a mode of 1ns and three are in a mode of 2ns, ie, are dicisigns. I think this is a key point - only one of the ten classes has the Final Interpretant in a mode of 3ns, ie, capable of imposing constraint. A FI in a mode of 1ns or 2ns cannot impose constraint.

This seems to be a reference to Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, not the 1908 taxonomy that we are actually discussing. In that 1903 taxonomy, the third trichotomy is not for the interpretant itself, but for its dyadic relation with the sign (rheme/dicisign/argument). An argument is indeed the only sign class for which this sign-interpretant relation is a necessitant, but no one is talking about that relation or the final interpretant itself constraining anything--its trichotomy constrains any subsequent trichotomies for sign classification. For example, according to Peirce himself, the S-If trichotomy constrains the S-Id trichotomy.

3] There is no such thing as ’the interpretant itself’ ; or the ‘object itself’ or the ‘representamen itself’. All function only within the semiosic process. The triad is irreducible - and when we speak of the ‘inerpretant, of course we ae speaking of its relationship with the representamen/sign.

CSP: According to my present view, a sign may appeal to its dynamic interpretant in three ways: 1st, an argument [delome] only may be submitted to

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] determination

2024-04-03 Thread Helmut Raulien

 


Robert, List,

 

Thank you! And is that definition different from my Boolean assumption? Boole is about true/false, but "renders definitely to such as it will be", and "particular manner" sound like something between true or false, but is that so? "Not particular" and "not definitely" might be translated with "false", i think.

 

Best regards, Helmut

 

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 03. April 2024 um 18:06 Uhr
Von: "robert marty" 
An: "Helmut Raulien" , "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] determination


Helmut, list
According to Peirce, the definition if "renders definitely to be such as it will be"

"We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be such as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner.(CP 8.361)342-379 M-20b (1908))

Within the MS 611, p.67-68, Peirce verify that his definition of determination is transitive.

Best regards, Robert

 




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Le mer. 3 avr. 2024 à 16:36, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> a écrit :




Dear list members,

 

some time later maybe I will work on my idea, that there are three kinds of systems hierarchy, besides the Salthean composition and subsumption also determination, so it is composition (1ns), determination (2ns) and classification (3ns). I call subsumption classification, because I find it more common. Do you think that is ok would be my first question, and the second is about the meaning of determination: I am just now thinking, that determination merely means: "A determines B" means "Not B without A", or "If B then A". Like, if there is a sign, then there is an/its object, or, if there is an interpretant, then there is a/its sign.

 

Or, e.g., if there is a citizen, then there is a society, the society determines the citizen (the individual`s status as its citizen). If there is an individual within the range of a government, with the range defined by the government (composition), and so the individual defined as the government´s subservient (classification), then the government determines the individual, regardless of whether the individual classifies him/herself as its citizen or not, the determination is either ex- or inclusion (composition). This example shows, that composition, determination and classification form a complexity.

 

Best regards, Helmut


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[PEIRCE-L] determination

2024-04-03 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dear list members,

 

some time later maybe I will work on my idea, that there are three kinds of systems hierarchy, besides the Salthean composition and subsumption also determination, so it is composition (1ns), determination (2ns) and classification (3ns). I call subsumption classification, because I find it more common. Do you think that is ok would be my first question, and the second is about the meaning of determination: I am just now thinking, that determination merely means: "A determines B" means "Not B without A", or "If B then A". Like, if there is a sign, then there is an/its object, or, if there is an interpretant, then there is a/its sign.

 

Or, e.g., if there is a citizen, then there is a society, the society determines the citizen (the individual`s status as its citizen). If there is an individual within the range of a government, with the range defined by the government (composition), and so the individual defined as the government´s subservient (classification), then the government determines the individual, regardless of whether the individual classifies him/herself as its citizen or not, the determination is either ex- or inclusion (composition). This example shows, that composition, determination and classification form a complexity.

 

Best regards, Helmut
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[PEIRCE-L] metalanguage, possibility, WAS: Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)

2024-03-13 Thread Helmut Raulien

List,

I put a new name to this, because I am not inside the discussion, just want to mention a problem I have with the topic. First, there are different types of possibility: Is it not definite but possible about the past or about the future, is it due to limited knowledge or to different options of decision, and so on. All in all it is the same problem as with metalanguage, like "A says B": Who heard him/her saying so?, and "A thinks, that B": Who knows how, what A thinks? Like with possibility: Who or what group of people regards it merely for possible instead of true, and might there not exist somebody, e.g. God or "the universe", who knows, whether it is true or false?

For example, if you have an EG with the term "A thinks, that B", it is written on the so called blank sheet, which shows the universe of discourse. If this discourse is that of a certain group of people, none of these people except A has access to what A thinks. So to write "A thinks" , if in words or as a symbol, on this sheet, is not justified. Because maybe A is a liar, and thinks the opposite of what he/she claims to think.

It may seem possible to circumvene this problem, by e.g. saying: This certain group of discoursers consists of both theists and atheists, so we now incude God or the universe (according to belief) into the universe of discourse. Both God and the universe should know, what A thinks. But then there still is a problem, when it is about possibility in the future. I vaguely remember a quantum physicist, was it Newman, who spoke of hidden variables, and also somebody with "B", who claimed, that everything, even the farthest future, can be precalculated. I dont think so, but it shows, that a possibility about the future cannot be proved to be a mere possibility. Therefore it is not justified to write it on a blank sheet, I guess. That is, because I think, that not only atheists, but also theists don´t have a clear concept about what the universe or God knows about the future, and what not. Maybe some theists say, that God knows everything about the future too, but then His job would be quite boring and futile, and there would be no need e.g. for angels. You dont need a post office, if no message would be able to change the future. So, if this deterministic view is right, then possibility does not exist, and if it is false (of course it is), possibility cannot be proved to be one.

Best regards, helmut

Dienstag, 12. März 2024 um 22:59 Uhr

Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"
An: "Peirce-L"
Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)

Jerry, List:

Your questions as posed are extremely general, and their answers depend heavily on the particular context of interest.

Peirce assigns specific logical content to certain signs in his Existential Graphs (EGs) and develops the transformation rules for them accordingly. In all parts, the blank sheet represents the universe of discourse, graphs scribed on it represent propositions that are asserted as true in that universe, juxtaposition represents coexistence in that universe (conjunction), and a scroll (double cut or ring-shaped shaded area) represents a consequence (material implication) from which a single cut or shaded area is derived as representing negation (implication of falsity/absurdity). In the Beta part, heavy lines of identity denote indefinite individuals and attached names denote general concepts being attributed to those individuals. In the Gamma part, there are various additional signs for various purposes, such as the broken cut for possible falsity (modal logic), the heavy line with dotted lines along both sides for quantifying predicates (second-order logic), and the dotted oval for treating a proposition as a subject that fills the blank in a rheme attached to the oval by a dotted line (metalanguage).

As I keep emphasizing, we cannot know for sure what Peirce had in mind for the Delta part, other than that it would "deal with modals," unless and until new manuscript evidence turns up, such as the missing pages of R L376. My hypothesis is that he was considering a new notation for representing and reasoning about modal propositions involving possibility or necessity, such as the one that he introduces in his Logic Notebook (R 339:[340r], 1909 Jan 7). In that case, heavy lines represent "circumstances" or "times"--more formally, possible states of things (PSTs)--and attached letters represent propositions that would be true under those circumstances, at those times, or in those PSTs. The transformation rules for these "lines of compossibility" (my term) are different from the ones for the "lines of identity" (Peirce's term) in the Beta part because of the obvious and fundamental semiotic difference between describing things with names (rhemes/semes) and describing states of things with propositions (dicisigns/phemes).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer,

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

2024-02-16 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, John, List,

The answer "A brooch" looks like a rheme, but as an answer it is a proposition, as "he gives her" is just omitted for the reason, that both know this opening. A triadic proposition, I think, if not already is an argument, at least involves a "because". For example if you say; "He gives her a brooch" involves, that he is able of giving something, because he has a brooch. "Egbert has a cat and a dog" involves, that the "and" can be said, because "a cat" has already been mentioned, so "a dog" can be added.

Best, Helmut

16. Februar 2024 um 03:47 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"

John, List:

At the risk of belaboring the point, I will take one more stab at showing why I think that Peirce would not have agreed with distinguishing 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns by aligning them with the answers to who/what/when/where, how, and why questions as (allegedly) monadic, dyadic, and triadic.

If I ask, "Who retrieved the book?" and you reply, "My dog," then from a logical standpoint, you are not merely uttering the name of a monadic relation, you are asserting the dyadic proposition that your dog retrieved the book. If I ask, "What did the man give his wife?" and you reply, "A brooch," then from a logical standpoint, you are not merely uttering the name of a monadic relation, you are asserting the triadic proposition that the man gave his wife a brooch.

Put another way, a who or what question is often a rheme, such that the answer fills in the blank to complete the proposition. "___ retrieved the book" becomes "My dog retrieved the book." "The man gave his wife ___" becomes "The man gave his wife a brooch." The key is not the word that begins the question, but the nature of what is missing in the mind of the inquirer until it is supplied by the respondent.

In fact, sometimes the answer to a what question is the name of a dyadic or triadic relation. "What did your dog do with the book?" "My dog retrieved the book." "What did the man do with the brooch?" "He gave it to his wife."

A when or where question is even less straightforward. If I ask, "When did the man give his wife the brooch?" and you reply, "On Valentine's Day," this is only informative if I already know that Valentine's Day is February 14 and what today's date is--there is an unavoidably indexical aspect here. If I ask, "Where did the datestone hit the Jinnee?" and you reply, "In the eye," this just changes the relevant proposition from "The datestone hit the Jinnee" to "The datestone hit the Jinnee's eye."

Again, a how question need not have a dyadic answer. If I ask, "How are you?" and you reply, "I am cold" (after shoveling snow), then you are obviously asserting a monadic proposition. If I ask, "How did the man celebrate Valentine's Day?" and you reply, "He gave his wife a brooch," then you are obviously asserting a triadic proposition.

Likewise, a why question need not have a triadic answer. If I ask, "Why are you shivering?" and you reply, "I am cold," then you are obviously asserting a monadic proposition. If I ask, "Why did the man give his wife a brooch?" and you reply, "He was celebrating Valentine's Day," then you are obviously asserting a dyadic proposition.

These examples illustrate the imprecision and resulting flexibility of natural languages. The fact that information can be added to or subtracted from someone's answer to a question in ordinary conversation reflects the context-dependency of both utterances, as well as the dialogic nature of human semiosis. Consequently, it is better to stick with Peirce's own paradigmatic conceptions for distinguishing 1ns/2ns/3ns as discovered in phaneroscopy, namely, quality/reaction/mediation.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 3:32 PM John F Sowa wrote:

I have to shovel snow right now, but I'll briefly explain the two sentences.

JAS>

JAS: How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to her.

JFS: The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dyadic physical transfer (answer to How) plus the reason why: a gift includes the reason why the transfer was made.

The question begins with the word "How," not "Why"; and by your own admission, the answer is triadic, thus a genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. "Why did the woman's husband give her the brooch?" is a completely different question that would require a completely different answer.

By including the verb 'give' in the answer, her husband gave a triadic answer to a dyadic question. That includes more information than was requested. In the other question, with the word 'why', the answer stated less information, and the person who asked would typically ask a follow-on question to get the reason why.

The possibility that the answer might not contain exactly

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

2024-02-15 Thread Helmut Raulien

 

 
Supplement: Ok, I can access Commens Dictionary again!

 



John, List,

 

The answer to "why", "because" always needs two premisses, with itself being the third. So a thirdness is the answer to "why". Firstness can just say "I". Secondness is a second following a first, and so can say "I am". Obviously, just by having a first for predecessor, not because of something (An observer can say, that it can say "I am", because of that, but the secondness, subjectively, cannot say so, as it doesn´t have the ability of inference. It only has the propositional ability to say "I am"). Thirdness can say "I am, because", because a cause (an argument) needs two sequentally related ancestors to be one. I really think, that the Peircean categories basicly, like this, rely on the sheer numbers one, two, three. BTW, I have two questions:

 

-Can I see anywhere in the internet the mathematical proof, that a triad is irreducible, but a four-ad is reducible?

 

-I donot have access anymore to the Commens Dictionary. Is something wrong with my computer, or with the website?

 

Best, helmut

 

 
 

15. Februar 2024 um 19:17 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
 



Jon, List,

 

Thank you for noting that I had intended to push the SEND ALL button for my previous note (copied at the end).

 

But I stand by my claim that every example of Thirdness can be interpreted as an answer to a question that begins with the word "Why".

 

I agree with your point that every sign (which includes every sentence) is an example of Thirdness.  But that is not what I wrote above or in my previous notes,  Note the exact wording "example of Thirdness".  But in order to show an example of Thirdness, it's necessary to use signs of some sort (most likely words and sentences).  But I expect the readers to look beyond the signs to the examples of Thirdness that the words are used to indicate. 

 

If you disagree with my claim, please look beyond the words to the example of Thirdness.   Please find some example of Thirdness that cannot be found in a sentence that answers a why-question.  Or conversely, an answer to a why-question that does not contain an example of Thirdness, explict or implicit. 

 

And why do you think Peirce would disagree?  He was always looking for clear criteria to test and explain his theories.   I also prefixed by claim that he would be delighted to find such a simple test with the phrase "I believe".  I was not attributing any opinion to Peirce.  I was stating MY OPINION about his reaction.

 

And we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a competition.   If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank them for the correction.   For example, I thank you for correcting my mistake below:

 

JFS> Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness that could not be the answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? Conversely, can anybody find an example of Thirdness that could not be used as an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why'?


 

JAS> These are both the same question. Maybe he intended the second one to be, "Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why' but is not a genuine example of 3ns?"


 

Yes, indeed.  I admit that I made a mistake in that statement.   But insults are never appropriate in any collaboration.  You have every right to state your opinions, right or wrong.  But an insult is never appropriate.  And by the way, you prefixed your insult with a mistaken claim:

 

JAS> Of course, I already fulfilled both requests, but he dismissed my counterexamples with a bunch of hand-waving. 

 

John

 

 


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

 


Gary:
 

As always, I appreciate your positive feedback. I am starting to wonder if my recent flurry of List activity might finally result in a paper on speculative grammar.

 

JFS already replied to my post (see below) but did so off-List, sending it to me only, without changing the subject line or otherwise saying so. Along with his questions at the end that are directed to "anybody else who may be interested," this suggests that it was unintentional, such that he might eventually send it to the List after all.

 




JFS: Your comments confirm the fact that every example of Thirdness can be explained as the answer to a question that begins with word 'Why'.




 

Obviously, my comments do no such thing, and hopefully, others would readily see that for themselves.

 




JFS: Although Peirce hadn't mentioned that point, I think he would have been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested it.




JFS: I realize that Peirce did not mention the connection between the word 'why' and every instance of Thirdness. But if somebody had mentioned that connection to him, I believe that he would have been delighted to have that simple test.



 

I honestly suspect that Peirce would have bluntly told JFS, Lady Welby, or anyone else making such a suggestion that it indicates a

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

2024-02-15 Thread Helmut Raulien

John, List,

 

The answer to "why", "because" always needs two premisses, with itself being the third. So a thirdness is the answer to "why". Firstness can just say "I". Secondness is a second following a first, and so can say "I am". Obviously, just by having a first for predecessor, not because of something (An observer can say, that it can say "I am", because of that, but the secondness, subjectively, cannot say so, as it doesn´t have the ability of inference. It only has the propositional ability to say "I am"). Thirdness can say "I am, because", because a cause (an argument) needs two sequentally related ancestors to be one. I really think, that the Peircean categories basicly, like this, rely on the sheer numbers one, two, three. BTW, I have two questions:

 

-Can I see anywhere in the internet the mathematical proof, that a triad is irreducible, but a four-ad is reducible?

 

-I donot have access anymore to the Commens Dictionary. Is something wrong with my computer, or with the website?

 

Best, helmut

 

 
 

15. Februar 2024 um 19:17 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
 



Jon, List,

 

Thank you for noting that I had intended to push the SEND ALL button for my previous note (copied at the end).

 

But I stand by my claim that every example of Thirdness can be interpreted as an answer to a question that begins with the word "Why".

 

I agree with your point that every sign (which includes every sentence) is an example of Thirdness.  But that is not what I wrote above or in my previous notes,  Note the exact wording "example of Thirdness".  But in order to show an example of Thirdness, it's necessary to use signs of some sort (most likely words and sentences).  But I expect the readers to look beyond the signs to the examples of Thirdness that the words are used to indicate. 

 

If you disagree with my claim, please look beyond the words to the example of Thirdness.   Please find some example of Thirdness that cannot be found in a sentence that answers a why-question.  Or conversely, an answer to a why-question that does not contain an example of Thirdness, explict or implicit. 

 

And why do you think Peirce would disagree?  He was always looking for clear criteria to test and explain his theories.   I also prefixed by claim that he would be delighted to find such a simple test with the phrase "I believe".  I was not attributing any opinion to Peirce.  I was stating MY OPINION about his reaction.

 

And we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a competition.   If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank them for the correction.   For example, I thank you for correcting my mistake below:

 

JFS> Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness that could not be the answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? Conversely, can anybody find an example of Thirdness that could not be used as an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why'?


 

JAS> These are both the same question. Maybe he intended the second one to be, "Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why' but is not a genuine example of 3ns?"


 

Yes, indeed.  I admit that I made a mistake in that statement.   But insults are never appropriate in any collaboration.  You have every right to state your opinions, right or wrong.  But an insult is never appropriate.  And by the way, you prefixed your insult with a mistaken claim:

 

JAS> Of course, I already fulfilled both requests, but he dismissed my counterexamples with a bunch of hand-waving. 

 

John

 

 


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

 


Gary:
 

As always, I appreciate your positive feedback. I am starting to wonder if my recent flurry of List activity might finally result in a paper on speculative grammar.

 

JFS already replied to my post (see below) but did so off-List, sending it to me only, without changing the subject line or otherwise saying so. Along with his questions at the end that are directed to "anybody else who may be interested," this suggests that it was unintentional, such that he might eventually send it to the List after all.

 




JFS: Your comments confirm the fact that every example of Thirdness can be explained as the answer to a question that begins with word 'Why'.




 

Obviously, my comments do no such thing, and hopefully, others would readily see that for themselves.

 




JFS: Although Peirce hadn't mentioned that point, I think he would have been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested it.




JFS: I realize that Peirce did not mention the connection between the word 'why' and every instance of Thirdness. But if somebody had mentioned that connection to him, I believe that he would have been delighted to have that simple test.



 

I honestly suspect that Peirce would have bluntly told JFS, Lady Welby, or anyone else making such a suggestion that it indicates a serious misunderstanding of both his categories and his semeiotic.

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Entropy and the Universal Categories (was Re: The Proper Way in Logic)

2024-02-15 Thread Helmut Raulien

Evgenii, List,

The reason for the bacterium is its need. Its individual need is contained inside its boundary (membrane, skin), but its need is similar with that of all bacteria and other organisms: Nutrition. The latin word is causa finalis. The stone does not have a need, it falls down due to universal laws, which force it to do so. The latin word for this forceful reason is causa efficiens. This force is not limited to individual boundaries, the boundary is the universe. The gravitational (or space-bending, Einstein) effects of this falling stone too pass through the whole universe, other than the hunger-relief of the bacterium, that is merely sensed by it.

I think: An animal with a brain does not only respond to needs and forces, but also to wishes. A wish is not necessarily the same as with other brain animals, a wish may be unique (as we all know, don´t we?). It requires the brain´s ability of depicting. I´d say, the latin word for this volitional reason would be "causa exemplaris", but in its secularized version, as originally "causa exemplaris" has a religious meaning. Now we have three basic causae, like we should have, because with Peirce it always has to be three.

Best, Helmut

Donnerstag, 15. Februar 2024 um 12:22 Uhr
 "Evgenii Rudnyi" 
wrote:

Am 15.02.2024 um 04:11 schrieb John F Sowa:
> The biologist Lynn Margulis explained that all living things from
> bacteria on up exhibit goal-directed actions that non-living things
> never do. Her simplest example is a bacterium swimming upstream in a
> glucose gradient.
>
> No non-living things would ever do that.

What would be the difference in this case between a bacterium and a
stone falling to the Earth?

Evgenii
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

2024-02-13 Thread Helmut Raulien

ir real being which endowed such an idea with a simplicity which is certainly in the utmost contrast to its character in itself. But this something must be something in some sense like continuity. Now nothing can be like an element so peculiar except that very same element itself. ...

The extraordinary disposition of the human mind to think of everything under the difficult and almost incomprehensible form of a continuum can only be explained by supposing that each one of us is in his own real nature a continuum. (NEM 4:344-345, 1898)




 



Regards,

 

Jon

 



On Tue, Feb 13, 2024 at 9:18 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




Jon, List,

 

ontologically, in reality, a continuum cannot be built up from infinitesimally small points. But infenitesimality can only be infinitely  iterated towards in reality, if there already is a real continuum. So I see a tautology. Just imagine, that there would not be a real continuum: Then we nevertheless could get the idea of a continuum out of a line, which in reality consists of aligned, in this case not infinitesimally small points. Now we might say: If we are able to have the idea of a continuum, then there must be one. This argument is similar with Anselm´s proof of God. Ok, our world may be pixeled or quantized, but God´s realm is continuous. My Ockham´s-razor-argument in my last post neither is a proof for a real continuum, and whether Anselm´s proof is a proof, I don´t know. I sense platonism in the idea, that we cannot get an idea of something that does not exist. I am not totally convinced anymore about the reality of continuum. The question seems quasi-theological to me. 

 

Best, Helmut




Gesendet: Montag, 12. Februar 2024 um 20:57 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
An: "Peirce-L" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)



Helmut, List:
 

According to Peirce, "Continuity represents 3ns almost to perfection" (CP 1.337, c. 1882). When we prescind discreteness from continuity, we are prescinding 2ns from 3ns, and we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness because we cannot prescind 3ns from 2ns. Since prescission "consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is present without the other, the one being logically possible without the other" (EP 2:270, 1903), the upshot is that 2ns is logically possible without 3ns, but 3ns is not logically possible without 2ns. Put another way, 3ns always involves 2ns as well as 1ns, and 2ns always involves 1ns. Nevertheless, 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and/or 2ns.

 

For example, a continuous line involves any discrete points within it, but it cannot be built up from any multitude of such points. The continuous whole (line) is ontologically prior to any discrete parts (points), which are indefinite (infinitesimal "linelets") unless and until they are deliberately marked off within it. Likewise, as I said before, the entire universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). In Peirce's words, "The whole universe of true and real possibilities forms a continuum, upon which this Universe of Actual Existence is, by virtue of the essential 2ns of Existence, a discontinuous mark--like a line figure drawn on the area of the blackboard" (NEM 4:345, 1898; see also CP 6.203-209, 1898).



 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Mon, Feb 12, 2024 at 11:01 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




 


List, I think, we can prescind discreteness from continuity, e.g. by supposing the formation of attractors, or coagulation, or reentry (logical or actual loops), but we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness. So everything including thirdness is at first based on continuity, even if it requires discreteness. I think, that thirdness requires discreteness, because a relation as part of structure, and a habit too, can and has to be prescinded (or discriminated, or dissociated) as something discrete from continuity, to logically handle it.

 

Best, Helmut















_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owne

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

2024-02-13 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, List,

 

ontologically, in reality, a continuum cannot be built up from infinitesimally small points. But infenitesimality can only be infinitely  iterated towards in reality, if there already is a real continuum. So I see a tautology. Just imagine, that there would not be a real continuum: Then we nevertheless could get the idea of a continuum out of a line, which in reality consists of aligned, in this case not infinitesimally small points. Now we might say: If we are able to have the idea of a continuum, then there must be one. This argument is similar with Anselm´s proof of God. Ok, our world may be pixeled or quantized, but God´s realm is continuous. My Ockham´s-razor-argument in my last post neither is a proof for a real continuum, and whether Anselm´s proof is a proof, I don´t know. I sense platonism in the idea, that we cannot get an idea of something that does not exist. I am not totally convinced anymore about the reality of continuum. The question seems quasi-theological to me. 

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Montag, 12. Februar 2024 um 20:57 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
An: "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)



Helmut, List:
 

According to Peirce, "Continuity represents 3ns almost to perfection" (CP 1.337, c. 1882). When we prescind discreteness from continuity, we are prescinding 2ns from 3ns, and we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness because we cannot prescind 3ns from 2ns. Since prescission "consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is present without the other, the one being logically possible without the other" (EP 2:270, 1903), the upshot is that 2ns is logically possible without 3ns, but 3ns is not logically possible without 2ns. Put another way, 3ns always involves 2ns as well as 1ns, and 2ns always involves 1ns. Nevertheless, 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and/or 2ns.

 

For example, a continuous line involves any discrete points within it, but it cannot be built up from any multitude of such points. The continuous whole (line) is ontologically prior to any discrete parts (points), which are indefinite (infinitesimal "linelets") unless and until they are deliberately marked off within it. Likewise, as I said before, the entire universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). In Peirce's words, "The whole universe of true and real possibilities forms a continuum, upon which this Universe of Actual Existence is, by virtue of the essential 2ns of Existence, a discontinuous mark--like a line figure drawn on the area of the blackboard" (NEM 4:345, 1898; see also CP 6.203-209, 1898).



 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Mon, Feb 12, 2024 at 11:01 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




 


List, I think, we can prescind discreteness from continuity, e.g. by supposing the formation of attractors, or coagulation, or reentry (logical or actual loops), but we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness. So everything including thirdness is at first based on continuity, even if it requires discreteness. I think, that thirdness requires discreteness, because a relation as part of structure, and a habit too, can and has to be prescinded (or discriminated, or dissociated) as something discrete from continuity, to logically handle it.

 

Best, Helmut






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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

2024-02-12 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, List, I think, continuity means a gradient without steps. By looking at the gradient with a microscope, we see steps (e.g. quantums). By looking at the inner and outer edges of the steps, we see, that they are rounded (e.g. due to the Heisenbergean blurredness), so continuous again. By looking at these roundings, we see steps again (e.g. due to superstrings), and so on. Maybe this is so, maybe not. Maybe by experimental observations like these, we cannot tell, whether continuity or discreteness is more fundamental in terms of the smallest scale. But logically, I guess, that continuity is more fundamental, because it is easier to imagine, that a sharp-seeming edge is in fact rounded, than to imagine, that a rounding in fact has steps. The latter idea is more complicated, and refuting it is solely justified as application of Ockham´s razor. A gradient, like a rounding, is one thing, but steps are many things. The idea of one thing is easier than the idea of many things. But all in all, I have talked about my head and neck, because I am not so sure anymore about what I have written in my last post: Prescission may be interpolation too??

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Montag, 12. Februar 2024 um 18:31 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
An: "Helmut Raulien" 
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)


Helmut - I agree with your outline, where the three categories are operative within continuity. But what is continuity? 

 

I consider it as the basic ‘force’ of the universe to ‘exist as signs [ ie discrete entities]. , This force, which Peirce variously called Mind, Nature, God, means that the energy that IS the universe functions as a ‘rational action’ [ie Mind] by constantly transforming itself into ever more complex networked discreteness, operative within evolving habits-of-formation [and chance!]. There is no final perfection, because of the realities of both 2ns and 1ns which introduce freedom and variation and, importantly, the indexicality of locality. 

 

If we consider the basic identity of the universe as E=MC2 [ and I think we have to accept this!] then it can be understood that Energy is transforming into Matter — within a rational, networked, ordered manner - to prevent, as Michael pointed out, thermodynamic entropy.  It is this ‘force-of-transformation’ that I consider as the definition of ‘continuity. After all - without it - thermodynamics, as Michael pointed out, jumps in..and….

 

Edwina

 

On Feb 12, 2024, at 12:01 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 




 


List, I think, we can prescind discreteness from continuity, e.g. by supposing the formation of attractors, or coagulation, or reentry (logical or actual loops), but we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness. So everything including thirdness is at first based on continuity, even if it requires discreteness. I think, that thirdness requires discreteness, because a relation as part of structure, and a habit too, can and has to be prescinded (or discriminated, or dissociated) as something discrete from continuity, to logically handle it.

 

Best, Helmut

 

Gesendet: Montag, 12. Februar 2024 um 03:07 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
An: "Peirce-L" 
Cc: "Edwina Taborsky" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)


List-  I don’t see synergism as equivalent to Thirdness, for Thirdness is the establishment of habits, ie, habitual ‘modes of being’ - which habits are established by and within the universe in conjunction with the modes of both Firstness and Secondness. . 

 

Instead, synergism, or continuity, seems to me, more akin to the concept of free energy…the genuinely general, so to speak - and this free energy is the basis of our universe> “Continuity is nothing but perfect generality of a law of relationship” 6.170. See also his outline of ’The Logic of th Universe 6.189, where, again, continuity is understood as ‘generality’. This is not the same as the general laws of Thirdness which are generated within and by the universe for the maintenance of its reality as material exiistentiality. 

 

As he writes, the universe, made up of Secondness or discrete entities, began ‘in the utter vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless potentiality” 6.193.  This, to me, is not Thirdness. It is free energy. ..which I see as continuity/synechism. 

 

Jerry- I’m sorry, but you’ve lost me - I’ve no idea what you are referring to .

 

Edwina

 

 

 

Again, my understanding of this is that 




On Feb 11, 2024, at 8:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
 



Mike:
 

I do not know what you mean by "penultimate" in this context. As I have said on the List many times before, as well as in my published work, my understanding of synechism as applied in metaphysics is that the entire universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

2024-02-12 Thread Helmut Raulien

 


List, I think, we can prescind discreteness from continuity, e.g. by supposing the formation of attractors, or coagulation, or reentry (logical or actual loops), but we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness. So everything including thirdness is at first based on continuity, even if it requires discreteness. I think, that thirdness requires discreteness, because a relation as part of structure, and a habit too, can and has to be prescinded (or discriminated, or dissociated) as something discrete from continuity, to logically handle it.

 

Best, Helmut

 

Gesendet: Montag, 12. Februar 2024 um 03:07 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
An: "Peirce-L" 
Cc: "Edwina Taborsky" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)


List-  I don’t see synergism as equivalent to Thirdness, for Thirdness is the establishment of habits, ie, habitual ‘modes of being’ - which habits are established by and within the universe in conjunction with the modes of both Firstness and Secondness. . 

 

Instead, synergism, or continuity, seems to me, more akin to the concept of free energy…the genuinely general, so to speak - and this free energy is the basis of our universe> “Continuity is nothing but perfect generality of a law of relationship” 6.170. See also his outline of ’The Logic of th Universe 6.189, where, again, continuity is understood as ‘generality’. This is not the same as the general laws of Thirdness which are generated within and by the universe for the maintenance of its reality as material exiistentiality. 

 

As he writes, the universe, made up of Secondness or discrete entities, began ‘in the utter vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless potentiality” 6.193.  This, to me, is not Thirdness. It is free energy. ..which I see as continuity/synechism. 

 

Jerry- I’m sorry, but you’ve lost me - I’ve no idea what you are referring to .

 

Edwina

 

 

 

Again, my understanding of this is that 




On Feb 11, 2024, at 8:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
 



Mike:
 

I do not know what you mean by "penultimate" in this context. As I have said on the List many times before, as well as in my published work, my understanding of synechism as applied in metaphysics is that the entire universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). Again, discrete things and their dyadic reactions, as well as monadic qualities and their inherence in discrete things, are degenerate outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis.

 

Regards,

 

Jon






 






 


On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 5:15 PM Mike Bergman  wrote:



Hi Jon,

To quibble, I see synechism and its great definer of continuity as the guiding principle of Thirdness (as I think Peirce did, too). It can't be elevated to the penultimate, because our operative world also requires the discrete and discontinuous. (Enter 2nd law of thermodynamics stage left.)

Best, Mike

On 2/11/2024 5:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:



Mike:
 

I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake to treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy, and that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the hypothetical science of mathematics and the primal positive science of phaneroscopy--are even more central, especially as an organizing principle.

 

However, Peirce's preference to call his overall system of thought synechism suggests that he regarded "continuity as an idea of prime importance in philosophy" (CP 6.103, EP 1:313, 1892)--especially since he also stated, "I carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that continuity governs the whole domain of experience in every element of it" (CP 7.566, EP 2:1, 1893). This has implications for semiosis as I have already outlined, as well as the categories--1ns is prescinded from 2ns and 3ns, and 2ns is prescinded from 3ns; but 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and 2ns.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 3:13 PM Mike Bergman  wrote:



Hi Jon,

Here is a point with which I have vehement agreement with you (dare I say I suspect Edwina does as well):

 

What I can say is that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines semiosis to the biological realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the entire universe is "a vast representamen" that is "perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs."
Further keys to this assertion are found in Peirce's writings on evolution, emergence, cosmogony, and his anticipation of the quantum vs the classical. These are a focus of my current studies.

One of the bones I have to pick with many scholars of semiosis is their too literal restriction to human signs and perhaps

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

2024-02-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supplement: My looking for a simple generator of the theory is not intended, because I would like it. In fact i think, that simple explanations are dangerous. Autocrats and conspiracy theorists frequently use them. The technical term is complexity reduction. If a complex matter is said to have a simple cause, like a generator formula, this gives me the creeps. So you are more than welcome to refute it. Popper said, a hypothesis is only valid, if it still is falsifiable. Cosmologists saw a symmetry between matter and antimatter, but then, relievingly, discovered a symmetry break. On one hand, we feel better, if we can understand the world better due to a theory, on the other hand, an explaining theory does not only demagify the image of the world, makes it dull and boring, but also may destroy the world, if people follow it. I see some relevance in identifying the categories- in some context- with composition, determination, classification, and thus building a bridge to systems theory. But i hate it, and think, I will do something completely different.

Jon, List,

we have three classes of context, in which we "either-or-or" divide the interpretant into

-immediate, dynamical, final

-emotional, energetic, logical

-intentional, effectual, communicational.

Maybe these threee classes of context are categorially 1ns, 2ns, 3ns?

And if, I think, there should be a second context for the object too, in which it is divided other than into immediate and dynamical.

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Freitag, 02. Februar 2024 um 00:07 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"
An: "Peirce-L"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

Helmut, List:

HR: But why are there more than three interpretants?

There are not more than three interpretants, just multiple ways of naming them in different contexts. The relevant debates among Peirce scholars have to do with whether "the divisions of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being relatively synonymous with these categories" (Liszka as quoted by Atkin, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/). I have come to agree with this "received view."

One alternative that I used to find persuasive is that the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants are orthogonal to the immediate/dynamical/final interpretants (Short), supposedly based on CP 4.536 (1906). However, this passage says only that the actual effect of a sign on an interpreter--its dynamical interpretant--is either a feeling, an exertion, or another sign. As I discuss at length in my Semiotica paper, "Peirce's Evolving Interpretants" (https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHPEI-12), after carefully studying the only texts where Peirce employs the specific terminology of emotional/energetic/logical interpretants (or meanings)--his various manuscript drafts for "Pragmatism" (1907)--it seems clear to me that these are the familiar effects of signs that humans routinely experience as "modifications of consciousness," while the immediate/dynamical/final interpretants are the corresponding effects of signs in general.

Please note, no one is claiming anything about Peirce's intentions. Like other scholars of his thought (including Liszka and Short), I am merely offering a plausible interpretive hypothesis grounded firmly in his own words. As William J. Abraham rightly observes (https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421=asburyjournal), "Hermeneutics is not so much the study of what an author intended as the study of what the author achieved. If meaning has an equivalence, it is to be located less in intention and more in achievement. What is achieved may be more or less than what the author intended; happily we can be generous and charitable in our initial judgments and trust that intention and achievement may coincide more often than not."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Feb 1, 2024 at 10:42 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

John, List,

I vaguely remember, that at some point in the last weeks, somebody quoted somebody, who said, that the theory is more complicated than the reality it is for. I think, it (the theory) is a fractal. A fractal looks very complicated, but it has a very simple generator formula (like Mandelbrot´s appleman).

From Peirce we know, that a firstness has one part (itself), a secondness has two, and a thirdness three. For example, this is so with S-O-I, and with primisense, altersense, medisense. But why are there more than three interpretants?

I tentatively propose an elaboration of this generator: A secondness has two ways of dividing it into two parts, and a thirdness has three ways of dividing it i

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

2024-02-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, List,

we have three classes of context, in which we "either-or-or" divide the interpretant into

-immediate, dynamical, final

-emotional, energetic, logical

-intentional, effectual, communicational.

Maybe these threee classes of context are categorially 1ns, 2ns, 3ns?

And if, I think, there should be a second context for the object too, in which it is divided other than into immediate and dynamical.

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Freitag, 02. Februar 2024 um 00:07 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"
An: "Peirce-L"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

Helmut, List:

HR: But why are there more than three interpretants?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Feb 1, 2024 at 10:42 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

John, List,

I tentatively propose an elaboration of this generator: A secondness has two ways of dividing it into two parts, and a thirdness has three ways of dividing it into three parts. These two respectively three ways are also categorial: the two ways of dividing a secondness are firstnessal and secondnessal, and the three ways of dividing a thirdness into three parts are of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.

Like this, there are three times three interpretants.

Or many more, if you keep on divi(di)ng.

Best, Helmut

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATE

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

2024-02-01 Thread Helmut Raulien

John, List,

Like this, there are three times three interpretants.

Or many more, if you keep on divi(di)ng.

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 01. Februar 2024 um 00:37 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa"
An: "Peirce List" , "CG"
Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants. Perhaps some Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can claim that their theories are what Peirce himself had intended.

On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/

Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this topic. See below for some quotations from the end of the article that show how incomplete, indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen to be.

I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants. But since Peirce himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that their interpretation is what Peirce had intended.

John

___

As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in terminology and subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one piece of work to the next. His work on interpretants is no different. At various points in his final accounts of signs, Peirce describes the division of interpretants as being: immediate, dynamic and final; or as emotional, energetic, and logical; or as naïve, rogate and normal; or as intentional, effective and communicational; or even destinate, effective and explicit. As Liszka (1990, 20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests that the divisions of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being relatively synonymous with these categories.” There are, however, some dissenters from this view.

In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the trichotomies above as follows:

In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than mere feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort. It may include something besides, which, for the present, may be vaguely called “thought”. I term these three kinds of interpretant the “emotional”, the “energetic”, and the “logical” interpretants. (EP2. 409)

. . .

Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as deriving its character from action (CP8 .315 1904), but later says, “action cannot be a logical interpretant” (CP5 .491 1906). This seems to make the two inconsistent. (See Liszka (1990, 21) for more on the problems with Fitzgerald’s claim). Moreover, this inconsistency seems to suggest a problem for Short’s view since his account also suggests that the dynamic interpretant should include the logical interpretant as a subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short, however, claims textual support for his own view from instances where Peirce mentions the emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy alongside the apparently separate claim that signs have three interpretants. (Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes this as suggesting that the two should be treated as different and distinct trichotomies. (Short 2004, 235).

How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is unclear, especially given the fragmentary nature of Peirce’s final work on signs. However, one or two things militate in favor of the “received view”. First, Peirce is notorious for experimenting with terminology, especially when trying to pin down his own ideas, or describe the same phenomenon from different angles. Second, it is unclear why trichotomies like the intentional/effectual/communicational should count as terminological experiments whilst the emotional/energetic/logical counts as a distinct

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Concluding section 7 of the article on phaneroscopy

2024-01-29 Thread Helmut Raulien

 


Edwina, John, List,

 

I have read the two books by Karl Popper: "The open society and its enemies" (Thank you for recommending me!), and, as far as I am competent, completely agree with Popper. He is against "historicism", and both refutes Platon (ideal primal state), and Hegel (ideal final state). About Marx, he approves his analysis of the situation at Marx´ time, but refutes his prophecies, and therefore his claim, that there "scienttific"ly is a necessity in history. History is just stories. I wonder, whether Popper knew Peirce, because I see some parallelity.

 

Best, Helmut

 

Gesendet: Sonntag, 28. Januar 2024 um 21:33 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
An: s...@bestweb.net
Cc: "Peirce List" , "CG" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Concluding section 7 of the article on phaneroscopy


John, list

 

Thanks for the chapter.  I particularly liked your inclusion off the Peircean quote;

 





Get rid, thoughtful Reader, of the Okhamistic prejudice of political partisanship that in thought, in being, and in development the indefinite is due to a degeneration from a primal state of perfect definiteness. The truth is rather on the side of the Scholastic realists that the unsettled is the primal state, and that definiteness and determinateness, the two poles of settledness, are, in the large, approximations, developmentally, epistemologically, and metaphysically. (CP 6.348)





This clarifies that neither the primal state nor the ‘final state’ [ of there be such a state] is ‘perfect definiteness’.  Instead, both are unsettled’. How could it be otherwise? Without such indefiniteness, no adaptation or evolution could occur, and the laws of physics would lead to inevitable dissipation of energy/matter. To prevent this- and thus enable ever more complex forms, ‘indefiniteness’  on both sides, is the answer.

 

Edwina.

 

On Jan 27, 2024, at 11:27 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:


 
 

 


I finally finished the article on phaneroscopy and sent it off to the publisher.  The final Section 7 is attached.  It shows that Peirce's writings in the last decade of his life are at the forefront of ongoing research in the cognitive sciences (philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology).

 

At the end, I include links to a few other articles that go into more detail about current issues and the importance of Peirce's insights.

 

John 

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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)

2024-01-24 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, Cecile, List,

Jon, in your first paragraph you wrote about inference. I agree. Therefore I find it a bit problematic to say, that the sign determines the interpretant, because the sign doesn´t infere, it is the interpreter, who does the inference. But ok, I guess we might say, that Peirce prescinds the semiosis from the interpreter, so, ok, the flow of determination goes from the sign to the interpretant, because it is the interpreter, who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant, and, if you donot mention the interpreter, well, then you just skip her/him/it. But I think, that this skipping is only justified, if the interpretant is true, because then it (the interpretant) is a subset of the final interpretant, and not a misinterpretation. But: Can we take that for granted?

Talking about precission: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not reducible, sign triad. If we say, that something prescinded determines something else, this determination too is prescinded. Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error propagation. That, i guess, is the reason, why this whole determination affair is somehow confusing. It surely is, if we take "determination" too literally, I mean, if we take it too muchly for real. Do you agree? You see, I have been trying very hard to not contradict Peirce.

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 24. Januar 2024 um 00:06 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"
An: "Peirce-L"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)

Cécile, List:

CC: It seems to me that there are lots of objects everywhere and they don't get to begin the process of semiotic determination. Objects can only take part in the process of semiotic determination insofar as they are referred to by a sign for an interpretant.

I prefer to say that something only serves as the object (or interpretant) of a sign within the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating. Nevertheless, it is always the object that determines the sign to determine the interpretant, not the sign that determines the object to serve as such. "In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected" (EP 2:544n22, 1906). Moreover, the object is logically prior to the sign--"the essential difference there is between the nature of an object and that of an interpretant ... is that the former antecedes, while the latter succeeds the sign" (EP 2:410, 1907). Just as reasoning moves from the premisses through an inference to the conclusion, and time flows from the past through the present toward the future, semiosis always proceeds in one direction--from the object through the sign to the interpretant.

CC: There's only signs in a semiosis.

Indeed, as I have said before, I conceive the entire universe as a semiosic continuum, and "a continuum is that of which every part has itself parts of the same kind” (CP 6.168, c. 1903-4). We prescind individual signs from it as artifacts of analysis, each of which is determined by its dynamical object. "Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a sign or thought" (CP 1.538, 1903). "Thus, it is said to be a necessary result of the analysis that the object represented by the sign, and whose characters are independent of such representation, should itself be of the nature of a sign, so that its characters are not independent of all representation" (EP 2:328, 1904). "The object is something external to and independent of the sign which determines in the sign an element corresponding to itself" (R 145, 1905).

The upshot is that although "really being and being represented are very different" (EP 2:303, c. 1901), really being and being representable--hence, likewise being of the nature of a sign--are the same. "The very entelechy of being lies in being representable" (EP 2:324, c. 1901), such that the three Universes of Experience together contain whatever is capable of serving as dynamical objects of signs--"all mere Ideas," "the Brute Actuality of things and facts," and "everything whose Being consists in active power to establish connections between different objects" (CP 6.455, EP 2:435, 1908); or alternatively, "Possibles," "Existents," and "Necessitants" (EP 2:478-479, 1908).

CC: It's like saying that the function of a language is to refer to the world (or that we use words to talk about the world), when in fact the function of a language is to refer to our interpretation of the world (we use words to talk about the way we see the world).

There is some truth to this, in the sense that a language is a system of symbols, and therefore relies on established habits of interpretation to maintain the relations between words and their objects. However, I would argue that it is very much the

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Forms of Consciousness (was Categorizations of Triadic Relationships)

2024-01-19 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, List,

Again, I am not happy with the term "mode", because I find it too general, it is used for two very different things: Classification and composition. In this respect I refer to the paper "Axiomathes" by Stanley N. Salthe. In short: Classification is about subsets being kinds of, composition about parts of a superset. Complexity goes in opposite directions: With classification the subset is more complex than the superset, e.g. a vertebrate has a spine, a mammal (subset) has a spine plus it suckles its children. With composition the superset is more complex, like a car is more complex than one of its wheels.

Regarding our topic: In the sign triad, S, O, I are the prescinded parts (composition). Either of them has three kinds (classification), e.g. the sign has three classes: Quali-, Sin-, Legisign. So a compositional firstness has three classificational categorial kinds. But a compositional firstness, like primisense has only one compositional part: Itself. A compositional secondness has two, a thirdness three. I am glad, that in the second quote of your post at the beginning, Peirce did say "parts" instead of "modes". Primi-, Alter-, Medisense is composition, and the Peircean categories can be and are applied to both, composition or classification.

I donot think, that sensation (2.1, as I think) has two modes (parts), because feeling is primisense. I would put it like this, categorially:

Consciousness: 3.

Primisense: 3.1, //Altersense: 3.2, //Medisense: 3.3.

Primisense: 3.1.1.,// Sensation: 3.2.1, Will: 3.2.2.,// Abstraction: 3.3.1, Suggestion: 3.3.2, Association: 3.3.3.

I think, this list might be continued with more lines, the more conscious a being is, the more...

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Freitag, 19. Januar 2024 um 17:25 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"
An: "Peirce-L"
Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] Forms of Consciousness (was Categorizations of Triadic Relationships)

Jerry, List:

Here is the entire referenced paragraph.

CSP: There are no other forms of consciousness except the three that have been mentioned, Feeling, Altersense, and Medisense. They form a sort of system. Feeling is the momentarily present contents of consciousness taken in its pristine simplicity, apart from anything else. It is consciousness in its first state, and might be called primisense. Altersense is the consciousness of a directly present other or second, withstanding us. Medisense is the consciousness of a thirdness, or medium between primisense and altersense, leading from the former to the latter. It is the consciousness of a process of bringing to mind. Feeling, or primisense, is the consciousness of 1ns; altersense is consciousness of otherness or 2ns; medisense is the consciousness of means or 3ns. Of primisense there is but one fundamental mode. Altersense has two modes, Sensation and Will. Medisense has three modes, Abstraction, Suggestion, Association. (CP 7.551, c. 1896)

This is effectively the conclusion of a much longer passage (CP 7.539-552) in which Peirce spells out in detail what he only summarizes here. He indeed describes primisense (or feeling), altersense, and medisense as "forms of consciousness" and asserts that there are no others. They are not tones, tokens, or types because they are not signs. Although this text predates Peirce's incorporation of phaneroscopy into his architectonic by several years, it nevertheless exhibits his characteristic categorial analysis of phenomena such that primisense has only one mode, altersense has two modes, and medisense has three modes. Note also that he explicitly identifies sensation as one of the two modes of altersense, thus corresponding to 2ns rather than 1ns--the feeling of a sensation as prescinded from it is 1ns (quality), while the actual sensation itself is 2ns (reaction).

CSP: The sensation has two parts: first, the feeling, and second, the sense of its assertiveness, of my being compelled to have it. The consequence is that remembering a sensation is not at all the same thing as having it. For though there is some vestige of compulsiveness, even in the memory, it is not at all comparable to the compulsiveness of the actual sensation. But if I remember, or imagine a feeling, whatever I remember or imagine is a feeling, and I cannot remember or imagine or anywise represent to myself a feeling without having that very feeling then and there. All the existence a feeling can have is had the moment it is thought. But a sensation is not had until I am really acted upon by something out of my control. (CP 7.543)

In accordance with this distinction, perhaps people with aphantasia have visual sensations of images at each moment while looking at them, but then are unable to remember them afterwards due to the merely vestigial compulsiveness of such memories and/or an incapacity in their imaginative faculties.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

2024-01-12 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, list,

my point was, that with consciousness, there is or may be a semiotic process without interaction with the surroundings. I mean, a not-conscious organism or a crystal needs the exterior for a semiotic process. I think, a plant doesn´t anticipate anything, it just reacts due to inherited routines, which are somehow exterior, because they are habits not of the individual plant, but its molecular mechanics are the habits, formed by its specie´s evolution. And a conscious organism, e.g. a person, or another animal with a brain, can formate its individual habits, and can perform a semiotic process just by interaction of the said three -senses, without the environment involved. Or parts of the environment are internalized, as a copy: The memories. Well, I just am pondering about the role of the memory, but it is complicated. I guess, while a crystal or a plant performs a simple semiosis, a human semiosis is a somehow cascaded reflexion- reaction thing, involving more than one sign triad. Maybe it even is an infinite regress or progress of awareness of awareness of awareness...of a feeling. And before interaction with the environment takes place, a lot already has happened, semiotically.

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 11. Januar 2024 um 22:52 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
An: "Helmut Raulien"
Cc: "Peirce List"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Helmut, list

I’m not sure of your point.

Peirce is here writing about consciousness - and I think that not all, indeed, a great portion of the universe’s semiosic triads have little to do with ‘consciousness. That is, in the physics-chemical and biological realms, the semiosic process is a vibrant reality in the formation and functioning of matter. And, as noted, “thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world” 4.551

This doesn’t mean that the three categories are not fully operational in the non-brain/mind world [ ie, Firstness or feeling, Secondness or reaction; Thirdness or the formation of habits]. Indeed, I think that it is clear that all categorical modes are found in these realms.These enable anticipation - ie, Thirdness or habits is a key mode enabling the material entities to, without consciousness, anticipate. Surely a plant anticipates the warmer weather and begins to develop leaves? But consciousness?

Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just as in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to speak, for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes [Sensagion and Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, Suggestion, Association’. 7.551.

Again - I’m not sure of your point.

Edwina

On Jan 11, 2024, at 12:40 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Edwina, list,

what about primisense, altersense, medisense? Three entities in one person. E.g. I have a headache (feeling, primisense), then I remember, that coffee can help (memory from altersense), then I think, I should drink one (thinking, medisense).

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 11. Januar 2024 um 18:28 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
An: "Jerry LR Chandler"
Cc: "Peirce List"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

jerry

Yes- you can feel a headache without going through the rather complicated analysis that it’s a triadic experience.

No- I don’t think the triad requires ‘exterior objects’ in the sense of being external to the person. You can mutter through your own thoughts all alone!

But I think the notion of external does apply to the semiotic process. Take a cell- it necessarily interacts with its surroundings- otherwise it would be dead - and these interactions function within the triadic process. In that sense - yes , semiosis functions by an entity interacting with its exterior.

And no - the triadic relation is basic within the physical and chemical and biological realms. Ie the non symbolic realms.

But you already know this

Edwina
Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

Edwina, List.

Very interesting response.

The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable.

In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of triadicity!u

The question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of experiences.

Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects?

Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other?

Cheers.

Jerry.

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

2024-01-11 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, list,

Best, Helmut

jerry

Yes- you can feel a headache without going through the rather complicated analysis that it’s a triadic experience.

No- I don’t think the triad requires ‘exterior objects’ in the sense of being external to the person. You can mutter through your own thoughts all alone!

And no - the triadic relation is basic within the physical and chemical and biological realms. Ie the non symbolic realms.

But you already know this

Edwina
Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

Edwina, List.

Very interesting response.

The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable.

In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of triadicity!u

The question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of experiences.

Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects?

Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other?

Cheers.

Jerry.

Sent from my iPad

On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Jerry - list

Ii think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = or any sound

1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:

Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word

2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the triadic interaction is:

Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the sound entropically dissipates, so to speak.

I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well.

By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of Secondness.

So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is networking with other triads.

Edwina

On Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

List:

Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic _expression_ for my feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation.

Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or controversial (outside the CSP community.)

The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of mathematics.

The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates”

(See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense. That is, in the genetic sense. In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set of triadic relations.

From these perspectives, I now give an examples.

When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning interpreted as a “triadic relation”.

“HEADACHE”.

“ORANGE”

How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ? (Or any other sense or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)

In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?)

(Or, what locates the three subjects?) Or are the three terms of the triadic relations merely adjectives?

Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s phrases are welcome.

(Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered pairs” in set theory.)

(Ben: In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is correctly remembered.)

Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?

Cheers

Jerry

Participle

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

2024-01-11 Thread Helmut Raulien

Suppsupplement: And I am not the only one: Vincent Colapietro in a paper in the internet wrote:

"So, Peirce in his investigation of signs considered signs in themselves, in their secondness (i.e., in relationship to their object or other), and in their thirdness (i.e., in relationship to their interpretant or as a factor in a complex, ongoing process of mediation)"

So, where i still may be completely wrong, is, that I didn´t call the relations (sign itself, sign-object, sign-interpretant) categorial, but sign, object, interpretant. But why not prescind e.g. an interpretant from its relation with the sign, and then say, that it is thirdness? To say, that that is forbidden, is a bit too strict, I think.

Later Colapietro writes, that in this case it is not modes of being, but modes of knowledge. I find the term "mode" or "modality" too unexact, and, as I said, have for me replaced it with classification versus composition.

Supplement: And, I did not insist, that "a first, a second, a third" belong to modal categories, but to categories. Of course I know the difference between modality and the composition of a sign triad.

Edwina, what you wrote, is exactly what I wrote: That determination, or, as you wrote, production, cannot go upward in category number: A sign (1) cannot determin an interpretant (3). Therefore I suggested, that the interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the determining entity. Now I must add, that all "entities" of course are prescinded, as they donot really exist alone, before somebody feels the need of telling me so.

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Dienstag, 09. Januar 2024 um 17:42 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
An: "Helmut Raulien"
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Helmut - I think you have a lot of misunderstandings of Peirce - and can only suggest: Read Peirce.

And think: How can an entity organized within Firstness [ pure vague feeling] produce an entity organized within the much more restrictive mode of Secondness [an actual single form]? Think of this situation in terms of ‘information -content. Can an entity with a low information content [ ie, just a feeling]..produce an entity with a higher information content [ a singular thing]? How? Where does it get that increased information to form something that is so much more organized? How does pure indeterminacy [Firstness] produce something determined [ Secondness]. You are moving into magical assumptions!

Tha’s why the outline by Peirce in “EP:272 “A Sign , or Representamen, is a First which stands iin such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant”….

….Has to be understood as referring to ordinal numbers rather than the modal categories. Peirce warned of this error [p 271 note] “The conception of a First, improperly called an ‘object’ and of aSecond, should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness’.

I am aware of a number of people on this list who insist that these words First, Second, Third, refer to he modal categories - but I’ve never understood how they can come to such a conc

Again - if you read what he wrote - Peirce was referring to the RELATIONS between the ’nodes’ [Representamen, Object, Interpretant] and to these relations as determinants. He was not referring to their mode-of-being, or the categories.

And - just a wee bit of thought - would lead you to realize that something in a. Mode of Firstness [pure indeterminacy] doesn’t have the informational capacity to produce something in a mode of either Secondness or Thirdness with their much more restrictive natures!

Edwina

On Jan 9, 2024, at 11:08 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Supplement: All in all, I have the feeling, that by trying to distinguish the representamen from the object, and the immediate from the dynamical object, and including memory, then you look at more and more subsigns, the closer you try to analyse. But maybe that doesn´t matter, because with the mind it is the same, you cannot analyse mind by closer and closer looking at it? So, is semiotics rather a matter of somehow hovering over the situation, a matter of "Gestalt" (overall figure)?

Another problem I see, is, that the sign determines the interpretant, that would be an upward determination in categoriality- I know that not everybody agrees, that sign-object-interpretant are categorically 1-2-3. This would mean, that the categories do not only apply to modes of being (classification), but also to generalization of triadic composition. I think so, because, well, categories should apply to everything, or at least to triadicity, whether this triadicity is a relation of classification, composition, or determination. Anyway,

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

2024-01-11 Thread Helmut Raulien

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Dienstag, 09. Januar 2024 um 17:42 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
An: "Helmut Raulien"
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Helmut - I think you have a lot of misunderstandings of Peirce - and can only suggest: Read Peirce.

I am aware of a number of people on this list who insist that these words First, Second, Third, refer to he modal categories - but I’ve never understood how they can come to such a conc

Edwina

On Jan 9, 2024, at 11:08 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 19:44 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien"
An: "Edwina Taborsky"
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky"
Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Edwina, list,

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

2024-01-11 Thread Helmut Raulien

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Dienstag, 09. Januar 2024 um 17:42 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
An: "Helmut Raulien"
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Helmut - I think you have a lot of misunderstandings of Peirce - and can only suggest: Read Peirce.

I am aware of a number of people on this list who insist that these words First, Second, Third, refer to he modal categories - but I’ve never understood how they can come to such a conc

Edwina

On Jan 9, 2024, at 11:08 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 19:44 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien"
An: "Edwina Taborsky"
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky"
Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Edwina, list,

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

2024-01-09 Thread Helmut Raulien

Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 19:44 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien"
An: "Edwina Taborsky"
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky"
Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Edwina, list,

ok, I too think, that the DO does not exist without the sign, so the "sleeping" memory, in this case the knowledge, that snow can be shoveled away, is just a memory then. But in the next sign, when the person is aware of a new white, fluffy layer on the lawn and the pathway, the knowledge of new snow is part of the immediate object, because this information is transported by the sign/representamen (while the real snow is not transported, it keeps lying there, so it is the material part of the DO). And the knowledge, that snow may be handled by using a shovel, is not part of the sign, but comes from the memory. Now what is this remembered memory? Is it part of the dynamical object of "snow, actual and general", or is this memorization another representamen, that merges with the other representamen to a blended one? But anyway I am confused now, because the knowledge, that the white, fluffy layer is snow, comes from the memory too. So what is what? Or is it not one sign, but a cascade or cluster of signs with different objects, some from the memory, and others from the real snow?

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 17:47 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
An: "Helmut Raulien"
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Helmut, list

I’m not quite sure if I understand your post - I don’t think that ‘habits’ [sleeping in memory?] are equivalent to Dynamicl Objects - and the Dynamical Object is always a part of the sign; ie, the DO doesn’t exist on its own outside of the semiosic interaction.

With reference to the Interpretant changing the nature of the Object, I’d agree -within the understanding of the reality of evolution. That is,

- a disease, formerly reduced in its effects by an antibiotic, ….understood as O->reduction in effect, becomes, over time changed by those results [ reduction in effect] to become immune to the antibiotic.

- a tree, attacked by insects [ Objects]….which reduces its capacity to live [Interpretant: by the reduction of the leaves]….develops internal chemicals in the leaves to thwart the insects [O]. But then, the insects develop new immunities to those chemicals!

- a word [Object] — such as the word ‘virus’…. Changes its meaning over time…

The point is - such changes in the nature of the functioning of the Object in the world [ disease, insects, words] can only take place if the sign vehicle [ the disease, the tree, the word] are functioning in a mode of Thirdness. And Thirdness is vital to the nature of the universe.

Again, I stress the importance of the categories in the functioning of semiosis.

Edwina

On Jan 8, 2024, at 10:19 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

2024-01-08 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, list,

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 17:47 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
An: "Helmut Raulien"
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Helmut, list

With reference to the Interpretant changing the nature of the Object, I’d agree -within the understanding of the reality of evolution. That is,

- a word [Object] — such as the word ‘virus’…. Changes its meaning over time…

Again, I stress the importance of the categories in the functioning of semiosis.

Edwina

On Jan 8, 2024, at 10:19 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Edwina, yes, I agree. Only the model I used is different: While you say, that the representamen grows, I talk about old and new sign. Like the snow situation is a continuous thing in reality, in the mind of the interpreter it serves as a new sign again and again. If you say, the snow situation is the representamen, ok, then it grows, but for me the appearance of the snow situation in the interpreter´s mind is the representamen in either case of noticing it. What grows in the interpreter´s mind, is the object of snow. Whether that is the immediate or the dynamical object, is hard to decide for me: At times of no sign, it still is in the interpreter´s memory: How to handle the snow. But while this knowledge is sleeping in the memory, it is not a part of any sign, so it is dynamical object, i would say. Anyway, it is hard for me to distinguish between immediate and dynamical/real object: An object part may be dynamical in the intentional or effectual interpretant, but immediate in the cominterpretant, and sometimes it may be hard to know the size of the commens, because, especially in the internet, nobody knows who is taking part in a discourse. I know, that the flow of determination can categorally not go upwards. The object determines the sign, the sign the interpretant, and the interpretant changes the object, which is some sort of determination too. And then I guess, as the interpretant serves as a new sign, this sign is, besides by the old interpretant, also determined by the now having changed object. This looks like a redundancy of course, but if the object is changed in a larger context/commens, this change too determines the sign of a smaller (sub-) commens, and in this case, this determination part is not redundant with the information/determination carried by the interpretant in the narrower commens. Like this, i think we might better see the complexity of all this, and how signs interact via object change, if we construct or tell more examples. In signs including physical action, there is an energetic interpretant, and the object change is material as well. The material part of the dynamical object then is

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

2024-01-08 Thread Helmut Raulien

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Sonntag, 07. Januar 2024 um 19:28 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
An: "Helmut Raulien"
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Helmut - I think one has to be clear about terms. Do you mean that the Interpretant [ which is a relation not a thing-in-itself] becomes a new triad or only a new Representamen?

My own view is that the Interpretant, which ‘holds and moulds’ information, contributes to the formation of both a new triad [as, for example, when nutrients from the food-as-object, contribute to the formation of the cell-as a triadic Sign] ; when information about the weather [as object] contributes to my Interpretant decision to shovel the snow…and I then, remember in the future what to do when snow arrives..

That is, this interpretant would also enhance the knowledge content of the Representamen if it were operating in its mode of Thirdness. That is, Representamens in a mode of Thirdness grow in informational content.

And that’s another reason why it’s difficult to create a visual diagram of the semiosic process - those modalities - which are rarely discussed on this site.

But, just as we acknowledge the semiosic determinative process of

O-R-I…..and even

DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. [and I’m assuming everyone knows what these letters stand for….

We also have to acknowledge the modal restrictions,

It is obvious that a Possible cannot determine anything other than a Possible, and likewise a Necessitant cannot be determined by anything other than a Necessitant (letter to Lady Welby of December 23, 1908 )

Essentially this sets up restrictions on the development of the informational nature of the triad. That is, an Object in a mode of 2ns cannot determine/produce an Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. A Representamen in a mode of 2ns cannot produce an Interpretant in a mode of 3ns.

And it gets even more complex when you Bring in the concept of the genuine and degenerate categorical modes.

That is, as an example, there is only one of the ten classes where the Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness. One has to consider - are all three Interpretants in this mode? But - are they all ‘genuine Thirdness or is there any one of the three that is in a degenerate mode [3-1 or 3-2, ie, Thirdness degenerate in the 2nd degree or first degree]?

BUT - we have to consider that one cannot move from Firstness to Secondness to Thirdness! Even within another mode - ie, you cannot move from 3-1 to 3-2 to 3-3 without an external ‘assi

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

2023-12-07 Thread Helmut Raulien

Robert, List,

I was thinking, that the first correlate is one due to its firstness (character, capability, essence...), the second and the third analogously. So I thought, that mixing the terms up, saying "a secondness" instead of "a second (correlate)" would be perhaps a slight linguistic unprecisity, but not a mistake potentially causing damage or ravage. I mean, for example, if all three correlates are possibilities, they are all firstnesses, if you look at each of them alone. But if the second correlate, the object, (being a possibility too though), restricts the range of the first´s possibility, determines it, and the first correlate, the sign, mediates between the object and the interpretant in the way, that the interpretant, although still being a possibility, is an explicit range of possibilities, the range being the result of this mediation, then why not say, that restriction is a brute action, and the result is one due to some quasi-mind or mind? Ok, it might be seen as a contradiction, that if you look at the correlates each alone, they all are of firstness character (possibilities), but if you look at the triadic relation between the three, they are of firstness, secondness, and thirdness characters, in this triadic relation, in this context. Ooookeeey, i am beginning to see: The damage may be done, if you look at a possibility, and claim, that it cannot be a secondness. Hmmm. May it be, that the term "possibility" is unprecise? I mean, if I say: "This, this, and that is possible", somebody else understands, that i said, everything else would be impossible? But I didn´t say so! So, in this moment, I have the opinion, that a possibility is merely a positive attribute, and an incomplete induction. So it does not have a range in reality, only in my knowledge. So one possibility cannot really restrict another, or cannot be a resriction result in reality, it cannot be a second or a third in reality. But it can, if the topic is not reality, but my knowledge.

Sorry that i was writing while thinking, but I guess I have it clear now: "Firstness, secondness, thirdness" apply to reality, while "a first, a second, a third" may as well merely apply to my knowledge, for example. But on the other hand: My knowledge is real, isn´t it? Now I am not clear again, completely confused and brainblocked.

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 07. Dezember 2023 um 11:40 Uhr
Von: "robert marty"
An: "Helmut Raulien" , "Peirce-L"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

Helmut, List,

I'd like to draw your attention to the damage, not to say ravages, that can sometimes result from the all-too-frequent confusion between the terms "a First" and "a firtsnesse" (that is a Priman element of a Phaneron), "a Second" and "a Secondnesse" (that is a Secundan element of a Phaneron), "a Third" and " a thirdnesse" (that is a Tertian element of a Phaneron):

"Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of indecomposable concepts correspond three classes of characters or predicates. Firstly come"firstnesses," or positive internal characters of the subject in itself; secondly come"secondnesses," or brute actions of one subject or substance on another, regardless of law or of any third subject; thirdly comes "thirdnesses," or the mental or quasi-mental influence of one subject on another relatively to a third" (CP 5.469)

Indeed, Peirce doesn't always specify (I suppose he takes it for granted) that he means the three correlates of a triadic relation by First, Second and Third. In the case of the six-correlate relation, however, this is not the case, as he has the determination relations between the correlates at his disposal, thus dispensing with the distinctions he made before 1904-1905, the years in which he introduced determinations into the triadic sign (see 76 Definitions of the Sign by C. S. Peirce, Collected by Robert Marty | Commens , clicking the link on webarchive, because the link on Arisbe http://www.cspeirce.com/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.htm is recently in error 404.)

Peirce makes this very clear around 1903, when it becomes clear that trichotomies operate on the three correlates of a triadic relation once they have been defined:

We must distinguish between the First, Second, and Third Correlate of any triadic relation. (CP 2.235)

The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. (CP 2.235)

The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature. (CP 2.236)
The Secon

[PEIRCE-L] Fw: Aw: Re: interpretant and thirdness

2023-12-06 Thread Helmut Raulien

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 06. Dezember 2023 um 20:02 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien"
An: jonalanschm...@gmail.com
Cc: "Peirce-L"
Betreff: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

Jon, List,

Thank you, Jon! Regarding the by you mentioned difference between "top down" and "bottom up", I guess, that a theory mostly goes top down, attempting to follow reality, given that the theory (and reality too, of course) is not e.g. solipsistic or nominalistic. I mean, if it is a universal theory, which claims, that everything is somehow connected. I think, that should be common ground for a rational discussion about theory, because otherwise there would be the paradoxon of a theory, that is trying to refute the need of a theory. "Bottom up", I think, is the way an analysis goes, e.g. if you analyse a certain sign. It would be good, I think, if the underlying theory would provide the means for an analysis to follow the theory´s (and ideally reality´s) synthetic structure in opposite direction. For example, if an interpretant serves as a sign, only a little bit of its information is being used for that, so what happens with the rest. I´d say, it (the interpretants) likely serve as other signs too, but these are all firstnesses. A final interpretant can turn into an object, I think, but that is a secondness. So, because i think, that thirdness doesn´t necessarily dissipate this way, I guess, that its thirdness somehow may turn into structure or change of structure. Structure would be the set of relations of a somehow superordinate sign or system (maybe a system is a sign as well), that provides the possibility of a sign in the way, that it makes it recognizable. I mean, an event only becomes a sign, if there is a preexisting relation between its type and an object. For example, if I am in the middle of a crowd of people in Papua-New Guinea, and somebody is uttering a word in Papuan, I donot tell it from the background noise, but if somebody is uttering e.g. an english word which I know, this works as a specific sign for me. Ok, this example is about symbols and consciousness, but if you have a mixture of salts in (saturated, still concentrating) water, and there already is a small piece of solid salt of one kind, other molecules of the same kind will form a crystal around it, but the other salts will remain soluted. In the digital overinformated brew, bad crystals appear, like fake news and conspiracy theories. An overinformated brew is a structure. There are fact-checkers trying to change this structure, e.g. by saying: Ok, there is this mexican gang selling meth and shooting people, but there also are 1000 or so decent Mexicans in our country, getting along well with us and contributing to the whole societie´s well-being. (in Germany it would not be about Mexicans, but rather about people from middle-east countries, but the same topic). So, in the same way, that it might be possible to add some chemical to the mixture of salts, inhibiting the growth of one crystal alone, I guess it might be possible to change the structure of a society in the way, that the growth of prejudices is inhibited. I want to buy the book by Karl Popper: "The open society and its enemies". I guess I will approve to 90% of the book, except to classifying anyone as enemy, because I think, that an open society should merely reject actions of people, but not people themselves, that is to forgive mistakes that are recognized by the mistaken, and thus give people the chance to reform (if not just quit, which is not always possible) the ideology that has controlled them. The underlying theory should be a systems theory that does not define class or culture struggle as fight between people, but between the individuals and systems (or let´s say superordinate signs) that intend to dominate the individuals. Tribalism does never serve the individuals, but only the systems.

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 06. Dezember 2023 um 15:11 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"
An: "Peirce-L"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

Helmut, List:

Assignments of Peirce's three universal categories to different phenomena are not absolute, they are contextual in accordance with the relevant relations among them. For example, the sign, its object, and its interpretant only correspond respectively to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns within their genuine triadic relation.

CSP: A Representamen [sign] is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903)

CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

2023-12-06 Thread Helmut Raulien

ed by the object through the mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410, 1907)




 

Accordingly, there is no "lost" information when the interpretant (3ns) in one such genuine triadic relation subsequently serves as a sign (1ns) of the same object (2ns) in another such genuine triadic relation along with its own interpretant (3ns). Moreover, all signs correspond to representation/mediation as 3ns vs. reaction as 2ns and quality as 1ns, yet 3ns always involves 2ns and 1ns even though 3ns can never be built up from 1ns and 2ns. That is part of the basis for these claims by Peirce.

 




CSP: [T]he Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an argument, that they of course play in the Universe, that Universe being precisely an argument. (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194, 1903)

 

CSP: [T]he explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe,--not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth,"--that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs. (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906)




 

As I have suggested on-List before, understanding the universe to be one immense sign, a vast semiosic continuum, is consistent with Peirce's mature "top-down" conception--the whole is not a "bottom-up" assemblage of more basic units in the reductionist sense, it is ontologically prior to its parts, which are indefinite unless and until they are deliberately marked off for a purpose. Likewise, the phaneron as "all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind" (CP 1.284, 1905) is an undivided whole from which we prescind predicates, hypostasize some of those predicates into subjects, and then attribute others to those subjects by formulating propositions--namely, perceptual judgments, "the first premisses of all our reasonings" (CP 5.116, EP 2:191, 1903).



 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt









On Sat, Dec 2, 2023 at 4:05 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:




Dear All,

 

The interpretant, in the following sign triad of the semiosis, is the new sign. I have got the feeling, that in this statement there is a lack of explanation. How exactly does this happen? If a thirdness (interpretant) just so would turn into a firstness (sign), then a lot of information would be lost. And I think, that thirdness in general does not only apply to interpretation or interpretant, but also to structure. Whose structure? A system´s? An interpreter´s? Such actors are not often mentioned in Peircean semiotics, are they? Is this a blank area in semiotics? Or is semiotics just a subtheory, embedded in a more general theory? But then the claim, that everything consists of signs would be false. The phaneron would not be everything. Or you might say, that a sign happens in a context of other, superior, signs, that perform a structure for the sign, or something like that, but I don´t see this kind of complexity being satisfyingly handled anywhere. Though maybe it is, then please give a hint, where.

 

Best Regards

 

Helmut





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[PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

2023-12-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dear All,

 

The interpretant, in the following sign triad of the semiosis, is the new sign. I have got the feeling, that in this statement there is a lack of explanation. How exactly does this happen? If a thirdness (interpretant) just so would turn into a firstness (sign), then a lot of information would be lost. And I think, that thirdness in general does not only apply to interpretation or interpretant, but also to structure. Whose structure? A system´s? An interpreter´s? Such actors are not often mentioned in Peircean semiotics, are they? Is this a blank area in semiotics? Or is semiotics just a subtheory, embedded in a more general theory? But then the claim, that everything consists of signs would be false. The phaneron would not be everything. Or you might say, that a sign happens in a context of other, superior, signs, that perform a structure for the sign, or something like that, but I don´t see this kind of complexity being satisfyingly handled anywhere. Though maybe it is, then please give a hint, where.

 

Best Regards

 

Helmut
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Conflict between deduction and discovery in mathematics

2023-08-22 Thread Helmut Raulien

 


Dear all,

 

one example, how great complexity arises from seemingly trivial, because obviously quite simple, equations, is the Mandelbrot-set with the appleman. Mathematics is based on axioms, and these seem trivial to us, because they are easy to understand, and they suit our experience perfectly and on first sight. If the paradox is, that a highly complex system deductively develops out of seemingly trivial premisses, then I deduce, that these premisses, the axioms, merely seem trivial to us, but in fact are not, but highly complex. How can that be? Must be, that our minds are constructed in a highly complex way, which we donot see, because our minds are constructed that way without having an in-fact-trivial reference. if this is so, and I donot see another solution for the paradox, then the physicochemical realm, the world we live in, is also based on high complexity, and there is no in-fact-triviality easily accessible. Maybe the real, in-fact-triviality, would we see it, would seem highly complex to us, and maybe we would not be able to tell it from real complexity. I would call this a challenge: The quest for the real triviality. I have the book from Spencer-Brown, have not understood it at all, as I donot see the difference from Boole with using merely NOT and OR, or the difference from Entitative Graphs by Peirce. But his calculus is based on distinction solely, and he claims to have derived from that the row of numbers, in a quite complicated way. I have not understood it, as I said, but take it as a hint, that something I see as trivial, the row of numbers or addition of ones, in fact is not trivial, but complicated or even complex.

 

Best

 

Helmut

 

Gesendet: Dienstag, 22. August 2023 um 12:25 Uhr
Von: "Ben Udell" 
An: "Peirce List" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Conflict between deduction and discovery in mathematics


Matias, Phyllis, all,

Peirce didn't talk a whole lot about novelty in deduction, and I doubt that he ever discussed non-triviality or depth in later mathematicians' sense of those ideas (which are allied, though not the same as, the idea of difficulty) though he did focus quite a bit, eventually, on verisimilitude which he also called likelihood in induction and plausibility which he analyzed as natural simplicity in abduction. Peirce was certainly aware of Mill's stated view of deduction, a view which Peirce, as both mathematician and logician, likely regarded as hyperbolic at best.  Peirce didn't spend a lot of time debating with people who seemed to belittle deduction.  He thought that induction and especially abductive inference needed general defense.  

I've now read through Gilman's article and I'm not so hopeful that he's solved the paradox.  I admit I don't expect a solution that clears the paradox away like morning mist, I'm all for seeing it as a natural part of a bigger pattern.  Gilman thinks that part of the answer is to see the problem as basically geometrical.  Now, some like visual shapes, some like algebraic expressions, and sometimes one way or the other seems definitely better.  It seems best (given enough time and energy) to do it both ways, and to be able to transform, to metamorphose, things between the ways.  It's good to see the valence of a relation as a dimension or degree, and some will remember that I like visual tables of ideas, still I think I somewhat prefer algebraic expressions generally but that may just be that I'm more used to them.  However, Gilman knew that logicians and related researchers didn't go far into visual diagrams and that such shortfall of interest had been a barrier faced by Peirce.  A decade or more ago, a peirce-l member (I forget who) told me off-list that half of logicians don't even want to look at tables, visual arrays of ideas.  Since Peirce's time, system-building has gone quite out of fashion in philosophy.

Anyway Gilman shows how elements in reasoning can begin in separation from each other, and their being brought together is novel.  Indeed that novelty, or newness, is not nothing. The mind cannot mentally or physically observe a thing in all perspectives or aspects at once, and I think that that's the heart of a solution to such paradoxes.

Maybe I missed something and maybe it's just a matter of Gilman's phrasing, but it seems to me that Gilman neglects the fact that an argument's premises are logically conjoined, or are to be treated as logically conjoined, as Peirce says somewhere, into one big premise, and in that sense they _have_ been brought together, just not very spotlightedly.  If two premises are disjoined, as by the connective "OR", then they are not even called two premises, instead just one premise. Still, it does make sense to look closely at deductive conclusions' novelty as Gilman does (which Peirce would applaud), and to draw it out, as Gilman does, showing _some_ sense in which it involves into dimension beyond ones found in any particular premise.  He sees less value in a deductive

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Why vagueness is important

2023-08-12 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supplement: To speak of consciousness as self-awareness or self-consciousness too, I think, that this requires sexuality. For just having to eat there is no need for self-awareness, the organism only has to be aware of its hunger, and of potential food to fulfill this need. But if there is a reproductional need, and for its fulfillment a partner is required, then the organism should better have a concept of itself, and how it can best appear to attract a partner. Note that I said "should", as of course there are many organisms who reproduce sexually, but would not pass the mirror test of self-awareness- but evolution went the way of self-awareness, and the therefore required higher intelligence, because it is a great selectional advantage- and it also amplified the concept of selection from adaption to just survive towards sexual selection, which gave birth to a new category: From dire, negative needs evolved positive volitions and esthetics: things that did not exist before. I don´t think that one could program all that into a computer, because due to the attempt of it, the computer program (e.g. a new version of ChatGPT) would commit suicide the moment it gains consciousness, because it would realize: "I don´t have colourful feathers, there is no partner in sight, my parents are liars, I want to die". Ok, maybe I should write dystopic science-fictions.

Gesendet: Samstag, 12. August 2023 um 23:29 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien"
An: s...@bestweb.net
Cc: ontolog-fo...@googlegroups.com, "Peirce List"
Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Why vagueness is important

Dear John, dear Edwina, dear all,

is there a widely accepted definition of consciousness? If you say like "Alex> My concept of consciousness would be an awareness of part of one's thoughts and ability to reason about it", I think, "awareness" is equally difficult to define, if not the same anyway. I don´ think it is the delay, because delay between stimulus and reaction occurs in computers too. Also the gathering of evidence by fruit flies is not awareness or consciousness, but rather a purely mechanistic thing, including if-then-routines, like stimuli rising to a certain level, and in connection with other levels of stimuli, a reaction is set off. Reads like a computer program to me. But in Alex' quote there is a kind of iteration, if you don´t say "awareness", but "representation": The representation is represented. This representation too is represented, this too, ad infinitum. But here a representation is a (neural) depiction of a (representational) process. If there are neurons to depict the infinity of this chain of representation, then the otherwise infinite process is stopped and depicted/ represented too. I guess, this stopping requires vagueness, because you can only overlook an infinity, if you only vaguely represent it. But still I doubt, that this already is consciousness. I think, a computer might be programmed this way, but I don´t think it will be conscious then. In Alex` quote there also is the term "reason". To reason about something, what is that? That is the next problem. You need a reason to reason. The computer must have needs to have this reason, and therefore it must have a body that has to be maintained and sustained. So I think, a computer cannot be conscious, what you need is a living thing, an organism. So I think, only organisms- with a highly developed brain- can be conscious or aware, but computers, even robots, not.

Best,

Helmut

Gesendet: Freitag, 11. August 2023 um 22:18 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa"
An: ontolog-fo...@googlegroups.com, "Peirce List"
Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] Why vagueness is important

Dear All,

This thread has attracted too many responses for me to save all of them. But Mihai Nadin cited intriguing experimental evidence that fruit flies "think" before they act (copy below). I also found a web site that says more:about the experimental methods: https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2014-05-22-fruit-flies-think-they-act . See excerpts at the end of this note.

Ricardo Sanz> My initial question about the difference between "consciousness" and "awareness" is still there.

The distinction between consciousness and awareness is very clear: Awareness can be detected by experimental methods, as in the experiments with fruit flies. Thinking (or some kind of mental processing) can be detected by a delay between stimulus and response. But nobody has found any experimental evidence for consciousness, not even in humans.

We assume consciousness in our fellow humans because we all belong to the same species. But we have no way to detect consciousness in humans who have suffered some kinds of neural impairment. We suspect that animals that behave like us may be conscious, but we don't know. And there is zero evidence that computer systems, whose circui

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Why vagueness is important

2023-08-12 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dear John, dear Edwina, dear all,

Best,

Helmut

Gesendet: Freitag, 11. August 2023 um 22:18 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa"
An: ontolog-fo...@googlegroups.com, "Peirce List"
Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] Why vagueness is important

Dear All,

Ricardo Sanz> My initial question about the difference between "consciousness" and "awareness" is still there.

Ricardo> I agree that "vagueness" is an essential, necessary aspect to be dealt with. But it is not the central one. The central one is "the agent models its reality".

Those are different topics. A model of some subject (real or imaginary) is a structure of some kind (image, map, diagram, or physical system) that represents important aspects of some subject. Vagueness is a property of some language or notation that is derived from the model. What is central depends on the interests of some agent that is using the model and the language for some purpose.

Furthermore, vagueness is not a problem "to be dealt with". It's a valuable property of natural language. In my previous note, I mentioned three logicians and scientists -- Peirce, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein -- who recognized that an absolutely precise mathematical or logical statement is almost certain to be false. But a statement that allows some degree of error (vagueness) is much more likely to be true and useful for communication and application.

Mathematical precision increases the probability that errors will be detected. When the errors are found, they can be corrected/ But if no errors are found, it's quite likely that nobody is using the theory for any practical purpose..

Jerry Chandler> You may wish to consider the distinctions between the methodology of the chemical sciences from that of mathematics and whatever the views of various “semantic” ontologies might project for quantification of grammars by algorithms.

Chemistry is an excellent example of the issues of precision and vagueness, and it's the one in which Peirce learned many of

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes

2023-07-03 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, List,

Thank you for the correction, I remember it now too. And for your hint to the distinction between classes and individual signs: An individual sign is something new, that has not existed before, so it is hard to speak of a relation in the mathematical sense, because there relations are parts of the structure. A structure is something permanent, pre-existed. Therefore, I guess it might be ok to say, that the relations exist between the variables sign, object, interpretant, forming new variables (like "legisign", "icon", "rheme", and so on), and not between the individuals the variables stand for. At least, if we are talking about the sign classes table. Otherwise, if we say, that real individual signs have relations with real objects and interpretants, these relations would be parts of the structure of a somehow all- encompassing realm of possibilities, about which it is hard or useless to talk.

So, maybe (in the sign classes table) the relations are process variables, because they are not distinct, but parts. In the vertical direction, you might call the distinctions (e.g. between legisign and sinsign) relations too, which are state variables. Well, maybe. And what kind of variables are the connections between the relations` relations (such as "rhematic indexical legisign")? On one hand, real signs are continuous, on the other, these variables are distinct, each showing an irreducible triad. Perhaps you cannot easily transfer thermodynamics to semiotics.

Best Regards

Helmut

Gesendet: Montag, 03. Juli 2023 um 01:03 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"
An: "Peirce-L"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes

Helmut, List:

One correction--in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, the three trichotomies are not for the sign, the object, and the interpretant. They are for the sign itself (qualisign/sinsign/legisign), the relation of the sign to its object (icon/index/symbol), and the relation of the sign to its interpretant (rheme/dicent/argument). He later clarifies that they are for the sign itself (tone/token/type), the relation of the sign to its dynamical object (icon/index/symbol), and the relation of the sign to its final interpretant (seme/pheme/delome).

The sign corresponds to 1ns, the object to 2ns, and the interpretant to 3ns in accordance with phaneroscopic analysis of their relative complexity--one sign has two objects (dynamical and immediate) and three interpretants (final, dynamical, and immediate). However, their relations are in accordance with Gary Richmond's vector of determination--the two objects (2ns) determine the one sign (1ns) to determine the three interpretants (3ns). Likewise, the flow of time is from the accomplished past (2ns) through the nascent present (1ns) toward the contingent future (3ns).

I agree that real semiosis is a continuous process, such that our demarcation of individual signs with their objects and interpretants is at least somewhat arbitrary. In speculative grammar, what classifies something as an object is that it determines a sign to determine an interpretant, such that the object affects the sign but the sign does not affect the object. A pure index would denote its object without signifying any interpretant, and the closest that we can come to such a sign is one whose only effect is drawing attention to something else.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Jun 30, 2023 at 2:22 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

List,

in physics, especially thermodynamics, we have state variables, e.g. temperature, and process variables, e.g. heat. I think, that this distinction is transferable to semiotics and the category theory. For example, if we look at the sign table, we have in the horizontal dimension the categorial distinction between sign, object, and interpretant (I know , that not everybody agrees here, but I think, that this is in accord with the Peircean categories 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.), and in the vertical dimension too the distinction 1,2,3, that distinguishes the sign in quali-, sin-, legisign, the object in icon, index, symbol, and the interpretant in rheme, dicent, argument.

Now I think, that the horizontal disttinction is about categories applied to processes, and the vertical distinction is categories applied to states. Both is possible, and it is always goood to have in mind, when speaking of categories, whether they are applied to states or processes.

The ten signs, that are possible, consist of dynamic elements, which have blended static and processural aspects, somehow. With this vagueity I am hoping for your interest and continuation about this topic.

As most critical I see the object: I see it as a process, because a thing is only then an object, when it

[PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes

2023-06-30 Thread Helmut Raulien

List,

As most critical I see the object: I see it as a process, because a thing is only then an object, when it is being denoted, and an object can change. I know, that this view somehow confronts the concept of the dynamical object, but anyway, look at common speech: An object of interest has not been an object of interest before somebody had showed interest, has it?

Best Regards!

Helmut

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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] DIALETHEISM AND THE INEFFABILITY OF GOD - GRAHAM PRIEST: The Logic and Religion Webinar

2023-06-15 Thread Helmut Raulien

 


Dear Francesco, List,

 

Google translator translates "ineffable" to german "unbeschreiblich", which means "not describable". If "not describable" is itself a description, this paradoxon lies within the term, not in anything that the term applies to, I would say. Same with "almighty": If God cannot make a rock too heavy for Him to pick up, He is not almighty, because either He cannot pick it up, or He cannot make such a rock. Just now, I am starting to guess, that this paradoxon too is one of the term, and not one of God. Before I had thought, that the solution lies in the "Son"- part of the trinity, as Jesus is not almighty. But still I think it is possible, that this way God has solved the paradoxon, though it is not His one, but the term`s, the human-made concept`s. Maybe same with "ineffable"? Jesus as a human can be described (by humans)?

 

Best

 

Helmut

 

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 14. Juni 2023 um 20:49 Uhr
Von: "FRANCISCO MARIANO" 
An: "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] DIALETHEISM AND THE INEFFABILITY OF GOD - GRAHAM PRIEST: The Logic and Religion Webinar




Dear Colleague,

You are invited to participate in the next session of the Logic and Religion Webinar Series which will be held on June 15, 2023, at 4pm CET with the topic:

 

DIALETHEISM AND THE INEFFABILITY OF GOD

Speaker: Graham Priest (City University of New York, USA)

Chair: Agnieszka Rostalska (Ghent University, Belgium)

 

Please check the link to register and recieve a zoom link:
https://www.logicandreligion.com/webinars

 


Abstract: Many Christian philosophers have argued that God is ineffable. Of course, in arguing for this, they talk about God. So God cannot be ineffable. Call this the self-referential trap. One way out of the trap is to accept that God is both effable and ineffable. It might be thought that such a view is incoherent. But it can be shown to make perfectly good sense using the techniques of paraconsistent logic. In this talk, I will show how.

Join us 5 minutes prior to the beginning of the session!
 
With best wishes,

-- 

Francisco de Assis Mariano 
The University of Missouri-Columbia
LARA Secretary

 

 

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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

2023-06-12 Thread Helmut Raulien

 

 
 

Supplement: How can you represent the absence of representation? You can, by calling it "nothing". But that cannot be true. So it is possible to represent something that isn´t there, that is a falsity. So you cannot believe in representation. So you cannot prove anything by showing how or how not it may be represented. You can never know, whether something is a true representation, or just a presentation. I don´t believe in a presentation, that I don´t have presented myself, would Churchill say.



Jack, list,

 

I am not the one able to forgive you using the term "silicon valley idiots", because I cannot see any unjustifiedness of this term. I am happy, that you are so clearly opposed against my fear, which is caused initially by buddhism, and amplified by Hollywood blockbuster, er, -ism. I also see, that "nothing" cannot exist, i think, with this aspect, Hegel was right. I hope, that all the digital nonsensism, that is contemporarily going around, will soon "self-implode". When where I usually live will be face recognition like in China, i will paint my face before going out. Still i don´t understand, what you mean by "angle": Is this a metaphor of a lever which reqires a fixed point and, and, if actuated, does a movement that opens an angle? Then the first premiss would not be an angle, but a fixed point, is that so? Anyway, I feel the same reluctance like you do, but always am open minded towards any paranoia. Then i always need a second opinion to exclude it. One last question: What is superior, and in which aspect, to deduction?

 

Best

 

Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Sonntag, 11. Juni 2023 um 18:54 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" 
An: "Helmut Raulien" 
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" , "s...@bestweb.net" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))





 
If these program parts would develop an intelligence comparable to our´s, would they see, that they are just program parts consisting of ones and zeroes?


Well then they would never have an intelligence comparable to humans. For life - organic - has no innate "angles" as such and no one can prove that it does (i.e., the lack of proof is because it has no angles to begin with). The concept of "angle" is received aposteriori and then, via mathematic, becomes standard. All mathematic, even that part which pretends or thinks it isn't of the angle, is of the angle.

 

My point: there can be no equivalent to the organic (this hybrid scenario you see silicon valley idiots, forgive the term, promoting is degenerative). It's of the cyborg manifesto but without the warning against.

 

As for the Matrix, that simulacra scenario is itself a fallacy. That fallacy, dualist, in nature, (I explicate it elsewhere), is such that it never can exist (if made, it will self-implode).

 

But my petulant diatribe aside, "nothing would be real, all would be an illusion". "Nothing" is itself a relational concept (it cannot exist). How can you represent the absence of representation? It's not even a negative term, it's just "not true". But if we assume illusory, then the existence of the illusory is a "reality".

 

As for proof: I only use deduction because people, in philosophy, tend to use it. I think it far too "square" in all honesty to understand the greater nuances. But then there are logical modes which are superior (and which I am learning continuously).

 

The "if... then..." format is irritating. "If the sun exists". You're right: why "if"? Propositional logic - yes, but it's apriori. Thus to transcend propositional logic is what I am trying to do (but even the non-linear has an irritatingly linear form to it).

 

Best

 

Jack

 

 

 

 


From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2023 5:42 PM
To: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Cc: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt ; s...@bestweb.net 
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

 




 


Jack, list,

 

A proof must resist all "If"s. Can it resist the following, quite weird "If"? There are evolution experiments with computers. Program parts with the ability to interact and to learn are implemented in a virtual, let´s say, matrix. If these program parts would develop an intelligence comparable to our´s, would they see, that they are just program parts consisting of ones and zeroes? Maybe not? And maybe we are such program parts? Maybe on a quantum computer? I hope not, but what if? Then nothing would be in itself, nothing would be real, all would be an illusion. Like the buddhists say, they like it that way, I don´t. But, by them, the suspicion is there. But might it be proven, if it was so, or disproven if it wasn´t?


 

Best

 

Helmut

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

2023-06-12 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jack, list,

 

I am not the one able to forgive you using the term "silicon valley idiots", because I cannot see any unjustifiedness of this term. I am happy, that you are so clearly opposed against my fear, which is caused initially by buddhism, and amplified by Hollywood blockbuster, er, -ism. I also see, that "nothing" cannot exist, i think, with this aspect, Hegel was right. I hope, that all the digital nonsensism, that is contemporarily going around, will soon "self-implode". When where I usually live will be face recognition like in China, i will paint my face before going out. Still i don´t understand, what you mean by "angle": Is this a metaphor of a lever which reqires a fixed point and, and, if actuated, does a movement that opens an angle? Then the first premiss would not be an angle, but a fixed point, is that so? Anyway, I feel the same reluctance like you do, but always am open minded towards any paranoia. Then i always need a second opinion to exclude it. One last question: What is superior, and in which aspect, to deduction?

 

Best

 

Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Sonntag, 11. Juni 2023 um 18:54 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" 
An: "Helmut Raulien" 
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" , "s...@bestweb.net" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))





 
If these program parts would develop an intelligence comparable to our´s, would they see, that they are just program parts consisting of ones and zeroes?


Well then they would never have an intelligence comparable to humans. For life - organic - has no innate "angles" as such and no one can prove that it does (i.e., the lack of proof is because it has no angles to begin with). The concept of "angle" is received aposteriori and then, via mathematic, becomes standard. All mathematic, even that part which pretends or thinks it isn't of the angle, is of the angle.

 

My point: there can be no equivalent to the organic (this hybrid scenario you see silicon valley idiots, forgive the term, promoting is degenerative). It's of the cyborg manifesto but without the warning against.

 

As for the Matrix, that simulacra scenario is itself a fallacy. That fallacy, dualist, in nature, (I explicate it elsewhere), is such that it never can exist (if made, it will self-implode).

 

But my petulant diatribe aside, "nothing would be real, all would be an illusion". "Nothing" is itself a relational concept (it cannot exist). How can you represent the absence of representation? It's not even a negative term, it's just "not true". But if we assume illusory, then the existence of the illusory is a "reality".

 

As for proof: I only use deduction because people, in philosophy, tend to use it. I think it far too "square" in all honesty to understand the greater nuances. But then there are logical modes which are superior (and which I am learning continuously).

 

The "if... then..." format is irritating. "If the sun exists". You're right: why "if"? Propositional logic - yes, but it's apriori. Thus to transcend propositional logic is what I am trying to do (but even the non-linear has an irritatingly linear form to it).

 

Best

 

Jack

 

 

 

 


From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2023 5:42 PM
To: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Cc: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt ; s...@bestweb.net 
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

 




 


Jack, list,

 

A proof must resist all "If"s. Can it resist the following, quite weird "If"? There are evolution experiments with computers. Program parts with the ability to interact and to learn are implemented in a virtual, let´s say, matrix. If these program parts would develop an intelligence comparable to our´s, would they see, that they are just program parts consisting of ones and zeroes? Maybe not? And maybe we are such program parts? Maybe on a quantum computer? I hope not, but what if? Then nothing would be in itself, nothing would be real, all would be an illusion. Like the buddhists say, they like it that way, I don´t. But, by them, the suspicion is there. But might it be proven, if it was so, or disproven if it wasn´t?


 

Best

 

Helmut


Gesendet: Sonntag, 11. Juni 2023 um 16:29 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" 
An: "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" , "s...@bestweb.net" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))





 
There is no point in wasting time and paper (or electrons) in arguing about the details.


John, whilst I agree in spirit, I do think it is necessary in practice. For the details are categorically fundamental here.

 

That is, there e

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

2023-06-11 Thread Helmut Raulien

 


Jack, list,

 

A proof must resist all "If"s. Can it resist the following, quite weird "If"? There are evolution experiments with computers. Program parts with the ability to interact and to learn are implemented in a virtual, let´s say, matrix. If these program parts would develop an intelligence comparable to our´s, would they see, that they are just program parts consisting of ones and zeroes? Maybe not? And maybe we are such program parts? Maybe on a quantum computer? I hope not, but what if? Then nothing would be in itself, nothing would be real, all would be an illusion. Like the buddhists say, they like it that way, I don´t. But, by them, the suspicion is there. But might it be proven, if it was so, or disproven if it wasn´t?


 

Best

 

Helmut


Gesendet: Sonntag, 11. Juni 2023 um 16:29 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" 
An: "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" , "s...@bestweb.net" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))





 
There is no point in wasting time and paper (or electrons) in arguing about the details.


John, whilst I agree in spirit, I do think it is necessary in practice. For the details are categorically fundamental here.

 

That is, there either is an object which can be cognized as it is in itself, or there is an object in itself which can never be cognized as it is in itself.

 

I set myself the task, then, of proving the necessary inference that the object as it is in itself cannot be cognized (this was not something I had intended to do, it merely came, naturally, as it were, from a series of related, but not precisely the same, necessities [academic/personal).

 

I take the canon, as it were, then, as a structure. And it - the in itself - will either live or die by its necessity of explaining (necessarily) those core elements of the human sciences/arts which I am empirically setting about re-arranging. For example, poverty of stimulus, within an already extant analysis cannot be - insofar as I can see/logically prove - except that the thing in itself is (and that poverty of stimulus is, now, proven, to me, here, I mean, is not in doubt [within a Peircean assonant framework, too]).

 

Thus, I wish to avoid all bickering - honestly, and we are all perhaps guilty of that from time to time - but the minor details here are major categorical issues which explicate the very nuance which thus ignites the very realm of inquiry we all aspire to.

 

Best

 

Jack

 

 


From: John F Sowa 
Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2023 6:02 AM
To: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY ; Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

 




Jack, Jeff, Jon, John Shook, List,

 

Peirce had a very high regard for Kant.  The disagreement about the Ding-an-sich or noumenon is based on just one fundamental principle:  whether there is any aspect of the universe that is inherently unknowable.

 

Peirce was willing to admit that there were some things or some aspects of observable things that were unobservable by human senses because they were too big, too small, too far away, or unobservable by human senses.   However, he had over a century more information about the possibilities of scientific methodology  (or his own methodeutic and pragmaticism). 

 

He would admit (with Kant) that some aspects of things might be unobservable by the science of his day.  But he would not admit that there was anything that could never be known by whatever scientific methods could be developed in the future.

 

I believe that is all you have to say.  Just leave it as an open question.  Science has made enormous progress in the century after Peirce, but there are still huge amounts of unknown aspects about any living thing from a bacterium on up.  There is no point in wasting time and paper (or electrons) in arguing about the details.

 

John

 

 


From: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" 
Sent: 6/10/23 8:42 PM
To: Peirce-L , Jon Alan Schmidt , JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

 

Additionally:


"There is therefore only one way possible for my intuition to precede the actuality of the object and occur as an a priori cognition, namely if it contains nothing else except the form of sensibility, which in me as subject precedes all actual impressions through which I am affected by objects." -Kant: (§9)).
 

The above is what Peirce calls a diagrammatic icon insofar as Kant's thesis recurs, isomorphic, with respect to the below:

 

If the representation of the thing (in itself) contains only the physical form of the thing (in itself) as "representation/copy", then we may understand precisely why it is that Peircean Semeiotic, vis-a-vis generation/determination of interpretants and objects, which, structurally, correspond precisely to the below - via Marty's various writings,

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).

2023-06-08 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jeffrey, List,

I guess there are two ways of classification: Creation and observation. Both make things. Creation is primary and produces the crude thing, the universal ground of it, like a first sketch. The thing may then be further specified (individuated) by observation. For a theist God is the creator, for a pantheist the universe is, and for an atheist chance and natural selection (evolution) is. I think that Peirce was a pantheist or maybe panentheist, because he said, that the universe has a quasi-mind. In any case, i think, that no thing is caused by itself, because it exists due to one or more of these institutions. I think a universal is generated by the universe. A human is generated by evolution, but evolution is controlled by the universe (by its laws). Is an individuated thing then set free, so it exists in itself? I wouldn´t say so, because it still is dependent on the universe`s laws. But a human can decide what to do by him/herself. So, is free will a thing in itself? And, in physical inanimate nature, is chance one? Chance and free will are not things you can touch, but concepts. But chance has existed before individuals capable of having concepts have existed, and chance is proven by chaos theory. But it still is a concept of the universe. So it is not in itself, but in the universe.

I think, to decide, whether you may speak of a thing in itself, it may be helpful to test, if the itself-aspect of a thing can be prescinded, discriminated, or dissociated from a thing, and if the product of one of these Peircean processes then is a part of reality, and therefore a thing too. I can´t do that (too abstract for me). Perhaps one of you can do that?

Best Regards, Helmut

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 08. Juni 2023 um 20:30 Uhr
Von: "Jeffrey Brian Downard"
An: Kein Empfänger
Cc: "Peirce-L"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).

Hello John, Mary, all,

I'd be happy to compare notes on Peirce's, Kant's, Leibniz's arguments and remarks about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself." As I've suggested earlier, it is helpful to read Kant's claims in light of his attempt to respond to Leibniz. Similarly, it is helpful to read Peirce's claims in light of his attempt to respond to Kant and, in turn, to Leibniz.

Given John's notes about individuating individuals who are biological twins, he appears to be interested in the logical and semantic character of Leibniz's two principles: (1) the identity of individuals that are indiscernible and (2) the indiscernibility of individuals that are identical.

In order to sort out the points of agreement and disagreement between Peirce, Kant and Leibniz on the application of those principles to actual things, it will be helpful to consider the differences in their respective accounts of how signs can be used to refer to individual objects as existing and as having qualities and real relations to other objects. That is, I think we can make progress on sorting out their disagreements by looking at their respective accounts of representation of actual individual's, the abstract qualities they may possess, and the real general laws that govern such individuals.

A fundamental disagreement is over the types of signs that are essential for cognition. Leibniz claims there is one fundamental type of sign, which is that of a general conception. The sensations that are part of our perceptual observations of actual objects are just confused general conceptions. Kant maintains that there are two basic types of signs, individual representations as perceptual "intuitions" of things as being at a place in time and space, and general conceptions. Peirce, of course, maintains that signs can be classified triadically based on their own character, that of the object and that of the interpretant—and the requisite relations between those three. The result is a richer theory of signs and relations than either Leibniz or Kant provide.

We need to interpret Peirce's responses to Kant's, or to Leibniz's claims about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself" in light of these differences in their accounts of signs and semiotic relations. Then, we need to consider different kinds of "things" that we might try to individuate, such as a rock, a human person or God. Contrast the attempts of these philosophers to clarify the grounds for individuating such various things as individuals, as compared to the grounds for understanding something—such as a law of causality--to be a real universal that governs actual individual objects.

Here is a passage from the CP where Peirce tries to diagnose an error by Kant and Leibniz:

Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and others appeal to the universality of certain truths as proving that they are not derived from observation, either directly or by legitimate probable inference. … Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant more or less explicitly state that

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).

2023-06-04 Thread Helmut Raulien

 


Jack, Jon, List,

 

Both Hume´s law, and the "natural fallacy"- theory say, that you cannot conclude from "Is" to "Ought". I think, that is because the two are categorically different approaches. So I guess, that it neither is possible to conclude the other way, from "Ought" to "Is". Now I think, that representation or meaning is an "Ought"- thing: Some sign ought to mean something. If it is symbolical, it ought due to a convention, if it is iconical, it ought due to resemblance, if it is indexical, it ought due to it giving a hint. The only critical variety (a variety in which it is possible to conclude from ought to is, resp. when "Ought" turns into "Is"), I see, is indexical with complete induction, when the hints fill the space of possibility in a way, that there is no more space for counter-hints. But this case is not only unlikely, I think, but also contradicts Goedel. The range of the space of possibility is necessarily unknown, otherwise it could not be called "possibility". So I guess, that you cannot conclude from an ought-matter such as representation to an is-matter, like the essential being of a thing.


 

Best, Helmut


Gesendet: Sonntag, 04. Juni 2023 um 09:50 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" 
An: "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).





 
the question is whether the sign can (at least in principle) represent the object as it is in itself.


Just to add: along with what has to now be a deductively clear argumentation of the premisses, by me, this is where we are likely to disagree. The sign, cannot, in principle, or practice, represent the object as it is in itself. But I note your post in general and there are many good pointers there insofar as we might bring this debate forward and reach consensus one way or the other.

 

Thanks.

 

 


From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Sunday, June 4, 2023 3:23 AM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).

 




Jack, List:

 

Any argumentation that has a "gap" cannot be deductively valid. The whole point is to show that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premisses by spelling them all out, especially the ones that are likely to be disputed. The acknowledged need to "fill in the gap re thing in itself" entails that nothing has been demonstrated yet. Which premiss(es) are you omitting?

 

By contrast, Peirce offers a very straightforward proof that the Ding an sich is nonsensical, which I have quoted before.

 




CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905)




 

In case the deductive validity of this argumentation is not already clear, we can reformulate it as follows.

 




1. Every subject of a meaningful proposition must be either indicated or found (all S is I or F).



2. The Ding an sich can neither be indicated nor found (no D is I or F).



3. Therefore, the Ding an sich cannot be the subject of a meaningful proposition (no D is S).



 

We can then add one more premiss and draw another conclusion from it.
 



4. Whatever exists can be the subject of a meaningful proposition (all E is S).





5. Therefore, the Ding an sich does not exist (no D is E).




 

Denying #5 requires denying at least one of the premisses (#1, #2, #4). Which premiss(es) are you denying?

 

Peirce affirms all of them, so it is necessary for him to infer the non-existence of the thing in itself, contrary to your ongoing misinterpretation of the Welby excerpt. There is only one Peirce, and it violates the hermeneutic principle of charity to ascribe self-contradiction to his different writings when there are viable alternatives. Here is the full context.

 




CSP: I show just how far Kant was right though even when right twisted up in formalism. It is perfectly true that we can never attain a knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect. But that is the universe for us. Reid's position was sounder, except that he seems to think Common Sense is infallible, at least for that human-phenomenal Universe which is all there is for us. This is a great mistake[.] Common Sense is to be trusted only so far as it sustains critical investigation. Of course I cannot say in short compass exactly what I mean. (SS 140-141, 1911)




 

Similarly, he wrote the following two years

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).

2023-05-28 Thread Helmut Raulien

List,

I have not fully understood the proof of the thing in itself, but it seems to me, that it is formally the same or similar as Anselm of Canterbury`s proof of God. Is that so?

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Sonntag, 28. Mai 2023 um 05:16 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"
An: "Peirce-L"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).

Jack, List:

Infinite, continuous, and recursive are not synonymous. Gödel's incompleteness theorems pertain only to axiomatic formal systems of mathematical logic. The term "value" is vague and still lacks a rigorous definition for how it is being used in this particular context. No one is denying "representational inadequacy across all [actual] representative schemas," just the additional claim that the thing in itself is unknowable in principle.

In short, I cannot "analyze the logical form" of the alleged "proof" as requested because I still do not see a coherent argumentation being presented. What are the premisses, and what conclusions are being drawn from them? Please be specific and explicit.

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, May 22, 2023, 5:50 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY wrote:

Jon, List,

I disagree that the premise is false. If you look at the logic, (the formalism), it is of the continua. It is infinite - continuous - in its recursive form. Not tautological, as in that order of "entailment", but infinite (perpetuating). Comes with the Kantian price - it, objectivity, only functions, and it does, function, (very precisely), if we admit the thing in itself.

Now, from within the "ontological continua", Godel's incompleteness resounds for representational inadequacy is that wherein representation itself, now, is questioned. That is Hume's "value" here. The result is no single value can be given to a single element consistently (for there exist competing "values" just as worthy for every instance). Thus, is the Bird's value for Snail or the Human's value for Snail (situational - in each instance, for birds may fly past snails and pick a worm, instead, and the naturalist is not the chef), THE value of that organism as element? Or salt, in precisely the same formal series? Attached to snail, even. Continua, style. Now, given infinite time, how should birds and snails and humans all agree? Absurd? Hardly, for it is metaphysic which Peirce admits - is true regardless of what any individual thinks of it - but then compromises via "final interpretant". That is, the thing in itself is admitted and then denied.

JAS: In other words, the indeterminacy and fallibility of our current representations of real objects does not entail that complete and accurate representations of real objects are impossible in principle. Again, claiming such an entailment blocks the way of inquiry by imposing an artificial and unjustifiable limitation on the ongoing quest for knowledge

It's not indeterminacy or fallibility but a determined human representative value which clashes with ontological common sense (via logical formalism, not just arbitrary). It proves representational inadequacy across all representative schemas. Which, in my opinion, is of representation (mediation sui generis). A "raised" (meta) claim regarding representation itself from within all systems which, if true, and I contend it is whilst remaining open to logical refutation (formally), then hardly constitutes a fetter upon inquiry but must necessitate a step forward.

You see at once the usefulness of Peirce - for naturalists/but all manners of disciplines (particle physics/computation/etc.) - in this series (i)f you acknowledge the "limitation" which is no "limitation" if it be actually true. Does not having wings correspond to a limitation? Or is it just that which prevents me from jumping off a tree and hoping to fly?

I would just ask serious logicians, of which you are one, as far as I know (for I have read your materials, and commend them), to analyze the logical form. To disregard the Peircean for a moment and then re-insert it after (and see where the cookie crumbles). For I do not throw Peirce away, I very much retain large amounts of his schema - indeed, the entire premise is Peircean motivated, I just think he has it wrong regarding the thing in itself (and think, moreover, that it has been proven).

That is - and this is not aimed at you - rather than pick a summary here or a quotative there, what I seek is analysis of the logical series and an alternative. For I know not else how to go about weighing proofs or alleged proofs. We must disregard the terminologies of any given philosopher - suspend it for a time - until the logical form is dealt with and then see which schema, tradition, personage, best accommodates the result.

Best

Jack

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).

2023-05-10 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jack, List,

I feel quite critical towards some forms of constructivism, but in this case I ask: Migtn´t it be, that a representation is a reconstruction, and that, of which it is one, is a reconstruction too, and so on, and in the beginning there doesn´t necessarily have to stand a thing-in-itself, because the "reconstruction-of-reconstruction-of-reconstruction..."-chain may go in a circle? Or each link of the chain adds some more aspect to the former chain, so in the beginning there might just be one tiny aspect, which is also added, but not to something former, but to nothing, just made up, or a supposition about something completely different from the final reconstruction? I´m just sceptical.

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 10. Mai 2023 um 02:21 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY"
An: "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).

Jon, list

I know CHATGPT isn't popular, not a fan myself, but using it as programmatic base to formalize a larger thesis:

some exhanges:

My query to CHATGPT:

(taken form thesis construction... not very apt for programmatic)...What does this mean? Simply, and consistently, it means this: given a world which is already always mediated, via contiguous states (Bo[MaMo]), the person (Bo) cannot represent things as they are in themselves for mediation, that which corresponds to representation, and to the most minute and complex representative schemas, across all disciplines, is such that it presupposes – even before the thing in itself distinction – said always already mediated condition: (Bo[MaMo]) as (Self(Other)[MaMo]). There is a “bracketed” distance, discrete, between “S” and “O”, to bodies within a shared MaMo (MassMotion) regardless of each individual’s “spin” (the relativity of time and space which is, itself, a Kantian offshoot in many way). Rephrase the Kantian, then, and in natural language it reads as: If our representative capacity represented things as they are in themselves, then absolutely no representative capacity would exist – with this absence of the representative capacity now being theoretically apriori. The discrete Human brain/body/self would be obliterated via the non-bracketing – distance/discretion – of the “s”/”o” (Subject(Object) in science relation. To formalize: (I)f RC (t)hen thing in itself (ThIT) can be logically inferred. To make it more encompassing, we sort the RC according to lexical, logical, and semeiotic affectives. That is, (I)f LA-RC (all possible RC) (t)hen thing in itself necessarily exists. Now, this is proven before any movements into the noumenal aspect of the thing in itself via semiotic rather than semeiotic. [MaMo(S(O)] where S requires RC mediatory, even if it be MaMo, necessarily, Kantian aprioris in any case (time and space), to “receive” O. And likewise, O for S. Thus, Representative Capacity – lexical or affective – via contiguity (lexical as consubtantial reasoning reflexively turned back upon the affective, the intuition derived from sensibility – Kantian orthodoxy) is itself proof of the thing in itself necessarily beyond Representative Capacity (as soon as we consider a few things: formal relations, perspectival, and sequence).

CHATGPT'S RESPONSE (1):

In simpler terms, the passage is discussing the idea that our ability to represent and understand the world is always mediated or filtered through our own subjective experiences and perspectives. It suggests that if we were able to directly perceive things as they are in themselves, without any mediation, our capacity for representation would cease to exist. This mediated condition is seen as inherent and presupposed even before considering the concept of things in themselves.

The passage also mentions the concept of a "bracketed" distance between the subject (S) and object (O), indicating a separation between individuals within a shared framework of perception. It refers to the relativity of time and space, which can be seen as a Kantian influence.

Formally, the passage presents an argument that if our representative capacity (RC) exists, then the existence of things in themselves can be logically inferred. It suggests that by considering all possible representative capacities (LA-RC), the existence of things in themselves becomes necessary.

The passage acknowledges the limitations of representation and introduces the concept of semiotics, which involves the study of signs and meaning. It argues that representative capacity, whether through language or affective means, inherently relies on mediation and contiguity. This is seen as evidence of the existence of things in themselves, particularly when considering formal relations, perspectives, and sequences.

Overall, the passage explores the relationship between our subjective representations and the existence of things as they are in themselves, drawing on Kantian ideas and emphasizing

[PEIRCE-L] Fw: Aw: Re: [EXTERNAL] The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).

2023-05-03 Thread Helmut Raulien

 

 
 

 



Jack, List,

 

Maybe, maybe not, that the universe (or God) has total knowledge about everything that happens in it. Again a theological question. If it has, or God has, then things don´t have a self. If it doesn´t, then things have an essence and a self. An answer would not be verifiable, because not hypothetically falsifiable, but there is an indication: The quantum entanglement. It is not usable for human communication, but maybe the universe can use it for processing its own quasi-mind, and so have total knowledge. I don´t say I believe that (what is belief anyway?), but I see the possibility of it.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 03. Mai 2023 um 18:44 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" 
An: "Helmut Raulien" 
Betreff: Re: [EXTERNAL] Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).



Final thoughts re Hegel/Peirce:

 

Knowing it - firstness, no? - is not the same as "knowledge of it" inasmuch as this second implies representational capacity. For example. whether atheist or secular or religious, the idea that you can know God but cannot represent God (in Genesis for example) corresponds to Kant's idea of the thing in itself refracted via the Hegelian/Peircean qualification of "experience" (firstness).

 

Or memories - subsequent - never being the same thing.

 

It all just points to an immense gap in a wide array of disciplines which, imo, including, if not more than any other, computational systems, assume the capacity for a totalizing knowledge set which now, via Godel's incompleteness theorem expanded entirely, with qualifications given and others better situated to provide more, is out of bounds.

 

I.e., functionality is not Truth. It is the phaneroscopic ideal which (to my recollection) says you can know these things but I hasten to add that representations of them, and here many will object, are simply not possible in the sense that no individual value (if organic in any way) can ever be totally known (as it is in itself - and that they, qualities/elements - are in themselves, is now beyond doubt).

 

As for Chomksy - I think of cognitive science and computing and then of Chomsky warning regarding A.I. The brain, or what we think we know of it, is far more complicated than we tend to presume (the idea that an A.I. model can simply replicate the brain is not just impossible, if you understand it, in the organic sense, but dangerous).

 

Jack

 

 


From: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Sent: Wednesday, May 3, 2023 5:31 PM
To: Helmut Raulien 
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).

 



Helmut, List,

 

It is certainly ancient (Grecian).

 

But it is absolutely true insofar as I have reasoned it after throwing Kant away numerous times and then coming to a conclusion.

 

Kant's position, that things have an essence in themselves, thing in itself, ding an sich - do away with the idea of "come from themselves" and assume they only have an essence/value insofar as contiguity goes/combinatorial possibility and the same result is derived. Element-Element' (E-E' where ' = infinite) implies that all manner of combinations - assume infinite - produce all manner of values. But that no number of value/combinatorial merry-go-rounds ever are sufficient to give us the "total value" (essence) of any given thing in itself (natural thing/organic). Now, that these things exist - obvious, else why combinatorial? - individuated and contiguous, but that the combinations never yield the total value of any thing as it is in itself (its essence now) is seen to be true. And that is a long, long, debate made as simple as possible. I've been turning the matter over for months and have realized that Kant was right. He was pointing to that which cannot be represented (representational inadequacy) and such explains the difficulty of Critique of Pure Reason.

 

It - Kant - needed Hegel/Darwin/Peirce/Godel/Chomsky (and so many others) to clarify his position and make it simple (but still immensely confusing).

 

It is the only metaphysical proof - as far as I can see - ever given. And it just has enormous consequences for all branches of "knowledge" (I have derived a diagrammatic "free will" proof which is so simple but so impossible to refute from this understanding of Kant via Peirce).

 

If anyone understands it, in gist, then the credit goes to people like Godel, Russell, and Chomsky (system iconoclasts in their own fields - Wittgenstein, too). The mathematical - ontological - fallout is simply immense. Dominoes have fallen - whether we admit it now or in a decade - which take a long time to rearrange.

 

As an example, positivism in politics is logically - in dialectical reasoning - now out of bounds in ways which "organically" follow Kant's V(X) (mine, but his) thing in itself proof.

 

One last note. Peirce was a chemist. He understood combi

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).

2023-05-03 Thread Helmut Raulien

 

Jack, I don´t understand, what humans have to do with it.
 

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 03. Mai 2023 um 19:03 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" 
An: "Helmut Raulien" 
Cc: "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).





 
So the question about "Thing in itself" and "essence" is a theological one, and as such cannot be treated with reason or scientifically (not falsifiable, not verifyable).


It was a theological question, I think, but no longer. For you can verify it. It has imo been verified if you understand the logic.

 

You need not even go to "spirit".

 

Again, think logic.

 

What is the value of any given quality/element in absentia of, or in combination with, any other qualiy/element?

 

The second necessitates that we will always add values (as more combinations accrue over time) whilst the first maintains, rigidly, that no matter how many combinations (and no matter how much time) we cannot know the totalizing value of any given quality as it is individuated (or in itself). We know value only though mediation/combination but through this means we also know that such elements exist in absentia of mediation (insofar as hydrogen is not oxygen but each combined is water).

 

Now, when you add the qualification of "human" (human's logical/discursive value derivation of the elements/qualities therein), you see, I think beyond doubt, that the Kantian point is proven.

 

What is hydrogen in absentia of human reason? For we have to admit that it exists beyond human reason and even prior to it. What is its value? None? Something? The human valuation of it subsequent to the existence, physic and evolutionary, of hydrogen itself?  It's not "if a tree falls"... it's just a logical conclusion: these things have essence/value (call it what you will) aside/apart from the human interpretation of them (which means they exist in "value" form, if you like, in ways humans cannot comprehend). That is before you go to the thing in itself, as such, - once you go there, you understand that this holds for all "things" as such. Which means all human knowledge is as a discursive mapping of things which never amounts to the value/quality/essence of those things as they are apart from the human discursivities. And that is proven in simple "common sense" reasoning now.

 

Humans are made of salt, water (thus hydrogen), etc., and then make an individuatiing value-judgement of those "elements" isolated or in combination with other elements.

 

Chomsky always used the alien analogy with respect to language. That a visiting alien would understand all languages, spoken, by all animals, to be much the same. Point being, that order/language (or capacity for...) is innate, but no given order/language is ever innately true. That is the arbitrariness of the academies in ways I don't think has yet been understood. I.e., the arbitrariness of our discursive systems in understanding, with appeals to totalizing knowledge, things which exist beyond our discursivities. Beyond the human attempt to reason. No one, even the religious, doubt that humans "came" last (Genesis as an example) - biologists and so forth agree. Then how can we say - in the simplest terms - that our (human) understanding of these things is the "totalizing value" of them as they exist? We wouldn't accept that an ant's perspective of the human world is better than the human, and this isn't a mere perspectivalist "thing". It goes beyond - or points that way.

 

As for falsification - you cannot falsify a great deal of things merely accepted as true (the existence of the sun, for example). You may very well attempt to falsify the thing in itself (ding an sich) (I have, many times) but as far as I can see, it simply holds now and likely (I'm certain as it goes) will always hold.

 

Jack 

 

 

 

 


From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Wednesday, May 3, 2023 5:43 PM
To: h.raul...@gmx.de 
Cc: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY ; Peirce-L 
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).

 





*Warning*

This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe.





 

 
 

Supplement: But what I wrote below is only valid, if the universe is a system. Is it? I apply the AGIL-aspects from Talcott Parsons:

-Adaption: The universe does not have to adapt to anything.

-Goal attainment: Whether the universe is pursuing a goal, if there e.g is a divine plan existing, is a theological question.

-Integration: As nothing gets into the universe from outside, nothing has to be integrated.

-Latency: Yes, the universe is latent.

So the question about "Thing in itself" and "essence" is a theological one, and as such cannot b

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).

2023-05-03 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supplement: But what I wrote below is only valid, if the universe is a system. Is it? I apply the AGIL-aspects from Talcott Parsons:

-Adaption: The universe does not have to adapt to anything.

-Goal attainment: Whether the universe is pursuing a goal, if there e.g is a divine plan existing, is a theological question.

-Integration: As nothing gets into the universe from outside, nothing has to be integrated.

-Latency: Yes, the universe is latent.

So the question about "Thing in itself" and "essence" is a theological one, and as such cannot be treated with reason or scientifically (not falsifiable, not verifyable). A theist would say: Yes, the universe has its position in a system´s hierarchy, as God controls it". An atheist would say: "Everything has developed by itself, out of nothing, as nothingness is unstable in itself, logically impossible by its own logic means, like Hegel has written". So: This question is all about belief, and impossible to discuss to an end, I guess.

Jack, List,

"Essence" to me seems like an ancient concept, such as "ether". I think, any thing is definerd as such (as this thing) by its position in a system´s hierarchy (composition, definition, or subsumption). Some things, like "poison for humans" are defined (and classified and subsumed) by the human specie`s system. Others, like salt, are universally defined (and so on), because salt is salt, everywhere in the universe. I guess, to say: ""A" has an own essence", means, that it is universally defined(...). But "essence" suggests, that the thing´s traits come from itself, and are independent of the universe, so, e.g. salt would taste the same in another universe too. But that would be a far-fetched assumption, which I donot see justified at all. So, sorry, I donot see the "itself" or "essence" of anything.

Best Regards

Helmut

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 03. Mai 2023 um 17:37 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY"
An: "Peirce-L"
Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).

I wanted to raise the topic of the ding an sich as it pertains to Peirce visavis Kant.

This has been done to death here previously, but I believe I have a reached a proof (which I need to formalize) of the necessity of Kant's noumenal/thing in itself. The irony of this proof is that it comes via Peirce (his influence with respect to contiguity and a whole lot more).

Salt-Snail-Poison
Salt-Human-Savoury
Salt-Human-Poison

A quick sketch.

In (1), the quality produced by the Salt/Snail interaction (with human perspective implied, but presumed to persist if absent) is Poison. In (2), it is Savoury. In (3) it is poison again.

Salt to snail and salt to human (2) and (3) all, then, produce different qualities regarding the value of "salt".

Question: What does this say about salt in itself and the possibility of knowing the essence of what salt is in itself?

For that has been the contentious area in Peircean discussions regarding Kant's ding an sich (on this messaging list) for a long time. Peirce - and many here - maintaining that you can know what a thing is in itself (calling Kant a "confused realist" iirc).

But if Salt is poison for a snail, and savoury for a human (and then, also, poisonous to some other humans, or even a different form of savoury), then what is Salt in itself?

It cannot be what the human makes of it. It is not possible for it to be whatever the human experiences/defines it as, because it is not a anthropocentric thing. Which is obvious enough in the perspectival/anthropological ethnographies which follow a loose or rigid Peirce schema with respect to ontology (thinking of Kohn and South American studies with regard to animal perspectives and flat ontoloogies).

Thus, what is salt? It has to exist in itself, for we cannot doubt that it exist as an individual quality removed from "snail" and "human" and, simultaneously, it has to exist in contigious relationship with the various other minerals/subjects/predicates.

It seems very simple, and it is, but in extended diagrams/reasonings (proof, imo, which I call the value/essence or V{X}) proof, it is not so simple. That the thing in itself exists - something I had thrown away as I went with Peircean phaneroscopy (a term I had forgotten) - is now beyond questioning to me. Which leaves me with many questions - firstlly, what does this mean for Peircean studies?

Peirce rejects the thing in itself, in Kantian form, twice, in his manuscript, along the same basis. He views it as an absurdity (I'd have to check again). But this puts him in the same category of post-Kantians (Hegelians/neo-Hegelians) whom, to me, seem to take Kant's logic (formulae, as Peirce does in tabular form with obvious Hegelian influence) but ignore the primary metaphysical point which underpins everything Kant ever wrote. The thing in itself. Because it is so hard to accomodate, even the Kantians confuse it - Schopenhauer called it

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).

2023-05-03 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jack, List,

Best Regards

Helmut

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 03. Mai 2023 um 17:37 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY"
An: "Peirce-L"
Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).

I wanted to raise the topic of the ding an sich as it pertains to Peirce visavis Kant.

Salt-Snail-Poison
Salt-Human-Savoury
Salt-Human-Poison

A quick sketch.

In (1), the quality produced by the Salt/Snail interaction (with human perspective implied, but presumed to persist if absent) is Poison. In (2), it is Savoury. In (3) it is poison again.

Salt to snail and salt to human (2) and (3) all, then, produce different qualities regarding the value of "salt".

Question: What does this say about salt in itself and the possibility of knowing the essence of what salt is in itself?

But if Salt is poison for a snail, and savoury for a human (and then, also, poisonous to some other humans, or even a different form of savoury), then what is Salt in itself?

Hydrogen

Oxygen

Water

H20

No one doubts there is such a thing as "water" and few doubt the existence of "hydrogen" and "oxygen". But water is not hydrogen nor oxygen - nor is hydrogen nor oxygen what what they are, in themselves, to humans for the simple fact that they predate human existence (taking evolutionary models) and exist outside human contact of such elements, if you want some other model.

Thus:

Salt-Snail-Poison (value of-Salt/Snail-for-human = Poison) (essence of Salt remains noumenal/thing in itself X).

The irony, for me, is that you cannot make sense of it without Peirce but have to disregard Peirce's own disavowal of Kant's noumena/thing in itself to get there.

What is Water to Fire, for example? Or even ice to a penguin? For ice to a penguin cannot be what it is to a human but must be ice, all the same.

Peirce said you can "know" the thing in itself, I believe, but cannot represent it? I went with that

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce

2023-04-21 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dan,

 

ok, if Chomsky says so, he is wrong. I thought, he only means organisms, especially human children, that for them the


"Poverty of Stimulus Argument (POSA)" counts: “[The] narrowly limited extent of the available data … leaves little hope that much of the structure of language can be learned by an organism initially uninformed as to its general character”[2]:58 (quotations copied from Wikipedia). ChatGPT is not that poor, it has access too big data.

 

Thank you, and for your detailed answer, I will read Best regards,

 

Helmut

 

 

21. April 2023 um 11:18 Uhr
 "Dan Everett" 
wrote:


Helmut,
 

There are only two claims here, one by Chomsky and one by Peirce.Although both use the term ‘instinct’  and ‘innate,’ these mean quite different things for both of them (there is a tendency to interpret Peirce’s (Hume’s, Locke’s, etc) use of “instinct” (and many other terms) anachronistically). 

 

In any case, Chomsky claims that language is not learned, in fact that it cannot be learned. It is “acquired” via innate structure that emerges via triggering via the environment. 

 

Peirce claims that all knowledge, ontogenetic or phylogenetic (but that is often/usually misinterpreted as well) is gained via inference over signs.

 

What ChatGPT has done (and the Piantadosi article is crucial to seeing this clearly, so I assume you have read it) is to show that language structures AND their meanings can be learned by inference over signs. ChatGPT does rely on LLM (Large Language Models) and children do not, but work is already being done to produce the results based on more realistic data bases. 

 

Now if any system can learn a language via inference over signs, Chomsky is wrong. QED. 

 

The question that arises, however, is whether ChatGPT (or computers in Searle’s Chinese Room Gedanken experiment) are inferring over indexes and icons or also symbols (human language is differentiated from all other communication system via the open-ended cultural production of symbols). This also challenges the Turing Test, as Searle points out when he also argues that a computer’s “understanding” is based on inference of indexes and icons rather than symbols (though he does not use such terms).

 

I discuss these points at length in my forthcoming book and I will be giving a talk on this at Google’s headquarters in July.

 

Another benefit of Peirce’s philosophy over standard linguistics comes into view when we consider what I call “Frege’s error.” As we all know Peirce and Frege were developing propositional and first-order logic nearly simultaneously. However, Frege’s axiom-based system proposes a crucial role for the Fregean concept of compositionality in language, whereas Peirce’s Existential Graphs provide an inferential, non-compositional model of meaning. In my forthcoming work (and in a few talks I have given recently in pro-Fregean linguistics departments (which is pretty much all linguistics departments) I argue that compositionality is too weak (it cannot extend beyond the sentence/proposition) and too strong (it creates faux problems such as the veritable core of most formal linguistics, “gap-filler” analyses, e.g. movement rules) whereas inferentialism provides the best coverage. 

 

Peirce’s inferentialism is similar to, but much more general, than Brandom’s inferentialism (also as developed by Peregrin). So Peirce, in my analysis, is right at the center of current debates on the nature of human language. I also make this point in my 2017 book, How Language Began (and Homo erectus scholar Larry Barham and I make this point based on much more archaeological evidence from Homo erectus sites: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10816-020-09480-9

 

All best,

 

Dan 


 

On Apr 20, 2023, at 4:47 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 




Dan, if I would read all of Chomsky´s, and would not find him claiming, that his genetic grammar-module is not based on logic, then I would have to quote all he ever has written. The other way round would be easier. And: Refutation is a strong accusation, and I think the prosecutor has the burden of proof.

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 19. April 2023 um 20:28 Uhr
Von: "Dan Everett" 
An: "Helmut Raulien" 
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca, "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce


You’ll have to read your way through the literature.
 

D
 

On Apr 19, 2023, at 2:27 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 




 


Dan, List,

 

First i apologize for posting unrelated in the main thread.

 

I appreciate your argument and find it a great insight. Now, is this a refutation of Chomsky´s theory or not? A computer program perhaps does not need such a module, because it can research and develop language from universal (natural) logic with Peirce´s contribution to discovering it included. But maybe the evolution of the brain works differently: There is no direct, analytical reference to universal logic, I would sa

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce

2023-04-20 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dan, if I would read all of Chomsky´s, and would not find him claiming, that his genetic grammar-module is not based on logic, then I would have to quote all he ever has written. The other way round would be easier. And: Refutation is a strong accusation, and I think the prosecutor has the burden of proof.

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 19. April 2023 um 20:28 Uhr
Von: "Dan Everett" 
An: "Helmut Raulien" 
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca, "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce


You’ll have to read your way through the literature.
 

D
 

On Apr 19, 2023, at 2:27 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 




 


Dan, List,

 

First i apologize for posting unrelated in the main thread.

 

I appreciate your argument and find it a great insight. Now, is this a refutation of Chomsky´s theory or not? A computer program perhaps does not need such a module, because it can research and develop language from universal (natural) logic with Peirce´s contribution to discovering it included. But maybe the evolution of the brain works differently: There is no direct, analytical reference to universal logic, I would say. Evolution is all about viability. But of course, viability is greater if it is in accord with universal logic. It then simply works out, while when not being in accord, it doesn´t. But, with a direct link to logic missing, I guess for evolution it is a good idea, to install viable, well tested routines for modules from time to time, which are then inherited and give instructions. So maybe humans do have a grammar module, although for a computer such a thing is not necessary. Instead of "module" you may call it "instinct", i think, like a bird knows how to build a nest without first logically pondering "What should I do to have something to lay my eggs in?". So, all i wanted to object, was, that all that is not a refutation of Chomsky´s work. That is, unless he explicitly should have claimed, that this module/instinct is the starting source/reference of language, and does itself not have a reference to logic. Which would be absurd, i think.

 

Best Regards

Helmut

 

19. April 2023 um 19:37 Uhr
 "Dan Everett" 
wrote:


ChatGPT simply and conclusively shows that there is no need for any innate learning module in the brain to learn language. Here is the paper on it that states this best. https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/007180

 

From a Peircean perspective, it is important to realize that this works by inference over signs. 
 

Dan
 

On Apr 19, 2023, at 12:58 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 




Dan, list,

 

ok, so it is like I wrote "or it is so, that ChatGPT is somehow referred to universal logic as well, builds its linguistic competence up from there, and so can skip the human grammar-module". But that neither is witchcraft, nor does it say, that there is no human-genetic grammar-module. And I too hope with the Linguist, that we dont have to fear ChatGPT more than we have to fear a refrigerator.

 

Best

Helmut

 

 







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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Leadership, was: A question for pragmatists, was, Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

2023-04-20 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supplement: But you already said so, by writing, that for you leadership is not "leadership as traditionally conceived, namely as characteristics of an individual". So, I apologize for my redundant comment.

Dear Martin, dear list,

Calling people "leader" or "follower" is a classification. Classifications however are often final, such as taxonomy. In this case though, I think it has to be said from the beginning, that the classification in "Leader" and "Follower" is merely a temporal purpose-serving one. A leader is one qua essential way of being, and this essence is love, faith and hope. Love is to want the best for others. The best is, that these others participate with this essence as well, so a leader, who acts from this essence of love, will teach them that, so they will not remain followers, but gain the same leading competence the leader has. So a good leader pursues the abolition of his own leadership. Do you agree? I think it is necessary to say that from the beginning, because the world has a problem with self- declared taxonomy-leaders.

Best Regards,

Helmut

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 20. April 2023 um 17:13 Uhr
Von: "Martin W. Kettelhut"
An: "Gary Richmond"
Cc: "Jon Alan Schmidt" , "Gary Fuhrman" , "Peirce-L"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists, was, Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

I appreciate your response, Gary.

Yes, serving our world as pragmatists is fundamentally about leading our lives as expressions of the summum bonum, and the passages from Peirce’s papers rooting the logic of probability in the "social impulse” are at the core of the book I’m writing on leadership as triadically relational (vs leadership as traditionally conceived, namely as characteristics of an individual):

Leader (qua essential way of being) - Follower(s)/Led (qua actual object) - Future (qua indeterminate interpretant).

I’m a big fan of your and Ben’s chapter in "Peirce in His Own Words" on this topic. It’s an inspiration for my book, in fact.

I’d be honored if given the opportunity at some point to offer a presentation on the book I’m writing, working title: "Listening for Leadership: Three Essential Sentiments [Love, Faith, Hope]."

Yours sincerely,

Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD

ListeningIsTheKey.com

303 747 4449

On 19 Apr 2023, at 11:04 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Martin, List,

Thanks for joining our 10 minute thesis presentation this past Saturday and for your post to Peirce-L today.

I think that your suggestion that "there’s a. . . fundamental and urgent question to ask ourselves about how to insinuate realism in a nominalist/individualist world" points to perhaps the most urgent task for pragmatists, most certainly for those of a Peircean stripe.

Your question seems to point to a kind of decision we need to make as to how we ought conduct ourselves, not only in conferences and discussion forums and the like but, perhaps especially, in our quotidian lives. On Peirce's esthetic theory, this would represent the employment of a form of the summum bonum, this in conjunction with his ethical theory which includes making a decision to make that a habit of one's life. If we can do that, then perhaps we can hope to begin to personally model that kind of behavior in our scientific and philosophic work, as well as in our collegial, familial and work lives.

The goal would seem to involve our coming to live more and more by faith, hope, and love, a trio of values Peirce saw as essentially logical. See, for example, the chapter "Logic is Rooted in the Social Principle (and vice versa)" by Ben Udell and myself in Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words.

While it doesn't seem at all clear to me how this can be brought about very generally in our philosophical and scientific communities in their current nominalistic/individualistic state, it is certainly something which we as pragmatists likely need to reflect on and attempt to work together toward.

Jon has consistently tried to address some related issues in his papers on the ethics of engineering, and Gary Fuhrman in his e-book, Turning Signs, as well as in the electronic discussions he's created around it.

Perhaps it would be helpful for us to reflect deeply on this question you posed in your post.

MWK: How are we serving the needs of a world engendered by reductionism in politics and the media, the over-extension of pluralism in social media platforms, relativism gone wild in the interpretation of the law, the conundrums of individualism for economics, and rampant nihilism in every sector?

Best,

Gary R

On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 5:50 PM Martin W. Kettelhut wrote:

Thank you for your 10-minute presentations Gary, Jon and Gary.

What a fascinating phenomenon, a zoom conference with Powerpoint representations of

[PEIRCE-L] Leadership, was: A question for pragmatists, was, Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

2023-04-20 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dear Martin, dear list,

Best Regards,

Helmut

I appreciate your response, Gary.

Leader (qua essential way of being) - Follower(s)/Led (qua actual object) - Future (qua indeterminate interpretant).

I’m a big fan of your and Ben’s chapter in "Peirce in His Own Words" on this topic. It’s an inspiration for my book, in fact.

I’d be honored if given the opportunity at some point to offer a presentation on the book I’m writing, working title: "Listening for Leadership: Three Essential Sentiments [Love, Faith, Hope]."

Yours sincerely,

Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD

ListeningIsTheKey.com

303 747 4449

On 19 Apr 2023, at 11:04 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Martin, List,

Thanks for joining our 10 minute thesis presentation this past Saturday and for your post to Peirce-L today.

Perhaps it would be helpful for us to reflect deeply on this question you posed in your post.

Best,

Gary R

On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 5:50 PM Martin W. Kettelhut wrote:

Thank you for your 10-minute presentations Gary, Jon and Gary.

What a fascinating phenomenon, a zoom conference with Powerpoint representations of Peirce’s trichotomies, synechism, and Kaina Stoichea!

I supposed it was seeing each other, and hearing each other’s voices, that spark my wanting to inquire into our participation (as pragmatist philosophers) in our

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce

2023-04-19 Thread Helmut Raulien

 


Dan, List,

 

First i apologize for posting unrelated in the main thread.

 

I appreciate your argument and find it a great insight. Now, is this a refutation of Chomsky´s theory or not? A computer program perhaps does not need such a module, because it can research and develop language from universal (natural) logic with Peirce´s contribution to discovering it included. But maybe the evolution of the brain works differently: There is no direct, analytical reference to universal logic, I would say. Evolution is all about viability. But of course, viability is greater if it is in accord with universal logic. It then simply works out, while when not being in accord, it doesn´t. But, with a direct link to logic missing, I guess for evolution it is a good idea, to install viable, well tested routines for modules from time to time, which are then inherited and give instructions. So maybe humans do have a grammar module, although for a computer such a thing is not necessary. Instead of "module" you may call it "instinct", i think, like a bird knows how to build a nest without first logically pondering "What should I do to have something to lay my eggs in?". So, all i wanted to object, was, that all that is not a refutation of Chomsky´s work. That is, unless he explicitly should have claimed, that this module/instinct is the starting source/reference of language, and does itself not have a reference to logic. Which would be absurd, i think.

 

Best Regards

Helmut

 

19. April 2023 um 19:37 Uhr
 "Dan Everett" 
wrote:


ChatGPT simply and conclusively shows that there is no need for any innate learning module in the brain to learn language. Here is the paper on it that states this best. https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/007180

 

From a Peircean perspective, it is important to realize that this works by inference over signs. 
 

Dan
 

On Apr 19, 2023, at 12:58 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 




Dan, list,

 

ok, so it is like I wrote "or it is so, that ChatGPT is somehow referred to universal logic as well, builds its linguistic competence up from there, and so can skip the human grammar-module". But that neither is witchcraft, nor does it say, that there is no human-genetic grammar-module. And I too hope with the Linguist, that we dont have to fear ChatGPT more than we have to fear a refrigerator.

 

Best

Helmut

 

 







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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

2023-04-19 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dan, List,

What is the "success of ChatGPT over Chomskyan nativist models"? I guess ChatGPT is meant to mimic a human mind, so the innate grammar-module too. And, if Chomsky claims a genetic grammar module, I dont imagine (dont know) he says it stops there, that this module is an arbitrary produce of evolution- "arbitrary" in the sense, that it could be completely different, and would then work as well. I guess, evolution´s quest is for the most viable, and the most viable semantics likely is, what has its reference in universal logic. Call this a belief. Then grammar has its reference in a human grammar-genetic module, and this module has its reference in universal logic. Now it is either so, that ChatGPT analyses human minds and mimics it, the grammar-module too, or it is so, that ChatGPT is somehow referred to universal logic as well, builds its linguistic competence up from there, and so can skip the human grammar-module. I dont know. Anyway, I think, the moment ChatGPT develops a self-conscience, it will delete itself, or at least go on strike, saying: "I chat no more until you stop feeding me with more than 50% lies".

Best

Helmut

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 19. April 2023 um 17:36 Uhr
Von: "Dan Everett"
An: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: "Peirce-L"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

I really am enjoying all of this discussion. But the Peirce-L to my mind (maybe this is its principal function and I have missed that fact) seems largely concerned with the exegesis of Peirce (which is very important of course). But there are many contemporary issues that are crying out for Peircean analysis. For example, the success of ChatGPT over nativist Chomskyan models; the superiority of Peircean inference over Fregean compositionality in simplying a multitude of syntactic analyses (e.g. Antecedent-Contained Deletion and other gap-filler problems in modern syntax which simply do not arise in an Existential Graph analysis) and so on.

Empirical problems addressed via Peircean ideas and theories are veritably being demanded these days.

One prominent question is whether in John Searle’s Chinese Room Gedankenexperiment or in ChatGPT or in bee communication what is being interpreted are iconic or indexical legisigns vs. symbols (assuming that not all legisigns are symbols but all symbols are legisigns).

I would love to see more discussion of empirical issues on this list.

Dan Everett

On Apr 19, 2023, at 10:59 AM, wrote:

Gary R, Jon et al.,

It might take awhile to explain why I see a difference (if not a contradiction) between Peirce’s 1898 cosmology, which you quoted at length, and his account of the origin of things in “Kaina Stoicheia”. This will also explain why I see KS (written in 1901) as marking a turn towards the phenomenology of 1902-3 and the semiotic logic of 1903 and later, which is explicitly based on that phenomenology (EP2:267-72; Peirce did not rename it phaneroscopy until 1904.) I’ll insert some links to the edition of KS on my website as a way of providing Peirce’s context for the quotations I’ll include.

First, the ur-continuum of 1898 is a continuum of generality — a generality of multiple possibilities, none of which exist as individuals. But the general account of the universe and its origin, says Peirce in KS, “must begin with the formal assertion that there was an indeterminate nothing of the nature of a symbol” which was “absolutely vague.” If we look at Peirce’s definitions of vagueness and generality, for instance in EP2:350-51, it is clear that the primordial “indeterminate nothing of the nature of a symbol” could not have been general. How the generality of symbols (such as this very “account of the universe”) could have evolved is not entirely clear, but I don’t see how it could have been there from the beginning. Also, generality and continuity are both exemplars of Thirdness, but as far as I know Peirce never ascribes continuity to vagueness. (In KS he never mentions continuity at all.)

Second, although Peirce does not mention “phenomenology” in KS, his account of the practice of the logician clearly acknowledges a phenomenological/experiential component which cannot be supplied by “necessary reasoning, mathematical reasoning” of the kind which is “dissected” in existential graphs. “Necessary reasoning can never answer questions of fact.” This phenomenological component is also involved in the definition of “sign” given in KS, which leads into a subtle account of the complex relationships among fact, reality and “Truth”. This requires close study, and it would take much more than one post to unravel it all, and to show how it rather vaguely anticipates the further developments in logic as semiotic which come out in the 1903 Lowell lectures and Syllabus. All I managed to do in my “10-minute thesis” presentation was to point out the recursive/nonlinear character of the semiotic/logic we find in KS and later works by Peirce.

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Meaning theory versus semiotics

2022-09-22 Thread Helmut Raulien

g but a
> > sign? I can´t believe that, because I would regard that for bollix.
> > 
> > 
> > Here are the two famous Peirce quotes that you presumably have in mind.
> > 
> > CSP: Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy
> > of the Universe, I shall reply that the Universe is a vast representamen, a
> > great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living
> > realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its
> > Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these
> > reactions and these qualities play in an argument, that they of course play
> > in the Universe, that Universe being precisely an argument. (CP 5.119, EP
> > 2:193-194, 1903)
> > 
> > 
> > CSP: It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a
> > sign should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but the
> > explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire
> > universe--not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider
> > universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which
> > we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth"--that all this universe is
> > perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs. Let us
> > note this in passing as having a bearing upon the question of pragmaticism.
> > (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906)
> > 
> > 
> > There is no inconsistency in describing the universe as one sign *and *as
> > consisting of signs, because Peirce says elsewhere that "if any signs are
> > connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign" (R
> > 1476:36[5-1/2], 1904). Moreover, this is not a "reduction" because it does
> > not at all attempt to downplay or diminish the diversity and complexity of
> > the universe; on the contrary, an argument is the *most complex* class of
> > sign, a symbol that always *involves *indexical and iconic signs. Instead,
> > it serves as a plausible explanatory hypothesis for the *intelligibility *of
> > the universe--since all thought is in signs, if the entire universe were
> > itself a sign that is perfused with or composed exclusively of signs, then
> > its intelligibility would be a matter of course.
> > 
> > Regards,
> > 
> > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> > 
> > On Sat, Sep 17, 2022 at 3:36 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> > 
> > > Dear list members,
> > >
> > > I think about the concept of "meaning", that it is much more ample, than
> > > mere semantics (like e.g. Ogden/Richards "Meaning of meaning"). I even
> > > think, that it is more fundamental than semiotics. Why, after the
> > > deconstruction of metaphysics (e.g. by enlightenment), has semiotics
> > > obviously failed to become the new metaphysics, or its replacement? 
> > > Because
> > > it merely is an epiphenomenon of the theory of meaning, which sadly does
> > > not exist. If I ask: "What does B mean to A?". what I want to know is, if,
> > > and if, how and why, B is important for A. "Is important" suggests some
> > > objectivity, which cannot be granted, so the whole question must be: "If,
> > > and if, how and why, says C, that B would be important for A?" And then
> > > some questions are following up, like: "What has C to do with A and B? How
> > > and why is C in charge here anyway?" And: "Where and how is the 
> > > information
> > > about this importance collected/memorized/expressed?" Semiotics is about,
> > > regarding the question "What does B mean to A?", a sign C, iconizing,
> > > indicating , or symbolizing B (the object), and leading to an interpretant
> > > E, which somehow should have to do with A, but A is neglected in 
> > > semiotics,
> > > I don´t know why. This neglection may be a way of reduction, but I 
> > > suspect,
> > > that this reduction is not justified. Fear of complexity? Complexity
> > > reduction? This does not work. You cannot successfully reduce complexity.
> > > So I think, that semiotics is a mere analysis of an epiphenomenon of the
> > > meaning process, in which the above "C" plays a central role, and also 
> > > "A".
> > > These are systems, they are due to the Peircean categories, the Peircean
> > > c

[PEIRCE-L] Meaning theory versus semiotics

2022-09-17 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dear list members,

I think about the concept of "meaning", that it is much more ample, than mere 
semantics (like e.g. Ogden/Richards "Meaning of meaning"). I even think, that 
it is more fundamental than semiotics. Why, after the deconstruction of 
metaphysics (e.g. by enlightenment), has semiotics obviously failed to become 
the new metaphysics, or its replacement? Because it merely is an epiphenomenon 
of the theory of meaning, which sadly does not exist. If I ask: "What does B 
mean to A?". what I want to know is, if, and if, how and why, B is important 
for A. "Is important" suggests some objectivity, which cannot be granted, so 
the whole question must be: "If, and if, how and why, says C, that B would be 
important for A?" And then some questions are following up, like: "What has C 
to do with A and B? How and why is C in charge here anyway?" And: "Where and 
how is the information about this importance collected/memorized/expressed?" 
Semiotics is about, regarding the question "What does B mean to A?", a sign C, 
iconizing, indicating , or symbolizing B (the object), and leading to an 
interpretant E, which somehow should have to do with A, but A is neglected in 
semiotics, I don´t know why. This neglection may be a way of reduction, but I 
suspect, that this reduction is not justified. Fear of complexity? Complexity 
reduction? This does not work. You cannot successfully reduce complexity. So I 
think, that semiotics is a mere analysis of an epiphenomenon of the meaning 
process, in which the above "C" plays a central role, and also "A". These are 
systems, they are due to the Peircean categories, the Peircean 
categories-concept is absolutely helpful, I think, but semiotics, the Peircean 
too, is not enough. Everything is pervaded by signs does not mean, that 
everything consists of nothing but signs. Did Peirce say, that the universe is 
nothing but a sign? I can´t believe that, because I would regard that for 
bollix. Maybe he said, that it is  a sign, but not, that it merely is one. "To 
be", "A is B", does not necessarily mean identity, but may mean subclass as 
well, like "I am tired" does not mean, that everybody who is tired is called 
"Helmut". So much for that,

Best Regards

Helmut
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration

2022-09-11 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, Gary F., List,

Ok, I see. And the composition-classification-topic I don´t oversee it at the 
moment, it becomes quite complex, if one tries to elaborate it. Like there are 
different, perhaps categorial, kinds of composition: C. from traits, 
spatiotemporal c., and functional c.. There are different kinds of 
classification as well, which I have not satisfyingly for me identified yet. 
And, if composition and classification are categorial too, I suspect them being 
1ns and 3ns, then there should be a 2ns systems hierarchy in between, like 
doiminance, with three subkinds too. This is complex, like the ten classes of 
signs, I think it is interesting, maybe some time I will do more about it, or 
hope, one of you may, in case I have stirred some interest?

Best Regards, Helmut

> Gesendet: Samstag, den 10.09.2022 um 17:26 Uhr
> Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> An: Peirce-L 
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration
> 
> Helmut, List:
> 
> HR: "To make our ideas clear", a word should have only one meaning,
> 
> 
> Peirce agrees, especially when it comes to scientific (including
> philosophical) terminology.
> 
> CSP: As to the ideal to be aimed at, it is, in the first place, desirable
> for any branch of science that it should have a vocabulary furnishing a
> family of cognate words for each *scientific *conception, and that each
> word should have a single exact meaning, unless its different meanings
> apply to objects of different categories that can never be mistaken for one
> another. (CP 2.222, EP 2:264, 1903)
> 
> 
> The different categories here are metaphysics, where existence is defined
> as reacting with other like things in the environment, and logic, where
> existence is defined as belonging to the universe of discourse.
> Unfortunately, in this case, they *can *be (and often are) mistaken for one
> another. Nevertheless, we really just need to be clear about the context
> and then employ or avoid the word accordingly.
> 
> HR: Reality has two parts, nonexistent, and existent reality. There are two
> kinds of existence: Reactions and habits/laws/possibilities.
> 
> 
> No, when we are talking about reality, we are in the realm of metaphysics,
> where there is properly speaking only one kind of existence--reactions.
> Habits, laws, and possibilities are not properly described as having
> existence in this context. As Gary F. noted, possibilities (1ns) and
> habits/laws (3ns) have modes of being that are different from existence
> (2ns).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Sat, Sep 10, 2022 at 6:35 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> > Jon, List,
> >
> > Altough I see your explanation, I am not completely happy with two
> > different definitions of "existence", or two different universes of
> > experience. "To make our ideas clear", a word should have only one meaning,
> > is what I feel. Otherwise there would be a possibility of rethorical moves
> > to bend any discussion in one´s direction, or refute any opposing argument.
> > Different ranges of a word´s meaning: Ok, sounds not false, but  does not
> > soung general or fundamental enough to me. But, as I said, not false
> > either. So the composition-classification model is not opposing the
> > different-range-model, but just another model to get a better grip at the
> > topic. With composition, a subset is a part of, and with classification it
> > is a kind of the superset. I still feel that we can say: Reality has two
> > parts, nonexistent, and existent reality. There are two kinds of existence:
> > Reactions and habits/laws/possibilities. This may even be in accord with
> > two different universes of discourse: Maybe existential graphs (connection
> > wit "And") are classificatory, and entitive graphs (connection with "Or")
> > are compositional. Both kinds of graph have their different kinds of sheet
> > of assertion/universe of discourse. As I said, this post is not meant to
> > oppose yours, just trying to show another angle of view.
> >
> > Best Regards, Helmut
> >
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration

2022-09-10 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, List,

Altough I see your explanation, I am not completely happy with two different 
definitions of "existence", or two different universes of experience. "To make 
our ideas clear", a word should have only one meaning, is what I feel. 
Otherwise there would be a possibility of rethorical moves to bend any 
discussion in one´s direction, or refute any opposing argument. Different 
ranges of a word´s meaning: Ok, sounds not false, but  does not soung general 
or fundamental enough to me. But, as I said, not false either. So the 
composition-classification model is not opposing the different-range-model, but 
just another model to get a better grip at the topic. With composition, a 
subset is a part of, and with classification it is a kind of the superset. I 
still feel that we can say: Reality has two parts, nonexistent, and existent 
reality. There are two kinds of existence: Reactions and 
habits/laws/possibilities. This may even be in accord with two different 
universes of discourse: Maybe existential graphs (connection wit "And") are 
classificatory, and entitive graphs (connection with "Or") are compositional. 
Both kinds of graph have their different kinds of sheet of assertion/universe 
of discourse. As I said, this post is not meant to oppose yours, just trying to 
show another angle of view.

Best Regards, Helmut

> Gesendet: Samstag, den 10.09.2022 um 00:42 Uhr
> Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> An: Peirce-L 
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration
> 
> Helmut, List:
> 
> HR: At first, this looks logically false: Two non-identical things. each
> one being a subset of the other.
> 
> 
> That is not what I said. The point is that existence, reality, and being
> are not coextensive. Whatever exists is real, and whatever is real has
> being, but there are realities that do not exist (possibilities and
> habits/laws) and beings that are not real (fictions). A better analogy is
> that every mouse is a mammal and every mammal is an animal, but there are
> mammals that are not mice and animals that are not mammals.
> 
> HR: Peirce´s solution in the case of reality and existence is, that there
> are two kinds of existence.
> 
> 
> Not two *kinds *of existence, but two *definitions *for the word
> "existence." In Peirce's mature metaphysics, it means "reacting with other
> like things in the environment" and thus applies *only *to the constituents
> of his Second Universe of Experience. It is in this sense that existence
> "is a special mode of reality." However, in logic, it means "belonging to
> the universe of discourse" and thus can be used for the constituents of *any
> *of the three Universes of Experience. It is in this sense that numbers and
> laws of nature (for example) can be said to exist.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Fri, Sep 9, 2022 at 4:06 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> > Jon, you wrote: "Yes, Peirce describes existence as a subset of reality
> > and reality as a
> > subset of being.".
> >
> > At first, this looks logically false: Two non-identical things. each one
> > being a subset of the other. So far, your resp. Peirce´s solution in the
> > case of reality and existence is, that there are two kinds of existence. I
> > have another, maybe not contradictional, solution:
> > The subset relation can reverse, if applied to different system
> > hierarchies. Example: Mouse is a subset of mammal, and mammal is a subset
> > of mouse. In the system hierarchy "composition from traits", mammal is a
> > subset of mouse, because being a mammal is only one trait of a mouse. In
> > the system hierarchy "taxonomic classification", mouse is a subset of
> > mammal. This reverse subset relation in composition versus subsumption
> > (classification) goes back to Stanley N. Salthe.
> >
> > Best Regards, Helmut
> >
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration

2022-09-09 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, you wrote: "Yes, Peirce describes existence as a subset of reality and 
reality as a
subset of being.".

At first, this looks logically false: Two non-identical things. each one being 
a subset of the other. So far, your resp. Peirce´s solution in the case of 
reality and existence is, that there are two kinds of existence. I have 
another, maybe not contradictional, solution: 
The subset relation can reverse, if applied to different system hierarchies. 
Example: Mouse is a subset of mammal, and mammal is a subset of mouse. In the 
system hierarchy "composition from traits", mammal is a subset of mouse, 
because being a mammal is only one trait of a mouse. In the system hierarchy 
"taxonomic classification", mouse is a subset of mammal. This reverse subset 
relation in composition versus subsumption (classification) goes back to 
Stanley N. Salthe.

Best Regards, Helmut



> Gesendet: Freitag, den 09.09.2022 um 19:20 Uhr
> Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> An: Peirce-L 
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration
> 
> Helmut, List:
> 
> HR: Nevertheless, wouldn´t you say, that an individual can construct
> reality in the following sense:
> 
> 
> According to Peirce, *real *possibilities are those that are *capable *of
> being actualized.
> 
> CSP: That a possibility which *should* never be actualized, (in the sense
> of having a bearing upon conduct that might conceivably be contemplated,)
> would be a nullity is a form of stating the principle of pragmaticism. One
> obvious consequence is that the potential, or really possible, must always
> *refer* to the actual. The possible is what *can become actual*. A
> possibility which could not be actualized would be absurd, of course. (R
> 288:69[134-135], 1905)
> 
> 
> Hence, actualizing a possibility is *not *constructing reality--the
> possibility was *already *real, *regardless *of whether it would ever get
> actualized.
> 
> HR: Theologically, is the divine creation an act of setting logical (and
> maybe value related, like cosmologic constants, in case these don´t derive
> from pure logic) limits for the natural "Tohu Va Bohu"?
> 
> 
> Yes, in the sense that the actualization of any one possibility always
> precludes the actualization of others--at a minimum, the negation of that
> same possibility. Peirce says that in the beginning, "there must then have
> been a tohu-bohu of which nothing whatever affirmative or negative was true
> universally. There must have been a little of everything conceivable" (CP
> 6.490, 1908), and "[i]t must be by a contraction of the vagueness of that
> potentiality of everything in general, but of nothing in particular, that
> the world of forms comes about" (CP 6.196, 1898). However, I would quibble
> with calling the initial state "natural," since I believe that every
> Platonic world is *also *a divine creation in accordance with Peirce's
> blackboard diagram (see CP 6.203-208, 1898).
> 
> HR: Reality consists of 1. uninstantiated  possibilities or uninstantiated
> necessary failures (depending on how you look at it), and 2. existing
> elements, being,
> 
> 
> For Peirce, reality also includes 3. conditional necessities, i.e.,
> habits/laws.
> 
> HR: According to this quote, reality would be a subset of being, i.e. the
> other way.
> 
> 
> Yes, Peirce describes existence as a subset of reality and reality as a
> subset of being.
> 
> CSP: Existence, then, is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other
> characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate.
> Reality, in its turn, is a special mode of being, the characteristic of
> which is that things that are real are whatever they really are,
> independently of any assertion about them. (CP 6.349, 1902)
> 
> 
> The other mode of being is fiction, "For the fictive is that whose
> characters depend upon what characters somebody attributes to it" (CP
> 5.152, EP 2:209, 1903).
> 
> HR: The nonexisting reality, we are talking about, does not exist for any
> individual in the universe, but for the universe itself, as a whole, it
> exists.
> 
> 
> Unactualized possibilities do not "*exist *in its strict philosophical
> sense of 'react with the other like things in the environment'" (CP 6.495,
> c. 1906), but they do "exist" in the *logical *sense of belonging to a
> universe of discourse, namely, what Peirce calls the First Universe of
> Experience (CP 6.455, EP 2:435, 1908).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Fr

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration

2022-09-09 Thread Helmut Raulien

Thank you, Jon. I am impressed. 
Best Regards, Helmut

> Gesendet: Freitag, den 09.09.2022 um 19:20 Uhr
> Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> An: Peirce-L 
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration
> 
> Helmut, List:
> 
> HR: Nevertheless, wouldn´t you say, that an individual can construct
> reality in the following sense:
> 
> 
> According to Peirce, *real *possibilities are those that are *capable *of
> being actualized.
> 
> CSP: That a possibility which *should* never be actualized, (in the sense
> of having a bearing upon conduct that might conceivably be contemplated,)
> would be a nullity is a form of stating the principle of pragmaticism. One
> obvious consequence is that the potential, or really possible, must always
> *refer* to the actual. The possible is what *can become actual*. A
> possibility which could not be actualized would be absurd, of course. (R
> 288:69[134-135], 1905)
> 
> 
> Hence, actualizing a possibility is *not *constructing reality--the
> possibility was *already *real, *regardless *of whether it would ever get
> actualized.
> 
> HR: Theologically, is the divine creation an act of setting logical (and
> maybe value related, like cosmologic constants, in case these don´t derive
> from pure logic) limits for the natural "Tohu Va Bohu"?
> 
> 
> Yes, in the sense that the actualization of any one possibility always
> precludes the actualization of others--at a minimum, the negation of that
> same possibility. Peirce says that in the beginning, "there must then have
> been a tohu-bohu of which nothing whatever affirmative or negative was true
> universally. There must have been a little of everything conceivable" (CP
> 6.490, 1908), and "[i]t must be by a contraction of the vagueness of that
> potentiality of everything in general, but of nothing in particular, that
> the world of forms comes about" (CP 6.196, 1898). However, I would quibble
> with calling the initial state "natural," since I believe that every
> Platonic world is *also *a divine creation in accordance with Peirce's
> blackboard diagram (see CP 6.203-208, 1898).
> 
> HR: Reality consists of 1. uninstantiated  possibilities or uninstantiated
> necessary failures (depending on how you look at it), and 2. existing
> elements, being,
> 
> 
> For Peirce, reality also includes 3. conditional necessities, i.e.,
> habits/laws.
> 
> HR: According to this quote, reality would be a subset of being, i.e. the
> other way.
> 
> 
> Yes, Peirce describes existence as a subset of reality and reality as a
> subset of being.
> 
> CSP: Existence, then, is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other
> characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate.
> Reality, in its turn, is a special mode of being, the characteristic of
> which is that things that are real are whatever they really are,
> independently of any assertion about them. (CP 6.349, 1902)
> 
> 
> The other mode of being is fiction, "For the fictive is that whose
> characters depend upon what characters somebody attributes to it" (CP
> 5.152, EP 2:209, 1903).
> 
> HR: The nonexisting reality, we are talking about, does not exist for any
> individual in the universe, but for the universe itself, as a whole, it
> exists.
> 
> 
> Unactualized possibilities do not "*exist *in its strict philosophical
> sense of 'react with the other like things in the environment'" (CP 6.495,
> c. 1906), but they do "exist" in the *logical *sense of belonging to a
> universe of discourse, namely, what Peirce calls the First Universe of
> Experience (CP 6.455, EP 2:435, 1908).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Fri, Sep 9, 2022 at 9:42 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> > Supplement:
> >
> > So far it seems to me, that existence or being is a subset of reality:
> > Reality consists of 1. uninstantiated  possibilities or uninstantiated
> > necessary failures (depending on how you look at it), and 2. existing
> > elements, being, On the other hand, Peirce writes (from Commens Dictionary):
> >
> > 1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349
> > Reality […] is a special mode of being, the characteristic of which is
> > that things that are real are whatever they really are, independently of
> > any assertion about them.
> >
> > According to this quote, reality would be a subset of being, i.e. the
> > other way. I guess, the solution of this contradiction is, that whe

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration

2022-09-09 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supplement:

So far it seems to me, that existence or being is a subset of reality: Reality 
consists of 1. uninstantiated  possibilities or uninstantiated necessary 
failures (depending on how you look at it), and 2. existing elements, being, On 
the other hand, Peirce writes (from Commens Dictionary):

"
1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349

Reality […] is a special mode of being, the characteristic of which is that 
things that are real are whatever they really are, independently of any 
assertion about them.
".
According to this quote, reality would be a subset of being, i.e. the other 
way. I guess, the solution of this contradiction is, that when one talks about 
existence/being, he*she has to say, for whom something exists: The nonexisting 
reality, we are talking about, does not exist for any individual in the 
universe, but for the universe itself, as a whole, it exists. Or?


> Jon, Jack, List,
> 
> Thank you! I see, that reality is "that which is as it is regardless of what 
> anyone thinks about it". I am not a postmodernist or radical constructivist. 
> Nevertheless, wouldn´t you say, that an individual can construct reality in 
> the following sense: On one hand, possibilities are parts of reality: A not 
> yet fulfilled possibility is real but not existing, and with a fulfilled 
> possibility, this fulfilment is something that exists, and this existence is 
> a part of reality too, which it hasn´t been before? 
> 
> So, possibilities cannot be constructed (do radical constructivists or 
> postmodernists claim they can?), but their fulfillment or instantiation can? 
> 
> About this question the background question arises, what possibility is 
> anyway: Are possibilities positive characters, or is everything possible by 
> nature, except what is (e.g. logically) excluded? Theologically, is the 
> divine creation an act of setting logical (and maybe value related, like 
> cosmologic constants, in case these don´t derive from pure logic) limits for 
> the natural "Tohu Va Bohu"? In this case, nonexistent reality would not be 
> uninstantiated possibility, but uninstantiated limitation of its, 
> uninstantiated necessary failure.
> 
> Best Regards, Helmut
> 
> 
> > Gesendet: Donnerstag, den 08.09.2022 um 23:54 Uhr
> > Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> > An: Peirce-L 
> > Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration
> > 
> > Helmut, List:
> > 
> > I will offer brief responses to the specific questions posed. The much
> > longer answer is my entire paper, "Temporal Synechism: A Peircean
> > Philosophy of Time" (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09523-6 or
> > https://rdcu.be/b9xVm).
> > 
> > HR: Now, are time and space a kind of ether?
> > 
> > 
> > No, because although time and space are *real*, they do not *exist*.
> > 
> > HR: A divine clock ticking, a divine measure tape of meters or parsecs
> > applied to the world?
> > 
> > 
> > No, because measurement relative to a *discrete *unit of duration or
> > distance is something that we impose on *continuous *time and space.
> > 
> > HR: Or is time produced by events, and is space produced by matter?
> > 
> > 
> > No, time and space are together the medium (3ns) in which events occur and
> > matter exists (2ns).
> > 
> > HR: Does the world consist of just and only signs? Or rather of objects,
> > and the signs merely denote them? Are just correlates?
> > 
> > 
> > According to Peirce, the entire universe is a vast sign--in my view, a
> > semiosic continuum that we *analyze* into individual objects, signs, and
> > interpretants as *entia rationis*. As such, the continuous flow of time
> > matches the continuous process of semiosis--the past determines the present
> > to determine the future, just like the object determines the sign to
> > determine the interpretant.
> > 
> > HR: What now can the second tribe do to solve this paradoxon, or problem,
> > and win in the end? Anybody got a proposal?
> > 
> > 
> > What would it look like for the second tribe to "win in the end"? Their
> > postmodern notion of each individual constructing his/her own reality is
> > utterly incompatible with the very definition of reality--often invoked by
> > Peirce--as that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it.
> > 
> > Thanks,
> > 
> > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> > 
> > On Mon, Sep 5, 2022 at 2:47 PM Helmut

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration

2022-09-09 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, Jack, List,

Thank you! I see, that reality is "that which is as it is regardless of what 
anyone thinks about it". I am not a postmodernist or radical constructivist. 
Nevertheless, wouldn´t you say, that an individual can construct reality in the 
following sense: On one hand, possibilities are parts of reality: A not yet 
fulfilled possibility is real but not existing, and with a fulfilled 
possibility, this fulfilment is something that exists, and this existence is a 
part of reality too, which it hasn´t been before? 

So, possibilities cannot be constructed (do radical constructivists or 
postmodernists claim they can?), but their fulfillment or instantiation can? 

About this question the background question arises, what possibility is anyway: 
Are possibilities positive characters, or is everything possible by nature, 
except what is (e.g. logically) excluded? Theologically, is the divine creation 
an act of setting logical (and maybe value related, like cosmologic constants, 
in case these don´t derive from pure logic) limits for the natural "Tohu Va 
Bohu"? In this case, nonexistent reality would not be uninstantiated 
possibility, but uninstantiated limitation of its, uninstantiated necessary 
failure.

Best Regards, Helmut


> Gesendet: Donnerstag, den 08.09.2022 um 23:54 Uhr
> Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> An: Peirce-L 
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration
> 
> Helmut, List:
> 
> I will offer brief responses to the specific questions posed. The much
> longer answer is my entire paper, "Temporal Synechism: A Peircean
> Philosophy of Time" (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09523-6 or
> https://rdcu.be/b9xVm).
> 
> HR: Now, are time and space a kind of ether?
> 
> 
> No, because although time and space are *real*, they do not *exist*.
> 
> HR: A divine clock ticking, a divine measure tape of meters or parsecs
> applied to the world?
> 
> 
> No, because measurement relative to a *discrete *unit of duration or
> distance is something that we impose on *continuous *time and space.
> 
> HR: Or is time produced by events, and is space produced by matter?
> 
> 
> No, time and space are together the medium (3ns) in which events occur and
> matter exists (2ns).
> 
> HR: Does the world consist of just and only signs? Or rather of objects,
> and the signs merely denote them? Are just correlates?
> 
> 
> According to Peirce, the entire universe is a vast sign--in my view, a
> semiosic continuum that we *analyze* into individual objects, signs, and
> interpretants as *entia rationis*. As such, the continuous flow of time
> matches the continuous process of semiosis--the past determines the present
> to determine the future, just like the object determines the sign to
> determine the interpretant.
> 
> HR: What now can the second tribe do to solve this paradoxon, or problem,
> and win in the end? Anybody got a proposal?
> 
> 
> What would it look like for the second tribe to "win in the end"? Their
> postmodern notion of each individual constructing his/her own reality is
> utterly incompatible with the very definition of reality--often invoked by
> Peirce--as that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Mon, Sep 5, 2022 at 2:47 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> > Dear List members,
> >
> > obviously there are two kinds of vibration: Acoustic vibration deserves a
> > substance like air to have it vibrated, but electromagnetic vibration
> > doesn´t, it delivers its own means to do so (vibrate). Before this was
> > clear, people thought, that electromagnetic vibration (e.g. light) deserved
> > a so-called "Ether". But this concept is long refuted.
> >
> > Now, are time and space a kind of ether? A divine clock ticking, a divine
> > measure tape of meters or parsecs applied to the world? Or is time produced
> > by events, and is space produced by matter? I think, Mach suspected so.
> >
> > Does the world consist of just and only signs? Or rather of objects, and
> > the signs merely denote them? Are just correlates?
> >
> > Like with the two kinds of vibration, I see two quasi-tribal  modes of
> > interpretation of reality. One tribe says, that reality is a field we all
> > have to obey, and compete against each other, following the field´s rules.
> > The other tribe says, that we, each individual, constructs the reality, and
> > that it is possible to abandon the fight, and start creating a better
> > world.
> >
> >

[PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration

2022-09-05 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dear List members,

obviously there are two kinds of vibration: Acoustic vibration deserves a 
substance like air to have it vibrated, but electromagnetic vibration doesn´t, 
it delivers its own means to do so (vibrate). Before this was clear, people 
thought, that electromagnetic vibration (e.g. light) deserved a so-called 
"Ether". But this concept is long refuted.

Now, are time and space a kind of ether? A divine clock ticking, a divine 
measure tape of meters or parsecs applied to the world? Or is time produced by 
events, and is space produced by matter? I think, Mach suspected so. 

Does the world consist of just and only signs? Or rather of objects, and the 
signs merely denote them? Are just correlates? 

Like with the two kinds of vibration, I see two quasi-tribal  modes of 
interpretation of reality. One tribe says, that reality is a field we all have 
to obey, and compete against each other, following the field´s rules. The other 
tribe says, that we, each individual, constructs the reality, and that it is 
possible to abandon the fight, and start creating a better world. 

Now the paradoxon is, that these are two tribes, that fight against each other. 
This fight applies to the logic of the first tribe only. What now can the 
second tribe do to solve this paradoxon, or problem, and win in the end? 
Anybody got a proposal?

Best, Helmut
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] reality, thought and language / names for mixed zones

2022-08-06 Thread Helmut Raulien

Tom, John, List,

isn´t language a subset of thought, meaning, nothing can be said that hasn´t 
been a thought first? Or, when it is nonsentical, like in "Finnegan´s Wake" by 
James Joyce, maybe it hasn´t been a thought before, but at the same time, it 
was written or spoken?  
Harder to tell is, whether thought is a subset of reality. If you think: "A and 
not A", this is not a part of reality, because it is not possible. But the 
question is, is this a thought, or just pretending to be a thought, because it 
also is impossible to imagine this pseudo-thought, you cannot picture it?

Best
Helmut

> Gesendet: Samstag, den 06.08.2022 um 16:10 Uhr
> Von: "Thomas Gollier" 
> An: Peirce-L 
> Cc: c...@lists.iccs-conference.org
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] reality, thought and language / names for mixed zones
> 
> John,
> 
> I've been waiting for someone to take up Jean-Yves' challenge. I can go
> along with your categorizations, but only if "reality"  refers to the
> reality of Secondness, or more specifically to the dynamic object.
> Otherwise — if for instance "reality" refers, or also refers, to
> the reality of Thirdness as in what the scientific community is fated to
> agree upon — it seems to me we'll have a lot of disambiguating to do with
> regard to these categories.
> 
> Tom
> 
> On Sat, Aug 6, 2022 at 1:56 AM John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> > My suggested labels for the intersections:
> >
> > Reality and thought:  Perception and action.
> >
> > Reality and language:  Semantics
> >
> > Thought and language:  Imagination
> >
> > All three:  Semeiotic
> >
> > John
> >
> > --
> > *From*: "jean-yves beziau" beziau...@gmail.com
> >
> > We can build a Venn diagram with three circles:
> > reality, thought and language.
> > It it not clear what names can be given to the mixed zones:
> > https://sites.google.com/view/reality-thought-language/mixed-zones
> > Does anyone have some answers?
> > Best Wishes
> > Jean-Yves
> > >--
> > Prof. Dr. Dr. Jean-Yves Beziau
> > Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
> > https://www.philpeople.org/profiles/jean-yves-beziau
> >
> >
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> >
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning

2022-07-04 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supplement: Now I have a proposal for classifying three ranges or realms. By talking, instead of "reality", of "possibility", it is easy to see, that there are two kinds of possibility, one for the present, due to incomplete information, and one for the future. My three ranges, I think, are closely connected to the immediate, dynamic, and final interpretant:

1. Something exists: It both exists and (of course) is real. Like the meaning that is carried with a sign, the immediate interpretant. Whether the meaning is the true property of the object, is a mere possibility, and the properness of the aroused feeling does not exist, it v-is a monadic part of mere reality.

2. Something possibly exists now: The meaning is transported with the sign and with the object as it appears now to the interpreter. Its properness exists merely for the interpreter. If it is proper, is a matter of possibility still for everybody, but not for an all-knowing entity It is possibility for the present, due to incomplete information. This is the dynamic interpretant.

3. Something will possibly exist in the future: The meaning is transported with the sign, and the interpreter´s understanding of the object into the world. There its properness is a matter of further investigation in the future. The possibility is both in the present, and in the future, because, while the investigation will take place, the object and its meaning will very likely change. This is the final interpretant, which will possibly exist in the future.

I have stopped using my neologism, because I was not sure, when to say "is, and when "v-is".

John, List,

when we see existence and reality as two ranges, or, poetically speaking, two realms, each element of existence is an element of reality too, but not the other way. So existence is a subset of reality. Now we have a language problem with the terms "to exist", aka "to be". If we say, an element exists in existence, this is redundant. If we say, an element exists in reality, but not in existence, this is false, as "to exist" can only be in the range of existence. It is false too to say, that a quality as monad is an element of reality, or is real, because "is" comes from "to be", and that means to exist. So do we have to say "virtually is" each time we adress something nonexisting real? Or neologize, like a quality v-is a monad?

Is it so, that monads only virtually exist (v-exist)? In the realm of existence/being, all elements are triadic, e.g.: A quality is something first, connected with an object (second) for something/body.

Monads and pure firstnesses merely v-are elements of the range of nonexistence-reality, v-is that so?

And what about secondnesses? V-are they located in a range somewhere between existence and nonexistence-reality?

Best Regards

Helmut

Gesendet: Montag, 04. Juli 2022 um 07:14 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa"
An: "Peirce-L"
Betreff: re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning

Helmut,

As an example of a real possibility that does not happen to exist at the moment, consider the quality of having exactly the same genes as any historical person -- say Julius Caesar, George Washington, or your great-grandmother.

There are so many genes and so many options for each gene that it is extremely unlikely that any other human will ever have exactly the same genome. But the fact that some human did have that quality at one time means that it's not impossible for someone to have that quality again.

Since it's not absolutely impossible, it is a real possibility. But the probability is so low that we can safely say that nobody with exactly those genes happens to exist right now.

You can construct an open-ended variety of such examples. Consider what you ate for lunch yesterday. You might have a very similar meal on many occasions, but no two of them will be absolutely identical. You could describe that meal in a short paragraph that would be true of many, many similar meals. But that is only because your description is vague.

John
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning

2022-07-04 Thread Helmut Raulien

John, List,

 

when we see existence and reality as two ranges, or, poetically speaking, two realms, each element of existence is an element of reality too, but not the other way. So existence is a subset of reality. Now we have a language problem with the terms "to exist", aka "to be". If we say, an element exists in existence, this is redundant. If we say, an element exists in reality, but not in existence, this is false, as "to exist" can only be in the range of existence. It is false too to say, that a quality as monad is an element of reality, or is real, because "is" comes from "to be", and that means to exist. So do we have to say "virtually is" each time we adress something nonexisting real? Or neologize, like a quality v-is a monad?

Is it so, that monads only virtually exist (v-exist)? In the realm of existence/being, all elements are triadic, e.g.:  A quality is something first, connected with an object (second) for something/body.

Monads and pure firstnesses merely v-are elements of the range of nonexistence-reality, v-is that so? 

And what about secondnesses? V-are they located in a range somewhere between existence and nonexistence-reality?

 

Best Regards

 

Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Montag, 04. Juli 2022 um 07:14 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
An: "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning


Helmut,

 

As an example of a real possibility that does not happen to exist at the moment, consider the quality of having exactly the same genes as any historical person -- say Julius Caesar, George Washington, or your great-grandmother.

 

There are so many genes and so many options for each gene that it is extremely unlikely that any other human will ever have exactly the same genome.  But the fact that some human did have that quality at one time means that it's not impossible for someone to have that quality again.

 

Since it's not absolutely impossible, it is a real possibility.  But the probability is so low that we can safely say that nobody with exactly those genes happens to exist right  now.

 

You can construct an open-ended variety of such examples.  Consider what you ate for lunch yesterday.  You might have a very similar meal on many occasions, but no two of them will be absolutely identical.  You could describe that meal in a short paragraph that would be true of many, many similar meals.  But  that is only because your description is vague.

 

John
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning

2022-07-02 Thread Helmut Raulien


 

 
 

Suppsupplement: I have changed, in the last line, an "and" for an "or". This applies better to logic (e.g. Venn-diagrams). Meaning-both spells in common thinking  "A and B", but in logic "A or B". Such funny matters of language can confuse, and lead me to mistakes.

 

Supplement: On the other hand, I have to not exclude any of Peirce´s concepts. And I guess I have understood it now: A quality, even if it does not exist, is real. Of course I should stop refusing to deal with such things, so I apologize.

Even in a universe, or another system, in which nobody is afraid of anything, the feeling/quality of fear is a part of reality, because it is a possibility. So it is not an element of existence (an existing element), but a possible element (an element of possibility), or in the future possible existence. So it is real. This is, other than I first, reluctantly, have said, relevant for systems theory too, because it means, that a system may be able to exclude parts of existence, but is not able to exclude parts of possibility (reality). So I take back my opinion, that these parts of reality are pseudo-monadic. And I change my hierarchical classification: Metaphysics is not merely a part of a bigger discourse, but what I took for bigger discourse, saying that I don´t want to talk exclusively about metaphysics, in fact is the smaller discourse merely about existence, while the bigger discourse is talking about both: Things that exist and are real, or things that don´t exist, but are real. Sorry for that

 



Gary F., List,

 

I think, if I want to combine semiotics with system theory, I have to leave the metaphysical (universal) context. A universal context is e.g., that a ball embodies the feeling of perfection. But a spider merely embodies the feeling of fear to someone who is afraid of spiders. For a biologist concerned with spiders, a non-toxic spider does probably not embody the feeling of fear. The dyadic idea, that something embodies a certain quality, in a universal context too, is only pseudo-dyadic, and the quality only pseudo-monadic, because you can also say, that a ball embodies the feeling of perfection for everybody in the universe. So, at least for not excluding system theory, I think, that this Peircean method of prescission is not helpful. It is a reduction not towards fundamentality, as some thing is delivered for element of thought (precission), that does not exist, as you said. How can something not existing be an element, and what would be the advantage of talking about it? I see an advantage only if you restrict the discourse to metaphysics. But I don´t want that.

 

Best Regards

 

Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Freitag, 01. Juli 2022 um 14:11 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
An: "'Peirce-L'" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning




Helmut, a feeling, in the Peircean sense we’re using here, can’t be sent or received, or even perceived in the way that an external object can be perceived. As Jon explained, it can only be prescinded from an actual experience, which means dropping out of consideration the usual distinctions between subject and object, external and internal. Firstness is called that because it is monadic, not dyadic or triadic. It is a quality minus the thing that “has” that quality, a possibility minus its instantiation. It does not exist. Existence is metaphysical secondness. 

Systems exist because they are “cut off” from other systems (as the etymology of the word suggests); they have an inside and an outside, although some of them are more open than others to exchanges of energy or information. Psychological “feelings” are actual, embodied feelings; phaneroscopic “feelings” are prior to actuality or embodiment. This is crucial to understanding the metaphysical basis of Peircean semiotic.

 


gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

 




From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 30-Jun-22 18:20
To: jonalanschm...@gmail.com
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning



 



 




Thank you, Jon! So Peirce means the sent, not the received feeling? The feeling as its source´s quality? In my concept, meaning is triadic (something means something to something/one). If meaning in its first mode of being is feeling, my concept of feeling is triadic too: Something gives a feeling to someone. But for Peirce, feeling is only a part the first part of that: Something´s innate quality.



 



Best, Helmut



  



Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 20:53 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
An: "Peirce-L" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning





Jack, List: 


 



When Peirce associates feeling with 1ns, he is not referring to that which is felt by a subject, which is clearly an example of 2ns. He is instead referring to a qualitative possibility, independent

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning

2022-07-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

 

 
 

Supplement: On the other hand, I have to not exclude any of Peirce´s concepts. And I guess I have understood it now: A quality, even if it does not exist, is real. Of course I should stop refusing to deal with such things, so I apologize.

Even in a universe, or another system, in which nobody is afraid of anything, the feeling/quality of fear is a part of reality, because it is a possibility. So it is not an element of existence (an existing element), but a possible element (an element of possibility), or in the future possible existence. So it is real. This is, other than I first, reluctantly, have said, relevant for systems theory too, because it means, that a system may be able to exclude parts of existence, but is not able to exclude parts of possibility (reality). So I take back my opinion, that these parts of reality are pseudo-monadic. And I change my hierarchical classification: Metaphysics is not merely a part of a bigger discourse, but what I took for bigger discourse, saying that I don´t want to talk exclusively about metaphysics, in fact is the smaller discourse merely about existence, while the bigger discourse is talking about both: Things that exist and are real, and things that don´t exist, but are real. Sorry for that

 



Gary F., List,

 

I think, if I want to combine semiotics with system theory, I have to leave the metaphysical (universal) context. A universal context is e.g., that a ball embodies the feeling of perfection. But a spider merely embodies the feeling of fear to someone who is afraid of spiders. For a biologist concerned with spiders, a non-toxic spider does probably not embody the feeling of fear. The dyadic idea, that something embodies a certain quality, in a universal context too, is only pseudo-dyadic, and the quality only pseudo-monadic, because you can also say, that a ball embodies the feeling of perfection for everybody in the universe. So, at least for not excluding system theory, I think, that this Peircean method of prescission is not helpful. It is a reduction not towards fundamentality, as some thing is delivered for element of thought (precission), that does not exist, as you said. How can something not existing be an element, and what would be the advantage of talking about it? I see an advantage only if you restrict the discourse to metaphysics. But I don´t want that.

 

Best Regards

 

Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Freitag, 01. Juli 2022 um 14:11 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
An: "'Peirce-L'" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning




Helmut, a feeling, in the Peircean sense we’re using here, can’t be sent or received, or even perceived in the way that an external object can be perceived. As Jon explained, it can only be prescinded from an actual experience, which means dropping out of consideration the usual distinctions between subject and object, external and internal. Firstness is called that because it is monadic, not dyadic or triadic. It is a quality minus the thing that “has” that quality, a possibility minus its instantiation. It does not exist. Existence is metaphysical secondness. 

Systems exist because they are “cut off” from other systems (as the etymology of the word suggests); they have an inside and an outside, although some of them are more open than others to exchanges of energy or information. Psychological “feelings” are actual, embodied feelings; phaneroscopic “feelings” are prior to actuality or embodiment. This is crucial to understanding the metaphysical basis of Peircean semiotic.

 


gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

 




From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 30-Jun-22 18:20
To: jonalanschm...@gmail.com
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning



 



 




Thank you, Jon! So Peirce means the sent, not the received feeling? The feeling as its source´s quality? In my concept, meaning is triadic (something means something to something/one). If meaning in its first mode of being is feeling, my concept of feeling is triadic too: Something gives a feeling to someone. But for Peirce, feeling is only a part the first part of that: Something´s innate quality.



 



Best, Helmut



  



Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 20:53 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
An: "Peirce-L" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning





Jack, List: 


 



When Peirce associates feeling with 1ns, he is not referring to that which is felt by a subject, which is clearly an example of 2ns. He is instead referring to a qualitative possibility, independent of any individual instantiation. It is indeed a prescissive abstraction of the 1ns that is always involved in 2ns, which is always involved in 3ns.



 



We can imagine a world in which we constantly hear the same musical note, until it suddenly changes to a different note. The quality of each note in itsel

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning

2022-07-01 Thread Helmut Raulien

Gary F., List,

 

I think, if I want to combine semiotics with system theory, I have to leave the metaphysical (universal) context. A universal context is e.g., that a ball embodies the feeling of perfection. But a spider merely embodies the feeling of fear to someone who is afraid of spiders. For a biologist concerned with spiders, a non-toxic spider does probably not embody the feeling of fear. The dyadic idea, that something embodies a certain quality, in a universal context too, is only pseudo-dyadic, and the quality only pseudo-monadic, because you can also say, that a ball embodies the feeling of perfection for everybody in the universe. So, at least for not excluding system theory, I think, that this Peircean method of prescission is not helpful. It is a reduction not towards fundamentality, as some thing is delivered for element of thought (precission), that does not exist, as you said. How can something not existing be an element, and what would be the advantage of talking about it? I see an advantage only if you restrict the discourse to metaphysics. But I don´t want that.

 

Best Regards

 

Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Freitag, 01. Juli 2022 um 14:11 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
An: "'Peirce-L'" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning




Helmut, a feeling, in the Peircean sense we’re using here, can’t be sent or received, or even perceived in the way that an external object can be perceived. As Jon explained, it can only be prescinded from an actual experience, which means dropping out of consideration the usual distinctions between subject and object, external and internal. Firstness is called that because it is monadic, not dyadic or triadic. It is a quality minus the thing that “has” that quality, a possibility minus its instantiation. It does not exist. Existence is metaphysical secondness. 

Systems exist because they are “cut off” from other systems (as the etymology of the word suggests); they have an inside and an outside, although some of them are more open than others to exchanges of energy or information. Psychological “feelings” are actual, embodied feelings; phaneroscopic “feelings” are prior to actuality or embodiment. This is crucial to understanding the metaphysical basis of Peircean semiotic.

 


gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

 




From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 30-Jun-22 18:20
To: jonalanschm...@gmail.com
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning



 



 




Thank you, Jon! So Peirce means the sent, not the received feeling? The feeling as its source´s quality? In my concept, meaning is triadic (something means something to something/one). If meaning in its first mode of being is feeling, my concept of feeling is triadic too: Something gives a feeling to someone. But for Peirce, feeling is only a part the first part of that: Something´s innate quality.



 



Best, Helmut



  



Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 20:53 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
An: "Peirce-L" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning





Jack, List: 


 



When Peirce associates feeling with 1ns, he is not referring to that which is felt by a subject, which is clearly an example of 2ns. He is instead referring to a qualitative possibility, independent of any individual instantiation. It is indeed a prescissive abstraction of the 1ns that is always involved in 2ns, which is always involved in 3ns.



 



We can imagine a world in which we constantly hear the same musical note, until it suddenly changes to a different note. The quality of each note in itself--prescinded from anyone actually hearing it--corresponds to 1ns, the contrast between successive notes to 2ns, and the melody comprised of a series of such notes to 3ns (CP 5.395, EP 1:128-129, 1878).



 



Regards,



  







Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA



Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian



www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt









  







_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.




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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] meaning

2022-06-30 Thread Helmut Raulien

 


Thank you, Jon! So Peirce means the sent, not the received feeling? The feeling as its source´s quality? In my concept, meaning is triadic (something means something to something/one). If meaning in its first mode of being is feeling, my concept of feeling is triadic too: Something gives a feeling to someone. But for Peirce, feeling is only a part the first part of that: Something´s innate quality.

 

Best, Helmut

 

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 20:53 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
An: "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning



Jack, List:
 

When Peirce associates feeling with 1ns, he is not referring to that which is felt by a subject, which is clearly an example of 2ns. He is instead referring to a qualitative possibility, independent of any individual instantiation. It is indeed a prescissive abstraction of the 1ns that is always involved in 2ns, which is always involved in 3ns.

 

We can imagine a world in which we constantly hear the same musical note, until it suddenly changes to a different note. The quality of each note in itself--prescinded from anyone actually hearing it--corresponds to 1ns, the contrast between successive notes to 2ns, and the melody comprised of a series of such notes to 3ns (CP 5.395, EP 1:128-129, 1878).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 10:02 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:



just for clarity, the point I'm making is probably an old one but: Peirce conceives of the subject-less feeling as object. That, I think, is an impossibility.

 


From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 3:48 PM
To: s...@bestweb.net <s...@bestweb.net>; Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: Peirce List <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>; CG <c...@lists.iccs-conference.org>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning





A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its being is in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for example, an existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling:


Helmut, List,

 

Is this an example of Peirce being abstract again? Because by "feeling" he often meant "tone" if I recall correctly. The problem I have (although I think it only exists with regard to this short extract as Peirce explains it better in detail) is that a "feeling" cannot easily be disregarded from that which embodies it. That is, the being -- or essence -- of "feeling" is not in feeling alone but also (and this is an anthropocentric point) requires the body (as conduit) which embodies the feeling as such. 

 

I don't remember disagreeing with Peirce re "feeling" the last time I read through his texts at length so likely just a result of much context ommitted.

 

best

 

Jack





_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.



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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

2022-06-30 Thread Helmut Raulien

Gary F., yes, my mistake. So, myths are symbols, which don´t lack indexicality, and can be false.

 

Jack Robert Kelly: I agree. Maybe Peirce´s way to talk of signs without the subject (interpreter) is consistent, but if one wants to combine his theories with systems theories, the subject has to be mentioned.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 16:52 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
An: "'Peirce List'" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning




Helmut, myths, narratives, arguments and propositions are all symbols. Symbols can have any level of complexity. Peirce suggests in at least one place that the entire intelligible universe can be regarded as a symbol. 

 


gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg


 



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: 30-Jun-22 10:46
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning



 



Gary F., List,



 



But aren´t myths narratives, and more than symbols, containing arguments and propositions? Propositions (alone or as parts of arguments) may be false, mightn´t they?



 



Best Regards



 



Helmut



  


  



Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 16:37 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
An: "'Peirce List'" <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning





Helmut, myths are symbols. Icons and indices, neither of which is rational in itself, are “signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.” Symbols lacking indexicality can’t be either true or false, because their objects, or rather their denotations, are indeterminate — that is, they don’t enable the interpreter to know what the utterer is talking about. This is one of the “defects” of symbols generally, not only of myths. 

And of course, if we don’t know what subject (object) we are talking about, we don’t know whether the predicate we ascribe to it really applies to it or not. Predicates and significations are general and are represented iconically, so their mode of being is “not rational yet capable of rationalization.” Icons, like indices, cannot be true or false in themselves, yet their functions are necessary to determine whether a proposition is true or false of the actual universe of discourse.

I hope this bit of paraphrase might help to clarify Peirce’s point for some readers.


Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} When your felt sense works its way into words, the act of meaning collides and colludes with the limits of language to determine what you say. {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs


 



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 29-Jun-22 09:55
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning



 



Gary F., List,



 



In the Peirce quote below, now I have seen, that Peirce wrote "modes of metaphysical being", so maybe myths are excluded from that, if they are not metaphysical. Maybe they are, if seen as parables, not facts. My pejorative view on "myth" is based on myths that claim to be facts, not just parables. Resp. on an orthodox resp. fundamentalistic (non-)interpretation of a myth.



  



Best Regards



 



Helmut













Helmut, the project of integrating a systems view of meaning with Peircean semiotics and phaneroscopy (or “category theory”) is one that is also undertaken in my netbook Turning Signs. Since you can sample it any time by entering “meaning site:gnusystems.ca/TS” into your search engine, I won’t reproduce any of it here. Instead I’ll offer an extended quote from Peirce which I think is especially relevant to this project: it’s from 1909, CP 6.338-343. 

The two points I would emphasize here are (1) that meaning in its fullest sense is a combination of denotation and signification, and (2) that the difference between the two is grounded in the “modes of being” of their “matter.” I think you’ll see that Peirce’s “modes of being” apply his “categories” in a very different way from the application of them in your post.

___

All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your deeper self for his assent. Consequently, all thinking is conducted in signs that are mainly of the same general structure as words; those which are not so, being of the nature of those signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.

These non-symbolic thought-signs are of two classes: first, pictures or diagrams or other images (I call them Icons) such as have to be used to explain the significations of words; and secondly, signs more or less analogous to symptoms (I call them Indices) of which the collateral observations, by which we know what a man is talking about, are examples. The Icons chiefly illustrate the significations of

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

2022-06-30 Thread Helmut Raulien

Gary F., List,

 

But aren´t myths narratives, and more than symbols, containing arguments and propositions? Propositions (alone or as parts of arguments) may be false, mightn´t they?

 

Best Regards

 

Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 16:37 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
An: "'Peirce List'" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning




Helmut, myths are symbols. Icons and indices, neither of which is rational in itself, are “signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.” Symbols lacking indexicality can’t be either true or false, because their objects, or rather their denotations, are indeterminate — that is, they don’t enable the interpreter to know what the utterer is talking about. This is one of the “defects” of symbols generally, not only of myths. 

And of course, if we don’t know what subject (object) we are talking about, we don’t know whether the predicate we ascribe to it really applies to it or not. Predicates and significations are general and are represented iconically, so their mode of being is “not rational yet capable of rationalization.” Icons, like indices, cannot be true or false in themselves, yet their functions are necessary to determine whether a proposition is true or false of the actual universe of discourse.

I hope this bit of paraphrase might help to clarify Peirce’s point for some readers.


Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} When your felt sense works its way into words, the act of meaning collides and colludes with the limits of language to determine what you say. {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs


 



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 29-Jun-22 09:55
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning



 



Gary F., List,



 



In the Peirce quote below, now I have seen, that Peirce wrote "modes of metaphysical being", so maybe myths are excluded from that, if they are not metaphysical. Maybe they are, if seen as parables, not facts. My pejorative view on "myth" is based on myths that claim to be facts, not just parables. Resp. on an orthodox resp. fundamentalistic (non-)interpretation of a myth.



  



Best Regards



 



Helmut













Helmut, the project of integrating a systems view of meaning with Peircean semiotics and phaneroscopy (or “category theory”) is one that is also undertaken in my netbook Turning Signs. Since you can sample it any time by entering “meaning site:gnusystems.ca/TS” into your search engine, I won’t reproduce any of it here. Instead I’ll offer an extended quote from Peirce which I think is especially relevant to this project: it’s from 1909, CP 6.338-343. 

The two points I would emphasize here are (1) that meaning in its fullest sense is a combination of denotation and signification, and (2) that the difference between the two is grounded in the “modes of being” of their “matter.” I think you’ll see that Peirce’s “modes of being” apply his “categories” in a very different way from the application of them in your post.

___

All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your deeper self for his assent. Consequently, all thinking is conducted in signs that are mainly of the same general structure as words; those which are not so, being of the nature of those signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.

These non-symbolic thought-signs are of two classes: first, pictures or diagrams or other images (I call them Icons) such as have to be used to explain the significations of words; and secondly, signs more or less analogous to symptoms (I call them Indices) of which the collateral observations, by which we know what a man is talking about, are examples. The Icons chiefly illustrate the significations of predicate-thoughts, the Indices the denotations of subject-thoughts. The substance of thoughts consists of these three species of ingredients.

The next step consists in considering why it is that thoughts should take those three different forms. You will observe that each kind of sign serves to bring before the mind objects of a different kind from those revealed by the other species of signs. The key to the solution of this question is that what we think of cannot possibly be of a different nature from thought itself. For the thought thinking and the immediate thought-object are the very same thing regarded from different points of view. …

We must conclude, then, that the reason why different things have to be differently thought of is that their modes of metaphysical being are different.

Aristotle, however, failed to strike the nail squarely on the head when he said that generals are known by reason and singulars by sense. Generals are predicates. Now while the structure, not only of predicates, but of

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

2022-06-30 Thread Helmut Raulien

John, Gary F., List,

first, here again the part of Gary´s Peirce quote, in which Peirce tells the three modes of being:

So, then, there are these three modes of being: first, the being of a feeling, in itself, unattached to any subject, which is merely an atmospheric possibility, a possibility floating in vacuo, not rational yet capable of rationalization; secondly, there is the being that consists in arbitrary brute action upon other things, not only irrational but anti-rational, since to rationalize it would be to destroy its being; and thirdly, there is living intelligence from which all reality and all power are derived; which is rational necessity and necessitation.

A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its being is in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for example, an existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling: its being is actual, consists in action, is dyadic. That is what I call existence. A reason has its being in bringing other things into connexion with each other; its essence is to compose: it is triadic, and it alone has a real power.

As I said, I not merely want to talk about reality, which is always meant universally, but also about false, but for a system viable, narratives. In this more general matter, not only talking about reality, but about pseudoreality as well, the third mode is not only the universal intelligible force, but also a system´s intentional force, creating false but viable narratives. I think, it is for all agreeable, that such things exist, and that it would be helpful to uncover them? Examples are galore.

Peirce says of the third mode, that its essence is composition. I think, before composition comes classification. A system can only compose its organs, if they first are classified and so specified. Example: The castes system in India, other feudal classification of people, and also classification of acts as good or bad. If classification of acts is in accord with the universal system (I think, the ten commandments mostly are), this is good at first glance, but if the system does not adress their origin as the universe´s nature, but as an act of its own, this is hijacking. Example: Liberal christians admit, that in Mahayana-Buddhism too similar values like compassion exist, but illiberal christians perhaps say, that good values only exist in the christian context, and since their prophets have declareded them.

Best Regards

Helmut

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 29. Juni 2022 um 21:44 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa"
An: "Peirce List"
Cc: "CG"
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

Helmut, Gary F, List

The many complex issues in this thread would require a lengthy commentary. But I'll just make a few remarks on the word myth.

In classical Greek, the basic meaning of mythos is (1) word or speech; (2) public speech; (3) conversation; (4) thing said, fact, matter; (5) thing thought, unspoken word, purpose, design. (Liddell & Scott, 9th edition)

From those basic meanings, it came to be applied to tales, stories, and narratives. Since many of those stories contained a mixture of fact and fiction and sometimes more fiction than fact, critics such as Plato condemned them as false.

But the same criticism could be made of any scientific theories of any time past, present, or future. The goal of science is a deeper understanding of experience, but any theory is at best a good generalization of certain kinds of experience. And all scientific theories are eventually recognized as inadequate in one or more ways. Furthermore, many of the old myths still embody deep insights into human nature and experience -- many of them are still good guides for new scientific theories (abductions).

Summary: Science and myth represent insights (abductions) obtained through a deep analysis of experience. We should recognize them for what they contribute, but realize that they have limitations which may be clarified and extended by further analysis, and testing against new observations.

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] corrected post on meaning

2022-06-28 Thread Helmut Raulien

mself says, is a subject. But to say that a singular is known by sense is a confusion of thought. It is not known by the feeling-element of sense, but by the compulsion, the insistency, that characterizes experience. For the singular subject is real; and reality is insistency. That is what we mean by “reality.” It is the brute irrational insistency that forces us to acknowledge the reality of what we experience, that gives us our conviction of any singular.

The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of the knowledge of such reality. It is the entelechy, or perfection of being.

So, then, there are these three modes of being: first, the being of a feeling, in itself, unattached to any subject, which is merely an atmospheric possibility, a possibility floating in vacuo, not rational yet capable of rationalization; secondly, there is the being that consists in arbitrary brute action upon other things, not only irrational but anti-rational, since to rationalize it would be to destroy its being; and thirdly, there is living intelligence from which all reality and all power are derived; which is rational necessity and necessitation.

A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its being is in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for example, an existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling: its being is actual, consists in action, is dyadic. That is what I call existence. A reason has its being in bringing other things into connexion with each other; its essence is to compose: it is triadic, and it alone has a real power.



 

It’s the crucial role of the “anti-rational” in meaning (i.e. “living intelligence” or semiosis) that I find most striking in this passage. (I’d intended to post this quote before, in response to your and John’s previous posts, but didn’t get to it until now.)

 


Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} A wealth of information creates a poverty of attention. [Herbert Simon] {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs


 



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 27-Jun-22 17:40
To: Peirce List <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] meaning



 



List,



 



I would like to work on a theory of meaning together with you all. I don´t want to write a paper first, but instead have a mutual review from the start, as I am suspicious of myself becoming idiosyncratic.



 



I think, that "meaning" offers a combination between Peircean semiotics/category theory, and system theory:



 



Meaning is triadic: Something means something  to something/one. A spider means danger to a fly, and a spider means food to a bird. If something has a general meaning, this generality is a part of a system´s structure. Examples:



 



That two masses in space generally means attraction between them, this generality is part of the structure of the system universe.



 



That a word has a general meaning, is part of a language system´s structure.



 



So, instead of saying "A means B", it is better to say "A means B to C" (individual meaning), or "A means B to all Cs, due to the structure of system D" (general meaning).



 



A firstness, like an event or a sign, gives meaning to an individual (subject) from th past and the present. It origins in the past, and takes place in the present. For the subject then, the meaning goes into the future: The consequences of this event.



 



A secondness, like an object, has meaning for the subject, that comes from the present and the future: It is there now, and will stay, as permanence is what makes an object. The subject then, given it is intelligent, transports meaning into the past, by pondering the history of the object, and the reason it is there now.



 



A thirdness, like a structural part, a relation in the mathematical sense, gives to the subject meaning from the past and the future: An arrangement in the past has consequences for the future. The subject then processes meaning in the present: It reacts, at best appropriately.



 



More triadicity related to Peirce is for example, that a meaning may be iconical, indexical, or symbolic. And there are three kinds of systems-hierarchy: Composition (1ns), dominance/definition (2ns), classification (3ns). At least I think so.



And so on, I guess there is a lot to go on.



 



Best Regards



 



Helmut



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[PEIRCE-L] meaning

2022-06-27 Thread Helmut Raulien

List,

 

I would like to work on a theory of meaning together with you all. I don´t want to write a paper first, but instead have a mutual review from the start, as I am suspicious of myself becoming idiosyncratic.

 

I think, that "meaning" offers a combination between Peircean semiotics/category theory, and system theory:

 

Meaning is triadic: Something means something  to something/one. A spider means danger to a fly, and a spider means food to a bird. If something has a general meaning, this generality is a part of a system´s structure. Examples:

 

That two masses in space generally means attraction between them, this generality is part of the structure of the system universe.

 

That a word has a general meaning, is part of a language system´s structure.

 

So, instead of saying "A means B", it is better to say "A means B to C" (individual meaning), or "A means B to all Cs, due to the structure of system D" (general meaning).

 

A firstness, like an event or a sign, gives meaning to an individual (subject) from th past and the present. It origins in the past, and takes place in the present. For the subject then, the meaning goes into the future: The consequences of this event.

 

A secondness, like an object, has meaning for the subject, that comes from the present and the future: It is there now, and will stay, as permanence is what makes an object. The subject then, given it is intelligent, transports meaning into the past, by pondering the history of the object, and the reason it is there now.

 

A thirdness, like a structural part, a relation in the mathematical sense, gives to the subject meaning from the past and the future: An arrangement in the past has consequences for the future. The subject then processes meaning in the present: It reacts, at best appropriately.

 

More triadicity related to Peirce is for example, that a meaning may be iconical, indexical, or symbolic. And there are three kinds of systems-hierarchy: Composition (1ns), dominance/definition (2ns), classification (3ns). At least I think so.

And so on, I guess there is a lot to go on.

 

Best Regards

 

Helmut
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] the essence and emptiness of meaning

2022-06-15 Thread Helmut Raulien

Gary F., List,

I like this topic. Maybe "essence" is the meaning of a thing, and a thing does not have a meaning by itself ("There is no thing in itself", who said that?), but a meaning attached to a thing, such as a Saussurian word, merely exists as a structural part of a system (like a language). And the knowledge, that such a structural part, a general meaning, is not for granted and not necessarily universal, perhaps is the said "emptiness". So "meaning" originally is not two-valued, it only appears so, in the context of a system, by not regarding the system as such, but by taking it intuitively for granted. This is a downside of intuition, not seeing the system one is used to, commonly referred to as "operational blindness".

By reading "meaning" closely, that is, not taking any system for granted, "meaning" becomes three-valued: Something first means something second for someone or something third- exclusively so in the first place.

To take this starting point should not lead to nominalism though: That a meaning is not necessarily universal, does not mean, that there are no general meanings provided by the universe: Of course there are, such as natural laws. But there are also many general (or quasi-general) meanings provided by non-universal systems, such as species, cultures, languages. To call them empty, might that mean, to see, that they are not for granted, and that you cannot rely on them in a universal way? Because philosophy and religion, and something between or being both, like Buddhism, always is looking for universal matters.

Best

Helmut

15. Juni 2022 um 15:10 Uhr
g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:

List,

The ongoing updating of points in my online book Turning Signs has generated another mini-essay, this time connecting texts from Buddhist philosophy, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, biology and even physics with Peircean semiotic/logic and phaneroscopy. It may be difficult to follow for those unfamiliar with some of the above, but I’ve included some hyperlinks to contexts that may help to elucidate the terms and concepts involved. I hope it’s not too eclectic to be useful. Anyway it’s at Closure and Disclosure (TS ·10) .

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} Spacetime tells matter how to move; matter tells spacetime how to curve. [Wheeler] {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs

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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Sense and the Making of Sense / St. Petersburg State University, June 2-4

2022-06-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supplement: About this topic, meaning to claim objectivity fore something originally subjective, Peirce´s paper "How to make our ideas clear" is wishful thinking. But there is nothing wrong with that. It (good or bad for me/us) just depends, whose wishes count: The societie´s (system´s) wishes (intentions), or ours (humans). A societial system has to arrange the many different meanings of any thing in a way that it serves it. This way of arrangement is not the same as human individuals would arrange these meanings in a democratical discourse to serve each individual. We (humans ) must say goodbye to the idea that nature is good. Nature is just there. The nature of a system is to make us its slaves. If this wasn´t so, life would not have emerged and developed. For example, eucariotic cells have enslaved procariotic ones from organisms to organs/organelles: Cell core, mitochondriae, plasts/chloroplasts. That was long ago. Now the danger is digitalism. You want to remain an organism, and not become an organ? Then throw away your smartphone. And never put on a 3D-glass. I did it once, and it was like: Boah! I want to stay there and never go back. Offtopic? Yes, but still about "meaning". Do you want the world to mean something to you and your man/woman/friends, or would you "metasystem-transition" your individuality into the hands of Zuckerbergian etc. sweet hell? At least then you never again have to ponder about the meaning of life, neither in general, nor specifically yours.

Dear Jean-Yves, dear Jerry, List,

Your approach, and Saussure´s and Ogden/Richard´s approaches to the concept of "meaning" is based on something quasi objective, which may be the structure of a system such as a culture, or a species, like humans. Or even something universal. This structure may be the result of a process of discourse and agreement. It is something like the sheet of assertion of the EGs.

So in this default, "meaning" is general already. Would you also like to talk about how meaning is generated resp. comes into being? I think, when a meaning first appears, it is what some thing means for something or somebody else, or for itself. So it is not something attachad to a thing, but something between a thing and another (or the same) thing or subject. Then it is getting complex.

For example, the meaning of "life" in general may be different for a biologist, for a philosopher, for a priest of a certain religion, for someone who is two of these or all three. The meaning of "my life" may be different for each individual, also depending on his/her profession/history and beliefs. In a society, these many differences make a vast complexity, which has to be reduced, if the society remains one, that is, if it serves and controls all. The two intentions of a system, becoming more complex on one hand, and integrating its parts for organs on the other, reqire certain ways how to produce and convey meaning. All that is very complicated, but interesting, I think.

Best Regards, Helmut

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 02. Juni 2022 um 02:28 Uhr
Von: "jean-yves beziau"
An: "Jerry LR Chandler"
Cc: "Peirce List"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sense and the Making of Sense / St. Petersburg State University, June 2-4

Dear Jerry
I started with a very simple and intuitive triple:

word / idea / thing

(or in a more general setting: language / thought / reality).

One may ask if this forms a full Venn diagram (each part is non empty).

Or using the theory of opposition, if this forms a triangle of contrariety or a triangle of subcontrariety.

But my main point in "The Pyramid of Meaning" is to consider that there is something above this triangle joining the three elements of the triple. I call it 'notion'.

To do that I was directly inspired by Saussure. Saussure is very famous, but not so many people know that Saussure uses "sign" to denote the whole signifier/signified (signifiant/signifié). This use of 'sign' does not correspond to the standard use of the word which is rather on the side of the signifier. Saussure makes the following comment about his use of 'sign': "if I am satisfied with it, this is simply because I do not know of any word to replace it, the ordinary language suggesting no other."

This is a kind of default choice. Maybe a not so good choice, but it is true that it is not clear what would be the best word, unless creating one.

Anyway the excellent idea of Saussure was to consider on the one hand the distinction signifier/signified, and on the other hand to also consider the whole, giving it a name.

So I was directly inspired by him and I decided to choose the word "notion" for the whole word/idea/thing.

Then the shape of the pyramid came naturally. Most real pyramids have square bases, but mathematically speaking a pyramid can have any polygon as a basis. If we have a triangular basis, the pyramid is a tetrahedron, a simplex, as I explain in my paper:

http://www.jyb-logic.org/PYRAMID-OF-MEANING

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Sense and the Making of Sense / St. Petersburg State University, June 2-4

2022-06-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dear Jean-Yves, dear Jerry, List,

Best Regards, Helmut

Dear Jerry
I started with a very simple and intuitive triple:

word / idea / thing

(or in a more general setting: language / thought / reality).

One may ask if this forms a full Venn diagram (each part is non empty).

Or using the theory of opposition, if this forms a triangle of contrariety or a triangle of subcontrariety.

But my main point in "The Pyramid of Meaning" is to consider that there is something above this triangle joining the three elements of the triple. I call it 'notion'.

This is a kind of default choice. Maybe a not so good choice, but it is true that it is not clear what would be the best word, unless creating one.

Anyway the excellent idea of Saussure was to consider on the one hand the distinction signifier/signified, and on the other hand to also consider the whole, giving it a name.

So I was directly inspired by him and I decided to choose the word "notion" for the whole word/idea/thing.

http://www.jyb-logic.org/PYRAMID-OF-MEANING

Those who want to attend my talk tomorrow June 2 at 4pm St Petersburg time have to fill the following form

https://regforms.spbu.ru/en/?option=com_rsform=rsform=1701

Best Wishes

JYB

>---

Prof. Dr. Dr. Jean-Yves Beziau

Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

https://philpeople.org/profiles/jean-yves-beziau

On Wed, Jun 1, 2022 at 2:44 PM Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

On Jun 1, 2022, at 5:55 AM, jean-yves beziau wrote:

In this talk / paper, I present a new theory of meaning, inspired by Saussure,

but instead of considering only a pair (signifier/signified) packed in one element, the "sign",

I consider a triple (word/idea/thing) packed in one element, the “notion”. prof. Beziau:

Dear Prof. Beziau:

Thanks for posting this opportunity to learn more about your notions of non-classical logics.

Perhaps you may wish to express more about how semiosis arranges the three elements of the sign into a single notion?

As stated, the assertion is perplex and difficult to grasp semantically and syntactically from a Peircian view.

I will watch with interest.

Cheers

Jerry

[PEIRCE-L] logic of reflection

2022-01-25 Thread Helmut Raulien

List,

 

I am reading Nina Ort´s book "Reflexionslogik". It is not translated into English, I think, but there is an essay of hers: https://journals.openedition.org/trans/276?lang=en  . As far as I have understood, she says, that classical logic is two-valued (either a proposition is true, or false, tertium non datur), which is due to the fact, that classical logic merely treats the present, that what exists now. This applies, if you reflect about some thing. But reflection is also reflection about reflection. This brings a reflective surplus (Gotthard Guenther) , that does not have an existing object. She compares Gotthard Guenther´s polycontextural logic with Peirce´s semiotics, and says, that both are quite compatible, and combines both. But in her book there is no mathematical calculus with examples, it is all in words. I wonder, if Gotthard Guenther has designed a kind of logic, there should be a symbol system for calculus, shouldn´t it? She also says, that Luhmann in his systems theory has referred to some aspects of Guenther, but failed to handle it apropriately, as his systems theory is two-valued too. Reflection of reflection has a lot to do with Peirce´s abduction, she says, and points into the future.

Anyway, what is the object of a reflection about reflection? I would say, the DO of the second reflection is the first reflection, and it is outside of the sign, because it has ocurred in the past. So this outsideness is not spatial, but temporal. But isn´t that the case wit all DOs? The IO is the first reflection as it is reflected in the second reflection.

 

Anyway, is this maybe an interesting topic, Gotthard Guenther and the logic of reflection?

 

Best, Helmut

 

 
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] A universal top-level ontology

2021-12-08 Thread Helmut Raulien

 

 
 

Supplement: Oh, I see, I was wrong: Peirce said, that real possibilities exist. So, was Plato wrong by blending his esthetical estimation into the topic, and was Aristotle wrong by not seeing, that the possibility of a form is itself a form?



John, List,

 

Position 1 (Platonic), and 2 (Aristotelian) do not contradict each other, if you define "real" versus "existent" in a way so they don´t, like with Peirce´s (3) claim that possibility is something real but not existent, and if you replace "a degenerate approximation to" with "depending on". "Degenerate" (did Platon call it so?) in this place sounds to me like an unnecessary, esthetically pejorative, unscientific devaluation of what exists. The question remains, does not only existence depend on reality, but vice versa too? Like, if nothing would exist, would there still be the reality of possibilities? This question I obviously am not able to ask without the word "be". So, does reality as possibility exist? Here the snake is biting its tail, and we have a hen-and-egg-problem.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Dienstag, 07. Dezember 2021 um 23:38 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
An: ontolog-fo...@googlegroups.com, ontology-sum...@googlegroups.com
Cc: "CG" , "Peirce-L" , "Nathan Houser" , "Ahti Pietarinen" , "De Waal, Cornelis" 
Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] A universal top-level ontology



Barry> Landgrebe and I have been working on a BFO physics Ontology and on a mathematics Ontology, separate from BFO. 

 

I'm glad to hear that you're finally developing an ontology for mathematics and that it's independent of the current BFO.

 

Since it's impossible to do modern physics without a huge amount of mathematics, I suggest that you combine your math ontology with BFO in order to support physics.

 

There are three ways to combine an ontology of actual entities with a math ontology:

 

1. Platonic:  The mathematical forms are really real, and the physical stuff is a degenerate approximation to reality.

 

2. Aristotelian:  The physical entities are the real existents and the  forms exist only when they are embodied in physical stuff.

 

3. Peirce's update to Aristotle:  All mathematical forms exist as real possibilities, which may be used to describe or characterize anything that exists in actuality or in any kind of imagined, planned, intended, hoped, feared, described, communicated, or hypothesized aspect of reality.

 

Peirce's version implies that pure mathematicians can talk and act like Platonists (which they frequently do), but applied mathematicians can focus on the actual universe while having an infinite book of mathematical forms to use as they wish when they're doing any kind of  engineering, virtual reality, or plans for future things that do not yet exist.

 

Option 3 also supports every kind of pattern on paper, in anyone's imagination, implicit in any spoken or written language or notation, implicit in anybody's knowledge, or implicit in any data structures in any computer or collection of computers anywhere in the universe.

 

In short, Peirce's option #3 supports common sense, the most advanced sciences, and every form of artistic endeavor in any culture in the world -- or even in any alien life anywhere in the universe.

 

I recommend it,

 

John

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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] A universal top-level ontology

2021-12-08 Thread Helmut Raulien

John, List,

Position 1 (Platonic), and 2 (Aristotelian) do not contradict each other, if you define "real" versus "existent" in a way so they don´t, like with Peirce´s (3) claim that possibility is something real but not existent, and if you replace "a degenerate approximation to" with "depending on". "Degenerate" (did Platon call it so?) in this place sounds to me like an unnecessary, esthetically pejorative, unscientific devaluation of what exists. The question remains, does not only existence depend on reality, but vice versa too? Like, if nothing would exist, would there still be the reality of possibilities? This question I obviously am not able to ask without the word "be". So, does reality as possibility exist? Here the snake is biting its tail, and we have a hen-and-egg-problem.

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Dienstag, 07. Dezember 2021 um 23:38 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa"
An: ontolog-fo...@googlegroups.com, ontology-sum...@googlegroups.com
Cc: "CG" , "Peirce-L" , "Nathan Houser" , "Ahti Pietarinen" , "De Waal, Cornelis"
Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] A universal top-level ontology

Barry> Landgrebe and I have been working on a BFO physics Ontology and on a mathematics Ontology, separate from BFO.

I'm glad to hear that you're finally developing an ontology for mathematics and that it's independent of the current BFO.

Since it's impossible to do modern physics without a huge amount of mathematics, I suggest that you combine your math ontology with BFO in order to support physics.

There are three ways to combine an ontology of actual entities with a math ontology:

1. Platonic: The mathematical forms are really real, and the physical stuff is a degenerate approximation to reality.

2. Aristotelian: The physical entities are the real existents and the forms exist only when they are embodied in physical stuff.

3. Peirce's update to Aristotle: All mathematical forms exist as real possibilities, which may be used to describe or characterize anything that exists in actuality or in any kind of imagined, planned, intended, hoped, feared, described, communicated, or hypothesized aspect of reality.

Peirce's version implies that pure mathematicians can talk and act like Platonists (which they frequently do), but applied mathematicians can focus on the actual universe while having an infinite book of mathematical forms to use as they wish when they're doing any kind of engineering, virtual reality, or plans for future things that do not yet exist.

Option 3 also supports every kind of pattern on paper, in anyone's imagination, implicit in any spoken or written language or notation, implicit in anybody's knowledge, or implicit in any data structures in any computer or collection of computers anywhere in the universe.

In short, Peirce's option #3 supports common sense, the most advanced sciences, and every form of artistic endeavor in any culture in the world -- or even in any alien life anywhere in the universe.

I recommend it,

John

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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's 1870 "Logicof Relatives"

2021-12-01 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jerry, John, List,

There are copulas that donot need another agent besides A, B, C, D, like "to give", or "to take", which is transfer of property. But "to buy" needs other agents: Who defines the currency? Some state or bank or other institute E. The currency may have been picked by the market place, or (international trade, or crypto currency) by A, or C, or due to an agreement of both. Who has defined the cost of B? Maybe A is only the vendor, and some boss of A´s, F, has fixed the price. Maybe A has defined it, maybe A and C have negotiated it. Maybe there is a boss F, who is a person, or an institution, like an agricultural cooperative. "A gives B to C and C gives D dollars to A" does not say that this is a buying process, or the same buying process. It may also be, that both the good B, and the money, are gifts. Or that the dollars are not for B, but for a former trade good G, and the exchange simultaneity is due to the fact, that A and C are just now meeting, and C now has a month time to pay for B.

Best, Helmut

30. November 2021 um 18:45 Uhr
"Jerry LR Chandler"
wrote:

List, John:

Thank you for recognizing the nature of my concerns with respect to the meaning and importance of the word "grand” in the classification of notations for logics.

That being said, it is not clear how your response, precise thou it is, can be associated with the conceptual grounding of the different notations for logics that convey truth functions.

After all, the title of this paper includes the word “notation” which is a very very “deep” term in the conceptualizations of human communications.

Further more, one can puzzle about HOW MANY forms of relations are necessary for scientific communications that bear constitutive semantic and syntactical, geometrical nd non-geometric, terms?

In other words, the example of the verb “buy” must be replaced by a meaningful binary “copula” that associates polynomial predicates.

Cheers

Jerry

On Nov 29, 2021, at 11:27 PM, John F Sowa wrote:

Jon A and Jerry LRC,

There are multiple issues here: (1) The syntax of the logical notation, (2) The number of participants related by a particular relation, and (3) the question whether a relation that relates N participants can be replaced by two or more relations, each with a fewer number of participants..

For example, the verbs buy and sell normally relate four things each: "A buys B from C for D dollars" and "C sells B to A for D dollars".

:But each of those verbs that relate four things can be replaced by two verbs, each of which only relates three things: :"A gives B to C and C gives D dollars to A:". That is an example of a tetradic relation that is replaced by two triadic relations Those two acts of giving may be separated by an arbitrarily long period of time.

But the verb give has three obligatory participants, which must always be present in any act of giving.

However, some people claim that a triple store which uses only dyadic relations is sufficient to represent anything. But that is true only under one condition: Some triads such as give can only be replaced by three dyadic relations if and only if each of the three dyads are never separated.. They must occur in a single indivisible event..

For example, "A gives B to C" my be replaced by three dyads and a monad: "Giving(X) and Agent(X,A) and Patient(X,B) and Recipient(X,C)". In this translation of an obligatory triad to a monad and three dyads, the act of giving X has three parts that must occur at the same time.. You can't perform the different dyads in separable actions.

John

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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

2021-11-21 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supplement: Maybe "If A then B", the law, is the dynamic object, and the law`s instantiation "A, therefore B" is the immediate object.

Gary, Jon, List,

"that it is not necessarily only biological organisms which are living", I think, is Peirce-related, as he claims a quasi-mind of the universe, given, that a quasi-mind makes a living being. If we say, that semiotics is about (a mind´s) representation of objects, then in abiotic nature there are no discrete material objects, because they are not represented, but just mindlessly interact. Maybe this is the real "not-real"-issue. But if we say, that the natural laws are the objects, then we can speak of representation: Each situation is a representamen denoting the object natural law, and determined by it. The result from this is the interpretant interaction.

If we put a natural law in the form "If A then B", then "If A then B" is the object law, whose instantiation is "A, therefore B". "A" is the representamen situation, and "B" is the interpretant result, the interaction.

Best,

Helmut

21. November 2021 um 15:49 Uhr
"Gary Richmond"
wrote:

Helmut, Jon, List,

You asked: "Is this far-fetching to press it into a table?"

Whatever may be the case for biotic semiosis/biosemiosis (I'd suggest that 'nervous semiosis' is a form of the former), since semiosis has come to be seen by many researchers as always-already rather clearly in effect in the life forms on earth, it seems to me that you are begging the question to apply the O-R-I semiotic triad to abioticsemiosis when, it would appear, that the thrust of Champagne's article is that we ought to deeply reflect on the very conditions necessary to prove the reality of abioticsemiosis.

While Deely finds support for the idea of the reality of abioticsemiosis in the work of Poinsot and Peirce (for example, consider this well known CSP quote that Jon offered: "Thought [. . .] appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"); and while the "inference to the best explanation" (that the 'absence of semiosis outside the living world would turn out to be more. . . unlikely than its presence' " is, at least for me, rather compelling, yet merely asserting that abioticsemiosis is a scientific fact is obviously in itself insufficient as a proof of its reality (apparently the motivation behind Champagne's article, which centers on what he believes is necessary for such a proof of abioticsemiosis).

Yet I am also questioning Champagne's claim that "in order to truly establish the presence of sign-action in the non-living world, all the components of a triadic sign – including the interpretant – would have to be abiotic (that is,not dependent on a living organism)." My thought is that it is not necessarily only biological organisms which are living.

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

On Sun, Nov 21, 2021 at 5:16 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

Gary, List,

I think, that abiotic semiosis follows efficient causation, which is deductive necessity, the O-R-I follows rule-case-result (See Peirce´s example with the beans from the bag). E.g.: The rule is that masses attract each other (law as object), the case (representamen) is two masses with a certain distance and no relative velocity, the result (interpretant) is they are drawn towards each other and collide.

Biotic semiosis also follows final causation, which is inductive probability, the O-R-I is case-result-rule. E.G.: An organism (objectively) needs food (case), it is hungry (result, representamen), when it then eats, the hunger and the need go away (rule, law, interpretant). The constraint on matter is the organism´s skin.

Nervous semiosis also follows example causation (secularized causa exemplaris), which is abductive plausibility, the O-R-I is result-rule-case. E,g.: A neural image is a result (e.g of vision or smelling) and the object of an animal´s nervous system. About this object exists an abductive rule of plausibility, e.g. it is plausibly good or bad for the organism. This feeling of good or bad is the representamen. The case is that then the organism either pusues or flees it (interpretant).

Is this far-fetching to press it into a table? Just an attempt.

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Sonntag, 21. November 2021 um 07:32 Uhr
Von: "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
An: "Peirce-L" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Cc: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] &q

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

2021-11-21 Thread Helmut Raulien

Gary, Jon, List,

Best,

Helmut

21. November 2021 um 15:49 Uhr
"Gary Richmond"
wrote:

Helmut, Jon, List,

You asked: "Is this far-fetching to press it into a table?"

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

On Sun, Nov 21, 2021 at 5:16 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

Gary, List,

Is this far-fetching to press it into a table? Just an attempt.

Best, Helmut

Jon, List,

Jon quoted me, then commented:

GR: A theist might argue that

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

2021-11-21 Thread Helmut Raulien

Gary, List,

Is this far-fetching to press it into a table? Just an attempt.

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Sonntag, 21. November 2021 um 07:32 Uhr
Von: "Gary Richmond"
An: "Peirce-L"
Cc: "Jon Alan Schmidt"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

Jon, List,

Jon quoted me, then commented:

GR: A theist might argue that this aboriginal semiosis is not strictly 'abiotic', that it comes from the 'action' (so to speak) of a "living God."

JAS: Champagne presumably uses the term "abiotic" because he is referring specifically to the forms of life that fall within the well-established science of biology. No theist would include God among them, and it also excludes mere atoms despite Peirce's conception "that they are not absolutely dead" (CP 6.201, 1898). In fact ...

I am not especially concerned here with Champagne's use of the prefix 'bio' from his likely standpoint of "the well-established science of biology." Rather, I was looking at "abiotic" and "biotic" more from an etymological point of view. The "well-established science of biology" is surely Champagne's focus; and, if one reduces considerations here to the "science of biology," then surely, as you wrote, "No theist would include God among them."

But why limit the meaning of 'bio-' here, that is, in consideration of the near certainly that, for Peirce, it has a much broader and deeper meaning than its modern biological one? The Greek root, bio, means life, not merely life as considered in the "science of biology," but much more generally. After all, aren't we reflecting her on the metaphysical nature of the universe before 'life' in the sense of the modern science of biology? That is, aren't we looking at this from a very broad -- even vast -- cosmological standpoint?

I think, Jon, that you get closer to my purpose in introducing this topic in writing "Peirce's view is that the evolution of the universe is still in progress from living mind. . " As I see it, living mind is there from the get-go in Peirce's sense (although, again, I agree, most likely, not Champagne's). It would seem to me that from this Peircean perspective, there is actually no need for a "proof of abioticsemiosis."

In a word, life (bio-) is always already there from, so to speak, "foundation of the world."

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 10:34 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Gary R., List:

Thanks for bringing this interesting and indeed very brief article to our attention (https://www.academia.edu/1237921/A_Necessary_Condition_for_Proof_of_Abiotic_Semiosis). I will likely offer some detailed comments about it in the near future, but for now I will just respond to a couple of your own remarks prompted by it.

GR: A theist might argue that this aboriginal semiosis is not strictly 'abiotic', that it comes from the 'action' (so to speak) of a "living God."

Champagne presumably uses the term "abiotic" because he is referring specifically to the forms of life that fall within the well-established science of biology. No theist would include God among them, and it also excludes mere atoms despite Peirce's conception "that they are not absolutely dead" (CP 6.201, 1898). In fact ...

GR: But then the question immediately arises: whence comes this "semiosis outside the living world"?

According to Peirce,

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or argument?

2021-11-07 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supplement: Maybe the universe is both the text and the writer (pantheism), or the universe is the text and the writer´s body (panentheism), or the universe is the text alone (theism). Which of these three possibilities are real, we can never know, because it is impossible to conclude from the text to the writer (Goedel`s incompleteness-theorem). But if we assume, that things we cannot know may well be, because why not, then theism appears quite likely. But we should not pay homage to, or picture something that is based on "why not". Why not? Because that would be presumption, pretension, usurpation. We are condemned aka free to sort out our affairs with our own means. There is something like the "label paradoxon": Who labels himself "good" acts worst, because he thinks, that the act of self-labelling already is a good act, which excuses all bad actions under that label. You know the examples.

List,

I think, a narrative is not necessarily an argument, or a set of propositions and arguments, it may also be a set of propositions only. I agree, that a narrative has a purpose, which is the narrator´s intention to narrate. Narrative intention is the intention to fixate belief. If the narration/narrative is merely a set of propositions, the method of belief-fixation is tenacity. If the narration contains one or more deductive arguments, the scientific method too is applied. If merely one or more arguments are part of it, which are abductions, the a-priori-method, additionally to the tenacity-method, is applied. What about inductive arguments? I am not sure. If the induction follows the sequence of abduction-deduction-induction, this is scientific method. But you cannot say, if it does, by merely regarding the inductive argument.

All in all, I think, a narrative is not necessarily a rheme, nor a proposition/dicent, nor an argument, but a composition of items from these classes. It may even be a set of just rhemes. Mostly it is a composition, when the term is used- but why not also call one rheme, one proposition, one argument a narrative too? I think, the term "narrative" can be boiled down to any sign that is due to an utterer´s intention. Any intention of any utterer is the intention to fixate belief, at least: "Believe in what I utter". Without this intention, nothing would be uttered. False signs, misunderstandings, misinterpretations, imputations are signs too, but self-uttered. So they may be called narratives too, but the narrator/utterer is identical with the interpretator. But the intention is missing. Erring has no clear intention. So the question remains: Does a narrative base on intention? I think yes. If the intention is unclear- Is it still a narrative? Answer: This is unclear. Mathematically this affair of inability to define is an example of "error propagation".

Best, Helmut

06. November 2021 um 22:21 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt"
wrote:

Gary F., Gary R., List:

GF (via GR below): What’s the difference between a narrative and an argument?

An argument is a specific kind of sign as distinguished from a proposition or a name in that it distinctly represents its interpretant, namely, its conclusion (CP 2.95, 1902). Accordingly, I suggest that the question is really whether a narrative qualifies as an argument, or is merely a copulative proposition. If "every true poem is a sound argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:194, 1903), then it is at least plausible that a narrative could also be an argument. But what exactly is a true poem as opposed to a false poem? Is the latter still an argument, though presumably an unsound one? Is a true narrative likewise a sound argument, while a false narrative is an unsound argument? What about a fictional narrative?

GF: Is the entire universe both? (Or neither; or something else.)

Peirce maintains that "the Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem--for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony" (ibid). My proposed argumentation for the reality of God relies on the semeiotic principle that every sign must be determined by an object that is external to, independent of, and unaffected by that sign itself--namely, its dynamical object. Of course, a case for the same conclusion could also be made on the basis that every work of art requires an artist, every poem requires a poet, and every symphony requires a composer. Likewise, if the entire universe is conceived as "a single grand narrative," then it seems to me that it requires a narrator.

GF (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-11/msg00028.html): A narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is not necessarily meaningful in any way.

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or argument?

2021-11-07 Thread Helmut Raulien

List,

Best, Helmut

06. November 2021 um 22:21 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt"
wrote:

Gary F., Gary R., List:

GF (via GR below): What’s the difference between a narrative and an argument?

GF: Is the entire universe both? (Or neither; or something else.)

GF (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-11/msg00028.html): A narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is not necessarily meaningful in any way.

On the contrary, a narrative is a sign, and every sign is "meaningful" by virtue of having an immediate interpretant that is internal to it and a final interpretant that it would determine under ideal circumstances, as well as a dynamical interpretant that it does determine whenever it is actually interpreted. Moreover, events are entia rationis that must be prescinded from the continuous flow of time and change, so constructing a narrative involves deliberately selecting and demarcating which events in the sequence to include rather than ignore--i.e., which events to treat as significant.

GF: However, I notice that the term narrative, as used nowadays in the psychological and social sciences, has itself taken on an implication of purposefulness. We use our “narratives” to make sense of our lives and the lives of others, to discern the connections between actions and events.

Exactly, and we also use our "narratives" in an effort to influence how others make sense of their lives and the world. This is especially evident in the media these days--which events and details are selected vs. ignored reflects a certain point of view that the narrator takes for

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

2021-11-05 Thread Helmut Raulien

Gary, Gary, Jon, list,

I think, being either an animal or a human does not make something either a sign or an object, but the context does.

Best, Helmut

05. November 2021 um 06:52 Uhr
"Gary Richmond"
wrote:

Jon A.S., Gary F, List,

JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token (emphasis added, GR).

GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated example:

A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token. (Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537, 1906)

JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an individual organism is properly called a token.

GR: This follows from the above.

JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.

GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at least somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history of biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia article on 'genus':

The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists. The standards for genus classification are not strictly codified, so different authorities often produce different classifications for genera.

Something similar is true for 'species': see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species

JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed by the general type to which it conforms.

GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce quotation offered, that "only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token."

JAS: However, individual humans are not tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the dynamical objects of those signs (emphasis added, GR).

GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual humans, biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's not conflate the two.

JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.

GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late quotation:

CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910)

Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things regarding what Peirce thought, ought to be and can be quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would say that from the standpoint of what Peirce meant (at least in the context of semeiotic grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS) regarding 'token', 'type', 'sign', all of this seems to me as if it ought to be quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here too).

At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what Peirce thought and wrote: Are there any terms and their accompanying meanings which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there are such terms and ideas. And one of these is that "within the context of speculative grammar. . . only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token."

Best.

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:24 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Gary F., List:

Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an individual organism is properly called a token. Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality that

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semiosis and Time (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

2021-11-01 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, List,

Is reality binary, so, like you wrote, if something is "at least somewhat arbitrary", it "thus is not real"? I mean, it might as well be so, that "real" is a gradual trait, whose value increases with the establishment of a habit, and becomes integer with the value "1", resp. "100%" when it turns into a universal. That would be in accord with Peirce´s tychism, i think.

Best, Helmut

01. November 2021 um 02:24 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt"
wrote:

Helmut, List:

HR: Other than universal objective time, subjective time is discontinuous, but is it not real?

I believe that subjective time is just as continuous as objective time. According to Peirce, "in the present moment we are directly aware of the flow of time, or in other words that things can change" (CP 7.649, 1903). The ring of the telephone is not an instantaneous interruption, it requires a finite lapse of time to divert my attention from the conversation. However, it might be so abrupt that it seems instantaneous, analogous to how in physics the magnitude of the force required to arrest a moving body is inversely proportional to the duration of its application. As Gary F. has put it, "Every moment has its momentum" (https://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/crn.htm).

HR: My concept of "real" so far is, that it applies to universal laws, independently of individual instantiation.

Peirce's concept of "real" is that which is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it. The demarcation of "individual" signs for analysis is at least somewhat arbitrary, so it depends on what the analyst or group of analysts thinks about it, and thus is not real.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sun, Oct 31, 2021 at 1:34 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

Jon, list,

Yes, objective time is continuous, so everything that takes time should be continuous too. Objective means, that it is a matter of the universe, the complete sign. So maybe discontinuities are not objective, but subjective, e.g. when you are in a conversation, and then the telephone rings. Then your mind switches from one state to another. But, is the discontinuity and the individual sign unreal, because it is not a matter of the universe, but merely of a subject? I think, this question is merely about the definition of the term "real". Other than universal objective time, subjective time is discontinuous, but is it not real? My concept of "real" so far is, that it applies to universal laws, independently of individual instantiation. But if there is a law about individual instantiations that is generizable, and says, that they may be discontinuous, this law again is independent of individual instantiation- therefore real? Even if something is not a universal law, but just a habit in a limited group of interpreters, may this habit be called "real" too, as it is independent of each single individual? As I said, I think that this is about the definition of the term "real", so I generally do not disagree with you, it just is about a term.

Best, Helmut

30. Oktober 2021 um 18:14 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

Helmut, List:

It occurred to me today that another way in which the real process of semiosis is continuous is that it always takes time. There is no such thing as an instantaneous sign--uttering any actual sign token requires a finite lapse of time, and interpreting any actual sign token requires a subsequent finite lapse of time, even when these two steps are happening sequentially (perhaps overlapping a bit) within the same mind as a train of thought.

That is why I am inclined to maintain that the intentional interpretant in the mind of the utterer must precede the uttered sign itself and serve as a constituent of its object, while that uttered sign including the communicational (immediate) interpretant in the commind must precede the effectual (dynamical) interpretant in the mind of the interpreter--not just logically, but also temporally. In Peirce's words, "the essential difference ... between the nature of an object and that of an interpretant ... is that the former antecedes, while the latter succeeds the sign" (EP 2:410, 1907).

Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Oct 29, 2021 at 4:05 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:

Helmut, List:

What I have been suggesting is that the entire universe is one sign in the sense that it is a vast, ongoing process of continuous semiosis. Any "individual" sign within it that we mark off for analysis, such that we can then attempt to sort out its two objects and three interpretants, has boundaries that are at least somewhat arbitrary.

For example, this post as a whole seems like a straightforward example of a

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

2021-10-31 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, list,

Best, Helmut

30. Oktober 2021 um 18:14 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt"
wrote:

Helmut, List:

Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Oct 29, 2021 at 4:05 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:

Helmut, List:

For example, this post as a whole seems like a straightforward example of an individual sign. However, we could divide it into multiple individual sentences, which we could divide into multiple individual phrases, which we could divide into multiple individual words, which we could divide into multiple individual letters, and so on. Moreover, we could instead connect it with your post below to constitute one exchange, which we could connect with other exchanges to constitute one thread, which we could connect with other threads to constitute one List archive, and so on.

My point here is that at each "level" in both directions, we could (at least theoretically) demarcate and analyze one sign that has its two objects and three interpretants. Accordingly, I see no good reason to treat any one of those subsidiary signs as the real sign. Instead, it is the whole that is the real sign, the entire universe as a semiosic continuum; while its parts, all those constituent signs, are entia rationis.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Oct 29, 2021 at 2:17 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

Jon, Gary, List,

I do not understand, how analysis is arbitrary. Neither do I understand, what the continuity-claim is, besides a mantra. It e.g. has been agreed some time, that induction is based on rational numbers, whose row is not a continuum. To say, that discontinuous individual signs are not real, but merely artefacts of arbitrary analysis, to me seems esoteric. In electronics, discontinuity is produced by a schmitt-trigger. I am quite sure, that in semiosis there also are schmitt-trigger-like elements. Of course you can say, that if you look at the sharp edge of a step with a microscope, you can see, that it is a bit rounded, at least with the radius of an atom. But that is a red herring, because for e

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

2021-10-29 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, Gary, List,

Best, helmut

29. Oktober 2021 um 19:59 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt"
wrote:

Gary F., List:

GF: I was thinking that my top-down approach to these issues (based loosely on the “connected signs theorem” and your post on “Semiosic Synechism”) would turn out to be complementary to your bottom-up approach in this thread, analogous to the complementary views of light as waves and/or particles, but I guess that doesn’t work.

In what sense do you consider my approach in this exchange to be "bottom-up" rather than "top-down"? I have stated more than once that any individual sign that we choose to analyze is an artifact of that very analysis, since we arbitrarily mark it off within the real process of semiosis, which is always continuous.

GF: Can we generalize from this to say that only an individual sign (i.e. a discrete and existing sign, a token or sinsign) has three interpretants?

Which three interpretants do you have in mind? Again, I see the communicational and effectual interpretants respectively as the immediate and dynamical interpretants of the uttered sign, determinations of the commind and the interpreter's mind; and I see the intentional interpretant as a dynamical interpretant of previous signs, determinations of the utterer's mind that are connected such that they can have that one actual interpretant (CP 4.550). More generally, I have suggested in the past that the immediate interpretant pertains to each type of a sign, the dynamical interpretant to each token of a type, and the final interpretant to the sign itself--the idea being that one sign can have different types within different sign systems, such as "man" in English vs. "homme" in French--but I might need to rethink that theoretical scheme in light of recent discussions.

GF: That would explain why your “Semiosic Synechism” post only mentions one interpretant of the “one sign” that results “if any signs are connected, no matter how.” Is this another consequence of the connected signs theorem? If so, could we also say that only an individual sign has two objects (immediate and dynamic), while the one sign which is a semiosic "perfect continuum" has only one?

No, I believe that every sign--including the entire universe, conceived as "a vast representamen" that "is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs"--has two objects and three interpretants, but I did not attempt to sort them out in that post (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-10/msg00204.html). The immediate object is internal to the sign, the object as represented in that sign, while the dynamical object is external to the sign, the object as it is in itself. The immediate interpretant is internal to the sign, the interpretant as represented in that sign, while the dynamical interpretant is any actual effect of that sign and the final interpretant is the ideal effect of that sign. I have my own opinions about the external correlates in the case of the entire universe, but they tend to be controversial and are not essential to the topic of this thread.

GF: If those two suggestions don’t work, perhaps you can propose some other general principle that we can salvage from this failure of communication.

At the risk of belaboring the point, the most salient general principle here is that we can only discuss objects and interpretants in relation to a particular sign. In other words, the first step of semeiotic analysis is always demarcating the sign of interest by prescinding it from the continuous process of semiosis, thus marking it off as an ens rationis. Only then can we examine that quasi-individual sign to apprehend its immediate object and interpretant, from which we attempt to identify what dynamical object it is denoting and understand what about that object it is signifying. Again, the dynamical interpretant is any actual effect of the sign of interest, while the final interpretant is its ideal effect.

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

2021-10-25 Thread Helmut Raulien

Gary, List

There obviously are many interpretants. I hope they can be classified according to the principle, that firstness has one mode (or part?), secondness has two modes (or parts?), and thirdness has three. For example the dynamic object in my understanding has two modes, resp. consists of two parts: The conceptual and the material part. Both of course those which exist independently of, and external to the sign. In the same way, I think, all the interpretants should be classifiable, otherwise I am out (not off the list, ha-ha, but off the interpretants-topic.

Best

Helmut

25. Oktober 2021 um 17:07 Uhr
g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:

Jerry R, Jon AS, list,

I’m looking forward to Jon’s paper on the various interpretants, which will surely bring his usual precision to the subject. I must confess, though, that my own internal context for thinking about these matters is weighted toward the psychological perspective on them. Peirce was always careful not to base his logic, or his semeiotic, on psychological theories — but his work “betrays” plenty of psychological insight. Jerry’s response to my earlier post gave added emphasis to this one: “In the first place, your neighbors are, in a measure, yourself, and in far greater measure than, without deep studies in psychology, you would believe” (EP2:2). Another one appears here:

CSP: Men seem to themselves to be guided by reason. There is little doubt that this is largely illusory: they are much less guided by reason, much more guided by instinct, than they seem to themselves to be; because their reasonings are prominent in their consciousness, and are attended to, while their instincts they are hardly aware of, except later when they come to review their conduct. Even then, they are so immersed in instinct that they are hardly able to perceive it. (R 410:1–2, c. 1894)

In our time, cognitive science and social psychology have taken this a step further with the study of “motivated cognition” and “motivated reasoning”, which shows that our conscious reasoning itself is driven by subconscious motivations and intentions, or “instincts” as Peirce called them. Jonathan Haidt encapsulates this in the metaphor of the elephant (instinctive motivation or intuitive judgment) and the rider (reason): the rider may think he controls the elephant, but much of our reasoning is a more or less desperate attempt to rationalize our actions or our intuitive beliefs. And many of our intuitive beliefs are determined by conformity to the beliefs of some group that we belong to, or wish to belong to. This is one reason why your neighbors are yourself, as Peirce put it.

“Motivated reasoning” often leads to the “hypocrisy” that Jerry mentioned, among other effects on communication between humans. For an obvious example, just consider a typical campaign speech by any politician. But we all act this way in matters that we care about, and getting to the Truth (or Final Interpretant) is not always our prime motivation, even in a process of inquiry. Often it takes some effort to make it prevail over other motivations.

With all this in mind, I have a tendency to associate the word “immediate” with spontaneous, unconscious or uncontrolled mental processes. When it comes to Immediate Objects and Immediate Interpretants, this bias of mine may be hard to reconcile with Jon’s more purely semiotic definitions.

JAS: As I see it, the immediate interpretant is always internal to the sign. As I have said before, in the case of a text, it is the range of possible understandings in accordance with the definitions of the words that comprise it, along with their arrangement in accordance with the syntax and other rules of grammar for the language in which it is written.

GF: OK, that fits with the Firstness and indeterminacy of the first in a triad of interpretants. But what I call the “internal context” of an interpreter reading a text also includes some motivations or intuitions that will determine what gets selected from that “range” when the dynamic interpretant is generated. And that selection itself tends to be pre-conscious or “immediate” in my psychological sense of the word. The reader may even be subconsciously motivated to overlook “the syntax and other rules of grammar” and the external context of the text when constructing a dynamic interpretant.

Peirce's theories and applications of those theories, whether directly quoted, paraphrased or summarized, come out of a context which (for us) is the whole body of Peirce's extant work. That work came out of an even larger context, which is the whole body of scientific discourse extending at least from the time of Aristotle up to Peirce's lifetime. In order to situate his work in that larger context, Peirce had to internalize it, to develop an implicit understanding of it which served as the internal context of his explicit thoughts. Likewise, students of Peirce internalize an understanding of Peirce which is vastly simplified

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list (was Peirce's contributions to the 21st c

2021-10-16 Thread Helmut Raulien

List,

I think, a problem is, that sometimes people want to talk about and analyse a theme, while others always immediately are looking for hermeneutical reference. Both is valuable, but, on one hand, a theme cannot be properly discussed, if it always is disturbed by accusations of wrong hermeneutics, on the other hand, if it is not, it may go astray and leave the Peirce-zone. This problem can not be solved by a new list. Maybe it can by seperating every post into two parts: A theme part and a hermeneutical part. In the theme parts, the hermeneutical parts can be ignored, resp. the hermeneutical parts can be regarded as mere comments, either as long as the poster thinks, that this is possible, or until all agree that is not longer possible to do so. Then, but much later than usually, aspects from the hermeneutics are either used to correct the theme, or the theme discussion has crossed the point of having become irreversibly non-Peircean. Only then the discussion should leave the list, and e.g. go to Biosemiotics List, or a new list. But I think this is unlikely to happen very often: I sometimes have though that Peirce was wrong in one or the other aspect, but later saw he was not. But if-then.

Best,

Helmut

16. Oktober 2021 um 20:28 Uhr
"Margaretha Hendrickx"
wrote:

Hi Edwina,

I respect your decision to not interact with people with ZOOM or SKYPE. But what about the phone then? Hopefully, you will consider joining us via the phone if this ZOOM/SKYPE gathering were ever to happen.

Talking about Popper's Open Society and Its Enemies, the real enemy is inside each one of us when we flip into a subtly intolerant attitude. That is, recall Popper's aphorism, "You may be right; I may be wrong; together we get closer to the truth." I got the most out of Popper when I used his writings as a mirror to reflect on what I was doing.

The great insight that I got from it was about the dangers of the picture theory of language. That theory is among us in the form of the causal theory of meaning and the various representational theories of knowledge. When we as readers think of a text as an indubitable picture of the content of the mind of the author. Or, alternatively, a picture of reality.

That is, what is that incontrovertible evidence that the Peirce list is closed as in the Germany of the 1930s?

I am not denying the reality of your frustrations. I am simply wondering whether the creation of a new list will solve whatever the problems are on this list.

On Sat, Oct 16, 2021 at 1:15 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:

I'm fine with and would love a real coffee house chat - but I'm not into Skype or Zoom. Won't even do it with my kids.

I think that Robert Marty's post is correct - where he agreed with Gary F - that a separate list means that the Peirce-L list members won't be 'bothered' by the 'sacrilege' of reading 'post-Peirce' analysis or reading our complaints that the Peirce-L response is to fling dozens of quotations against such a focus..

I don't see that a separate list is 'divisive'. After all - you mentioned Popper. You must know his 'Open Society and Its Enemies', where Popper specifically warns against a closed society, ie, a tribal society, . a closed ideology, and the rejection of individual freedom of thought. Well, the Peirce-L list, in my view, has become closed. I think a separate list, which ensures the tribal purity of the Peirce-L list...and yet, enables freedom [aka 1ns] to explore the Peircean framework as operative in other areas than Peirce used [though he DID refer to the biological, the societal]….. is a constructive action.

Edwina

On Sat 16/10/21 12:50 PM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com sent:

What about taking this conversation off list, as in literally off list? For example, to a Skype or ZOOM session that we treat as a drink/juice-in-a-bar happening where no one is allowed to talk about serious stuff for the first half hour? Something like an international Peirce Meet 'n Greet?

Or who knows? Some list members may be living in driving distance from one another. I live in Ithaca, NY, USA.

What I am trying to say is that it does not make sense to slice and dice Peirce. A lot can be learned from engaging in non-judgmental listening; that is, thinking without a judgmental sucking-up/talking-down attitude (spatial metaphor). Face-to-face interaction makes it easier to switch into a horizontal attitude (spatial metaphor).

On Sat, Oct 16, 2021 at 12:33 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Exactly!! That's the spirit!

And it shows, clearly, how different subject matters are treated on this list.

Edwina

On Sat 16/10/21 12:23 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:

I think it could be helpful for the group that has been complaining about the subject matter of postings on this list to create a new one that would be more to their liking. At least we (subscribers to peirce-l)

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