Gary, Gary, Jon, list,
 
I think, being either an animal or a human does not make something either a sign or an object, but the context does.
 
Best, Helmut
 
 
 05. November 2021 um 06:52 Uhr
 "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]>
wrote:
 
Jon A.S., Gary F, List,
 
JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token (emphasis added, GR).
GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated example:
 
A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token. (Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537, 1906) 
 
JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an individual organism is properly called a token.
GR: This follows from the above.
 
JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at least somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history of biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia article on 'genus': 
 
The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists. The standards for genus classification are not strictly codified, so different authorities often produce different classifications for genera.
 
Something similar is true for 'species': see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species
 
JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed by the general type to which it conforms.
GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce quotation offered, that "only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token."
 
JAS: However, individual humans are not tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the dynamical objects of those signs (emphasis added, GR).
GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual humans, biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's not conflate the two.
 
JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.
GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late quotation:
 
CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910)
 
Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things regarding what Peirce thought, ought to be and can be quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would say that from the standpoint of what Peirce meant (at least in the context of semeiotic grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS) regarding 'token', 'type', 'sign', all of this seems to me as if it ought to be quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here too).
 
At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what Peirce thought and wrote: Are there any terms and their accompanying meanings which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there are such terms and ideas. And one of these is that "within the context of speculative grammar. . . only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token."
 
Best.
 
Gary R

 

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

 
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York




 
 
On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:24 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote:
Gary F., List:
 
Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an individual organism is properly called a token. Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
 
Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed by the general type to which it conforms. However, individual humans are not tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the dynamical objects of those signs.
 
Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.
 
Regards,
 
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
 
On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 9:31 AM <[email protected]> wrote:

Jon, list,

JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is either a type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the idea that every type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens …

GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token relation, like the general/specific relation, can apply to several levels in a hierarchic or holarchic classification system, so that the reference is relative to the level in the hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the genus is type and the species is token, but the species is also the type of which an individual organism of that species is token (and there can be other levels intermediate between those two!).

Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, homo, ἄνθρωπος are the same sign’ (MS 9), the “sign” is the type of which the three terms are tokens; but the three terms are also types of which individual humans are tokens. And if we use the term “individual” in logical strictness, we can say that Philip is the type of which Philip drunk and Philip sober are individual tokens. Is there a top type (Archetype? Metatype?) in the holarchy of signs? The universe as sign, perhaps? I don’t know, but I would say that it’s signs all the way down. So I’d rather not use the word sign to refer to several specific levels of generality at once.

By the way, some years ago I did a slideshow dealing with the etymology and history of the word “type,” in connection with a Peirce text where he uses the Greek form τύπος in reference to the “copulation” of Form and Matter in semiosis. The text is included in Turning Signs here, in a passage leading up to a discussion of the “categories.”

Gary f.

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