Category theory, theory of categories, and even categorial theory could
be hard to distinguish in some languages. Anyway, we're getting into the
territory of distinctions that are semantically nontrivial yet confusingly
expressed, such as that between relation algebra and relational algebra,
, and I'll be interested in others' responses
(presently, I would tend to agree with you that fallibilism re: our perceptual
judgments prefigures falsification and that fallibilism can be--I'd say,
is--more basic than falsification).
Best,
Gary
Benjamin Udell 8/5/2011 2:53 PM
List, Steven, Peter
Forwarded.
- Original Message -
From: Robert Lane
To: The Charles S. Peirce Society
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2011 4:55 PM
Subject: Peirce Society: 2011-12 Essay Contest: Call for Submissions
CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS
2011-12 Charles S. Peirce Society Essay Contest
Topic: Any topic on or
List,
Jerry Dozoretz passed away earlier this month. Condolences to his beloved wife
Ann and family. Ann emailed Nathan Houser, Gary Richmond, and me about it today.
Denver Post obituary
http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/denverpost/obituary.aspx?n=jerry-dozoretzpid=153047257
(August 12-14).
List,
Sorry I've been out of it for the last week or so.
Gary Richmond has asked me to send the list a note that, if anyone needs to
contact him, they should use his gmail account gary.richm...@gmail.com .
Best, Ben
Thanks, Gary and Irving.
For my part I agree that it's best to postpone On Peirce's Conception of the
Iconic Sign so that Fernando can do it.
I'm sorry that I've been out of loops both on-list and off-list! I plan to get
back into the current slow read. We all have our distractions, but I
P.S., regarding Arisbe website suggestions, you can make them on-list, but if
you want to send an Arisbe suggestion off-list, send it to both me and Gary:
richmon...@lagcc.cuny.edu
gary.richm...@gmail.com
bud...@nyc.rr.com
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
Forwarded at Nathan Houser's request. Thank you for your persistence, Nathan! -
Best, Ben.
===
Message for Peirce-L
The last thing I want to do is intrude on a good ongoing discussion but I guess
I'd better take a moment to introduce the October slow read of Joe's early
paper
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational CoDear Sally, list,
I've been occupied, and I guess that it's too late for me to catch up with the
rest of the slow read, anyway I won't be miffed if nobody replies to this.
Here's a cut-down version of the draft that I was working on for
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational CoSally, list,
I can't resist trying to catch up somewhat, even if I'm slower than ketchup.
I think that Joe would have taken your criticisms in your post below quite
seriously. You might even have changed his mind, or at least gotten him
to
learn more of it.
Thanks again,
Sally
On Oct 15, 2011, at 12:26 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L
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John, Michael, list,
I'd look harder, but right now I've a nasty cold. I've looked and don't find
Peirce speaking in so many words of a community of inquiry, inquirers,
research, researchers, investigation, or investigators.
It's occurred to me that, given that Peirce (in the Fixation of
Re: [peirce-l] On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for
SemioticCORRECTION, sorry. - Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
To: Neal Bruss ; PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Friday, November 25, 2011 4:07 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] ³On the Paradigm of Experience
Irving, Jerry, Steven, list,
Irving, thanks for your response, more interesting and informative than what I
have to say!
Irving wrote,
Is there some sort of causality, Aristotelian or otherwise, in [application
of] inference rules? Once again, I am at a loss here to comprehend how this
List,
Gary and I have a request to people replying in a slow read: that people please
do not change the titles of posts replying _in_ the slow read. The single
automatic Re: is good (don't delete it!) but please change nothing else - the
letter case, the wording, etc., of the post's title. The
Irving, list,
Thank you for your response, erudite and to the point as always.
I agree, it's hard even to imagine a mathematician simultaneously abjuring
abstraction and not abjuring mathematics itself. The main kind of abstraction
that I've read that mathematicians traditonally abjured in
Message -
From: Jerry LR Chandler
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Cc: Benjamin Udell
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2011 10:49 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate
for Semiotic
Gary, Ben, Steven, List:
With regard to alternative interpretations
Jim, Irving, John, Peter, list,
Thank you for the added comment, Jim. I've been stealing time to try to rummage
through online sources but this subject is very abstract for me. I'll just have
to remove the problematic sentence pending clarification.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
Peter, list,
Thanks for your response.
The augmentationist vision itself in its essence does not seem a conceptually
difficult one. In the 1970s I had some amateur notion of it though I knew
nothing of practical developments in IA. Without the initial government funding
and without the early
Stephen, Gary, Jon, Ken, list,
I don't know whether it supports Stephen Rose's point or not, but Peirce once
said that he would embrace Roman Catholicism if it espoused _practical_
infallibility instead of _theoretical_ infallibility. See C. S. Peirce and G.
M. Searle: The Hoax of
Jason,
Universal is an ambiguous word sometimes used to translate Aristotle's
_katholos_ even when Aristotle means merely that which in everyday English is
called general, something true of more than one object.
Some philosophers say universals and particulars where Peirce (with his
better
Forwarded.
- Original Message -
From: Robert Lane
To: The Charles S. Peirce Society
Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 4:58 PM
Subject: Peirce Society: Program and Business Meeting Agenda
Dear Members and Friends of the Charles S. Peirce Society,
Below is the program for our upcoming
Irving,
Do you think that your theoretical - computational distinction and likewise
Pratt's creator - consumer distinction between kinds of mathematics could be
expressed in terms of Peirce's theorematic - corollarial distinction? That
identification seems not without issues but still pretty
of what you say. But when one writes a book blurb, it's best to write it in
extra-hard-to-misconstrue ways, as if the reader may be a bit groggy, like I am
right now!
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Cc: Benjamin Udell
Sent
Gary F., Jon, Gary R. list,
I agree, Gary F., all your points are good. Also I did a search on
predicament in the CP and usually it turned out to be when he discussed
Aristotle's Categories, or Predicaments. I don't think that he means his own
categories by Category in the Prolegomena. And the
-theoretical principles), etc.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2012 1:14 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce
edition
Malgosia, list,
Responses interleaved
for a particular application. (All in all, we won't be able to get
rid of the term applied, but in some cases we may be find an alternate term
with the same denotation in the given context).
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Khadimir
To: Benjamin Udell
Cc: PEIRCE-L
=%22Mathematics+is+the+study+of+what+is+true+of+hypothetical+states+of+things%22
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 6:11 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce
edition
Irving
Jon, list,
Let's toss Michael Shapiro's blog a link while we're at it.
Language Lore http://www.languagelore.net/. Shapiro persistently brings a
pragmatist's perspective to linguistics.
I actually ventured into the S.A.A.P. session in honor of Richard Robin on
Thursday and met some of the
Steven, list,
The need to click on Reply All in order to reply _on list_ to a message is
not unique to peirce-l. It avoids a recurrent problem. Under peirce-l's old
system, people sometimes accidentally sent to peirce-l personal messages
unintended for peirce-l, and in some cases it led to
List,
I've added links at http://www.cspeirce.com/digitized.htm to pages leading to
Peirce manuscript images Los manuscritos de C. S. Peirce
http://www.unav.es/gep/MSCSPeirce.html at Grupo de Estudios Peirceanos. I've
translated the Spanish annotations into English.
This currently
Jon, Terry, list,
I've seen it suggested in a thread somewhere on the Web that the reason that
the position-velocity-acceleration trichotomy is a good one is that that there
are universal laws of acceleration and velocity (and position?) but not of the
third or higher derivatives. (The third
I said this wrong. Changed below between pairs of asterisks. Sorry! - Best, Ben
- Original Message -
Jason, list,
That's interesting. What aspects of synechism do they reject?
a.. Continuity of space and time? Lorentz symmetries seem to make such
continuity pretty credible.
b..
List,
Arisbe has now been transferred to IUPUI server (but the url remains and will
remain http://www.cspeirce.com/) . Now, it takes a while for the changed server
location to propagate through the Internet, so it Arisbe may seem to be down
when you try to access it. But don't worry, everybody
List,
The previous tech support person for peirce-l, Ali Zimmerman, has left her
position. From now on, for subscription problems, please contact me and Gary,
and if we cannot resolve the problem, we will contact the new tech person who
is currently settling into place. A few of you have
Ernesto,
There are extensive links to online materials on EGs at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existential_graph#References. Also, Ahti-Veikko J.
Pietarinen has just posted some new material including Ten Myths about
Existential Graphs at his webpages at http://www.helsinki.fi/~pietarin/. Once
Jon,
The way I learned it, (formal) implication is not the /assertion/ but
the /validity/ of the (material) conditional, so it's a difference
between 1st-order and 2nd-order logic, a difference that Peirce
recognized in some form. If the schemata involving p and q are
considered to expose
Hi, Jim
Thanks, but I'm afraid that a lot of this is over my head. Boolean
quantifier 'v' ? Is that basically the backward E? A 'unity' class? Is
that a class with just one element? Well, be that as it may, since I'm
floundering here, still I take it that Frege did not view a judgment as
Sorry, corrections in bold:
Jon,
The way I learned it, (formal) implication is not the /assertion/ but
the /validity/ of the (material) conditional, so it's a difference
between 1st-order and 2nd-order logic, a difference that Peirce
recognized in some form. If the schemata involving p and
Hi, Jim,
Sorry, I'm not following you here. F and a look like logical
constants in the analysis. I don't know how you're using v, and so
on. I don't know why there's a question raised about taking the
judgment as everything that implies it, or as everything that it
implies. Beyond those
Jim,
Sorry, I'm just getting more confused. I've actually seen a, b, etc.
called constants as opposed to variables such as x, y, etc.
Constant individuals and variable individuals, so to speak, anyway in
keeping with the way the words constant and variable seem to be used
in opposition to
Gary M., list,
In the passage that you quote from EP 2: 266, what Peirce says is,
[] This scholastic terminology has passed into English speech
more than into any other modern tongue, rendering it the most
logically exact of any. This has been accomplished at the
inconvenience
to the
whole semiotic triad of the representamen, the object (or the
significate, or significate object, as Deely calls it), and the
interpretant.
Best, Ben
On 5/13/2012 5:39 AM, Gary Moore wrote:
Dear Benjamin Udell,
Gary Moore: Although John Harvey’s reply was extremely good and very
thought
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