Jon, list:
1) I'm not sure where or what function the three universes have; I admit that
I haven't paid much attention to them. I don't see them as an ontological
alternative to the phenomenological categories. My first impression is that
they are quite different but again, I haven't paid
Edwina, List:
ET: I'm not sure what you mean by 'the latter is still divisible into a
trichotomy.'
Just that the Dynamic Interpretant can be a Possible, an Existent, or a
Necessitant; i.e., it is not confined to the second Category or Universe.
JS: ... the Categories correspond to the
Jon, List,
I'm not sure I can fully agree with Jappy's/Short's analysis, at least when
the language Jappy uses seems to imply that the three Universes represent a
break *from* the categories. It seems to me that the Universes are a
metaphysical expression *of* the categories, and not at all a
Auke, List:
AB: As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no
conclusions.
Yes, Peirce was right to call himself "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman,
in the work of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic" (CP 5.488;
1907).
AB: I in particular disagree with your:
Jon, Gary F, List,
How might we think about the relationship between the categories and the
universes? First, let's note that he uses these terms in a number of different
ways in different contexts. For instance, in the Harvard Lectures of 1903, he
provides a phenomenological account of the
Jon, list:
You'll find his outline of genuine and degenerate categories in various
places. See 5.66 and on, where he outlines the genuine and degenerate forms of
Secondness and Thirdness. It gets VERY complicated
For example, 5.73 ..he writes: 'Of these three genera of representamens, the
Gary R., List:
GR: It seems to me that the Universes are a metaphysical expression *of* the
categories, and not at all a complete break from them. Do you agree?
Yes; I actually see no significant inconsistency between your statement
here and Jappy's hypothesis that Peirce changed theoretical
Edwina, List:
ET: As i said repeatedly, the categories are not the same as the universes
and the universes are therefore not a 'mature' or 'better' version of the
categories.
Agreed; although again, I think that it is an open question whether Peirce
was right to *change *his theoretical
Jon, list
1) Agree - the DO can be in any of the three categorical modes.
2) Ah- I see your point about the categories and universes. Yes, it makes sense.
I am hypothesizing that the distinctions between the two kinds of Objects
(Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants
Jeff, List:
JD: Relations of reference subsist between two subjects that belong to
different categories of being. Referential relations subsist between
subjects that belong to different universes of discourse.
The passage that you quoted dates from 1903, before the shift in Peirce's
Hi Jon S,
I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes of
signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles,
existents and necessitants. As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb when he argues in
the essay at that is appended to the collection on
Gary R., List:
Jappy's paper is from earlier this year, and his book is not even out yet,
so his hypothesis obviously has not been vetted much so far. I agree that
he may be overstating the magnitude of Peirce's alleged change in
theoretical framework; I brought it up because I find it
Jeff, Jon, List,
*JD: Relations of reference subsist between two subjects that belong to
different categories of being. Referential relations subsist between
subjects that belong to different universes of discourse.*
*The passage that you quoted dates from 1903, before the shift in Peirce's
Jeff, List:
It looks like you may have inadvertently sent your reply to me only, rather
than to the List. The whole thing is included below.
JD: Well, the subject terms in a proposition typically refer to existent
objects or facts.
In "Prolegomena," Peirce states, "A logical universe is, no
Jeff, List:
JD: I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the
classes of signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between
possibles, existents and necessitants.
That is certainly the dominant interpretation. I only started questioning
it because Peirce
List:
While reviewing the letters to Lady Welby that are in EP 2.477-491, I
noticed that Peirce only explicitly employed his terms for the constituents
of the three Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants) to the Sign
itself, the Dynamoid or Dynamical Object, and the Immediate Object. He
Jon, List
I read this section On Signs and the Categories [see 8.327 and on, and also in
the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-as analyses of the
categories [not universes]. Peirce is quite specific: "I call these three ideas
the cenopythagorean categories" - referring to
List:
I was digging through my burgeoning collection of Peircean secondary
literature this morning and came across Gary Richmond's PowerPoint
presentation on "Trikonic" (http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/
menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonicb.ppt). It helpfully summarizes
various characterizations
Edwina, List:
ET: I read this section *On Signs and the Categories* [see 8.327 and on,
and also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-as
analyses of the categories [not universes].
As I just discussed in light of Jappy's papers, 8.327ff is from 1904,
before Peirce developed
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