Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims and Mediation

[kirstima]

Thank you, Jon for bringing up your "Seven major variations..."

In it you take up with excellent clarity seven perspectives upon the 
Maxim, from the standpoint of a philospher. Mentioning year with each 
quote is very informative in respect of development of CSP's main 
interests and aims.


However, my main interests lie in contexts of various formulations. 
Those in Harward lectures have occupied my thoughts several decades. The 
problem of mediation needs that, to my mind. Perhaps not yours.


Best,

Kirsti Määttänen



Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 14.2.2018 15:40:

Kirsti, List ...

I did once collect seven major variations on the theme:

Pragmatic Maxim
Seven Ways of Looking at a Pragmatic Maxim
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/

Plus a sample of previous discussions:

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/?s=Pragmatic+Maxim

Regards,

Jon




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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims and Mediation

[Jon Awbrey]

Kirsti, List ...

I did once collect seven major variations on the theme:

Pragmatic Maxim
Seven Ways of Looking at a Pragmatic Maxim
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/

Plus a sample of previous discussions:

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/?s=Pragmatic+Maxim

Regards,

Jon

On 2/14/2018 8:13 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

List,

First I wish to express my appreciation to Gary f., to his lead and his commentaries on LL. - However, it seem to me 
that the discussions tend to get muddled on certain very, very basic respects.


Peirce's first formulation of the Pragmatic Maxims was about "practical bearings". So it was about doing something, more 
specifically it was about experimentation. Experimentation is about doing systematical observations (with some stated, 
conscious rules, mostly with non conscius habits of feeling). This applies to thought experiments just as well.


The second, later formulation of the Pragmatic Maxim is about understanding and interpreting the ideas an thoughts 
mediated by texts, diagrams (etc).


But to my knowledge CSP did not write down a third, strictly worded formulation of the Maxim. If there is one to be 
found, it must reside in his very latest writings.


However, he left a legacy on how to find and grasp the essence of The Third. - To my mind Peircean phenomenology is the 
Turning Point. And the key.


Writing down or drawing down means making one's ideas observable, objectifying them to be inspected. By oneself AND by 
others. But the self to write down was the former self, not exactly the same as the one(self) doing the writing down.


Husserlian Phenomenology is all about knowledge and consciousness. Nonconscious mind gets left out at the outset. (I 
have consulted several experts on Husserl, as well as thoroughly inspected some of his key writings.) I have good 
reasons to believe that Peirce resorted in choosing (for some time) not to use the same term in order to avoid confusing 
and muddling his phenomenology with that of Husserl.  - Hegel's Phenomenology he partly accepted, but definitely not 
Hegel's Logic.


We do have conscious control (deliberation) in starting to write down our thoughts and ending it. But our minds are not 
simultaneously starting or ending feeling and thinking. Not with the first nor with last word (or line etc).


A living mind is continuously active, and any symbol lives as long as continuity gets created and recreated by new 
minds, in new contexts.


Any act of writing down one's thoughts and ideas is an experiment. We all (hopefully) reformulate what we write during 
writing. Up until it feels good enough. - Or should do so.


Peirce List is not supposed to be an arena for just opinions, in the the sense: "This is my opinion, and as such it is 
just as good as yours!". - A have seen such a response in the List. - The majority in Peirce's times voted him down, 
remember!


This list is and should by all means remain an arena for argumentation, not just expressing opinions. In philosophy and 
in sciences (including human sciences, i.e. humanities) soundness of grounds matters.


When I was a little child my mother sometimes used to respond to us children: 
"Auf dumme Fragen antworte ich
nicht". I did not understand the language, but in time I got the message: There was something wrong with the question 
asked. The question was stupid, unanswerable.


Perhaps my interest in formulating questions, in relation with possible 
answers, stems from these early, preschool times.

I will leave below my earlier mail on ordinality and cardinality, which, to my mind, deserves a second reading. The 
choice if of course yours.


By the time of the FIRST Maxim, CSP was concentrating on Signs, later on (SECOND) he shifted towards Meaning, though not 
at all changing his subject. Just changing the main, but not only perspective.


Best,

Kirsti Määttänen



kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 7.12.2017 11:57:

John & Jon,

The two paragraphs offered by John to clarify the meaning of the verb
'to indentify'  did not do the job for me. Quite the contrary.  Many
questions arose.

JFS:  "In mathematics, it is common practice to "identify" two
structures that are isomorphic.  Some mathematicians call that
practice "abuse of notation" and insist on adding some annotations to
the marks in order to distinguish the references.  But most do not
bother to clutter their notations with such annotations."

Question:  Which (variety of) notations do you mean?   2 = 2  and  a = a ?
Both can be read aloud as – equals – ,  OR – is identical with – .

The mark remains the same, but there is change of meaning, depending
on the (mathematical) context.
With cardinals,  2 = 2 can be taken as equal and identical with  1+1 =
1+1. With a = a the situation is not that simple.

With ordinals this does not apply.  As was shown by CSP in his
cyclical arithmetics.

Not only does "how many?" count, "how many times? " counts. (This is a
joke, mind you).

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

[Jon Awbrey]

Thanks, Gary, Kirsti,

I haven't been able to do more than randomly sample
the doings on the Peirce List for the last half year,
being deeply immersed in other Peirce work that I hope
to report on eventually, but Jon Alan's remarks on the
Pragmatic Maxim drew me back in for a bit.  He recited
one of the places where Peirce declares the role of the
Pragmatic Maxim in giving a rule to abduction, a point
often missed by many of the most careful commentators.
There are aspects of the Pragmatic Maxim that come more
naturally to engineers, workers in the applied sciences
and helping professions, and other practical categories
than they do to the most speculative of philosophizers.
But I have lost track of that direction for the moment.
No doubt the occasion will arise again ...

Regards,

Jon

On 11/2/2016 12:49 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Thanks, Jon A.,

I remember reading these on your blog years ago.
Very helpful, including your comments.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*



On 11/5/2016 5:29 PM, Kirsti Määttänen wrote:
> Jon,
>
> I could not agree more.  Excellent, to my mind.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Kirsti Määttänen
>
> Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 4.11.2016 15:51:
>> Jerry, List,
>>
>> Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush
>> to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us
>> to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need
>> to Compute Better Answers.
>>
>> For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence
>> of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from
>> taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just
>> recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim
>> again and again and trying to triangulate the points to
>> which they point.
>>
>> For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.
>> A well-developed formal system will have:  (1) Primitives,
>> the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place
>> in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions,
>> (2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives,
>> (3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of
>> the theorems that can be derived from them by means of
>> certain (4) Inference Rules.
>>
>> But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts
>> of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb
>> that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical
>> use, and that's where bits of practical advice like the Maxim
>> in question come into play.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On 11/3/2016 5:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>>> Jon, list:
>>>
>>> Thank you for that earnest answer.
>>>
>>> Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
>>> That is, an argument that is the best given
>>> the number of existing possibilities that are
>>> presented explicitly; a choice among them that
>>> is based on our valuation for likeness between
>>> terms?
>>>
>>> And if we were not to attempt to speak on it,
>>> does that not make us vegetables?  For that
>>> would be to deny that it is at least in our
>>> best interest to view clearly on what we place
>>> our valuations and the methods at our disposal.
>>>
>>> So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us,
>>> the community of investigators who are devoured
>>> by a desire to find things out?
>>>
>>> Thank you for your comments,
>>> Jerry R
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>>>
 Jerry, List,

 I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms,
 so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation
 of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.
 But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives
 we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful
 principles can be improved almost indefinitely.

 I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have
 to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on.

 Regards,

 Jon

 On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
> Jon, list:
>
> How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad?
>
> | "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad."
>
> | "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief
> | that the believer is the only existing person.  Were anybody to adopt
> | such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it.  But when
> | a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of
> | their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical
> | theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego."
> | ~ Peirce
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>
>> Peircers,
>>
>> Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim
>> that I 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

[kirstima]

Jon,

I could not agree more. Excellent, to my mind.

Best regards,

Kirsti Määttänen

Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 4.11.2016 15:51:

Jerry, List,

Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush
to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us
to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need
to Compute Better Answers.

For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence
of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from
taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just
recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim
again and again and trying to triangulate the points to
which they point.

For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.
A well-developed formal system will have:  (1) Primitives,
the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place
in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions,
(2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives,
(3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of
the theorems can be derived from them by means of certain
(4) Inference Rules.

But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts
of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb
that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical
use, and that's where bits of practical advice like the Maxim
in question come into play.

Regards,

Jon

On 11/3/2016 5:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:

Jon, list:

Thank you for that earnest answer.
Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that 
is

based on our valuation for likeness between terms?

And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us
vegetables?  For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best
interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the 
methods at

our disposal.

So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of
investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out?

Thank you for your comments,
Jerry R

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:


Jerry, List,

I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms,
so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation
of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.
But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives
we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful
principles can be improved almost indefinitely.

I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have
to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on.

Regards,

Jon

On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:

Jon, list:

How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad?

| "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or 
bad."


| "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the 
belief


| that the believer is the only existing person.  Were anybody to 
adopt
| such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it.  But 
when
| a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as 
sure of
| their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a 
metaphysical

| theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego."
| ~ Peirce

Best,
Jerry R

On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:


Peircers,

Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim
that I collected a number of years ago, along with
some commentary of my own as I last left it.  As I
understand them, they all say essentially the same
thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view,
or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience
or occasion.

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/

Regards,

Jon

On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:


List:

Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion
to a new thread topic.  I would appreciate it if others
would do likewise when extending any of the other ongoing
conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects
besides Peirce's cosmology.

There seems to be a confusion here between "*the* pragmatic 
maxim,"

which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic* with multiple
formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic 
maxim,"
which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can 
tell.

In particular, CP 5.189 is not *the* pragmatic maxim, nor even *a*
pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the 
best*
pragmatic maxim.  For one thing, as we established recently in 
another

thread, it is the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus
falls under logical *critic*.  *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently
serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to
deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting
those that are not.

In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which*
pragmatic maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...

| That is, pragmatism 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

[Jerry Rhee]

Jon, other Jon, Gary, list:



Thank you for your support of other Jon.  This would mean that you think CP
5.189 is not a pragmatic maxim also, because it belongs to what you both
classify as "logical critic”, the definition of which I suspect is clear to
you both.   For in that definition, “logical critic” would somehow exclude
pragmatic maxim by way of law of non-contradiction.  They cannot both be
one thing because each are exclusionary things.



Peirce said many things and I’ve noticed that we are just as free to pick
and choose the different things he said to support our arguments, as if we
believers are the only existing persons.  For instance, he said that “logic
is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad.”  And of course,
you consider my reasoning as bad for a reason; CP 5.189 is not *even* a
pragmatic maxim because “logical critic”.



Yet again, we are free to pick and choose what we like from the vast bed of
Peirce’s writings.  Here is another:

“Man is essentially a social animal: but to be social is one thing, to be
gregarious is another: I decline to serve as bellwether.

My book is meant for people who *want to find out; *and people who want
philosophy ladled out to them can go elsewhere.  There are philosophical
soup shops at every corner, thank God!”

__

I would ask you, social animal, to find out the depths of CP 5.189 and why
it is that I say understanding this object over any other is the best.

For “*whatever is fittingly related to its proper operation is said to be
virtuous and good**… And that which is most perfect in this operation is
the ultimate end, particularly in the case of operations that are not
ordered to any products, such as the acts of understanding and sensing.
Now, since operations of this type are specified by their objects, through
which they are known also, any one of these operations must be more perfect
when its object is more perfect.*”~Aquinas

CP 5.189 is the only pragmatic maxim that is fittingly related to its
proper operation; one that claims to be perfect like no other because it
even contributes to the *uberty* of reasoning, which far more calls for
solicitous care.

With best wishes,
Jerry Rhee

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 2:45 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, Jerry, List,
>
> Jon, I concur with your assessment.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  > wrote:
>
>> Jerry R.:
>>
>> You make CP 5.189 sound mystical, which it is not.  You offer it as a
>> candidate for "the [best] pragmatic maxim," which it is not.  You want us
>> to treat you as a "co-inquirer," which you are not--you are a *dogmatist*,
>> and CP 5.189 is your creed.  I already gave my reasons; please re-read them
>> at the very bottom of this e-mail string.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> The Other Jon
>>
>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:35 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, list:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You make pragmaticism sound mystical, which it is not.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What is plainer than to say that CP 5.189 is the one to which we ought
>>> to look; the one to read again and again before you move on to the others?
>>> For if the purpose is to select one over the lessers in order to spread
>>> pragmaticism in a way that prevents it from being kidnapped, then it is
>>> apparent to me that attending to these lessers too closely is one reason
>>> that keeps us from taking in the sense of plain advice. But that is an
>>> accusation that applies to both of us.  These are claims that must be
>>> decided by the rights of the question.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In order to move forward, we must make the rules clear at the outset.
>>> What I list are reasons to suspect that CP 5.189 is the best one. For
>>> example, this one has a C A B to triangulate, ("undefined terms that
>>> acquire meaning from their place in the whole system rather than from
>>> explicit definitions"), definitions that are outside of ourselves, ones
>>> that we can utter out loud, etc…
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What do you offer as reasons?  If you refuse to give reasons but simply
>>> more advice, you don’t treat me as a co-inquirer.  You are not agreeing to
>>> the expectations of an inquiry at the outset.  For if you give your
>>> reasons, then we can compare and make determinations together.  I
>>> anticipate that whatever reasons you give, it will be fitting for the case
>>> of CP 5.189 because it wholly captures the essence of pragmaticism for it
>>> is nothing but the logic of abduction.  Can you make such claims for the
>>> lessers?  For example, why did you not list this following maxim that was
>>> valued by Peirce?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is
>>> practically 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Jerry, List,

Jon, I concur with your assessment.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jerry R.:
>
> You make CP 5.189 sound mystical, which it is not.  You offer it as a
> candidate for "the [best] pragmatic maxim," which it is not.  You want us
> to treat you as a "co-inquirer," which you are not--you are a *dogmatist*,
> and CP 5.189 is your creed.  I already gave my reasons; please re-read them
> at the very bottom of this e-mail string.
>
> Thanks,
>
> The Other Jon
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:35 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>
>> Jon, list:
>>
>>
>>
>> You make pragmaticism sound mystical, which it is not.
>>
>>
>>
>> What is plainer than to say that CP 5.189 is the one to which we ought to
>> look; the one to read again and again before you move on to the others?
>> For if the purpose is to select one over the lessers in order to spread
>> pragmaticism in a way that prevents it from being kidnapped, then it is
>> apparent to me that attending to these lessers too closely is one reason
>> that keeps us from taking in the sense of plain advice. But that is an
>> accusation that applies to both of us.  These are claims that must be
>> decided by the rights of the question.
>>
>>
>>
>> In order to move forward, we must make the rules clear at the outset.
>> What I list are reasons to suspect that CP 5.189 is the best one. For
>> example, this one has a C A B to triangulate, ("undefined terms that
>> acquire meaning from their place in the whole system rather than from
>> explicit definitions"), definitions that are outside of ourselves, ones
>> that we can utter out loud, etc…
>>
>>
>>
>> What do you offer as reasons?  If you refuse to give reasons but simply
>> more advice, you don’t treat me as a co-inquirer.  You are not agreeing to
>> the expectations of an inquiry at the outset.  For if you give your
>> reasons, then we can compare and make determinations together.  I
>> anticipate that whatever reasons you give, it will be fitting for the case
>> of CP 5.189 because it wholly captures the essence of pragmaticism for it
>> is nothing but the logic of abduction.  Can you make such claims for the
>> lessers?  For example, why did you not list this following maxim that was
>> valued by Peirce?
>>
>>
>>
>> I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is
>> practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even
>> indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person,
>> while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what
>> [we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what
>> shoots through our own minds, it is *much safer to define all mental
>> characters* as far as possible *in* *terms* of their *outward
>> manifestations*.
>>
>>
>>
>> That is,
>>
>> What is C?
>>
>> What is A?
>>
>> What is B?
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 8:51 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>>
>>> Jerry, List,
>>>
>>> Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush
>>> to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us
>>> to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need
>>> to Compute Better Answers.
>>>
>>> For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence
>>> of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from
>>> taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just
>>> recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim
>>> again and again and trying to triangulate the points to
>>> which they point.
>>>
>>> For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.
>>> A well-developed formal system will have:  (1) Primitives,
>>> the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place
>>> in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions,
>>> (2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives,
>>> (3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of
>>> the theorems can be derived from them by means of certain
>>> (4) Inference Rules.
>>>
>>> But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts
>>> of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb
>>> that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical
>>> use, and that's where bits of practical advice like the Maxim
>>> in question come into play.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On 11/3/2016 5:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>>>
 Jon, list:

 Thank you for that earnest answer.
 Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
 That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
 possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that is
 based on our valuation for likeness between terms?

 And if we were not to attempt 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

[Jerry Rhee]

Jon, other Jon, list:

Thank you for that sobering thought.

"But that is an accusation that applies to both of us.  These are claims
that must be decided by the rights of the question.

 In order to move forward, we must make the rules clear at the outset.
What I list are reasons to suspect..."


So, what are the rules that are to be adopted at the outset?  CP 5.189.

If not this, *which*?  What is the strongest argument?

What will help us prevent the constant generation and destruction, and
instead promote best movement to our stated purpose?


"This mind may be called the *commens*. It consists of all that is, and
must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, in
order that the sign in question should fulfill its function. This I proceed
to explain." ~Peirce


Hth,

Jerry Rhee

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 2:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jerry R.:
>
> You make CP 5.189 sound mystical, which it is not.  You offer it as a
> candidate for "the [best] pragmatic maxim," which it is not.  You want us
> to treat you as a "co-inquirer," which you are not--you are a *dogmatist*,
> and CP 5.189 is your creed.  I already gave my reasons; please re-read them
> at the very bottom of this e-mail string.
>
> Thanks,
>
> The Other Jon
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:35 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>
>> Jon, list:
>>
>>
>>
>> You make pragmaticism sound mystical, which it is not.
>>
>>
>>
>> What is plainer than to say that CP 5.189 is the one to which we ought to
>> look; the one to read again and again before you move on to the others?
>> For if the purpose is to select one over the lessers in order to spread
>> pragmaticism in a way that prevents it from being kidnapped, then it is
>> apparent to me that attending to these lessers too closely is one reason
>> that keeps us from taking in the sense of plain advice. But that is an
>> accusation that applies to both of us.  These are claims that must be
>> decided by the rights of the question.
>>
>>
>>
>> In order to move forward, we must make the rules clear at the outset.
>> What I list are reasons to suspect that CP 5.189 is the best one. For
>> example, this one has a C A B to triangulate, ("undefined terms that
>> acquire meaning from their place in the whole system rather than from
>> explicit definitions"), definitions that are outside of ourselves, ones
>> that we can utter out loud, etc…
>>
>>
>>
>> What do you offer as reasons?  If you refuse to give reasons but simply
>> more advice, you don’t treat me as a co-inquirer.  You are not agreeing to
>> the expectations of an inquiry at the outset.  For if you give your
>> reasons, then we can compare and make determinations together.  I
>> anticipate that whatever reasons you give, it will be fitting for the case
>> of CP 5.189 because it wholly captures the essence of pragmaticism for it
>> is nothing but the logic of abduction.  Can you make such claims for the
>> lessers?  For example, why did you not list this following maxim that was
>> valued by Peirce?
>>
>>
>>
>> I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is
>> practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even
>> indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person,
>> while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what
>> [we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what
>> shoots through our own minds, it is *much safer to define all mental
>> characters* as far as possible *in* *terms* of their *outward
>> manifestations*.
>>
>>
>>
>> That is,
>>
>> What is C?
>>
>> What is A?
>>
>> What is B?
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 8:51 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>>
>>> Jerry, List,
>>>
>>> Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush
>>> to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us
>>> to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need
>>> to Compute Better Answers.
>>>
>>> For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence
>>> of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from
>>> taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just
>>> recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim
>>> again and again and trying to triangulate the points to
>>> which they point.
>>>
>>> For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.
>>> A well-developed formal system will have:  (1) Primitives,
>>> the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place
>>> in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions,
>>> (2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives,
>>> (3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of
>>> the theorems can be derived from them by means of certain
>>> (4) Inference Rules.
>>>
>>> But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts
>>> of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb
>>> that go toward sustaining any 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry R.:

You make CP 5.189 sound mystical, which it is not.  You offer it as a
candidate for "the [best] pragmatic maxim," which it is not.  You want us
to treat you as a "co-inquirer," which you are not--you are a *dogmatist*,
and CP 5.189 is your creed.  I already gave my reasons; please re-read them
at the very bottom of this e-mail string.

Thanks,

The Other Jon

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:35 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Jon, list:
>
>
>
> You make pragmaticism sound mystical, which it is not.
>
>
>
> What is plainer than to say that CP 5.189 is the one to which we ought to
> look; the one to read again and again before you move on to the others?
> For if the purpose is to select one over the lessers in order to spread
> pragmaticism in a way that prevents it from being kidnapped, then it is
> apparent to me that attending to these lessers too closely is one reason
> that keeps us from taking in the sense of plain advice. But that is an
> accusation that applies to both of us.  These are claims that must be
> decided by the rights of the question.
>
>
>
> In order to move forward, we must make the rules clear at the outset.
> What I list are reasons to suspect that CP 5.189 is the best one. For
> example, this one has a C A B to triangulate, ("undefined terms that
> acquire meaning from their place in the whole system rather than from
> explicit definitions"), definitions that are outside of ourselves, ones
> that we can utter out loud, etc…
>
>
>
> What do you offer as reasons?  If you refuse to give reasons but simply
> more advice, you don’t treat me as a co-inquirer.  You are not agreeing to
> the expectations of an inquiry at the outset.  For if you give your
> reasons, then we can compare and make determinations together.  I
> anticipate that whatever reasons you give, it will be fitting for the case
> of CP 5.189 because it wholly captures the essence of pragmaticism for it
> is nothing but the logic of abduction.  Can you make such claims for the
> lessers?  For example, why did you not list this following maxim that was
> valued by Peirce?
>
>
>
> I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is
> practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even
> indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person,
> while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what
> [we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what
> shoots through our own minds, it is *much safer to define all mental
> characters* as far as possible *in* *terms* of their *outward
> manifestations*.
>
>
>
> That is,
>
> What is C?
>
> What is A?
>
> What is B?
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Jerry R
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 8:51 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>
>> Jerry, List,
>>
>> Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush
>> to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us
>> to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need
>> to Compute Better Answers.
>>
>> For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence
>> of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from
>> taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just
>> recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim
>> again and again and trying to triangulate the points to
>> which they point.
>>
>> For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.
>> A well-developed formal system will have:  (1) Primitives,
>> the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place
>> in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions,
>> (2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives,
>> (3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of
>> the theorems can be derived from them by means of certain
>> (4) Inference Rules.
>>
>> But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts
>> of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb
>> that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical
>> use, and that's where bits of practical advice like the Maxim
>> in question come into play.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On 11/3/2016 5:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, list:
>>>
>>> Thank you for that earnest answer.
>>> Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
>>> That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
>>> possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that is
>>> based on our valuation for likeness between terms?
>>>
>>> And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us
>>> vegetables?  For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best
>>> interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the methods
>>> at
>>> our disposal.
>>>
>>> So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of
>>> investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out?
>>>
>>> Thank you for your comments,
>>> Jerry R
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

[Jerry Rhee]

Jon, list:



You make pragmaticism sound mystical, which it is not.



What is plainer than to say that CP 5.189 is the one to which we ought to
look; the one to read again and again before you move on to the others?
For if the purpose is to select one over the lessers in order to spread
pragmaticism in a way that prevents it from being kidnapped, then it is
apparent to me that attending to these lessers too closely is one reason
that keeps us from taking in the sense of plain advice. But that is an
accusation that applies to both of us.  These are claims that must be
decided by the rights of the question.



In order to move forward, we must make the rules clear at the outset.  What
I list are reasons to suspect that CP 5.189 is the best one. For example,
this one has a C A B to triangulate, ("undefined terms that acquire meaning
from their place in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions"),
definitions that are outside of ourselves, ones that we can utter out loud,
etc…



What do you offer as reasons?  If you refuse to give reasons but simply
more advice, you don’t treat me as a co-inquirer.  You are not agreeing to
the expectations of an inquiry at the outset.  For if you give your
reasons, then we can compare and make determinations together.  I
anticipate that whatever reasons you give, it will be fitting for the case
of CP 5.189 because it wholly captures the essence of pragmaticism for it
is nothing but the logic of abduction.  Can you make such claims for the
lessers?  For example, why did you not list this following maxim that was
valued by Peirce?



I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is
practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even
indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person,
while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what
[we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what
shoots through our own minds, it is *much safer to define all mental
characters* as far as possible *in* *terms* of their *outward
manifestations*.



That is,

What is C?

What is A?

What is B?



Best,

Jerry R

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 8:51 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Jerry, List,
>
> Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush
> to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us
> to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need
> to Compute Better Answers.
>
> For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence
> of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from
> taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just
> recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim
> again and again and trying to triangulate the points to
> which they point.
>
> For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.
> A well-developed formal system will have:  (1) Primitives,
> the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place
> in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions,
> (2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives,
> (3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of
> the theorems can be derived from them by means of certain
> (4) Inference Rules.
>
> But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts
> of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb
> that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical
> use, and that's where bits of practical advice like the Maxim
> in question come into play.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
>
> On 11/3/2016 5:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>
>> Jon, list:
>>
>> Thank you for that earnest answer.
>> Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
>> That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
>> possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that is
>> based on our valuation for likeness between terms?
>>
>> And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us
>> vegetables?  For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best
>> interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the methods
>> at
>> our disposal.
>>
>> So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of
>> investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out?
>>
>> Thank you for your comments,
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>>
>> Jerry, List,
>>>
>>> I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms,
>>> so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation
>>> of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.
>>> But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives
>>> we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful
>>> principles can be improved almost indefinitely.
>>>
>>> I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have
>>> to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

[Jon Awbrey]

Jerry, List,

Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush
to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us
to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need
to Compute Better Answers.

For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence
of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from
taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just
recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim
again and again and trying to triangulate the points to
which they point.

For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.
A well-developed formal system will have:  (1) Primitives,
the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place
in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions,
(2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives,
(3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of
the theorems can be derived from them by means of certain
(4) Inference Rules.

But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts
of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb
that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical
use, and that's where bits of practical advice like the Maxim
in question come into play.

Regards,

Jon

On 11/3/2016 5:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:

Jon, list:

Thank you for that earnest answer.
Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that is
based on our valuation for likeness between terms?

And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us
vegetables?  For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best
interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the methods at
our disposal.

So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of
investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out?

Thank you for your comments,
Jerry R

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:


Jerry, List,

I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms,
so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation
of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.
But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives
we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful
principles can be improved almost indefinitely.

I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have
to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on.

Regards,

Jon

On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:

Jon, list:

How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad?

| "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad."

| "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief



| that the believer is the only existing person.  Were anybody to adopt
| such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it.  But when
| a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of
| their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical
| theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego."
| ~ Peirce

Best,
Jerry R

On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:


Peircers,

Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim
that I collected a number of years ago, along with
some commentary of my own as I last left it.  As I
understand them, they all say essentially the same
thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view,
or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience
or occasion.

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/

Regards,

Jon

On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:


List:

Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion
to a new thread topic.  I would appreciate it if others
would do likewise when extending any of the other ongoing
conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects
besides Peirce's cosmology.

There seems to be a confusion here between "*the* pragmatic maxim,"
which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic* with multiple
formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim,"
which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can tell.
In particular, CP 5.189 is not *the* pragmatic maxim, nor even *a*
pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the best*
pragmatic maxim.  For one thing, as we established recently in another
thread, it is the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus
falls under logical *critic*.  *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently
serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to
deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting
those that are not.

In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which*
pragmatic maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...

| That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which,
| if sound, must render needless any further rule as to
| the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses,
| 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:

with apologies...

I meant "from the start no better than a vegetable".

Best,
Jerry R



On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:28 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Jon, list:
>
> Thank you for that earnest answer.
> Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
> That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
> possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that is
> based on our valuation for likeness between terms?
>
> And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us
> vegetables?  For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best
> interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the methods at
> our disposal.
>
> So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of
> investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out?
>
> Thank you for your comments,
> Jerry R
>
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>
>> Jerry, List,
>>
>> I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms,
>> so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation
>> of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.
>> But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives
>> we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful
>> principles can be improved almost indefinitely.
>>
>> I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have
>> to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>> > Jon, list:
>> >
>> > How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad?
>> >
>> > | "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad."
>> >
>> > | "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief
>>
>> > | that the believer is the only existing person.  Were anybody to adopt
>> > | such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it.  But when
>> > | a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of
>> > | their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical
>> > | theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego."
>> > | ~ Peirce
>> >
>> > Best,
>> > Jerry R
>> >
>> > On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>> >
>> >> Peircers,
>> >>
>> >> Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim
>> >> that I collected a number of years ago, along with
>> >> some commentary of my own as I last left it.  As I
>> >> understand them, they all say essentially the same
>> >> thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view,
>> >> or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience
>> >> or occasion.
>> >>
>> >> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/
>> >>
>> >> Regards,
>> >>
>> >> Jon
>> >>
>> >> On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> List:
>> >>>
>> >>> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion
>> >>> to a new thread topic.  I would appreciate it if others
>> >>> would do likewise when extending any of the other ongoing
>> >>> conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects
>> >>> besides Peirce's cosmology.
>> >>>
>> >>> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the* pragmatic maxim,"
>> >>> which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic* with multiple
>> >>> formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim,"
>> >>> which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can
>> tell.
>> >>> In particular, CP 5.189 is not *the* pragmatic maxim, nor even *a*
>> >>> pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the best*
>> >>> pragmatic maxim.  For one thing, as we established recently in another
>> >>> thread, it is the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus
>> >>> falls under logical *critic*.  *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently
>> >>> serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to
>> >>> deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting
>> >>> those that are not.
>> >>>
>> >>> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which*
>> >>> pragmatic maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...
>> >>>
>> >>> | That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which,
>> >>> | if sound, must render needless any further rule as to
>> >>> | the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses,
>> >>> | that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as
>> >>> | hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all*
>> >>> | that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do,
>> >>> | at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
>> >>> | not understood as a proposition in psychology.
>> >>> | (CP 5.196; 1903)
>> >>>
>> >>> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*.
>> >>>
>> >>> | For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have
>> >>> | no logical effect or import differing from that of a second
>> >>> | conception except so far as, taken in connection with other
>> >>> | conceptions and intentions, it 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

[Jerry Rhee]

Jon, list:

Thank you for that earnest answer.
Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that is
based on our valuation for likeness between terms?

And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us
vegetables?  For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best
interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the methods at
our disposal.

So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of
investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out?

Thank you for your comments,
Jerry R

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Jerry, List,
>
> I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms,
> so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation
> of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.
> But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives
> we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful
> principles can be improved almost indefinitely.
>
> I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have
> to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
> > Jon, list:
> >
> > How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad?
> >
> > | "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad."
> >
> > | "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief
>
> > | that the believer is the only existing person.  Were anybody to adopt
> > | such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it.  But when
> > | a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of
> > | their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical
> > | theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego."
> > | ~ Peirce
> >
> > Best,
> > Jerry R
> >
> > On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> >
> >> Peircers,
> >>
> >> Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim
> >> that I collected a number of years ago, along with
> >> some commentary of my own as I last left it.  As I
> >> understand them, they all say essentially the same
> >> thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view,
> >> or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience
> >> or occasion.
> >>
> >> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >>
> >> Jon
> >>
> >> On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> >>
> >>> List:
> >>>
> >>> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion
> >>> to a new thread topic.  I would appreciate it if others
> >>> would do likewise when extending any of the other ongoing
> >>> conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects
> >>> besides Peirce's cosmology.
> >>>
> >>> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the* pragmatic maxim,"
> >>> which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic* with multiple
> >>> formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim,"
> >>> which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can tell.
> >>> In particular, CP 5.189 is not *the* pragmatic maxim, nor even *a*
> >>> pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the best*
> >>> pragmatic maxim.  For one thing, as we established recently in another
> >>> thread, it is the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus
> >>> falls under logical *critic*.  *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently
> >>> serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to
> >>> deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting
> >>> those that are not.
> >>>
> >>> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which*
> >>> pragmatic maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...
> >>>
> >>> | That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which,
> >>> | if sound, must render needless any further rule as to
> >>> | the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses,
> >>> | that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as
> >>> | hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all*
> >>> | that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do,
> >>> | at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
> >>> | not understood as a proposition in psychology.
> >>> | (CP 5.196; 1903)
> >>>
> >>> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*.
> >>>
> >>> | For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have
> >>> | no logical effect or import differing from that of a second
> >>> | conception except so far as, taken in connection with other
> >>> | conceptions and intentions, it might> conceivably modify our
> >>> | practical conduct differently from that second conception.
> >>>
> >>> Regards,
> >>>
> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> >>>

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

[Jon Awbrey]

Jerry, List,

I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms,
so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation
of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.
But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives
we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful
principles can be improved almost indefinitely.

I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have
to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on.

Regards,

Jon

On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
> Jon, list:
>
> How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad?
>
> | "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad."
>
> | "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief
> | that the believer is the only existing person.  Were anybody to adopt
> | such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it.  But when
> | a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of
> | their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical
> | theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego."
> | ~ Peirce
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>
>> Peircers,
>>
>> Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim
>> that I collected a number of years ago, along with
>> some commentary of my own as I last left it.  As I
>> understand them, they all say essentially the same
>> thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view,
>> or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience
>> or occasion.
>>
>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>>
>>> List:
>>>
>>> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion
>>> to a new thread topic.  I would appreciate it if others
>>> would do likewise when extending any of the other ongoing
>>> conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects
>>> besides Peirce's cosmology.
>>>
>>> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the* pragmatic maxim,"
>>> which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic* with multiple
>>> formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim,"
>>> which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can tell.
>>> In particular, CP 5.189 is not *the* pragmatic maxim, nor even *a*
>>> pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the best*
>>> pragmatic maxim.  For one thing, as we established recently in another
>>> thread, it is the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus
>>> falls under logical *critic*.  *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently
>>> serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to
>>> deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting
>>> those that are not.
>>>
>>> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which*
>>> pragmatic maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...
>>>
>>> | That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which,
>>> | if sound, must render needless any further rule as to
>>> | the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses,
>>> | that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as
>>> | hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all*
>>> | that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do,
>>> | at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
>>> | not understood as a proposition in psychology.
>>> | (CP 5.196; 1903)
>>>
>>> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*.
>>>
>>> | For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have
>>> | no logical effect or import differing from that of a second
>>> | conception except so far as, taken in connection with other
>>> | conceptions and intentions, it might> conceivably modify our
>>> | practical conduct differently from that second conception.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>

--

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

[Gary Richmond]

Thanks, Jon A.,

I remember reading these on your blog years ago. Very helpful, including
your comments.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 10:40 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Peircers,
>
> Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim
> that I collected a number of years ago, along with
> some commentary of my own as I last left it.  As I
> understand them, they all say essentially the same
> thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view,
> or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience
> or occasion.
>
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion to a new thread
>> topic.  I would appreciate it if others would do likewise when extending
>> any of the other ongoing conversations about pragmatic maxims or other
>> subjects besides Peirce's cosmology.
>>
>> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the *pragmatic maxim," which
>> is a very specific principle of *methodeutic *with multiple formulations
>> in
>> Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim," which is not
>> something
>> that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can tell.  In particular, CP 5.189
>> is not *the *pragmatic maxim, nor even *a* pragmatic maxim in the same
>> sense, so it is certainly not *the best* pragmatic maxim.  For one thing,
>> as we established recently in another thread, it is the form of inference
>> for abduction *only*, and thus falls under logical *critic*.  *The*
>> pragmatic
>> maxim subsequently serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are
>> amenable to deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting
>> those that are not.
>>
>> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which *pragmatic
>> maxim
>> Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...
>>
>> That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render
>> needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as
>> hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful
>> suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all *that the maxim of pragmatism
>> really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
>> not understood as a proposition in psychology. (CP 5.196; 1903)
>>
>> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*.
>>
>> For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical
>> effect
>> or import differing from that of a second conception except so far as,
>> taken in connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might
>> conceivably modify our practical conduct differently from that second
>> conception.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 12:14 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>>
>> John Collier, John Sowa, Kirsti Maatanen, Edwina Taborsky, list:
>>>
>>> John Collier:
>>> But that is my point.  Isn't a pragmatic maxim to be taken strictly since
>>> it is carefully crafted, with logographic necessity, then it shouldn't be
>>> handled loosely.  To say that such things are in the pragmatic maxim (the
>>> pragmatic maxim and not a pragmatic maxim) also implies that it is in ONE
>>> pragmatic maxim, the best one.  So, which one?  I think this is the
>>> matter
>>> that does not get criticized enough.
>>> __
>>>
>>> John Sowa, Edwina:
>>>
>>> "*logos* means something rather like calculation than religion..."
>>> ~Strauss
>>>
>>> “The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three --in a word,
>>> number
>>> and calculation: --do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of
>>> them?
>>>
>>> Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my ears truly
>>> witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great calculator
>>> and geometrician?”
>>> ~Plato
>>>
>>> “By understanding both sophistry (in its highest as well as in its lower
>>> meanings) and statesmanship, one will understand what philosophy
>>> is.”~Strauss
>>>
>>> “When a reputable witness makes, or witnesses make, an assertion which
>>> experience renders highly improbable, or when there are other independent
>>> arguments in its favor, each independent argument *pro* or *con* produces
>>> a certain impression upon the mind of the wise man, dependent for its
>>> quantity upon the frequency with which arguments of those kinds lead to
>>> the
>>> truth, and the algebraical sum of these impressions is the resultant
>>> impression that measures the wise man’s state of opinion on the whole.”
>>> ~Peirce
>>>
>>> The way begets one;
>>> One begets two;
>>> Two begets three;
>>> Three 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

[Jerry Rhee]

Jon, list:

How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad?

"For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad."

"There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief that
the believer is the only existing person. Were anybody to adopt such a
belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it. But when a person
finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of their
existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical theory that
they are all hypostatically the same ego."
~Peirce

Best,
Jerry R

On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Peircers,
>
> Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim
> that I collected a number of years ago, along with
> some commentary of my own as I last left it.  As I
> understand them, they all say essentially the same
> thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view,
> or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience
> or occasion.
>
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion to a new thread
>> topic.  I would appreciate it if others would do likewise when extending
>> any of the other ongoing conversations about pragmatic maxims or other
>> subjects besides Peirce's cosmology.
>>
>> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the *pragmatic maxim," which
>> is a very specific principle of *methodeutic *with multiple formulations
>> in
>> Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim," which is not
>> something
>> that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can tell.  In particular, CP 5.189
>> is not *the *pragmatic maxim, nor even *a* pragmatic maxim in the same
>> sense, so it is certainly not *the best* pragmatic maxim.  For one thing,
>> as we established recently in another thread, it is the form of inference
>> for abduction *only*, and thus falls under logical *critic*.  *The*
>> pragmatic
>> maxim subsequently serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are
>> amenable to deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting
>> those that are not.
>>
>> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which *pragmatic
>> maxim
>> Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...
>>
>> That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render
>> needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as
>> hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful
>> suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all *that the maxim of pragmatism
>> really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
>> not understood as a proposition in psychology. (CP 5.196; 1903)
>>
>> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*.
>>
>> For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical
>> effect
>> or import differing from that of a second conception except so far as,
>> taken in connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might
>> conceivably modify our practical conduct differently from that second
>> conception.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 12:14 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>>
>> John Collier, John Sowa, Kirsti Maatanen, Edwina Taborsky, list:
>>>
>>> John Collier:
>>> But that is my point.  Isn't a pragmatic maxim to be taken strictly since
>>> it is carefully crafted, with logographic necessity, then it shouldn't be
>>> handled loosely.  To say that such things are in the pragmatic maxim (the
>>> pragmatic maxim and not a pragmatic maxim) also implies that it is in ONE
>>> pragmatic maxim, the best one.  So, which one?  I think this is the
>>> matter
>>> that does not get criticized enough.
>>> __
>>>
>>> John Sowa, Edwina:
>>>
>>> "*logos* means something rather like calculation than religion..."
>>> ~Strauss
>>>
>>> “The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three --in a word,
>>> number
>>> and calculation: --do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of
>>> them?
>>>
>>> Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my ears truly
>>> witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great calculator
>>> and geometrician?”
>>> ~Plato
>>>
>>> “By understanding both sophistry (in its highest as well as in its lower
>>> meanings) and statesmanship, one will understand what philosophy
>>> is.”~Strauss
>>>
>>> “When a reputable witness makes, or witnesses make, an assertion which
>>> experience renders highly improbable, or when there are other independent
>>> arguments in its favor, each independent argument *pro* or *con* produces
>>> a certain impression upon the mind of the wise man, dependent for its
>>> quantity upon the frequency with which arguments of