RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-07 Thread Gunnar Peterson
have been able to defend itself? -gp > -Original Message- > From: Brian Chess [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Sat Feb 04 00:56:16 2006 > To: sc-l@securecoding.org > Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws > > The best definition for "flaw" and &quo

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-07 Thread Julie Ryan
there's no reason that static analysis can't help verify all of them in an application. --Jeff -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Gary McGraw Sent: Monday, February 06, 2006 11:13 PM To: Brian Chess; sc-l@securecoding.org Su

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-07 Thread Jeff Williams
on, but touches on several others. But, in theory, there's no reason that static analysis can't help verify all of them in an application. --Jeff -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Gary McGraw Sent: Monday, February 06, 2006 11:13

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-07 Thread Crispin Cowan
s not something that will be > fixed over night. > > --- > Regards, > Dana Epp [Microsoft Security MVP] > Blog: http://silverstr.ufies.org/blog/ > > > *From:* [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Crispin Cowan >

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-06 Thread Gary McGraw
ware Security). gem -Original Message- From: Evans, Arian [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Fri Feb 03 18:29:29 2006 To: Crispin Cowan; Gary McGraw; Secure Coding Mailing List; Kenneth R. van Wyk Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws per WMF// Let's face it, this was legacy, possibly

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-06 Thread Gary McGraw
P.p.s. The book is out www.swsec.com -Original Message- From: Brian Chess [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sat Feb 04 00:56:16 2006 To: sc-l@securecoding.org Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws The best definition for "flaw" and "bug" I've heard so far is t

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-06 Thread Evans, Arian
aw > Cc: Kenneth R. van Wyk; Secure Coding Mailing List > Subject: Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws > > > Gary McGraw wrote: > > To cycle this all back around to the original posting, lets > talk about > > the WMF flaw in particular. Do we believe that the best way for >

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-06 Thread Evans, Arian
2:29 2006 > To: 'Secure Coding Mailing List' > Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws > > At the risk of piling on here, there's no question that it's > critical to > consider security problems across the continuum. While we're > at it, the > ana

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-03 Thread Nick FitzGerald
Al Eridani <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > If the design says "For each fund that the user owns, do X" and my > code does X for > all the funds but it skips the most recently acquired fund, I see it as a > "manufacturing" error. > > On the other hand, if a user sells all of her funds and the design

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-03 Thread Brian Chess
The best definition for "flaw" and "bug" I've heard so far is that a flaw is a successful implementation of your intent, while a bug is unintentional. I think I've also heard "a bug is small", a flaw is big", but that definition is awfully squishy. If the difference between a bug and a flaw is in

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-03 Thread Nick FitzGerald
"Gary McGraw" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > To cycle this all back around to the original posting, lets talk about > the WMF flaw in particular. Do we believe that the best way for > Microsoft to find similar design problems is to do code review? Or > should they use a higher level approach? I'l

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-03 Thread Dana Epp
Title: Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws I think I would word that differently. The design defect was when Microsoft decided to allow meta data to call GDI functions.   Around 1990 when this was introduced the threat profile was entirely different; the operating system could trust the metadata

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-03 Thread Crispin Cowan
Gary McGraw wrote: > To cycle this all back around to the original posting, lets talk about > the WMF flaw in particular. Do we believe that the best way for > Microsoft to find similar design problems is to do code review? Or > should they use a higher level approach? > > Were they correct in sa

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-03 Thread Greg Beeley
Wietse Venema wrote: > My experience is otherwise. Without detailed documentation I can > usually see where in the life cycle the mistake was made: analysis > (e.g., solving the wrong problem), design (e.g., using an inappropriate > solution) or coding. I tend to agree - for *many* design related

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-03 Thread James Stibbards
blem of knowing when we're done, I realize. See you at SSS. - James -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Gary McGraw Sent: Friday, February 03, 2006 11:13 AM To: Kenneth R. van Wyk; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaw

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-03 Thread Al Eridani
On 2/2/06, David Crocker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > If some small bolt in my car fails because the bolt met its manufacturer's > specification but was not strong enough to withstand the loads it was > subjected > to, that is a low-level design error, not a manufacturing error. I agree. > Simil

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-03 Thread Gary McGraw
To cycle this all back around to the original posting, lets talk about the WMF flaw in particular. Do we believe that the best way for Microsoft to find similar design problems is to do code review? Or should they use a higher level approach? Were they correct in saying (officially) that flaws s

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-03 Thread Kenneth R. van Wyk
This thread sure has opened up some lively debate... Gary McGraw wrote: As a matter of practice, I usually use the terms that you suggested as modifiers and say: implementation bug design flaw software defect FWIW, I like to use the nomenclature "security defect" as an all-encompassing ter

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-03 Thread Wietse Venema
Gary McGraw: > I'm sorry, but it is just not possible to find design flaws by > staring at code. My experience is otherwise. Without detailed documentation I can usually see where in the life cycle the mistake was made: analysis (e.g., solving the wrong problem), design (e.g., using an inappropria

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-03 Thread der Mouse
> I'm sorry, but it is just not possible to find design flaws by > staring at code. I strongly disagree with this, largely because I've done it myself. It's the primary way I find design flaws in code, in fact. Even if you add "unmotivated by a misbehaviour example", I've still done it, though on

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-03 Thread John Steven
Ah, The age-old Gary vs. jOHN debate. I do believe along the continuum of architecture-->design-->impl. that I've shown the ability to discern flawed design from source code in source code reviews. Cigital guys reading this thread have an advantage in that they know both the shared and exclusive

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-03 Thread Blue Boar
David Crocker wrote: I don't think this analogy between software development and manufacturing holds. There are no "manufacturing defects" in software construction For software: A design defect is when you correctly implement what you wanted, and you wanted the wrong thing. A "manufacturing d

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-02 Thread Chris Wysopal
TED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On > Behalf Of Chris Wysopal > Sent: 02 February 2006 21:35 > To: Gary McGraw > Cc: William Kruse; Wall, Kevin; Secure Coding Mailing List > Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws > > > > In the manufacturing world, which is far more mature than

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-02 Thread Jeff Williams
aseline. The huge advantage is that it's correct. --Jeff -Original Message- From: Gary McGraw [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, February 02, 2006 9:06 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws Not unless you talk to the design

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-02 Thread Gary McGraw
ubject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws Um, so if there is no documentation you can't find design flaws? --Jeff -Original Message- From: Gary McGraw [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, February 02, 2006 8:50 PM To: Jeff Williams; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: RE: [SC-L

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-02 Thread Jeff Williams
Um, so if there is no documentation you can't find design flaws? --Jeff -Original Message- From: Gary McGraw [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, February 02, 2006 8:50 PM To: Jeff Williams; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws I'm sorry, but

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-02 Thread Gary McGraw
I'm sorry, but it is just not possible to find design flaws by staring at code. gem -Original Message- From: Jeff Williams [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thu Feb 02 20:32:29 2006 To: 'Secure Coding Mailing List' Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws At the

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-02 Thread Brian Chess
t topic. Brian -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Chris Wysopal Sent: 02 February 2006 21:35 To: Gary McGraw Cc: William Kruse; Wall, Kevin; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws In the manufacturing world, which is far

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-02 Thread Jeff Williams
EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Crispin Cowan Sent: Wednesday, February 01, 2006 5:07 PM To: John Steven Cc: Will Kruse; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws John Steven wrote: > I'm not sure there's any value in discussing this minutia f

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-02 Thread David Crocker
CTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Chris Wysopal Sent: 02 February 2006 21:35 To: Gary McGraw Cc: William Kruse; Wall, Kevin; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws In the manufacturing world, which is far more mature than the software development world, they us

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-02 Thread Gunnar Peterson
So from a countermeasure standpoint, a bug can and should be fixed locally, while a flaw may require that the countermeasure exists at a different level of abstraction. For example, I assume no one thinks (in OO at least) that input validation is resident in every method, but rather called external

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-02 Thread Crispin Cowan
John Steven wrote: > Re-reading my post, I realize that it came off as heavy support for > additional terminology. Truth is, we've found that the easiest way to > communicate this concept to our Consultants and Clients here at Cigital has > been to build the two buckets (flaws and bugs). > My ma

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-02 Thread Gavin, Michael
age- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Chris Wysopal Sent: Thursday, February 02, 2006 4:35 PM To: Gary McGraw Cc: William Kruse; Wall, Kevin; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws In the manufacturing world, which is far more mature than the

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-02 Thread Gary McGraw
Hi Weld, You make a very good point. I think we have lots to learn from manufacturing. As a matter of practice, I usually use the terms that you suggested as modifiers and say: implementation bug design flaw software defect As long as there is a clear way to separate the two ends of the sli

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-02 Thread Chris Wysopal
In the manufacturing world, which is far more mature than the software development world, they use the terminology of "design defect" and "manufacturing defect". So this distinction is useful and has stood the test of time. Flaw and defect are synonymous. We should just pick one. You could say t

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-02 Thread Gary McGraw
Hi all, When I introduced the "bugs" and "flaws" nomenclature into the literature, I did so in an article about the software security workshop I chaired in 2003 (see http://www.cigital.com/ssw/). This was ultimately written up in an "On the Horizon" paper published by IEEE Security & Privacy. Na

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-02 Thread John Steven
Kevin, Jeff Payne and I were talking about this last night. Jeff's position was, "...Or, you could just use the existing quality assurance terminology and avoid the problem altogether." I agree with you and him; standardizing terminology is a great start to obviating confusing discussions about wh

RE: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-02 Thread Wall, Kevin
John Steven wrote: ... > 2) Flaws are different in important ways bugs when it comes to presentation, > prioritization, and mitigation. Let's explore by physical analog first. Crispin Cowan responded: > I disagree with the word usage. To me, "bug" and "flaw" are exactly > synonyms. The distincti

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-01 Thread Gunnar Peterson
Hi John, Which of the following more aptly characterizes the problem?: IMPL. BUG: Insufficient security-constraint existed on the admin Servlet in the app's deployment descriptor. ARCH. FLAW: No façade component gated privileged functionality -alternatively- ARCH. FLAW: Privileged functio

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-01 Thread Crispin Cowan
John Steven wrote: > I'm not sure there's any value in discussing this minutia further, but here > goes: > We'll let the moderator decide that :) > 1) Crispin, I think you've nailed one thing. The continuum from: > > Architecture --> Design --> Low-level Design --> (to) Implementation > > is a

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-01 Thread John Steven
I'm not sure there's any value in discussing this minutia further, but here goes: 1) Crispin, I think you've nailed one thing. The continuum from: Architecture --> Design --> Low-level Design --> (to) Implementation is a blurry one, and certainly slippery as you move from 'left' to 'right'. But,

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-01 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Crispin Cowan writes: > Unfortunately, this safety feature is nearly useless, because if you >take an infected whatever.doc file, and just *rename* it to whatever.rtf >and send it, then MS Word will cheerfully open the file for you when you >double click on the attac

Re: [SC-L] Bugs and flaws

2006-02-01 Thread Crispin Cowan
Gary McGraw wrote: > If the WMF vulnerability teaches us anything, it teaches us that we need > to pay more attention to flaws. The "flaw" in question seems to be "validate inputs", i.e. don't just trust network input (esp. from an untrusted source) to be well-formed. Of special importance to the