Shane Legg wrote:
To be specific: The Kolmogorov complexity of a constant universe is less, so the prior probabilities of universes that are consistent with ours up until now, but then suddenly flip tomorrow, are lower under Solomonoff's universal prior. I think Jurgen has also pointed this out.Hi Cliff,And if the "compressibility of the Universe" is an assumption, is there a way we might want to clarify such an assumption, i.e., aren't there numerical values that attach to the *likelihood* of gravity suddenly reversing direction; numerical values attaching to the likelihood of physical phenomena which spontaneously negate like the chess-reward pattern; etc.?This depends on your view of statistics and probability. I'm a Bayesian and so I'd say that these things depend on your prior and how much evidence you have. Clearly the evidence that gravity stays the same is rather large and so the probability that it's going to flip is extremely super hyper low and the prior doesn't matter to much...
(http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/)
--
Eliezer S. Yudkowsky http://singinst.org/
Research Fellow, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence
-------
To unsubscribe, change your address, or temporarily deactivate your subscription, please go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?[EMAIL PROTECTED]
