On 19 Jan 2010, at 03:28, silky wrote:
I don't disagree with you that it would be significantly
complicated, I suppose my argument is only that, unlike with a real
cat, I - the programmer - know all there is to know about this
computer cat. I'm wondering to what degree that adds or
On 20 Jan 2010, at 03:09, silky wrote:
On Wed, Jan 20, 2010 at 2:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 19 Jan 2010, at 03:28, silky wrote:
I don't disagree with you that it would be significantly
complicated, I suppose my argument is only that, unlike with a real
cat, I
On 20 Jan 2010, at 11:25, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/20 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk:
If the no clone theorem were a problem then you could not survive
more
than a moment, since your brain is constantly undergoing classical
level changes.
How interesting!! I had forgotten
Hi ferrari,
It is weird, my computer decided that this mail was junk mail.
It is the first time it put an everything list post in the junk list.
I am afraid you hurt its susceptibility :)
On 20 Jan 2010, at 19:15, ferrari wrote:
come on silky,
the answer you know yourself of course.
Hi John,
On 21 Jan 2010, at 22:19, John Mikes wrote:
Dear Bruno,
you took extra pain to describe (in your vocabulary) what I stand
for (using MY vocabulary).
-
On Thu, Jan 21, 2010 at 2:17 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
John
On 22 Jan 2010, at 20:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi John,
On 21 Jan 2010, at 22:19, John Mikes wrote:
Dear Bruno,
you took extra pain to describe (in your vocabulary) what I stand
for (using MY vocabulary).
-
On Thu, Jan
On 24 Jan 2010, at 21:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/24 Mark Buda her...@acm.org
Bruno Marchal wrote:
[a lot of stuff I'd probably agree with if I understood it all]
Bruno, I desperately need to understand your stuff. Where do I start?
Computer science, compiler theory , number theory
On 24 Jan 2010, at 22:39, Mark Buda wrote:
2010/1/24 Mark Buda her...@acm.org
Bruno Marchal wrote:
[a lot of stuff I'd probably agree with if I understood it all]
Bruno, I desperately need to understand your stuff. Where do I
start?
Computer science, compiler theory , number theory, what
On 25 Jan 2010, at 04:39, Mark Buda wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I would suggest the SANE 2004 paper:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm
Okay, first question: in step 5, assuming the measure is 1/2 in the
preceding steps, suppose I agree to be transported
On 25 Jan 2010, at 07:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Now, having postulated the natural numbers with addition and
multiplication, they organized themselves, independently of our
whishes, in a way which escapes *any* attempt of *complete*
unification. They defeat all
On 25 Jan 2010, at 23:15, Mark Buda wrote:
On 25 Jan 2010, at 04:39, Mark Buda wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I would suggest the SANE 2004 paper:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm
[mixed up question deleted]
I don't understand clearly your protocol
On 26 Jan 2010, at 03:34, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jan 2010, at 04:39, Mark Buda wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I would suggest the SANE 2004 paper:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm
Okay, first question: in step 5, assuming
On 25 Jan 2010, at 23:16, Jack Mallah wrote:
Killing one man is not OK just because he has a brother.
In our context, the 'brother' has the same consciousness. From this I
conclude you would say no to the doctor. All right? The doctor
certainly kill a 'brother' .
Bruno Marchal
http
Le 26-janv.-10, à 22:29, Jack Mallah a écrit :
--- On Tue, 1/26/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 25 Jan 2010, at 23:16, Jack Mallah wrote:
Killing one man is not OK just because he has a brother.
In our context, the 'brother' has the same consciousness.
The brother most
Le 27-janv.-10, à 01:39, Mark Buda a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jan 2010, at 23:15, Mark Buda wrote:
On 25 Jan 2010, at 04:39, Mark Buda wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I would suggest the SANE 2004 paper:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm
Are you OK
On 27 Jan 2010, at 19:31, Mark Buda wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 27-janv.-10, à 01:39, Mark Buda a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jan 2010, at 23:15, Mark Buda wrote:
On 25 Jan 2010, at 04:39, Mark Buda wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I would suggest the SANE 2004 paper:
http
On 28 Jan 2010, at 02:46, Jack Mallah wrote:
I'm replying to this bit seperately since Bruno touched on a
different issue than the others have. My reply to the main measure
again '10 thread will follow under the original title.
--- On Wed, 1/27/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote
On 31 Jan 2010, at 03:10, soulcatcher☠ wrote:
I see a red rose. You see a red rose. Is your experience of redness
the same as mine?
1. Yes, they are identical.
2. They are different as long as neural organization of our brains is
slightly different, but you are potentially capable of
On 28 Jan 2010, at 20:27, RMahoney wrote:
On Jan 8, 12:38 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Welcome RMahoney,
Nice thought experiments. But they need amnesia (like in going from
you to Cruise). I tend to think like you that it may be the case that
we are the same person (like those
can be perverted, and in our theorizing we should distinguish
religion from any of perverted religions. Basically science and
religion allows infinite set of comments and revisions, and perverted
sciences and perverted religions disallows comments and revisions.
Bruno Marchal
http
On 03 Feb 2010, at 03:00, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Dec 31, 2009 at 12:38 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
UDA = Universal Dovetailer Argument. It is an argument which is
supposed to show that if we take seriously the idea that we are
digitally emulable, then we have
Le 02-févr.-10, à 22:29, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Feb 2010, at 12:07, w.tay...@math.canterbury.ac.nz
mailto:w.tay...@math.canterbury.ac.nz wrote (FOR list) :
The problem with both groups is that both have a tendency to forget
that both Science and Religion
On 03 Feb 2010, at 15:49, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 03 Feb 2010, at 03:00, Jason Resch wrote:
Is your point that with addition, multiplication, and an infinite
number of successive symbols, any computable function can
On 04 Feb 2010, at 15:28, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 1:47 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 03 Feb 2010, at 15:49, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 03 Feb 2010, at 03:00, Jason Resch wrote
On 05 Feb 2010, at 13:13, ronaldheld wrote:
Bruno:
is there a free version of Theoretical computer science and the
natural
sciences?
I have still many preprints. People interested can send me their
addresses out of line.
Oops! I just see the axiom 3) below is not correct. Please
Actually we have already discussed this a lot, and the work I explain
here (uda, auda) can be considered as an answer to Tegmark (or
Schmidhuber), except that it has been published many years before, and
relies on philosophy of mind/computer science or machine's theology.
The main problem
break the switch so it can't go back, that would
be, yes.
--- On Thu, 1/28/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Does the size of the components affects the computation?
Other than measure, the implemented computation would be the same,
at least for the cases that matter.
So
with
mathematical logic. We will have other opportunities to talk on this.
The point is not showing computationalism true, but to show it
testable/falsifiable.
Bruno M
On 2/2/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Feb 2010, at 12:07, w.tay...@math.canterbury.ac.nz wrote (FOR
list
On 11 Feb 2010, at 17:14, Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
A little thin brain would produce a zombie?
Even if size affects measure, a zombie is not a brain with low
measure; it's a brain with zero measure. So the answer is obviously
On 13 Feb 2010, at 19:48, Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Fri, 2/12/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
MGA is more general (and older).
The only way to escape the conclusion would be to attribute
consciousness
on its strongest if only motivation.
You may perhaps be more specific and elaborate your thought.
Bruno Marchal
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Friday, February 19, 2010 12:18 PM
To: fabric-of-real...@yahoogroups.com
Cc: everything-list List
Subject: Does the plants quantum computations?
Hi,
I have to find time to look at this in more detail, but I am already
rather
impressed. Please correct me.
http
apply
'computation' in a wide enough(?) domain.
Well, if you are willing to survive with an artificial brain, then the
notions of computation and computability play a key role in *your*
theology, including your physics.
Best,
Bruno
On 2/19/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi
, matter is no more primitive, but still fundamental.
I hope this can help.
Best Regards,
Bruno Marchal
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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On 21 Feb 2010, at 17:31, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2010 18:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are
related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously
computable, not even partially).
Yes, I do
) machine. But you need *faith* to lift that theology
on yourself.
Correct machine will find as hard as ourself the possibility that they
are machine (locally finitely describable).
Bruno
On 2/21/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Stephen,
On 20 Feb 2010, at 19:52, Stephen P
amazing we (re)find the type of theory developed by the
greeks among those who were both mystic and rationalist. They did
introspect themselves very deeply, apparently.
Wait my next post to David for how comp does solve the hard problem of
consciousness.
Bruno Marchal
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be
the
conceptual hard problem of consciousness. (With the usual price that
physics becomes a branch of machine's theology).
On 22 Feb 2010, at 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
On 22 February 2010 07:37, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
What do you mean by implicit here? What is implicit
On 24 Feb 2010, at 08:22, Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote:
It seems to me that there are two easy ways to get rid of the hard
problem.
1) Get rid of 1-p. (A la Dennettian eliminative
of fulfillment here.
The luckiest both enjoy the quest and also arrive at solutions that
prove their lives to have been meaningful and important. These
people feel fulfilled no matter which group they come from.
marty a.
- Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
, but eventually he disappointed
me in being far too much relativist. He seems to hide real technical
difficulties by linguistic hand waving, in my opinion.
Bruno Marchal
Bye Bye
Diego Caleiro
Phil of Mind.
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 9:18 AM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com
wrote
On 27 Feb 2010, at 18:38, David Nyman wrote:
On 8 Feb, 14:12, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity
thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the
computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work
On 28 Feb 2010, at 07:33, Rex Allen wrote:
What would the causal mechanism for natural selection be? A
selection field? Selection particles? Spooky selection at a
distance???
No, it is (mainly) Sex.
Selection by individual seduction. On some level.
Chatting universal chromosomes. On
On 28 Feb 2010, at 18:43, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 February 2010 15:45, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has to
emerge from
a relative state measure on all computational histories.
The schroedinger equation has to be itself
On 01 Mar 2010, at 05:40, Rex Allen wrote:
On Sun, Feb 28, 2010 at 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 28 Feb 2010, at 07:33, Rex Allen wrote:
What would the causal mechanism for natural selection be? A
selection field? Selection particles? Spooky selection
On 01 Mar 2010, at 11:58, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 March 2010 08:26, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Everett uses comp, in the usual intuitive way, because he
characterizes the
observer by its crisp memory, and he derives the phenomenology of
the wave
packet reduction, by showing
On 01 Mar 2010, at 20:29, Rex Allen wrote:
On Mon, Mar 1, 2010 at 4:07 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 01 Mar 2010, at 05:40, Rex Allen wrote:
At most (!) one of those levels is
what really exists - the other levels are just ways that we think
about what really exists or ways
epistemological: it is
the map of our indeterminate histories.
Bruno
On 02 Mar 2010, at 17:45, David Nyman wrote:
On 2 March 2010 16:13, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I think that you are forgetting the 8th step of the UDA. That is
the Movie
Graph Argument (MGA).
It shows that, assuming
On 02 Mar 2010, at 20:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/2/2010 10:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Mar 2010, at 20:29, Rex Allen wrote:
I don't have a problem with anti-realism about causal laws, since as
you say, my position boils down to consciousness is fundamental and
uncaused.
What does
that way.
--- On Sun, 2/14/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Jack Mallah wrote:
What is false is your statement that The only way to escape the
conclusion would be to attribute consciousness to a movie of a
computation. So your argument is not valid.
OK. I was talking in a context
I may be absent for a period, for reason of sciatica.
Best,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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On 04 Mar 2010, at 06:44, Rex Allen wrote:
On Wed, Mar 3, 2010 at 9:26 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
I may be absent for a period, for reason of sciatica.
Best,
Bruno
No worries! I will be a bit delayed on my response anyway. All is
well!
I am back home ...because
On 04 Mar 2010, at 22:59, Jack Mallah wrote:
Bruno, I hope you feel better.
Thanks.
My quarrel with you is nothing personal.
Why would I think so?
Now I am warned.
--- Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Jack Mallah wrote:
Bruno, you don't have to assume any 'prescience'; you
On 06 Mar 2010, at 03:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/5/2010 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In this list I have already well explained the seven step of UDA,
and one difficulty remains in the step 8, which is the difference
between a computation and a description of computation. Due
On 06 Mar 2010, at 23:54, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/6/2010 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2010, at 03:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/5/2010 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In this list I have already well explained the seven step of UDA,
and
one difficulty remains in the step
On 08 Mar 2010, at 10:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It's perhaps just a matter of definition but I would have thought the
requirement for a hypercomputer was not compatible with
computationalism, but potentially could still come under
functionalism.
Putnam(*) is responsible for introducing
is a notion definable in
arithmetic, and which has a priori nothing to do with physics.
Bruno Marchal
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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On 11 Mar 2010, at 02:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
Here's an interesting theory of consciousness in which
counterfactuals would make a difference.
The fat that the counterfactuals makes a difference is the essence of
comp and of the comp supervenience thesis. But that is the reason why
Marty,
With the MWI, superluminal computers are particular case of quantum
computer, as far as I guess correctly on what they are talking about.
There is no transmission of information at speed higher than light
speed, but in a single universe view, quantum weirdness exploitation
(like
On 11 Mar 2010, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical
or a computational role to inactive device in the actual
supervenience of a an actual computation currently not using that
device
Message -
From: m.a.
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2010 3:42 PM
Subject: Re: Free will
Bruno,
ummm...I don't follow this answer. Does your reply affirm free will,
deny it or take some other tact? m.a.
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal
Hi Brent,
We have discussed this a long time ago. Ah, perhaps it was on the FOR
list.
Free-will can only diminish when indeterminacy is added.
It is a product of awareness of ignorance on oneself, that an high
level construct. I appreciate infinitely both Kochen and Conway, but
on free
On 11 Mar 2010, at 23:14, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 1:56 PM, m.a. wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2010 4:38 PM
Subject: Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
On 3/11/2010 1:26 PM, m.a. wrote:
Bruno and
On 11 Mar 2010, at 20:38, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Mar 2010, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical
or a computational role to inactive
Marty,
I think the question, Do you believe in free will? could as easily
be, Do you believe in Santa Claus or God or Fate and on and on. We
loudly assert: I do what I want!! But without considering the
factors that influence (determine?) our wants and desires. No.I
don't suppose I
On 12 Mar 2010, at 18:34, m.a. wrote:
What sort of short cut are you talking about? I don't see any
short cuts here. I can see where people will find reasons afterwards
to justify their decisions by consulting conscience and notions of
good and bad, but that's all
a posterior.
On 12 Mar 2010, at 18:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/12/2010 4:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Brent,
We have discussed this a long time ago. Ah, perhaps it was on the
FOR list.
Free-will can only diminish when indeterminacy is added.
It is a product of awareness of ignorance on oneself
On 12 Mar 2010, at 19:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
Why? The QM many worlds entails that he is old in the normal
worlds, and
he will keep going less than 60mi/h there too.
In some worlds his car is a Toyota.
But he is old. He will not go faster than 60mi/h in the normal worlds.
Tp
On 12 Mar 2010, at 21:53, m.a. wrote:
I agree with you that quantum indeterminacy doesn't
affect (free) will: Quantum mechanics is local and deterministic,
and explains why it seems indeterministic to the 99,...% of the
observers. (3/12/2010 7:58 AM), which is why I
more, but it is already a lot.
Bruno
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Saturday, March 13, 2010 6:37 AM
Subject: Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
On 12 Mar 2010, at 21:53, m.a. wrote:
I agree with you that quantum
, Nature Neuroscience, 11, 543 -
545 (2008) ? In this paper, the split second becomes 10
seconds. Sorry if this has been addressed before in this list.
William
On Mar 13, 2010, at 3:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Mar 2010, at 21:53, m.a. wrote:
I agree with you
/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
You can download the slides also, to have the 8 steps of the Universal
Dovetailer Argument (UDA) in front of you.
Best,
Bruno
On Mar 13, 2010, at 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi William,
OK I found it on the net:
http://www.socialbehavior.uzh.ch/teaching
On 13 Mar 2010, at 23:15, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/13/2010 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi William,
OK I found it on the net:
http://www.socialbehavior.uzh.ch/teaching/semsocialneurosciencespring09/Haynes_NatNeurosci_2008_ext.pdf
But my comment will consist in repeating what I am always
On 14 Mar 2010, at 03:35, m.a. wrote:
Please see questions below (in bold).
On 13 Mar 2010, at 16:00, m.a. wrote:
Bruno,
Thanks to your lucid explanation I begin to glimpse the
beauty of comp. Please check my reasoning here. If materialism is
correct, the brain can be
On 14 Mar 2010, at 06:55, Brent Meeker wrote:
I could have said associated or attributed instead of
attached. To say that a brain is conscious is a category error.
My brain is not conscious (no more than a rock). The person who has
that brain can be said to be conscious.
So how does a
legal, medications which are inefficacious and unhealthy.
Bruno Marchal
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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On 16 Mar 2010, at 02:55, m.a. wrote:
Bruno,
Another plea for understanding. For clarity I will
delete some questions from previous pages leaving only the ones that
continue to puzzle me, in bold type.
By computer I assume you're referring here to the arithmetical
On 16 Mar 2010, at 12:59, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 16 March 2010 01:39, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The problem is that right has no objective basis. It's like good
or beauty: a concept made up by humans.
The concepts of moon, rock, galaxies, and numbers, are also made
On 16 Mar 2010, at 16:17, m.a. wrote:
By 3-determinacy I assume you mean 3rd person determinacy.
Yes. It is the content of the diary of an experimenter, teleporting
some rabbits or guinea pig, perhaps human.
As opposed to the first person view, which is the one described by the
rabbits,
On 16 Mar 2010, at 19:29, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/16/2010 6:03 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 16 March 2010 20:29, russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
I've been following the thread on Jack's partial brains paper,
although I've been too busy to comment. I did get a moment
On 17 Mar 2010, at 13:47, HZ wrote:
I'm quite confused about the state of zombieness. If the requirement
for zombiehood is that it doesn't understand anything at all but it
behaves as if it does what makes us not zombies? How do we not we are
not? But more importantly, are there known cases of
On 17 Mar 2010, at 14:06, m.a. wrote:
But is there a deliberate feedback (of any kind) between first
person and UD?
No. The UD can be seen as a set of elementary arithmetical truth,
realizing through their many proofs, the many computations. It is the
least block-universe fro the
On 18 Mar 2010, at 07:01, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18 March 2010 16:36, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Is it coherent to say a black box accidentally reproduces the I/
O? It is
over some relatively small number to of I/Os, but over a large
enough number
and range to
On 17 Mar 2010, at 18:34, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/17/2010 3:34 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 17 March 2010 05:29, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
I think this is a dubious argument based on our lack of
understanding of
qualia. Presumably one has many thoughts that do
On 17 Mar 2010, at 18:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/17/2010 5:47 AM, HZ wrote:
I'm quite confused about the state of zombieness. If the requirement
for zombiehood is that it doesn't understand anything at all but it
behaves as if it does what makes us not zombies? How do we not we are
not?
On 17 Mar 2010, at 19:12, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/17/2010 10:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Mar 2010, at 13:47, HZ wrote:
I'm quite confused about the state of zombieness. If the requirement
for zombiehood is that it doesn't understand anything at all but it
behaves as if it does what
that that is obvious.
Me neither. On the contrary, it is what required magic.
Bruno Marchal
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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at some level. No
problem if you choose the quantum level. In all case physics has to be
derived, in a precise way (based on the logics of self-reference) from
arithmetic (see my url for the papers).
Bruno
William
On Mar 18, 2010, at 1:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Mar 2010
Marty,
Can you clarify the origins of the Lobian Machine?
Does it arise out of the theorem of Hugo Martin Lob?
Yes. I have often explained that theorem, years ago on this list (and
elsewhere) and I can have opportunities to explain it again. You can
see some of my
, 2010, at 2:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
William,
On 18 Mar 2010, at 18:06, L.W. Sterritt wrote:
Bruno and others,
Perhaps more progress can be made by avoiding self referential
problems and viewing this issue mechanistically.
I don't see what self-referential problems you are alluding too
On 20 Mar 2010, at 16:56, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2010 17:57, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Please, keep in mind I may miss your point, even if I prefer to say
that you
are missing something, for being shorter and keeping to the point.
You
really put your finger right
On 20 Mar 2010, at 21:34, David Nyman wrote:
On 20 March 2010 18:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Well, if by 3-p Chalmers you mean some 'body', such a body *is* a
zombie.
The 1-p Chalmers is Chalmers, the person. Its body does not think,
but makes
higher the probability
Hi Jason, Hi Skeletori,
A short comment, on Jason's comment on Skeletori.
A deeper question is what is the upper limit to intelligence? I
haven't yet mentioned the role of memory in this process. I think
intelligence is bound by the complexity of the environment. From
within the
On 07 Apr 2010, at 10:32, Skeletori wrote:
I would define intelligence by an amount of self-introspection
ability. In that case the singularity belongs to the past, with the
discovery of Löbian machine, that is universal machine knowing that
their are universal.
This makes all humans
John,
On 12 Apr 2010, at 16:31, John Mikes wrote:
To Jason's fantasy-contest (just imagine and put it as 'reality?)
upon his
John, Jason did not imagine and then put as real. Instead, he was
*assuming* and then *deriving* consequences. You talk like if we could
ever know for sure
On 12 Apr 2010, at 20:24, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 4/12/2010 6:26 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Apr 11, 2010 at 5:13 PM, silky michaelsli...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Mon, Apr 12, 2010 at 5:50 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
wrote:
[...]
In an uploaded state you could spend all day
On 16 Apr 2010, at 05:01, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
What would make universes with honest initial conditions + causal laws
more probable than deceptive ones? For every honest universe it would
seem possible to have an infinite number of deceptive universes that
are the equivalent of The
On 16 Apr 2010, at 19:07, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think intelligence in the context of a particular world requires
acting within that world. Humans learn language starting with
ostensive definition: (pointing) There that's a chair. Sit in
it. That's what it's for. Move it where you
On 18 Apr 2010, at 03:15, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
On Apr 16, 4:02 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 16 Apr 2010, at 05:01, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
What would make universes with honest initial conditions + causal
laws
more probable than deceptive ones? For every
On 20 Apr 2010, at 05:22, Rex Allen wrote:
On Sun, Apr 18, 2010 at 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 18 Apr 2010, at 03:15, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
I agree in theory, though I still hold to my consciousness is
fundamental and uncaused mantra!
Would you agree
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