From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu <religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
on behalf of Alan E Brownstein <aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu>
Sent: Thursday, May 4, 2017 5:30:53 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Johnson Amend
expressive activities you think
deserve protection against state interference as religious exercise rather than
speech for constitutional purposes?
Alan
____
From: Alan E Brownstein
Sent: Thursday, May 4, 2017 3:17 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subjec
blog: http://www.mirrorofjustice.blogs.com
-
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu <religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
on behalf of Alan E Brownstein <aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu>
Sent: Thursday, May 4, 2017 2:01:34 PM
To: Law & Religion issues
I understand the concern that content-based constraints prohibiting the
endorsement of candidates during sermons by clergy during worship services
interfere with religious liberty. But it is also the case that such speech is a
distinctive religious voice on electoral choices by the polity. The
Not all of the same folk who complain about government funding.
There are still some of us left who support the old model of significant
limitations on government funding of religious institutions and significant
protection of religious institutions from government regulation and
What I find most surprising is that the demise of the argument that government
funding will undermine religious freedom is occurring at a time when the
argument may well turn out to be accurate at least in some locations.
It may be that for many people on the left the failure of the church
I think the question Michael poses is more complicated than his posts suggest
in important respects, but I also think the dischordant rights argument he
presents has substantial force.
>From an analytic perspective, because religion implicates not only liberty
>values but group and identity
Has anyone written anything about (or given some thought to) the possibility of
RFRA being employed to challenge the federal government's deportation policies.
For example, might a professor or registrar at a private school be permitted to
assert RFRA as a defense to a federal law requiring
Three quick thoughts.
1. It would be helpful at least as a first step to limit the passages in Hobby
Lobby about substantial burden to which Doug refers to claims where the
government requires religious individuals or institutions to so some thing that
their religion prohibits (often
The Standing Rock case is only of several religious liberty cases that are
likely to arise where, as Doug says “the political valences are reversed.”
Obviously, there are already questions regarding the religious liberty and
equality rights of Muslims. Also, it isn’t going to be too long before
It is also worth noting that California Workplace Religious Freedom Act,
enacted in 2012, not only imposed a stronger duty to accommodate religious
employees on employers generally. It also explicitly included religious dress
and grooming practices in the religious belief and observance
I have suggested to my students (Yeah, I'm still teaching one semester a year)
that RFRA as construed in Hobby Lobby pretty much leaves it to each person's
conscience to determine when they are substantially burdened by a federal law
when the law allegedly compels them to do something that
I have an odd question that I hope list members might be able to help me answer.
Do any list members know whether there were ever any federal restrictions on
clergy serving as elected or appointed officers of the United States early on
in our constitutional history that would parallel state
rs? (Again, I set aside the
question whether this violates the Equal Protection Clause, quite apart from
the religious questions.)
Eugene
From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Be
I think the answer to Chip's question is that an Establishment Clause analysis
evaluating the harms caused by a religious accommodation does require a
balancing of interests. Indeed, the balancing analysis would have significant
similarities to the balancing necessary to implement a serious
Very thoughtful and helpful post, Chris.
Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 2, 2016, at 9:18 PM, "Christopher Lund"
> wrote:
I have thought about these issues a little bit over the years, because a
similar program is in place at Wayne State, where I teach.
main questions of harm to third parties.
Religious diversity in public swimming pools does not seem to present an
interest of any importance whatsoever.
On Thursday, June 2, 2016, Alan E Brownstein
<aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu<mailto:aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu>> wrote:
I think it is both r
I think it is both reasonable and valid to accommodate religious groups whose
members would be unable to enjoy benefits that the majority enjoys because of
conflicts with a minority faiths beliefs.
No one has to attend the prom or go on discretionary field trips or play in
intra mural sports.
There is an article in the April 20th issue of the New Yorker titled "The
Immortality Upgrade." It involves a group called the Mormon Transhumanist
Association "who believe that the development and dissemination of advanced
technologies-cryogenics, bionics, artificial
ligious speakers are no more and no less protected here.
Eugene
From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan E Brownstein
Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2016 9:41 PM
To: Law &
I recognize this hypothetical, based very indirectly on a real incident, is
more speech than religion, but I hope Eugene will allow my post to go forward
in any case.
Suppose a LGBT student group at a public university invites a guest speaker to
present a scheduled lecture in a university
llow how past RFRAs
have been applied, but such broad and formerly almost universally praised
legislation should be defensible without discussing a relatively narrow aspect
of it as the bill's reason for being.
On Mon, Mar 28, 2016 at 2:34 PM, Alan E Brownstein
<aebrownst...@ucda
Based purely on anecdotal information, I think this issue is based more on
timing than on legislative history. I worked on the attempt to get a state RFRA
passed in California in 1998. The bill passed both houses of the legislature --
controlled by the Democrats -- only to be vetoed by the
I think that attenuation continues to be a useful factor to consider in cases
where the government burdens the religious claimant by making it more difficult
to engage in religiously mandated practices. But in cases in which the
government allegedly compels conduct which the claimant asserts
I think that attenuation continues to be a useful factor to consider in cases
where the government burdens the religious claimant by making it more difficult
to engage in religiously mandated practices. But in cases in which the
government allegedly compels conduct which the claimant asserts
Vik Amar and I wrote a lengthy column on this case several years ago:
The Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause in the Context of the Texas
High School Cheerleader Religious Banner Dispute
Nov. 9, 2012 Justia.com Verdict.
Our conclusion was that the cheerleaders should lose under
Hi Rick,
Viewing the question of religious exemptions and church autonomy on the one
hand and equal access to government subsidies on the other from a broad
perspective, I "hear" this discord all the time. I spend a lot of time speaking
to various civic groups, church groups and the like --
Since Doug isn't going to respond and most members of the list have written
about these issues at some length, let me make two very brief points here.
The focus of the discussion is the government funding of religious
institutions. Doug is correct that if funds are made available to
I'm not about to suggest that Eugene's equal access arguments don't make sense.
But I don't think his examples provide persuasive support for an equal access
rule either.
Example 1 is a designated public forum. As such, it is subject to equal access
rules. But it is certainly not clear to
It might also be relevant to note that at least for many congregations,
pre-schools -- which typically have playgrounds -- are very important sources
of revenue for the house of worship at which they are based.
Alan
Sent from my iPhone
> On Jan 17, 2016, at 11:16 AM, "Graber, Mark"
be
relevant to the way we evaluate the play in the joints when the same state
limits subsidies available to religious institutions.
Alan
From: Alan E Brownstein
Sent: Saturday, January 16, 2016 6:55 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject
>From Micah Schwartzman (who is having trouble connecting to the List).
I take the larger point from Alan's examples to be that the state in his
hypothetical gives religious organizations special treatment by providing them
with exemptions and by excluding them from certain legal benefits.
I wonder if I might offer a modest (well maybe not so modest) amendment to
Eugene's excellent hypotheticals.
Say that the government adopted a package bill. It provided that:
A. Houses of worship and directly affiliated schools and day care centers:
Need not comply with many land use
ax."
Howard Friedman
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
on behalf of Alan E Brownstein [aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu]
Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2015 4:01 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: reserved seat for me
Anyone have any thoughts on the constitutionality of a rule that reserves one
seat on a multi-member police commission for a member of a local religious
organization (any religious organization would be acceptable) who is nominated
by the organization. Some compensation is involved.
Alan
I agree with Chip that an accommodation analysis may permit the creation of
these facilities, but the analysis changes if we are evaluating a general
funding program where no substantial burden on religious liberty requires
accommodation.
One important difference is that the accommodation can
delete it immediately and call (972)
941-4451 to advise me that you received it. Thank you.
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION / ATTORNEY WORK
PRODUCT
From: Alan E Brownstein
<aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu<mailto:aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu>>
Reply-To: Law &
Ed knows much more about the ownership and management of airports than I do –
although it’s not hard to satisfy that standard. But I recall several cases
where airport governing authorities were sued for violating the free speech
rights of people using the airport terminals for expressive
I'm not sure how all of these free speech cases the Sixth Circuit cites apply
to the government funding of a chapel. Is the argument that the creation of
rooms in an airport terminal for expressive purposes is determined under
open-access neutral criteria and that like the public property at
Just wondering -- is anyone circulating a call for scholars to support the
fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry as affirmed by the Court in
Obergefell and the principles of personal liberty and autonomy and human
dignity on which the decision is based?
the office of county clerk,"
understood as a government entity or a place that somebody goes. The protection
is personal to a human being.
Kevin
From: Alan E Brownstein
<aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu<mailto:aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu>>
Reply-To: Law & Religion List
&l
I think I understand Kevin's argument from his last post better than I did
before, but I still disagree with it. Let me check my understanding of his
position. Suppose Kentucky adopted an accommodation which it described in a
sign that was to be posted in each county clerk's office.
While I appreciate Kevin's efforts to identify an accommodation that will work
here -- and I certainly try to look for acceptable accommodations in resolving
religious liberty disputes -- I'm inclined to agree with Jim and Chip here. A
public official's insistence that the government office
Doug is probably correct that the absence of Ms. Davis’s name on the marriage
license form sends a powerful statement of her beliefs. But in evaluating the
merits of granting her an accommodation I would consider that an incidental
consequence of her religious liberty claim – and in my judgment
I appreciate Eugene's point here, but let me press the argument because I think
it may be more complicated than Eugene suggests.
Assume arguendo that having to go to a different county to get a marriage
license does not impose a substantial burden on the right to marry. (I think it
does, but
Chip raises some important and provocative points about the way this litigation
has gone forward.
Let me re-characterize one of them and question another.
Putting aside issues about complicity and whether Ms. Davis's actually
authorizes anything by having her name on the license, let's just
Sorry to be late joining this discussion, but I had two idiosyncratic , left
field thoughts on this issue.
If an accommodation is created (either through a separate statute or a RFRA
decision) that permits the county clerk to delete his or her name from marriage
licenses to mitigate the burden
Let me apologize in advance because I probably will not be able to participate
in a timely way to further posts in this thread (which is a very interesting
thread). But let me question Eugene's suggestion that just as sufficiently
cabined rules for parade permits prevent viewpoint
I would prefer to see a Supreme Court opinion striking down bans on same-sex
marriage based on a due process fundamental right to marry analysis or on the
argument that gays and lesbians are a suspect or quasi suspect class or some
mixture of the two. If the Court does decide to resolve this
such schools
now? In what year does your hypo occur?
On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:30 PM, Alan E Brownstein
aebrownst...@ucdavis.edumailto:aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu wrote:
None of us can predict the future very well. The world today is very different
than I thought it would be 30 years ago
as discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, religion, and disability, I also believe nonprofit religious institutions
with nonconforming views should be able to provide a venue for fellow believers
to pursue a shared commitment to their own values.
- Jim
On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 11:30 AM, Alan E Brownstein
at 3:02 PM, Alan E Brownstein
aebrownst...@ucdavis.edumailto:aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu wrote:
The school or college could discriminate against the LGBT community in a
variety of ways -- both as to students and faculty. But let's assume we are
talking about 2017 and a privately funded religious
Interesting that the Canadian Court was so dismissive of the preamble. As I
recall in Australia, the reason the Australian Constitution has a free exercise
clause and establishment clause although it does not have a Bill of Rights is
that people were sufficiently worried about the reference to
Excellent post, Hillel. I agree with you and also see the current situation as
deeply sad and tragic.
Alan
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 6, 2015, at 9:21 PM, Hillel Y. Levin
hillelle...@gmail.commailto:hillelle...@gmail.com wrote:
In an ideal world I would stand with Sandy's plea for
Thanks, Rob. A very forceful statement. But I guess no one was listening when
you spoke. I'm pretty sure I read statements by Indiana legislators to the
effect that no one had ever suggested to them that this law might be used to
shield discrimination before the law was adopted.
Alan
exemption more favorably in one case than the other.
Alan
From: Will Esser [mailto:willes...@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, April 02, 2015 2:19 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics; Alan E Brownstein
Subject: Re: Dignitary Injury as an argument against religious exemptions to
non
Will and Chip’s exchange ended on such a thoughtful and positive note (which I
greatly appreciate) that I hesitate to add another post to this thread out of
fear it might break the spell.
I agree with Will and Chip’s discussion about when and whether speech by itself
constitutes
’ religious observance.
On Apr 1, 2015, at 4:07 PM, Alan E Brownstein
aebrownst...@ucdavis.edumailto:aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu wrote:
The problem I have with Jim's argument, if I understand him correctly, is that
it seems to suggest that no religious exemption can be accepted if it causes
any harm
The problem I have with Jim's argument, if I understand him correctly, is that
it seems to suggest that no religious exemption can be accepted if it causes
any harm to a third party. (I'm not sure if Jim includes the general public or
the public fisc in third party.) I think many liberals
Sorry to be returning to prior posts, but I would like further clarification on
the argument against adopting a RFRA law with a provision excluding civil
rights laws from its application.
If a state RFRA is not intended or expected to provide any kind of expansive
protection to discrimination
Three quick points:
1. As Marty suggests below, if the Court had ruled in Hobby Lobby’s favor
but issued a narrow opinion (narrow in its reasoning and holding) making it
clear that the ruling in favor of Hobby Lobby gives no support to RFRA claims
challenging anti-discrimination laws
If it is a mistake to prohibit discrimination in hiring based on mutable
characteristics and vaguely defined concepts, then clearly we should not
prohibit discrimination based on religion.
Other prohibited grounds for discrimination might also fall victim to an
insistence that the
My question is a bit different than the one Hillel posed. Suppose the
religious exemption permitting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in places of public accommodation/employment is broader than
exemptions provided to religious objectors who believe they are required to
and doctor-client speech is broadly
subject to much more compulsion than freelance writing, photography, etc.
Eugene
From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan E Brownstein
Sent: Sunday
I think Steve's focus on the difficulty of drawing distinctions in this area
is helpful, but it also demonstrates the potential range of autonomy and/or
expressive exemptions from civil rights laws.
Let's put prostitution aside for the moment since it involves a form of
intimacy that is so
-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Alan E Brownstein
Sent: Sunday, February 15, 2015 2:16 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Wedding photographers as creators of art
I think Steve's focus
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