> the
> gap that the Soviet leadership had left wide open after Yalta
eh? What gap?
>and
> the attempt
> to bring some appeasement to the aggression from the West by way of
eh? what appeasement?
>
> It was an attempt to keep the revolution in the periphery going on
> in spite of
> the reluctancy of Soviet leadership.
Stalin said something like "The export of revolution is nonsense. Each country
will make its own revolution if it wants to do so, and if it does not want to
do so there will be no revolution." But this was in the context of scrambling
to create the Soviet A-weapon in response to Hiroshima, and of a general
assault, ideological and political, on imperialism. Not exporting revolution
seems reasonable to me, in the circs. It was Lenin's policy since at least
1921. What *should* Stalin have done? Unoriginal dogmatic answers should be
directed to Jim Hillier's list, not here. Lenin was the first Soviet leader to
speak of "peaceful coexistence".
> In fact, a good deal of the
> resources of
> the imperialists were engaged in this struggle, resources that
> would have been
> directed against the USSR and China if this had not been the case.
Yeah, yeah, whatever. Now, about Tito and the "Non-aligned" movement. This, in
your view, was, unlike the Soviet policy, a "non-reluctant" and truly
revolutionary wave in the peripheries, eh? Don't think so. It was a Trojan
horse.
>
> Mark, probably, means that in the Non alligned movement there were
> bourgeois
> and non-bourgeois regimes sitting next to each other. How could it be
> otherwise? It was a tragedy, a political tragedy (and thus _not_ an
> unescapable
> one), that the leadership of the USSR did not realize this.
This flies in the face of *what actually happened* and what Soviet leaders
said about Tito-ism. They rejected it because it was obviously and on its
face, an accommodation with imperialism.
> What would Tito have had to do? He did not want to accept the leadership of
> Russia, he wanted Yugoslavia to follow its own step towards
> socialism.
If Tito thought the South Serbs, all 14 million of them, could create their
own socialist utopia among the seaside resorts and mountains of the Adriatic,
he must have been a raving idiot, which however, he wasn't. What he was, was
convinced that the USSR would survive and that thus his own little
evolutionary niche would be conserved. He was wrong on all counts. It would
have served the Yugoclav peoples better if he'd taken a different long-term
view, don't you think? There is a word for this kind of sell-out. The other
word is predatory opportunism.
>He did
> not want to surrender his arms, as the Greek communists had been
> forced to do
> under Soviet pressure,
This is a hoary old Trot canard! What on earth are you dragging us into here?
>he did not want to have his own country
> become a piece
> in the checkerboard of Europe drawn in Yalta. The Balkans were, as everyone
> knows, "reserved" for Great Britain.
No, they were not. On the contrary.
>Tito's reluctance to follow
> this ruling
> took him to independence from Moscow. After that, he (together with
> Sukarno,
> among others) tried to devise an independent road for the revolting
> peoples in
> the periphery.
This is mythopoeising nonsense, old friend. You are a dear old pal and
comrade, but you obviously have a sore tooth today.
>
> Growling hugs,
rebartatively likewise.
Mark
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