$ please understand i have no whatsoever background of philosophy, so please make your explanations as clear as if you're talking to a dickhead (maybe i am indeed)
$ i was just bored & decided to read something that i've never read before. somehow i ended up at (1) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/ (2) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ $ in matter of minutes, i *saw* the ghost of Plato laughing, then saying "get lost, dumbass" > i have a couple of questions, here's one ================== I. diff between evidentialism & reliabilism (as theory of justification) $ evidentialism: for a belief to be justified, the believer must possess evidence that allows her to be in a mental state that represents the belief as being true > (1) gives some examples, 1 of them is "if the coffe in your cup tastes sweet > to you, then you have evidence for believing that the coffee is sweet" > then (1) says that evidence consists of perceptual, introspective, memorial, > intuitional experiences $ (1) says that relibilism asserts that a belief is justified iff it's produced from reliable cognitive process > (1) also emphasizes that a belief is justified by the reliability of its > cognitive origin, not the possession of evidence that supports it > it gives me an impression that a belief can be produced & then justified > without possessing evidence, while i thought, let alone justification, even > just producing a belief requires possession of evidence $ according to my *common sense*, a belief is produced 'after' / 'before' having evidence 1. belief after evidence $ for instance, i order a particular type of coffee & have it served right in from of me, then i suddenly *have* a belief "the coffee is sweet". now how is this belief formed? i tend to think to have prior experiences, such as a. someone has told me that that particular type of coffee is sweet (testimony + memory) b. i saw the coffee-guy put much sugar into the coffee (visual perception) c. i remember having that type of coffee before, in the same coffee shop (memory + perception) > all count as evidence, if i find them reliable, then my belief is justified, > if not, then i get more evidences through ones that i find reliable, such as > tasting $ for beliefs such as "3 is more than 4" / "whole is greater than any of its parts", i admit that is hard to find experiences like the above, but if i take intuition / innate knowledge to be a cognition, then i can include such beliefs as ones that are formed after having evidence $ gee, after i lay it like this, it's more like discovering belief / bringing belief to consciousness, rather than producing 2. belief before evidence $ on the other hand, i find it hard to imagine how i can come to the belief "the coffee is sweet" without prior evidences, it's more likely that the question "is it sweet?" pops into my mind $ i think beliefs that are formed this way are ones that arise due to psychological factors, such as desire, prejudice, etc > i usually avoid justifying such beliefs because frankly i don't know what to > make out of them > i believe trying to justify them is dangerous due to all the biases that > psychology has / will found, & this belief is justified by the reliability of > my memory for this particular case (ie. i've had alot of bad experience on > such belief) $ so my conclusions are 1. in either case, to justify a belief, i need to have evidences, prior ones are used to form the belief, posterior ones are used to bring the probability of the belief being true up to my satisfaction / std 2. beliefs that are *worthwhile* are almost always formed after having evidence (ignore this if you find it offensive) $ now, what i'm asking is can i safely conclude that reliabilism explicates evidentialism by requiring the cognitive faculties from which evidences are acquired to be reliable, ie. reliabilism filters evidences, discarding ones that come from unreliable origins? > if i'm right, then what are cognitive faculties that are usually considered > to be unreliable, ie. ones that are accepted by evidentialists but not > reliabilists? my best bet is that they're the psychological factors like the > above > if i'm wrong, then what is the correct interpretation of the "producing > belief from reliable cognition"? & please give example -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en.
