On Nov 19, 10:14 pm, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > Focusing on belief formation and reliability may obscure the truth > about belief as much as it reveals. Once we understand that belief can > and does manifest spontaneously in hindsight, with no evidence or > reliability, we can see it as a sense phenomenon and it's epistemology > is self-authoritative. The task then becomes understanding how sense > works, and how factual experience can be derived through fiction. > Evidentialism & reliabilism to me are just two different forms of > pattern recognition, no more valid than intuition, perception, > emotion, etc. depending on the context.
that's one of the reason endorsed by reliabilists in rejecting evidentialism. reliabilists say that since we don't have a degree of control over formation of our beliefs at the same level as we have for our actions, which is presupposed by evidentialism, mental state alone isn't enough to justify belief, instead, AIUI, we need to (1) investigate through what processes the belief is formed, if we regard them as reliable, then we're justified in holding the belief, if we don't, then cast it into fire, if we can't determine the reliability / we're not satisfied, then (2) acquire more evidences from processes that are regarded reliable, until we are in a mental state that represents the belief as being true i disagree with your saying that causality of belief is irrelevant, because of (1); believing that belief B isn't worthy to be justified, is justified by reasoning, where the main reason is B doesn't come from reliable process. hence, the causality of belief, albeit complex, isn't irrelevant, of course we don't need to determine how exactly a belief is formed (no need to be an omniscient), skimming over memorial experiences about the belief's formation is enough to approximate whether the cognitive processes are reliable. i think it's easier to practice rather than to theorize so IMO, (1) is important because it's our first tool in filtering beliefs; to get beliefs that are worthy to be justified, ie. ones that people should spend efforts in proving. ones who assert causality of belief is irrelevant simply have more beliefs to justify > Which 2 ism? I think that defining terms in linguistic accord with a > theory is (sorry) a waste of time. I'm really only interested in > reality. i believe we're in a misunderstanding here, i, too, don't like the vagueness characteristic of lang, but what can we do? our ability to conceptualize clearly surpass our ability to describe them that's why i asked for help in determining what the correct, or at least common, interpretation of 'evidence' is according to evidentialism, i thought this google group carrying the name 'epistemology' is one of the right place just for fun, (1) the 1st statement of your 1st post: "I'm not sure about how Plato should be interpreted, but it seems presumptuous to me that we should assume that 'beliefs' exist in an objective way" (2) the articles aren't about Plato's view on the matter, it's just the domain name --------- (3) "you haven't read the 2 articles i mentioned in my 1st post" (4) one who isn't interested in something, probably won't read articles about it --------- (5) "you believe you don't need to know about evidentialism- reliabilism" (6) discussing something with someone who doesn't interested in it, probably will lead to misunderstanding --------- (7) "we're in misunderstanding" of course, there're other causes of beliefs (3), (5), (7), but i don't need them, these are enough, & because i regard induction as reliable (which i believe you also do, because i believe you're a scientist), thus my belief (7) is justified, i might try to obtain more evidences, but i'm satisfied already make no mistake, if my belief that "you believe you don't need to know about evidentialism-reliabilism" is in fact true, IMO, you're rightly so. after all i'm also just *playing* around with these stuffs -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en.
