On Nov 17, 8:26 pm, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > Take a dream for example. You can believe that you are > late for a train when in fact there is no evidence, no memory, no > perception, no testimony, etc. I think that belief is part of the > phenomenology of cognition, just a relatively fixed semantic > orientation from which thought can be projected out from. The belief > in the dream train is implicit as your feelings of anxiety and > thoughts of racing to catch it, disappointment in missing it, etc are > the active sensorimotive experiences.
isn't this an example of psychologically caused belief? > Belief is the same way; it has causal properties which can be traced, > but these are not indicative of what constitutes belief any more than > a wavelength of electromagnetic radiation constitutes what a color > looks like. Belief is passive sensory participation. Like 'potential > energy', it's not really 'there', but rather can be deduced in > hindsight. i agree that for most cases, figuring out the causes & their interactions in forming a belief is hard / even impossible, but it's not important for what i'm trying to get at. what matters is the fact that belief has cause(s), because then i can interpret reliabilism as clarifying evidentialism -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en.
