On Nov 17, 5:10 am, kedra marbun <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> $ gee, after i lay it like this, it's more like discovering belief /
> bringing belief to consciousness, rather than producing

I'm not sure about how Plato should be interpreted, but it seems
presumptuous to me that we should assume that 'beliefs' exist in an
objective way. Take a dream for example. You can believe that you are
late for a train when in fact there is no evidence, no memory, no
perception, no testimony, etc. I think that belief is part of the
phenomenology of cognition, just a relatively fixed semantic
orientation from which thought can be projected out from. The belief
in the dream train is implicit as your feelings of anxiety and
thoughts of racing to catch it, disappointment in missing it, etc are
the active sensorimotive experiences.

To be able to read these words, for example, is a capacity borne not
out of evidence and memory, it is a sensory experience which presents
semantically coherence to the subject. We don't say 'ah yes, I
remember learning that the word 'remember' looks like this and sounds
like this and means this - rather we see and understand the meaning
directly in our natural subjective language. We can infer that in fact
we did at some point learn these associations, probably many times in
many different ways, but this is a second order analysis of the
phenomenon. It is injecting a narrative where none is necessary.
Belief is the same way; it has causal properties which can be traced,
but these are not indicative of what constitutes belief any more than
a wavelength of electromagnetic radiation constitutes what a color
looks like. Belief is passive sensory participation. Like 'potential
energy', it's not really 'there', but rather can be deduced in
hindsight.

Craig

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