On Nov 20, 8:04 am, kedra marbun <[email protected]> wrote: > On Nov 19, 10:14 pm, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Focusing on belief formation and reliability may obscure the truth > > about belief as much as it reveals. Once we understand that belief can > > and does manifest spontaneously in hindsight, with no evidence or > > reliability, we can see it as a sense phenomenon and it's epistemology > > is self-authoritative. The task then becomes understanding how sense > > works, and how factual experience can be derived through fiction. > > Evidentialism & reliabilism to me are just two different forms of > > pattern recognition, no more valid than intuition, perception, > > emotion, etc. depending on the context. > > that's one of the reason endorsed by reliabilists in rejecting > evidentialism. > reliabilists say that since we don't have a degree of control over > formation of our beliefs at the same level as we have for our actions, > which is presupposed by evidentialism, mental state alone isn't enough > to justify belief, instead, AIUI, we need to > (1) investigate through what processes the belief is formed, if we > regard them as reliable, then we're justified in holding the belief, > if we don't, then cast it into fire, if we can't determine the > reliability / we're not satisfied, then > (2) acquire more evidences from processes that are regarded reliable, > until we are in a mental state that represents the belief as being > true > > i disagree with your saying that causality of belief is irrelevant, > because of (1); believing that belief B isn't worthy to be justified, > is justified by reasoning, where the main reason is B doesn't come > from reliable process. hence, the causality of belief, albeit complex, > isn't irrelevant,
I'm questioning the entire concept of belief as a logical entity though. My point is that belief can occur spontaneously in a dream without cause, therefore, at a fundamental level, 'belief' is a sensorimotive event, which will automatically be justified retroactively. The reasoning can be reliable or a complete non- sequitur and the subject will not know the difference. > of course we don't need to determine how exactly a > belief is formed (no need to be an omniscient), skimming over memorial > experiences about the belief's formation is enough to approximate > whether the cognitive processes are reliable. i think it's easier to > practice rather than to theorize > > so IMO, (1) is important because it's our first tool in filtering > beliefs; to get beliefs that are worthy to be justified, ie. ones that > people should spend efforts in proving. ones who assert causality of > belief is irrelevant simply have more beliefs to justify > > > Which 2 ism? I think that defining terms in linguistic accord with a > > theory is (sorry) a waste of time. I'm really only interested in > > reality. > > i believe we're in a misunderstanding here, i, too, don't like the > vagueness characteristic of lang, but what can we do? We can focus on experiential realities rather than theories rooted in language. > our ability to > conceptualize clearly surpass our ability to describe them > > that's why i asked for help in determining what the correct, or at > least common, interpretation of 'evidence' is according to > evidentialism, i thought this google group carrying the name > 'epistemology' is one of the right place No worries, I'm not at all representative of this google group. I'm just trying to present a different perspective. Sorry if I crashed your inquiry, you're not in the wrong place - I might be, but I don't so much care about that kind of thing. > > just for fun, > (1) the 1st statement of your 1st post: "I'm not sure about how Plato > should be interpreted, but it seems presumptuous to me that we should > assume that 'beliefs' exist in an objective way" > (2) the articles aren't about Plato's view on the matter, it's just > the domain name Right, yes, my bad. You mentioned Plato initially "$ in matter of minutes, i *saw* the ghost of Plato laughing, then saying "get lost, dumbass"" so I thought that your question had to do with Plato. Again, I'm not so much interested in that, I'm only interested in consciousness itself, rather than schools of thought. > --------- > (3) "you haven't read the 2 articles i mentioned in my 1st post" > (4) one who isn't interested in something, probably won't read > articles about it I skimmed them enough to get the gist. You're right though, I'm mainly interested in my own ideas. > --------- > (5) "you believe you don't need to know about evidentialism- > reliabilism" > (6) discussing something with someone who doesn't interested in it, > probably will lead to misunderstanding I'm not discussing evidentialism-reliabilism, I'm questioning their usefulness and presenting an alternative. > --------- > (7) "we're in misunderstanding" ok > > of course, there're other causes of beliefs (3), (5), (7), but i don't > need them, these are enough, & because i regard induction as reliable > (which i believe you also do, because i believe you're a scientist), Scientists think I'm a crazy new ager, new agers think I'm a square scientist. > thus my belief (7) is justified, i might try to obtain more evidences, > but i'm satisfied already > > make no mistake, if my belief that "you believe you don't need to know > about evidentialism-reliabilism" is in fact true, IMO, you're rightly > so. after all i'm also just *playing* around with these stuffs Yes, I only responded because you indicated that you were just curious about it. If you were working on an academic paper with a limited scope I wouldn't have butted in. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology?hl=en.
