1Z wrote: > Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between > computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing > and highly significant.
It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have remarked, our agenda here is more ecumenical. > A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism > is much less so. Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP? We do need, I think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque as to its roots in 'physical causality'. and 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR, etc. David > David Nyman wrote: > > Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > > But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and > > > the only way to > judge whether it is a good model to see how it > > > corresponds with "mere appearance"; just > like we test QM, general > > > relativity, and every other theory. It *might* be the really real > > > > model - but so might any other model that fits all the data. > > > > Yes, of course, Brent - hence my comments later on in my post. But in > > fact, comp implies that the normal physics model can't 'fit all the > > data', if we include (as we must) the 1-person pov itself in 'the > > data'. > > Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between > computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing > and highly significant. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism > is much less so. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
