Le 22-oct.-06,  1Z ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:

> Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim)

You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only 
Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical 
logic is sound for arithmetic. I use often the expression "platonia" 
for a place where all machines run forever or stop. Or, if I refer to 
Plato, it means I refer to some precise proposition in Plato's 
Theaetetus, or in its Parmenides.
So AR is indeed a very weak hypothesis, and has nothing to do with what 
you call Platonism.

Given that "platonism" seems to be too much charged, I propose to keep 
the expression "Arithmetical realism" instead. It is, I recall, the 
belief that arithmetical propositions are true or false. (Excluded 
middle applies).

Le 22-oct.-06, à 20:31, David Nyman a écrit :

> Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP? We do need, I
> think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between
> 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on
> materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues),
> at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is
> concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque
> as to its roots in 'physical causality'.
> and
> 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure
> on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its
> axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR,
> etc.

Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by 
Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:

Computationalism entails COMP.

But I prefer to consider COMP just as a precise version of standard 
Then the UDA shows, or is supposed at least to show, that if we believe 
in computationalism (perhaps even motivated by materialism at first) 
we get an epistemological contradiction, so that we have to abandon 
either computationalism or materialism.
The contradiction is only epistemological: it is possible to keep a 
belief in material stuff with comp, but it is impossible to relate that 
stuff with consciousness and subjective experience, including 
consciousness of experimental result in physics. So UDA shows that the 
notion of primitive or fundamental matter can not been used to explain 
result of any experience in physics.
Of course such a result is annoying for materialist because 
computationalism  is their favorite implicit or explicit theory of 
mind. My point is that it does not work.
Although Penrose uses incorrectly Godel theorems, I agree with his 
conclusion: if you want a universe made of primitive matter, then the 
only way to make consciousness "physical" or "material" will consist in 
abandoning comp in the philosophy of mind. You will have to attach 
consciousness to actual material infinite. If you want to keep comp 
instead, you have to abandon the notion of primitive matter. But in 
that case,  of course, you have to explain the appearance of matter 
from and only from comp. OK?

Descartes was already aware that mechanism (even non digital) is a 
threat for materialism. His solution has consisted in positing an 
infinitely good God, unable to cheat us, so that our material illusion 
is founded by God's Goodness. I don't follow him that far, but 
Descartes solution is in the same spirit as the use of 
"self-consistency" bets explanation of matter by the lobian machine.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to