Derek Denton in....
Denton D. 2005. The Primordial Emotions: The dawning of consciousness:
Oxford University Press. 267 p.
....is able to point to activated regions of basal brain in a human subject
undergoing extreme thirst. It isnt easy to control for obfuscating
parameters but he did it. Dry mouth, wet mouth, blood salt levels,
micturition thwarting...etc...He can point (in fMRI) to a single small
cohort of cellular material unambiguously responsible for thirst qualia (a
primordial emotion). One cohort does it. Another nearby in the same
activated chain doesn't. Totally outside the cerebral cortex.
If COMP is correct it should be telling us why that is and what to look for.
Exactly what computational process corresponds to the difference between the
two cohorts in first person presentation?
What is it about COMP as an abstraction that renders that difference
invariant? (being a real cellular version vs being a COMP version of the
This is a glaring, large scale (well beyond quantum levels) phenomenon,
right in your face at the cellular level and above.
Perhaps you can shed some light on COMP in this regard, because I cant see
(EC still brewing!)
> -----Original Message-----
> From: email@example.com [mailto:everything-
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
> Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2006 8:23 PM
> To: firstname.lastname@example.org
> Subject: Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
> Le 23-oct.-06, à 00:12, 1Z a écrit :
> > Huh? Computationalism is no more able to account for
> > qualia than physicalism.
> Computationalism (the standard one) through my work (don't hesitate to
> criticize it) gives a precise account of qualia.
> It is even a refutable theory of both quanta and qualia, given that
> quanta are shown to be sharable qualia (first person plural).
> If the comp quanta behavior are shown to contradict empirical quanta,
> then that would refute the comp theory of of both qualia and quanta,
> and actually this would refute comp, even acomp (comp without "yes
> Contrarywise, everyone a bit serious in philosophy of mind agrees that
> physicalist theories have not yet succeed in just approaching or
> formulating the the qualia problem.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at