Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 22-oct.-06, 1Z ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> > Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim)
> You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only
> Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical
> logic is sound for arithmetic.
You need a UD -- a UD which exists. Somehow, somewhere.
> I use often the expression "platonia"
> for a place where all machines run forever or stop. Or, if I refer to
> Plato, it means I refer to some precise proposition in Plato's
> Theaetetus, or in its Parmenides.
> So AR is indeed a very weak hypothesis, and has nothing to do with what
> you call Platonism.
> Given that "platonism" seems to be too much charged, I propose to keep
> the expression "Arithmetical realism" instead. It is, I recall, the
> belief that arithmetical propositions are true or false. (Excluded
> middle applies).
> Le 22-oct.-06, à 20:31, David Nyman a écrit :
> > Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP? We do need, I
> > think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between
> > 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on
> > materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues),
> > at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is
> > concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque
> > as to its roots in 'physical causality'.
> > and
> > 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure
> > on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its
> > axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR,
> > etc.
> Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
> Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
> Computationalism entails COMP.
> But I prefer to consider COMP just as a precise version of standard
> Then the UDA shows, or is supposed at least to show, that if we believe
> in computationalism (perhaps even motivated by materialism at first)
> we get an epistemological contradiction, so that we have to abandon
> either computationalism or materialism.
Contradiction? Haven't you previously claimed that COMP only
makes matter redundant.
Where is the UD? surely it has to exist. Somehow, somewhere.
> The contradiction is only epistemological: it is possible to keep a
> belief in material stuff with comp, but it is impossible to relate that
> stuff with consciousness and subjective experience, including
> consciousness of experimental result in physics. So UDA shows that the
> notion of primitive or fundamental matter can not been used to explain
> result of any experience in physics.
Does the UDA show that physics cannot generate consciousness
> Of course such a result is annoying for materialist because
> computationalism is their favorite implicit or explicit theory of
> mind. My point is that it does not work.
> Although Penrose uses incorrectly Godel theorems, I agree with his
> conclusion: if you want a universe made of primitive matter, then the
> only way to make consciousness "physical" or "material" will consist in
> abandoning comp in the philosophy of mind. You will have to attach
> consciousness to actual material infinite. If you want to keep comp
> instead, you have to abandon the notion of primitive matter. But in
> that case, of course, you have to explain the appearance of matter
> from and only from comp. OK?
If you have an argument from contradiction, and not,
as previously stated a redundancy argument.
> Descartes was already aware that mechanism (even non digital) is a
> threat for materialism. His solution has consisted in positing an
> infinitely good God, unable to cheat us, so that our material illusion
> is founded by God's Goodness. I don't follow him that far, but
> Descartes solution is in the same spirit as the use of
> "self-consistency" bets explanation of matter by the lobian machine.
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