Hi Colin,
I am not sure I understand your point. Would you say that Derek Denton work is conflicting with comp? Actually comp can explain why we cannot attribute some brain *function* to some brain *part* activity. Such relation are described by G* (true but unprovable or unverifiable). Only an argument showing that some part of the brain use "physical infinities" would be a stress for comp. Not really the time to say more now(*). Bruno (*) I have not even the time to just read the other mail before sunday ... But then I see Quentin, Tom and others manage rather well most of Peter's current critical remarks. Le 27-oct.-06, à 02:45, Colin Hales a écrit : > > Hi Bruno, > > Derek Denton in.... > > Denton D. 2005. The Primordial Emotions: The dawning of consciousness: > Oxford University Press. 267 p. > > ....is able to point to activated regions of basal brain in a human > subject > undergoing extreme thirst. It isn’t easy to control for obfuscating > parameters but he did it. Dry mouth, wet mouth, blood salt levels, > micturition thwarting...etc...He can point (in fMRI) to a single small > cohort of cellular material unambiguously responsible for thirst > qualia (a > primordial emotion). One cohort does it. Another nearby in the same > activated chain doesn't. Totally outside the cerebral cortex. > > If COMP is correct it should be telling us why that is and what to > look for. > > Exactly what computational process corresponds to the difference > between the > two cohorts in first person presentation? > > What is it about COMP as an abstraction that renders that difference > invariant? (being a real cellular version vs being a COMP version of > the > same thing) > > This is a glaring, large scale (well beyond quantum levels) phenomenon, > right in your face at the cellular level and above. > > Perhaps you can shed some light on COMP in this regard, because I > can’t see > it. > > Regards, > > Colin Hales > (EC still brewing!) > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal >> Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2006 8:23 PM >> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com >> Subject: Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted >> >> >> >> Le 23-oct.-06, à 00:12, 1Z a écrit : >> >>> Huh? Computationalism is no more able to account for >>> qualia than physicalism. >> >> >> >> Computationalism (the standard one) through my work (don't hesitate to >> criticize it) gives a precise account of qualia. >> It is even a refutable theory of both quanta and qualia, given that >> quanta are shown to be sharable qualia (first person plural). >> If the comp quanta behavior are shown to contradict empirical quanta, >> then that would refute the comp theory of of both qualia and quanta, >> and actually this would refute comp, even acomp (comp without "yes >> doctor"). >> >> Contrarywise, everyone a bit serious in philosophy of mind agrees that >> physicalist theories have not yet succeed in just approaching or >> formulating the the qualia problem. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
