David Nyman wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > > 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on > > > materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), > > > at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is > > > concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque > > > as to its roots in 'physical causality'. > > > > No, not entirely opaque. > > Could you illuminate?
Maybe physics is relations all the way down. > > Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not > > the conclusion. > > Yes indeed, but the conclusions (e.g. the explanatory direction of > 3-person <--> 1-person) are surely somewhat different? They are very different, and a lot of the work is done by the Platonic assumption. > David > > > > David Nyman wrote: > > > 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between > > > > computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing > > > > and highly significant. > > > > > > It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have > > > remarked, our agenda here is more ecumenical. > > > > > > > A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism > > > > is much less so. > > > > > > Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP? > > > > Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim) > > > > > We do need, I > > > think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between > > > > > > 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on > > > materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues), > > > at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is > > > concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque > > > as to its roots in 'physical causality'. > > > > No, not entirely opaque. > > > > > and > > > > > > 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure > > > on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its > > > axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR, > > > etc. > > > > Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not > > the conclusion. > > > > > David > > > > > > > David Nyman wrote: > > > > > Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, > > > > > > and the only way to > judge whether it is a good model to see > > > > > > how it corresponds with "mere appearance"; just > like we test QM, > > > > > > general relativity, and every other theory. It *might* be the > > > > > > really real > model - but so might any other model that fits > > > > > > all the data. > > > > > > > > > > Yes, of course, Brent - hence my comments later on in my post. But in > > > > > fact, comp implies that the normal physics model can't 'fit all the > > > > > data', if we include (as we must) the 1-person pov itself in 'the > > > > > data'. > > > > > > > > Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between > > > > computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing > > > > and highly significant. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism > > > > is much less so. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
