Le 23-oct.-06, à 00:12, 1Z a écrit :

> Huh? Computationalism is no more able to account for
> qualia than physicalism.

Computationalism (the standard one) through my work (don't hesitate to 
criticize it) gives a precise account of qualia.
It is even a refutable theory of both quanta and qualia, given that 
quanta are shown to be sharable qualia (first person plural).
If the comp quanta behavior are shown to contradict empirical quanta, 
then that would refute the comp theory of of both qualia and quanta, 
and actually this would refute comp, even acomp (comp without "yes 

Contrarywise, everyone a bit serious in philosophy of mind agrees that 
physicalist theories have not yet succeed in just approaching or 
formulating the the qualia problem.



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