Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > > I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a > > > > > virtual > > > > > reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, > > > > > for the sake > > > > > of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your > > > > > conscious > > > > > experience do not need to be explicitly linked together to "flow" and > > > > > they do > > > > > not need to be explicitly separated, either in separate universes or > > > > > in separate > > > > > rooms, to be separate. > > > > > > > > I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical > > > > reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all > > > > mathematical > > > > structures are exemplified, the structure corresponging to (me up till > > > > 1 second ago) > > > > + (purple dragons) must exist. If there is nothing > > > > mathematical to keep out of HP universe, the fact that I have never > > > > seen one is > > > > evidence against a mathematical multiverse. > > > > > > That you don't experience HP universes is as much an argument against a > > > physical > > > multiverse as it is an argument against a mathematical multiverse. > > > > Not "as much". It depends on how constrained they are. > > Physical multiverses can be almost as constrained as single universes, > > or almost as unconstrained as multiverses. > > > > > If a physical MV > > > exists, then in some branch you will encounter purple dragons in the next > > > second. > > > > With a very low measure. > > > > > The fact that you don't means that either there is no physical multiverse > > > or there is > > > a physical multiverse but the purple dragon experience is of low measure. > > > Similarly in > > > a mathematical multiverse the HP experiences may be of low measure. > > > > Physical multiversalists can choose measure to match observation (that > > is > > basically how the SWE is arrived at). Mathematical multiversalists > > cannot choose an arbitrary measure, because nothing is arbitrary or > > contingnet > > in Platonia. Measure has to emerge naturally and necessarily for them. > > OK, if you put constraints on a physical multiverse so that it's smaller than > "every possible > universe".
> > > > > If you died today and just by accident a possible next > > > > > moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years > > > > > in the > > > > > future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in > > > > > the future. > > > > > > > > That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP > > > > universe. But I never do. > > > > > > Not "just as easily". If you are destructively scanned and a moment from > > > now 2 copies > > > of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a > > > 2/3 chance > > > of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in > > > Washington. > > > > What's that got to do with Platonia? Platonia contains every > > configuration of matter. > > (Snd no time). Configurations where I'm in Moscow, configurations where > > I'm in Washington, > > configurations where I'm on the moon, configurations where I'm in > > Narnia. > > There is no unaccountable fact to the effect that there is 1 copy of me > > in Moscow, > > 2 in Washington, and 0 on the moon. There are no random gaps in > > Platonia. > > > > (That's the "mathematical* mutiverse of course. A physical mutliverse > > is an entirely different matter). > > Suppose God took Platonia, in all its richness, and made it physical. What > would expect to > experience in the next moment? > > (a) nothing > (b) everything > (c) something > > (a) can't be right. Although in the vast majority of universes in the next > moment your head > explodes or the laws of physics change such that your brain stops working > (sorry), as long as > there is at least one copy of you still conscious, you can expect to remain > conscious. > > (b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only experience > being one at > a time. Even if one of the copies is mind-melded with others, that still > counts as an individual > with more complex experiences. Moreover, it is doubtful whether an experience > of everything > simultaneously - every possible thought, including all the incoherent ones - > is different to no > experience at all, much as a page covered in ink contains no more information > than a blank > page. > > Therefore, (c) must be right. You can expect to experience something. What is > it that you > might experience, if all possibilities are actualised? What will you > experience if no measure is > defined, or all the possibilities have equal measure? But c breaks down into: c1) I experience something coherent that obeys the laws of physics and c2) I experience wild and crazy "harry Potter" stuff. The memory-traces corresponding to c2 are a possible configuration of matter, and so must exist in Platonia. But I only experience c1. > > > It is a > > > real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to be > > > experienced than the > > > orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a summary of > > > some of the > > > debates on this issue), but it is not any more of a problem for a > > > mathematical as opposed > > > to a physical multiverse. > > > > Not at all. P-multiversalists can and do choose measure to match > > observation. > > > > > > > But if you had the successive moments of your consciousness > > > > > implemented > > > > > in parallel, perhaps as a simulation on a powerful computer, it would > > > > > be impossible > > > > > to tell that this was the case. For all you are aware, there may not > > > > > *be* any past > > > > > moments: your present experience may include false memories of your > > > > > past, and > > > > > whole world may have been created a second ago. > > > > > > > > A simulation running on a computer is still a dynamic, temporal > > > > process. The point is that the passage of > > > > time tells me that I am not in Platonia. > > > > > > > > > > > > Time Capsules: Getting Flow from Sequence. > > > > > > > > Proponents of the Block Universe view believe that there is only a > > > > B-Series. Some think that alone is adequate to explain the subjective > > > > Flow-of-Time. It is easy enough to see how there could be a sequence in > > > > the B series. If we consider a series of 3 dimensional "snapshots" of > > > > someone's brain, each subsequent snapshot iwll contain information > > > > relating back to previous ones. > > > > But is this chain or sequence enough to establish flow ? A B-series > > > > without an A-series is like a spatial series. If you had a series of > > > > clones arranged spatially so that clone 2 has all of clone 1's memories > > > > (and more), clone 3 has all of clone 2's memories (and more) and so on, > > > > you would not expect anything to be flowing from one clone to another. > > > > The clones form a series of "time capsules", and a such they have a > > > > natural sequence, but that is all. > > > > Without an A series, there is nothing to justify the idea that only one > > > > time capsule is conscious "at a time". Either they all are, or none > > > > are. We know we are conscious, so we must reject the "none are" option. > > > > The Block Universe therefore predicts that all time capsules are > > > > conscious. This is in line with the way the Block Universe spatialises > > > > Time. It predicts that consciousness is a single 4-dimensional entity. > > > > I would not just be conscious now with memories of the past, I would > > > > have a consciousness in the past overlaid on my present consciousness. > > > > > > Whether the Block Universe model is right or not, the series of clones you > > > describe, set up as an experiment, would still give the experience of > > > being > > > continuously conscious through time. > > > > The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem > > is that they would all be conscious simultaneously. > > Sure, objectively you could say they are all conscious simultaneously, but if > you > asked any of them, how do you think they would describe their subjective > experience? That's a good question. In order to exclude the possibility that the clones experience flow of consciousness through a dynamic mechanism, we would have to permit them to live for only a fraction of a second. But then the answer to the question would have to come from a group of clones, since no-one clone lives long enough to utter it. So any kind of coherent answer would tend towards the idea that they have a shared consciousness. > > > I remember being conscious a second > > > ago but how could I possibly know that I didn't just pop into existence > > > complete with false memories half a second ago? > > > > That isn't the problem. The problem is that if time is just like > > space, as the BU theory states, you should have single consciousness > > spread across time, not a temporal sequence of one-at-a-time > > conscious states. > > I don't understand that last statement. How, exactly, would my conscious > experience > be any different in a BU? There would be no difference between space-wise binding and time-wise separation, because everything works like space in a BU. > What evidence from my experience is there that I am not now > living in a BU? You experience a flow of time. > > > All I know is what I am > > > experiencing *now*. > > > > Yes. That is the phenomenological fact that contradicts the BU. > > > > > It is only because I have memories and a sense of being > > > the same person over time that I consider it was "I" who woke up this > > > morning > > > and it will be "I" again who goes to bed tonight. I don't have a direct > > > telepathic > > > link to past or future selves, or copies in the next room, to ensure that > > > they are > > > "really me". All I have to go on are my present memories and beliefs, > > > which could > > > in theory be artificially implanted without changing anything about my > > > stream of > > > consciousness. Nothing is changed if we say that we live only > > > transiently, and the > > > feeling that we persist as individuals through time is an illusion. > > > How does that phenomenological fact contradict the BU? There is no single "now" in the BU. It's all or nothing. > It seems to me that it supports it. > Stathis Papaioannou > _________________________________________________________________ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
