Le 01-déc.-06, à 20:05, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> Le 01-déc.-06, à 10:24, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : >> >>> >>> Bruno Marchal writes: >>> >>>> <snip> >>>> >>>>> We can assume that the structural difference makes a difference to >>>>> consciousness but >>>>> not external behaviour. For example, it may cause spectrum >>>>> reversal. >>>> >>>> Let us suppose you are right. This would mean that there is >>>> substitution level such that the digital copy person would act AS IF >>>> she has been duplicated at the correct level, but having or living a >>>> (1-person) spectrum reversal. >>>> >>>> Now what could that mean? Let us interview the copy and ask her the >>>> color of the sky. Having the same external behavior as the original, >>>> she will told us the usual answer: blue (I suppose a sunny day!). >>>> >>>> So, apparently she is not 1-aware of that spectrum reversal. This >>>> means >>>> that from her 1-person point of view, there was no spectrum >>>> reversal, >>>> but obviously there is no 3-description of it either .... >>>> >>>> So I am not sure your assertion make sense. I agree that if we take >>>> an >>>> incorrect substitution level, the copy could experience a spectrum >>>> reversal, but then the person will complain to her doctor saying >>>> something like "I have not been copied correctly", and will not pay >>>> her >>>> doctor bill (but this is a different external behaviour, ok?) >>> I don't doubt that there is some substitution level that preserves >>> 3rd >>> person >>> behaviour and 1st person experience, even if this turns out to mean >>> copying >>> a person to the same engineering tolerances as nature has specified >>> for ordinary >>> day to day life. The question is, is there some substitution level >>> which preserves >>> 3rd person behaviour but not 1st person experience? For example, >>> suppose >>> you carried around with you a device which monitored all your >>> behaviour in great >>> detail, created predictive models, compared its predictions with your >>> actual >>> behaviour, and continuously refined its models. Over time, this >>> device >>> might be >>> able to mimic your behaviour closely enough such that it could take >>> over control of >>> your body from your brain and no-one would be able to tell that the >>> substitution >>> had occurred. I don't think it would be unreasonable to wonder >>> whether >>> this copy >>> experiences the same thing when it looks at the sky and declares it >>> to >>> be blue as >>> you do before the substitution. >> >> >> >> Thanks for the precision. >> It *is* as reasonable to ask such a question as it is reasonable to >> ask >> if tomorrow my first person experience will not indeed permute my blue >> and orange qualia *including my memories of it* in such a way that my >> 3-behavior will remain unchanged. In that case we are back to the >> original spectrum reversal problem. >> This is a reasonable question in the sense that the answer can be >> shown >> relatively (!) undecidable: it is not verifiable by any external >> means, >> nor by the first person itself. We could as well conclude that such a >> change occurs each time the magnetic poles permute, or that it changes >> at each season, etc. >> *But* (curiously enough perhaps) such a change can be shown to be >> guess-able by some richer machine. >> The spectrum reversal question points on the gap between the 1 and 3 >> descriptions. With acomp your question should be addressable in the >> terms of the modal logic Z and X, or more precisely Z1* minus Z1 and >> X1* minus X1, that is their true but unprovable (and undecidable) >> propositions. Note that the question makes no sense at all for the >> "pure 1-person" because S4Grz1* minus S4Grz1 is empty. >> So your question makes sense because at the level of the fourth and >> fifth hypo your question can be translated into purely arithmetical >> propositions, which although highly undecidable by the machine itself >> can be decided by some richer machine. >> And I would say, without doing the calculus which is rather complex, >> that the answer could very well be positive indeed, but this remains >> to >> be proved. At least the unexpected nuances between computability, >> provability, knowability, observability, perceivability (all redefined >> by modal variant of G) gives plenty room for this, indeed. >> >> Bruno > > So what does your calculus say about the experience of people who wear > glasses which invert their field of vision? This is just an adaptation process. If I remember people wearing those glasses are aware of the inversion of their field of vision until their brain generates an unconscious correction. All this can be explained self-referentially in G without problem and even without mentioning the qualia (which would need the Z* or X* ....). Stathis' remarks on the existence of qualia changes without first person knowledge of the change is far less obvious. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---