Brent meeker writes:
> > I don't doubt that there is some substitution level that preserves 3rd 
> > person 
> > behaviour and 1st person experience, even if this turns out to mean copying 
> > a person to the same engineering tolerances as nature has specified for 
> > ordinary 
> > day to day life. The question is, is there some substitution level which 
> > preserves 
> > 3rd person behaviour but not 1st person experience? For example, suppose 
> > you carried around with you a device which monitored all your behaviour in 
> > great 
> > detail, created predictive models, compared its predictions with your 
> > actual 
> > behaviour, and continuously refined its models. Over time, this device 
> > might be 
> > able to mimic your behaviour closely enough such that it could take over 
> > control of 
> > your body from your brain and no-one would be able to tell that the 
> > substitution 
> > had occurred. I don't think it would be unreasonable to wonder whether this 
> > copy 
> > experiences the same thing when it looks at the sky and declares it to be 
> > blue as 
> > you do before the substitution.
> That's a precis of Greg Egan's short story "The Jewel".  I wouldn't call it 
> unreasonable to wonder whether the copy experiences the same qualia, but I'd 
> call it unreasonable to conclude that it did not on the stated evidence.  In 
> fact I find it hard to think of what evidence would count against it have 
> some kind of qualia.

It would be a neat theory if any machine that processed environmental 
in a manner analogous to an animal had some level of conscious experience (and 
with Colin's "no zombie scientists" hypothesis, although I don't think it is a 
conclusion he would 
agree with). It would explain consciousness as a corollary of this sort of 
information processing. 
However, I don't know how such a thing could ever be proved or disproved. 

Stathis Papaioannou
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