Brent meeker writes: > > I don't doubt that there is some substitution level that preserves 3rd > > person > > behaviour and 1st person experience, even if this turns out to mean copying > > a person to the same engineering tolerances as nature has specified for > > ordinary > > day to day life. The question is, is there some substitution level which > > preserves > > 3rd person behaviour but not 1st person experience? For example, suppose > > you carried around with you a device which monitored all your behaviour in > > great > > detail, created predictive models, compared its predictions with your > > actual > > behaviour, and continuously refined its models. Over time, this device > > might be > > able to mimic your behaviour closely enough such that it could take over > > control of > > your body from your brain and no-one would be able to tell that the > > substitution > > had occurred. I don't think it would be unreasonable to wonder whether this > > copy > > experiences the same thing when it looks at the sky and declares it to be > > blue as > > you do before the substitution. > > That's a precis of Greg Egan's short story "The Jewel". I wouldn't call it > unreasonable to wonder whether the copy experiences the same qualia, but I'd > call it unreasonable to conclude that it did not on the stated evidence. In > fact I find it hard to think of what evidence would count against it have > some kind of qualia.
It would be a neat theory if any machine that processed environmental information in a manner analogous to an animal had some level of conscious experience (and consistent with Colin's "no zombie scientists" hypothesis, although I don't think it is a conclusion he would agree with). It would explain consciousness as a corollary of this sort of information processing. However, I don't know how such a thing could ever be proved or disproved. Stathis Papaioannou _________________________________________________________________ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
