Hi Mirek,

Le 12-févr.-08, à 23:20, Mirek Dobsicek a écrit :

> Hi Bruno,
>> The UDA, in english, can be found here:
>> */The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations/*, (Invited Talk SANE  
>> 2004).
>> Click on that title, or copy the following in your browser:
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/ 
>> SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>> (if you study it I would suggest you print the slider too, so that you
>> could perhaps tell me which step you would find hard to go through  
>> ....).
> I have started reading this paper. Just a quick question.
> At the first step of UDA it seems you restrict yourself to classical
> bits. That is fine. I can imagine that somebody deliberately read and
> cut my running computer so that the computer goes on with its job after
> being 'reincarnated' in Helsinky. Even the substitution level is more  
> or
> less clear. Noise on transistors is definitely not important.


> However, at the third step you mention quantum mechanics.

This is weird. I read it twice and don't see where I would mention  
quantum mechanics ?
Please note that the 1-indeterminacy I am talking about in the third  
step is really a pure classical indeterminacy. It arises from the fact  
that my classical state is duplicable, and then I cannot predict which  
*experience* I will *feel* after a self-duplication: mainly Washington  
OR Moscow (or Sidney *or* Beijing), ...

> It is not
> clear to me how would you classically teleport my quantum computer.  
> What
> are the read & cut operations?

This is a very different question. I just cannot classically teleport a  
quantum computer.
And the UDA is supposed to already justify why we cannot teleport  
classicaly any "piece of matter". The rough reason is that matter  
simply not exist, and what we called "matter" is just a rough  
description of what is observable and that emerges, a priori by comp,  
from infinities of infinite computations. But this is part of the  
conclusion of the UD Argument. Few people seems to realize that the  
violation of Bell's inequality or the non cloning theorem is an easy  
consequence of the comp hyp. I think people does not realize this  
because they are not used to take the difference between first and  
third person points of view seriously enough. This is perhaps a  
consequence of 1500 years of Aristotelian brainwashing I'm afraid. Or  
they are just confused by the fact that scientific argument cannot make  
reference to personal feelings or points of view, although of course  
scientific argument can *bear* upon such personal experiences, through  
definitions, axioms, discourses, etc.

> Yes, there exists a classical Turing machine which can simulate my
> quantum computer,

Yes, but only by running those infinities of infinite (classical)  
computations (up to some hard to define equivalence relation: the  
lobian interview is all what I found to tackle this, and this is a lot  
because it has to eventually distinguish between loop gravity and  
superstring theory or whatever the correct third person description is  

> but I am not giving the running simulator to you. I
> don't have it.

Ah but this is not true. Of course you can give me the running  
simulator ... in case you do accept Church Thesis. The running  
simulator *is* the UD, which exists by Church Thesis. The UD, globally  
does "run" all relative states from which, from your first person  
(plural) point of view, quantum computation emerges (if both comp and  
the quantum hyp are correct). It does it an infinity of "times" (in  
Arithmetical Platonia). Although an unknown quantum state is not  
clonable, it is "preparable" in infinities of examplars. We cannot  
recognize it in any third person way, yet, we cannot not "recognize"  
it, albeit implicitly, when we are "living" it.
Of course this is step seven ...

> Please, make a short clarification about your framework. I might be  
> just
> misinterpreting you.

My hypothesis is that we are Turing-emulable, at some level of  
self-description. My conclusion is that whatever the "Universe" is, it  
cannot be Turing emulable, and in fine the physical laws emerges from  
machine theology (say). This makes the comp hyp testable: just derive  
some comp-physics, and compare it to empirical physics.

> What is the page reference to Gruska's book?

In the footnote 9 of the SANE paper I am just alluding to the  
non-cloning theorem which, if I remùamber correctly, is well proved in  
two manners in the book of Gruska. Just look at Gruska's book index on  
"non cloning". I don't have under my hands my exemplar right now.

I hope this helps a bit. The key point: I am not mentioning or using QM  
at all in the UDA, except for illustrating how the comp-physics, with  
its many histories (computation from first person perspectives) and non  
cloning phenomena is already similar to the "empirical physics".

I hope this helps,



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