Hi Bruno,

yes, I am now a bit busy. Lecturing, seminars,.. wedding planning :-)

I am somewhere in the middle your paper. Regarding the very point of the 
described 1-indeterminancy, I have no problem there at all. Anyone who 
ever called a fork() unix function (read, cut, duplicate) followed by an 
execve(read-destination-name-from-keyboard()) function, should not have 
a problem here. A program, even with considerably good self-referential 
skills, has no chance to know whether I will enter Warsaw or Moscow on 
the keyboard.

As I have said, I have not finished reading the paper yet. But sometime 
I have a problem with a bit of feeling of circularity of arguments, or 
described in better words, given assumptions A={..}, conjectures B={...} 
are true, where Bs feels like rephrased As, and therefore Bs are 
trivially true. No disrespect here!

It just how do I feel now. Bs are overwhelming, but As are pretty strong 
assumptions, so Bs are not surprising anymore, yet an hour later Bs are 
overwhelming again.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Mirek,
> I guess you are busy.
> I would just like to insist that when I say (14-febr.-08):
>> Please note that the 1-indeterminacy I am talking about in the third
>> step is really a pure classical indeterminacy. It arises from the fact
>> that my classical state is duplicable, and then I cannot predict which
>> *experience* I will *feel* after a self-duplication: mainly Washington
>> OR Moscow (or Sidney *or* Beijing), ...
> This is really a key point, if not *the* key point. I think it is 
> almost trivial, but sometimes some people have a problem with this. In 
> that case it helps to imagine the same experiment done with some 
> inference inductive machine in place of a human or "you", and this in 
> an iterated self-duplication. In that case the result amount to saying 
> that no robot, when duplicated iteratively (in Washington and Moscow, 
> say) can predict its future sequence of results of first person 
> self-localization. This becomes equivalent with the fact that most 
> finite bit-strings, like WMMMWWMWWWM ... are not compressible.
> Someone told me (out-of-line) that he *can* predict with certainty his 
> future in that situation: for example he can predict WWWWWWWWW..., but 
> this means he is not taking into account the saying of the other 
> reconstituted people, which, *assuming comp* are genuine "descendant" 
> of the "original". Those people will acknowledge that their "prediction 
> with certainty" was false, and they have the same right and reason to 
> be taken seriously, again when we *assume* the comp hypothesis.
> Have you  a problem with this? I think most on this list grasp this 
> point, but don't hesitate to tell me if you don't. Without a clear 
> understanding of what happens here we can't really proceed ... (nor can 
> we grasp Everett formulation of QM I could argue ...).
> Bruno

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