Hi Bruno, yes, I am now a bit busy. Lecturing, seminars,.. wedding planning :-)
I am somewhere in the middle your paper. Regarding the very point of the described 1-indeterminancy, I have no problem there at all. Anyone who ever called a fork() unix function (read, cut, duplicate) followed by an execve(read-destination-name-from-keyboard()) function, should not have a problem here. A program, even with considerably good self-referential skills, has no chance to know whether I will enter Warsaw or Moscow on the keyboard. As I have said, I have not finished reading the paper yet. But sometime I have a problem with a bit of feeling of circularity of arguments, or described in better words, given assumptions A={..}, conjectures B={...} are true, where Bs feels like rephrased As, and therefore Bs are trivially true. No disrespect here! It just how do I feel now. Bs are overwhelming, but As are pretty strong assumptions, so Bs are not surprising anymore, yet an hour later Bs are overwhelming again. Best, Mirek Bruno Marchal wrote: > Hi Mirek, > > I guess you are busy. > > I would just like to insist that when I say (14-febr.-08): > > >> Please note that the 1-indeterminacy I am talking about in the third >> step is really a pure classical indeterminacy. It arises from the fact >> that my classical state is duplicable, and then I cannot predict which >> *experience* I will *feel* after a self-duplication: mainly Washington >> OR Moscow (or Sidney *or* Beijing), ... > > > This is really a key point, if not *the* key point. I think it is > almost trivial, but sometimes some people have a problem with this. In > that case it helps to imagine the same experiment done with some > inference inductive machine in place of a human or "you", and this in > an iterated self-duplication. In that case the result amount to saying > that no robot, when duplicated iteratively (in Washington and Moscow, > say) can predict its future sequence of results of first person > self-localization. This becomes equivalent with the fact that most > finite bit-strings, like WMMMWWMWWWM ... are not compressible. > Someone told me (out-of-line) that he *can* predict with certainty his > future in that situation: for example he can predict WWWWWWWWW..., but > this means he is not taking into account the saying of the other > reconstituted people, which, *assuming comp* are genuine "descendant" > of the "original". Those people will acknowledge that their "prediction > with certainty" was false, and they have the same right and reason to > be taken seriously, again when we *assume* the comp hypothesis. > > Have you a problem with this? I think most on this list grasp this > point, but don't hesitate to tell me if you don't. Without a clear > understanding of what happens here we can't really proceed ... (nor can > we grasp Everett formulation of QM I could argue ...). > > Bruno > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---