Hi Mirek,

I guess you are busy.

I would just like to insist that when I say (14-febr.-08):

> Please note that the 1-indeterminacy I am talking about in the third
> step is really a pure classical indeterminacy. It arises from the fact
> that my classical state is duplicable, and then I cannot predict which
> *experience* I will *feel* after a self-duplication: mainly Washington
> OR Moscow (or Sidney *or* Beijing), ...

This is really a key point, if not *the* key point. I think it is 
almost trivial, but sometimes some people have a problem with this. In 
that case it helps to imagine the same experiment done with some 
inference inductive machine in place of a human or "you", and this in 
an iterated self-duplication. In that case the result amount to saying 
that no robot, when duplicated iteratively (in Washington and Moscow, 
say) can predict its future sequence of results of first person 
self-localization. This becomes equivalent with the fact that most 
finite bit-strings, like WMMMWWMWWWM ... are not compressible.
Someone told me (out-of-line) that he *can* predict with certainty his 
future in that situation: for example he can predict WWWWWWWWW..., but 
this means he is not taking into account the saying of the other 
reconstituted people, which, *assuming comp* are genuine "descendant" 
of the "original". Those people will acknowledge that their "prediction 
with certainty" was false, and they have the same right and reason to 
be taken seriously, again when we *assume* the comp hypothesis.

Have you  a problem with this? I think most on this list grasp this 
point, but don't hesitate to tell me if you don't. Without a clear 
understanding of what happens here we can't really proceed ... (nor can 
we grasp Everett formulation of QM I could argue ...).


>> It is not
>> clear to me how would you classically teleport my quantum computer.
>> What
>> are the read & cut operations?
> This is a very different question. I just cannot classically teleport a
> quantum computer.
> And the UDA is supposed to already justify why we cannot teleport
> classicaly any "piece of matter". The rough reason is that matter
> simply not exist, and what we called "matter" is just a rough
> description of what is observable and that emerges, a priori by comp,
> from infinities of infinite computations. But this is part of the
> conclusion of the UD Argument. Few people seems to realize that the
> violation of Bell's inequality or the non cloning theorem is an easy
> consequence of the comp hyp. I think people does not realize this
> because they are not used to take the difference between first and
> third person points of view seriously enough. This is perhaps a
> consequence of 1500 years of Aristotelian brainwashing I'm afraid. Or
> they are just confused by the fact that scientific argument cannot make
> reference to personal feelings or points of view, although of course
> scientific argument can *bear* upon such personal experiences, through
> definitions, axioms, discourses, etc.
>> Yes, there exists a classical Turing machine which can simulate my
>> quantum computer,
> Yes, but only by running those infinities of infinite (classical)
> computations (up to some hard to define equivalence relation: the
> lobian interview is all what I found to tackle this, and this is a lot
> because it has to eventually distinguish between loop gravity and
> superstring theory or whatever the correct third person description is
> correct).
>> but I am not giving the running simulator to you. I
>> don't have it.
> Ah but this is not true. Of course you can give me the running
> simulator ... in case you do accept Church Thesis. The running
> simulator *is* the UD, which exists by Church Thesis. The UD, globally
> does "run" all relative states from which, from your first person
> (plural) point of view, quantum computation emerges (if both comp and
> the quantum hyp are correct). It does it an infinity of "times" (in
> Arithmetical Platonia). Although an unknown quantum state is not
> clonable, it is "preparable" in infinities of examplars. We cannot
> recognize it in any third person way, yet, we cannot not "recognize"
> it, albeit implicitly, when we are "living" it.
> Of course this is step seven ...
>> Please, make a short clarification about your framework. I might be
>> just
>> misinterpreting you.
> My hypothesis is that we are Turing-emulable, at some level of
> self-description. My conclusion is that whatever the "Universe" is, it
> cannot be Turing emulable, and in fine the physical laws emerges from
> machine theology (say). This makes the comp hyp testable: just derive
> some comp-physics, and compare it to empirical physics.
>> What is the page reference to Gruska's book?
> In the footnote 9 of the SANE paper I am just alluding to the
> non-cloning theorem which, if I remùamber correctly, is well proved in
> two manners in the book of Gruska. Just look at Gruska's book index on
> "non cloning". I don't have under my hands my exemplar right now.
> I hope this helps a bit. The key point: I am not mentioning or using QM
> at all in the UDA, except for illustrating how the comp-physics, with
> its many histories (computation from first person perspectives) and non
> cloning phenomena is already similar to the "empirical physics".
> I hope this helps,
> Best,
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >

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