I would appreciate that the trolling of my thread stop.  Please take
your interesting but not obliviously (to me) related discussion to a
different thread.  Thanks.

On Mar 6, 5:49 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 05-mars-08, à 16:11, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> To tackle the math of that "physical bord", I use the Godel Lob
> >> Solovay modal logic of provability (known as G, or GL).
> > Can you derive any known (or unknown) physical laws from your theory?
> I am not sure we could ever *know* a physical law, but of course we can
> believe or bet on some physical theory, and make attempt to refute it
> experimentally.
> (Also it is not *my *theory, but the
> Pythagoras-Plato-Milinda-Descartes-Post-Church-Turing theory, that is,
> the very old mechanist theory just made precise through digitalness).
> But, yes, that digital theory makes possible to derive
> verifiable/refutable propositions:
> -existence of many "physical" histories/worlds, and some of their
> indirect effects.
> -verifiability of the many interference of the probabilities for any
> isolated observable when we look to "ourselves" at a level below the
> substitution level.
> -observable non locality in the same conditionS.
> - non booleanity of what the observables can describe (sort of Kochen
> Specker phenomenon)
> - It explains and predicts the first person (plural) indeterminacy (I
> don't know any simplest explanation of how indeterminacy can occur in a
> purely deterministic global context btw).
> (+ the first person expectation like the comp-suicide and its quantum
> suicide counterparts, etc.)
> Of course, the problem is that, *a priori* the theory predicts too
> much: the white rabbits, like I sum up usually. But then I show that
> the incompleteness constraints (a one (double) diagonalization
> consequence of Church thesis) explains why the presence of white
> rabbits in that context is not obvious at all. If they remains, after
> the math is done, then the comp hyp is refuted.
> The main advantage of this approach is that (unlike most physicalist
> program) the person cannot be eliminated, and the mind body problem
> cannot be put under the rug. Somehow my contribution consists in
> showing that the mind body problem, once we assume the computationalist
> thesis is two times more difficult than without, because it leads to a
> matter problem, under the form of the white rabbit problem, or, as
> called in this list, the (relative) measure problem.
> Do you know french? All this is explained in all details (perhaps with
> too much details) in *Conscience et 
> Mécanisme":http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecanisme.html
> My "result" (not *my* theory) is that evidences accumulate in favor of
> Plato's conception of matter (contra the primary matter of Aristotle).
> See my Plotinus paper for more precision on 
> this:http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf
> > or something that could be checked experimentally?
> There is a possibility of stronger form of Bell's inequality. To
> progress on this open problem you have to study the arithmetical
> quantum logics I am describing in most of my papers. Eric Vandenbusch
> has solved the first open problem, but a lot remains. But my modest
> result is that with comp, we *have to* extract physics (the
> Schroedinger equation), not a proposal of a derivation, just a reason
> why we must do that, and a proposal of a path (the Loebian interview)
> for doing that.
> What is your opinion about Everett? You can see my reasoning as an
> application of Everett's natural idea that a physicist obeys the
> physical laws in the mathematician/mathematics realm (or just
> arithmetics, combinators, etc.). I can understand that people in
> trouble with Everett can be in trouble with the comp hyp and its
> consequences.
> My *type* of approach consists in just illustrating that Mechanism has
> empirically verifiable consequences.
> *My* theory of everything, deduced from the comp hyp is just (Robinson)
> arithmetic: all the rest emerge from internal points of view. They are
> similar (formally or 'relationaly') to Plotinus' hypostases.
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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