----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Monday, March 24, 2008 11:33 PM
Subject: Re: Malcom/Standish white rabbit solution
>> >> If one takes the description string x (up to
>> >> some finite limit) as (minimally) representing a universe (and from
>> >> which
>> >> OM's are derived), then application of your equivalence class method
>> >> should
>> >> solve the WR problem directly (check out my roughly equivalent method
>> >> at
>> >> www.physica.freeserve.co.uk/pa01.htm) - this hopefully answers your
>> >> point
>> >> above about the origin of our being almost certainly in one of the
>> >> simplest
>> >> SAS-supporting universes: the premise can be all logically possible
>> >> universes (or just 'entities'), some or all of which are representable
>> >> by
>> >> description strings (say).
>> >
>> > Its been a while since I read your paper, but IIRC it was largely a
>> > paraphrase of the same argument I put in section 3 of Why Occams Razor.
>> Re-reading this section under the interpretation provided in your recent
>> email (where you talk about phenomenally cohering OM's) convinces me that
>> you are saying something fundamentally different. Your section 2 is
>> certainly closer - I previously assumed from other comments that you were
>> taking it as read that any minimal specification of an OM (eg via a
>> program,
>> description string etc) would have to implicitly include all the OM's in
>> that universe - that is the simplicity that a TOE is aiming for.
> The minimal specification including all OMs in a universe could not be
> sufficient to specify the OMs completely. There must always be some random
> component to the complete specification of an OM.

Bang goes AI! I can't actually see the necessity for unspecifiable or
random-content OM's, but here again I should see if I can unearth an
explanation for your above assertion in TON (rememember I am talking about
OM occurrences when I refer to OM's - part of my probably erroneous
assumptions about your approach). I am guessing there will be some premise
somewhere I can't agree with.

>> The
>> 'cohering OM's' are then automatically catered for - they are part of the
>> same representing description string (or whatever represents them). This
>> would then coincide with my own approach: the measure is taken over (say)
>> bit strings minimally representing all possible relevant universes (or
>> just
>> 'entities', since minimal universe representations are assumed to provide
>> the simplest representations of normal OM's), and not over 'histories'.
> This is measure over birth moments (which is handled by section
> 4.1). Subsequent moments must also include fairly random additional
> data - this is dealt with in section 4.2, which indicates that this
> additional random data is extremely unlikely to be interpreted as
> miraculous, but rather just interpreted as noise on top of the
> regularities contained in the birth moment. I note that you have this
> argument now in your pb01.htm paper, not in pa01.html which is where I
> remembered it to be. Have you swapped things around?

(Pb01 and Pa01 have never changed substantially; you may be thinking of
P105/111/112, no longer available; all of the modules have the same
fundamental approach in this area.)

This is part of the same mutual misunderstanding I suspect. I say nothing
about *interpretation* of data, or rejection of noise in Pb01 (or anywhere
else). For me, random data is very unlikely to be *encountered*, since I am
most likely to be in an ordered universe. If 'invisibles' were to occur
(which the program analogy lends itself more towards), they would stay

At least I can understand a *little* better what you are trying to do, which
is why I am more satisfied our approaches are fundamentally different.

A final brief point in an attempt to help clarify matters. The failure of
induction problem is about the next OM's, fine, but the applicability of the
minimal specification of a universe (bit string, axiom set, whatever, and
akin to a TOE if such exists) *itself* ensures that there is no failure of
induction (in general) - there is nothing special about now, or the next few


> -- 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> A/Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Mathematics
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052                  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Australia                                http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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