"...But if one can reconstruct "the rest of the world" from these simpler
domains, so much the better that they are simple...."
Paraphrased (facetiously): you have a painting of a landscape with
mountains, river, people, animals, sky and plants. Call that 'the totality'
and *select the animals as your model* (disregarding the rest) even you
continue by Occam - reject the non-4-legged ones, to make it (even) simpler.
((All you have is some beasts in a frame))
Now try to *"reconstruct"* the 'rest of the total' ONLY from those remnant
'model-elements' dreaming up (?) mountains, sunshine, river etc. *from
nowhere*, not even from your nonexisting fantasy, or even(2!) as you say:
from the *Occam-simple*, i.e. as you say: from those few 4-legged animals, -
to make it even simpler.
You must be a 'creator', or a 'cheater', having at least seen the *total *to
do so. You cannot *build up* unknown complexity from its simple parts -
you are restricted to the (reduced?) inventory you have - in a synthesis,
(while in the analysis you can restrict yourself to a choice of it. )
On Tue, Aug 19, 2008 at 3:19 PM, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:
> John Mikes wrote:
> > Isn't logical inconsistency = insanity? (Depends how we formulate the
> > state of being "sane".)
> As Bertrand Russell pointed out, if you are perfectly consistent you are
> 100% right or 100% wrong. Human fallibility being what it is, don't bet on
> being 100% right. :-)
> In classical logic, an inconsistency allows you to prove every propositon.
> In a
> para-consistent logic the rules of inference are changed (e.g. by restoring
> excluded middle) so that an inconsistency doesn't allow you to prove
> Graham Priest has written a couple of interesting books arguing that all
> beyond the narrow mathematical domain leads to inconsistencies and so we
> need to
> have ways to deal with them.
> > Simplicity in my vocabulary of the 'totality-view' means mainly to "cut"
> > our model of observation narrower and narrower to eliminate more and
> > more from the "rest of the world" (which only would complicate things)
> > from our chosen topic of the actual interest in our observational field
> > (our topical model).
> > Occam's razor is a classic in such simplification.
> And so is mathematical logic and arithmetic. But if one can reconstruct
> rest of the world" from these simpler domains, so much the better that they
> Brent Meeker
> > John M
> > On 8/18/08, *Bruno Marchal* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote:
> > On 18 Aug 2008, at 03:45, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > > Sorry. I quite agree with you. I regard logic and mathematics
> > as our
> > > inventions - not restrictions on the world, but restrictions we
> > > place on how we
> > > think and talk about the world. We can change them as in para-
> > > consistent logics.
> > I think it depends of the domain of inquiry or application.
> > Para-consistent logic can be interesting for the laws and in natural
> > language mind processing, but hardly in elementary computer science
> > number theory.
> > Then recall that any universal machine, enough good in the art of
> > remaining correct during introspection, discovers eventually at least
> > 8 non classical logics (the arithmetical hypostases) most of them
> > being near "paraconsistency" (by Godel's consistency of
> > making the most sane machine always very near insanity.
> > And so easily falling down.
> > Bruno
> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
> > >
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at