I don't think I follow you. This is the exact feeling I get when I try to
OK, I think what you're saying is that when it comes to reconstructing the
body with only knowledge of the mind itself, much of the exact physical
characteristics are ambiguous, in that they don't contribute directly and
are at best simply part of a set of possible underlying forms, and that this
even goes for many low-level brain functions.
If that's the case, I entirely agree.
2008/10/23 John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Who told YOU (and the other honored discutants in this thread) that *THIS*
> ONE of our existence is the one-and-only basic/original appearance? We,
> here and now, may be #37 for you and #49 for me etc.,
> -- B U T --
> could you please tell me if 'anyone' of this nightmare-topic remembers, or
> has knowledge of any other appearance of his SAME person (anywhere?) by
> If not, what else is the entire thread based on except for Everett's
> ingenious idea and the continuation of his line? (No matter how many
> matching equations could be drawn in the topic).
> Do we abide by a 'physical world' (Bruno?) in which a QTI transfers
> *material* with diseases, brain-damages, limbic pain and love-connections?
> Have fun in science (but with reason?)
> John Mikes
> On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 6:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:
>> 2008/10/22 razihassan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> > 2) I'd like to propose a thought experiment. A subject has his brain
>> > cells removed one at a time by a patient assistant using a very fine
>> > pair of tweezers. The brain cell is then destroyed in an incinerator.
>> > Is there a base level of consciousness beyond which, from the pov of
>> > the subject, the assistant will be unable to remove any more cells,
>> > since conscious experience will be lost? ie is there a minimum level
>> > of 'experience' beyond which nature will appear to act to always
>> > maintain the physical brain?
>> > If there is, does the second law of thermodynamics not suggest that
>> > all brains inexorably head towards this quantum of consciousness, for
>> > as long as our brains are physical?
>> The problem you raise is one of personal identity, and can be
>> illustrated without invoking QTI. If I am copied 100 times so that
>> copy #1 has 1% of my present memories, copy #2 has 2% of my present
>> memories, and so on to copy #100 which has 100% of my present
>> memories, which copy should I expect to end up as, and with what
>> probability? What about if there are a million instantiations of copy
>> #1 and one instantiation of the rest? What if there are 10^100^100
>> instantiations of copies with 1/10^100 of my present memories - as
>> there well might be?
>> Stathis Papaioannou
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