OK, sorry, upon re-reading it seems that you're asking whether diverged branches of consciousness can reconverge, and what that implies.
I'd say that since consciousness is rather 'forgetful', vague and high-level, there's an awful lot of scope for this. However, once reconverged there's no distinguishing between them - 'that which makes no difference is no difference.' It means that they share their underlying-possible-universes set and are just one branch again. 2008/10/23 Michael Rosefield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > I don't think I follow you. This is the exact feeling I get when I try to > read Pynchon... > > OK, I think what you're saying is that when it comes to reconstructing the > body with only knowledge of the mind itself, much of the exact physical > characteristics are ambiguous, in that they don't contribute directly and > are at best simply part of a set of possible underlying forms, and that this > even goes for many low-level brain functions. > > If that's the case, I entirely agree. > > 2008/10/23 John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Stathis, >> Who told YOU (and the other honored discutants in this thread) that *THIS* >> ONE of our existence is the one-and-only basic/original appearance? We, >> here and now, may be #37 for you and #49 for me etc., >> -- B U T -- >> could you please tell me if 'anyone' of this nightmare-topic remembers, or >> has knowledge of any other appearance of his SAME person (anywhere?) by >> QTI? >> If not, what else is the entire thread based on except for Everett's >> ingenious idea and the continuation of his line? (No matter how many >> matching equations could be drawn in the topic). >> >> Do we abide by a 'physical world' (Bruno?) in which a QTI transfers >> *material* with diseases, brain-damages, limbic pain and love-connections? >> >> Have fun in science (but with reason?) >> >> John Mikes >> >> >> >> On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 6:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL >> PROTECTED]>wrote: >> >>> >>> 2008/10/22 razihassan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: >>> >>> > 2) I'd like to propose a thought experiment. A subject has his brain >>> > cells removed one at a time by a patient assistant using a very fine >>> > pair of tweezers. The brain cell is then destroyed in an incinerator. >>> > >>> > Is there a base level of consciousness beyond which, from the pov of >>> > the subject, the assistant will be unable to remove any more cells, >>> > since conscious experience will be lost? ie is there a minimum level >>> > of 'experience' beyond which nature will appear to act to always >>> > maintain the physical brain? >>> > >>> > If there is, does the second law of thermodynamics not suggest that >>> > all brains inexorably head towards this quantum of consciousness, for >>> > as long as our brains are physical? >>> >>> The problem you raise is one of personal identity, and can be >>> illustrated without invoking QTI. If I am copied 100 times so that >>> copy #1 has 1% of my present memories, copy #2 has 2% of my present >>> memories, and so on to copy #100 which has 100% of my present >>> memories, which copy should I expect to end up as, and with what >>> probability? What about if there are a million instantiations of copy >>> #1 and one instantiation of the rest? What if there are 10^100^100 >>> instantiations of copies with 1/10^100 of my present memories - as >>> there well might be? >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Stathis Papaioannou >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---