OK, sorry, upon re-reading it seems that you're asking whether diverged
branches of consciousness can reconverge, and what that implies.

I'd say that since consciousness is rather 'forgetful', vague and
high-level, there's an awful lot of scope for this. However, once
reconverged there's no distinguishing between them - 'that which makes no
difference is no difference.' It means that they share their
underlying-possible-universes set and are just one branch again.

2008/10/23 Michael Rosefield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

> I don't think I follow you. This is the exact feeling I get when I try to
> read Pynchon...
> OK, I think what you're saying is that when it comes to reconstructing the
> body with only knowledge of the mind itself, much of the exact physical
> characteristics are ambiguous, in that they don't contribute directly and
> are at best simply part of a set of possible underlying forms, and that this
> even goes for many low-level brain functions.
> If that's the case, I entirely agree.
> 2008/10/23 John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Stathis,
>> Who told YOU (and the other honored discutants in this thread) that *THIS*
>> ONE of our existence is the one-and-only basic/original appearance?  We,
>> here and now, may be #37 for you and #49 for me etc.,
>>  --  B U T  --
>> could you please tell me if 'anyone' of this nightmare-topic remembers, or
>> has knowledge of  any other appearance of his SAME person (anywhere?) by
>> QTI?
>> If not, what else is the entire thread based on except for Everett's
>> ingenious idea and the continuation of his line? (No matter how many
>> matching equations could be drawn in the topic).
>> Do we abide by a 'physical world' (Bruno?) in which a QTI transfers
>> *material* with diseases, brain-damages, limbic pain and love-connections?
>> Have fun in science (but with reason?)
>> John Mikes
>> On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 6:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL 
>> PROTECTED]>wrote:
>>> 2008/10/22 razihassan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>>> > 2) I'd like to propose a thought experiment. A subject has his brain
>>> > cells removed one at a time by a patient assistant using a very fine
>>> > pair of tweezers. The brain cell is then destroyed in an incinerator.
>>> >
>>> > Is there a base level of consciousness beyond which, from the pov of
>>> > the subject, the assistant will be unable to remove any more cells,
>>> > since conscious experience will be lost? ie is there a minimum level
>>> > of 'experience' beyond which nature will appear to act to always
>>> > maintain the physical brain?
>>> >
>>> > If there is, does the second law of thermodynamics not suggest that
>>> > all brains inexorably head towards this quantum of consciousness, for
>>> > as long as our brains are physical?
>>> The problem you raise is one of personal identity, and can be
>>> illustrated without invoking QTI. If I am copied 100 times so that
>>> copy #1 has 1% of my present memories, copy #2 has 2% of my present
>>> memories, and so on to copy #100 which has 100% of my present
>>> memories, which copy should I expect to end up as, and with what
>>> probability? What about if there are a million instantiations of copy
>>> #1 and one instantiation of the rest? What if there are 10^100^100
>>> instantiations of copies with 1/10^100 of my present memories - as
>>> there well might be?
>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>> >>

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