Kory Heath wrote:
> On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
>> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the
>> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of
>> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a
>> computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would
>> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies.
> I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to  
> count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel  
> Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't  
> think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular- 
> automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is  
> implemented in some physical way. In the standard view, believing in  
> philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for  
> there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every  
> physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think  
> that's logically impossible.)
> -- Kory
I think I agree with Bruno that it is *logically* possible, e.g. 
accidental zombies.  It's just not nomologically possible.  But I don't 
know that Bruno allows that there is such a category as nomological, 
distinct from logical.


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