Kory Heath wrote: > On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real >> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the >> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of >> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a >> computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would >> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies. >> > > I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to > count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel > Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't > think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular- > automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is > implemented in some physical way. In the standard view, believing in > philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for > there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every > physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think > that's logically impossible.) > > -- Kory > I think I agree with Bruno that it is *logically* possible, e.g. accidental zombies. It's just not nomologically possible. But I don't know that Bruno allows that there is such a category as nomological, distinct from logical.
Brent --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
