Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 07 Nov 2008, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote: >> >> It's easy enough to agree with "describes", but is describing something >> the same as creating it? > > Yes, for effective things like numbers and programs, (machines, or > finite pieces of computations). > > >> How can we decide these entities (what makes >> them entities?) are or are not conscious? > > > We just cannot decide. > > >> >> >> I understand that up to the "map of our personal ignorance" = "physical >> things" How does our uncertainity as to which histories we are entail >> phyisical things? > > > Well, this is really the point of the whole reasoning. UDA(1...7) + UDA.8 > > I think now that if you have grasped up to step 6. It is really step 7 > which explain why the laws of physics have to emerge from computer > science or number theory. > > Imagine that in our physical universe (assumed, if only to get the > contradiction) a real concrete UD is running. This makes intuitive > sense. I have implemented in 1991 a UD, and it has run for two weeks. > The UD has no inputs and no outputs. It just runs, and simulate all > possible programs on all possible inputs with all possible (piece of) > oracles. The existence of this UD is not something obvious, but it does > exist, and is even constructible, if we accept Church Thesis. With > Church thesis, even a DU written in FORTRAN, and dovetailing only on the > fortran programs will generates all the program in LISP, but also in all > not yet invented languages, and runs them. OK? > > I assume here also (in step 7) that our physical universe is robust > enough to let the UD run forever. If you grasp up to step 6, then you > should understand that if you decide here and now to do any "physical > experiment", like sending a photon on a mirror, or like observing an > apple in a tree", the only real and correct way to predict or evaluate > what will happen, is NO MORE to use the physical laws of your universe, > but to look at all the computational histories generated through by the > UD up to your actual state of mind (this exists because we assume comp). > And what will happen is what happen in most of those stories. OK?

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No. That seems to me to be assuming what you want to prove. It's assuming that computations instantiate universes and there is a probability measure proportional to their number in the UD. I look at it the other way around. IF I look at the computational histories generated by the UD and measure probabilities by their number and that accurately predicts what I observe - then that will be evidence that computations instantiate this universe (and all others). > > So, even, without the Movie Graph Argument, if such a concrete UD > exists, if no white rabbits appears and if the photon bounce, or the > apple falls on the ground, you can deduce that the "physical laws' > describe those more common histories. Right - but that's three conditionals. > > At this point a mechanist who want to stay naturalist and keep "a > physical lawful universe" can decide that such a universe just cannot > run the UD, nor a too big portion of it. This would indeed evacuate the > comp white rabbits, and reinstate a sense to "physical law". > > But then MGA, UDA step 8, shows that such a move don't work. Yes, I think I understand that part. Brent --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---