Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 07 Nov 2008, at 08:51, Kory Heath wrote:
>> On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
>>> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in
>>> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of
>>> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a
>>> computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would
>>> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies.
>> I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to
>> count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel
>> Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't
>> think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular-
>> automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is
>> implemented in some physical way.
> Yes but Dennett takes matter for granted (no more conceptual problem
> in physics, he says).
>> In the standard view, believing in
>> philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for
>> there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every
>> physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think
>> that's logically impossible.)
> It is not easy for me to explain, the easiest explanation depends of
> what you have already understand.
> I should do exams or things like that :)
> Arithmetical truth, and even an important *tiny*, but not so tiny,
> part of arithmetical truth contains, encodes, defines, implements, the
> running of a universal dovetailer going through all possible mind
> states, through all possible computations, containing notably
> relations between bodies like in the more cellular automata type of
> It is a bit astonishing, but a tiny part of arithmetic contains
> description of our third person current conversation, including
> everything you need as far as you cut the description of somewhere. So
> you can talk about those entities as zombies, once we decide that they
> are not conscious, despite they act and behave like us in many
> stories, meaning with the right counterfactual, etc.
It's easy enough to agree with "describes", but is describing something
the same as creating it? How can we decide these entities (what makes
them entities?) are or are not conscious?
> In truth, *I* could reverse the game, and ask you what you mean by
> physics and physical. What is matter? That is the mystery for me. This
> is what truly interest me. I don't buy that theory saying simply "the
> physical Universe exist". But I don't, play that game because UDA+MGA
> is really a logical argument justifying that: IF you buy the
> mechanist theory of the mind, THEN you have to drop out the primary-
> materialist or substantialist explanation of matter.
> Fuch and Pauli and Wigner have defended already similar interpretation
> for QM.
> I think they are correct, except that, well Fuch explicitely, want a
> singular physical universe. This can't work with COMP or even with a
> vast hierarchy of weakening of comp.
> To sum up. Our problem is that I agree with you and Dennett that a
> physical zombie cannot exist, (and for the same reason), but assuming
> comp, there is no such thing as a physical thing, giving another
> reason. The days where I decide to believe in comp, I don't believe
> in physical things, be it zombie or people, in general. Those days I
> don't believe that people or person are physical. A physical thing,
> with comp, does not exist per se, it can only be a map of our personal
> ignorance of the story we are in (a bit like an electronic orbital is
> a map of the unknown computation story of the position of the electron
> relatively to your measurements).
I understand that up to the "map of our personal ignorance" = "physical
things" How does our uncertainity as to which histories we are entail
> Do you understand that if comp is false, then arithmetical truth
> contains (immaterial) zombies (because it contains already the
> relative implementations of all solutions of Schroedinger equations
> and variant, if only that for example ...)?
> It contains fictions, if you want, but as precise as us to say, the
> level of *description* of the quantum strings, again as a picture. Do
> you see what I mean?
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