Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 07 Nov 2008, at 08:51, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>   
>> On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>     
>>> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
>>> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in  
>>> the
>>> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of
>>> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a
>>> computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would
>>> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies.
>>>       
>> I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to
>> count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel
>> Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't
>> think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular-
>> automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is
>> implemented in some physical way.
>>     
>
>
> Yes but Dennett takes matter for granted (no more conceptual problem  
> in physics, he says).
>
>
>
>
>   
>> In the standard view, believing in
>> philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for
>> there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every
>> physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think
>> that's logically impossible.)
>>     
>
>
>   It is not easy for me to explain, the easiest explanation depends of  
> what you have already understand.
> I should do exams or things like that :)
>
> Arithmetical truth, and even an important *tiny*, but not so tiny,   
> part of arithmetical truth contains, encodes, defines, implements, the  
> running of a universal dovetailer going through all possible mind  
> states, through all possible computations, containing notably  
> relations between bodies like in the more cellular automata type of  
> histories.
> It is a bit astonishing, but a tiny part of arithmetic contains  
> description of our third person current conversation, including  
> everything you need as far as you cut the description of somewhere. So  
> you can talk about those entities as zombies, once we decide that they  
> are not conscious, despite they act and behave like us in many  
> stories, meaning with the right counterfactual, etc.
>   

It's easy enough to agree with "describes", but is describing something 
the same as creating it?  How can we decide these entities (what makes 
them entities?) are or are not conscious?
> In truth, *I* could reverse the game, and ask you what you mean by  
> physics and physical. What is matter? That is the mystery for me. This  
> is what truly interest me. I don't buy that theory saying simply "the  
> physical Universe exist". But I don't, play that game because UDA+MGA  
> is really a logical argument justifying that:  IF you buy the  
> mechanist theory of the mind, THEN you have to drop out the primary- 
> materialist or substantialist explanation of matter.
> Fuch and Pauli and Wigner have defended already similar interpretation  
> for QM.
> I think they are correct, except that, well Fuch explicitely, want a  
> singular physical universe. This can't work with COMP or even with a  
> vast hierarchy of weakening of comp.
>
> To sum up. Our problem is that I agree with you and Dennett that a  
> physical zombie cannot exist, (and for the same reason), but assuming  
> comp, there is no such thing as a physical thing, giving another  
> reason. The days where I decide to believe in comp,  I don't believe  
> in physical things, be it zombie or people, in general. Those days I  
> don't believe that people or person are physical. A physical thing,  
> with comp, does not exist per se, it can only be a map of our personal  
> ignorance of the story we are in (a bit like an electronic orbital is  
> a map of the unknown computation story of the position of the electron  
> relatively to your measurements).
>   

I understand that up to the "map of our personal ignorance" = "physical 
things"  How does our uncertainity as to which histories we are entail 
phyisical things?

Brent
>
> Do you understand that if comp is false, then arithmetical truth  
> contains (immaterial) zombies (because it contains already the  
> relative implementations of all solutions of Schroedinger equations  
> and variant, if only that for example ...)?
> It contains fictions, if you want, but as precise as us to say, the  
> level of *description* of the quantum strings, again as a picture. Do  
> you see what I mean?
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>
>   


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