Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 07 Nov 2008, at 08:51, Kory Heath wrote: > > >> On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real >>> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in >>> the >>> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of >>> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a >>> computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would >>> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies. >>> >> I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to >> count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel >> Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't >> think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular- >> automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is >> implemented in some physical way. >> > > > Yes but Dennett takes matter for granted (no more conceptual problem > in physics, he says). > > > > > >> In the standard view, believing in >> philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for >> there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every >> physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think >> that's logically impossible.) >> > > > It is not easy for me to explain, the easiest explanation depends of > what you have already understand. > I should do exams or things like that :) > > Arithmetical truth, and even an important *tiny*, but not so tiny, > part of arithmetical truth contains, encodes, defines, implements, the > running of a universal dovetailer going through all possible mind > states, through all possible computations, containing notably > relations between bodies like in the more cellular automata type of > histories. > It is a bit astonishing, but a tiny part of arithmetic contains > description of our third person current conversation, including > everything you need as far as you cut the description of somewhere. So > you can talk about those entities as zombies, once we decide that they > are not conscious, despite they act and behave like us in many > stories, meaning with the right counterfactual, etc. >
It's easy enough to agree with "describes", but is describing something the same as creating it? How can we decide these entities (what makes them entities?) are or are not conscious? > In truth, *I* could reverse the game, and ask you what you mean by > physics and physical. What is matter? That is the mystery for me. This > is what truly interest me. I don't buy that theory saying simply "the > physical Universe exist". But I don't, play that game because UDA+MGA > is really a logical argument justifying that: IF you buy the > mechanist theory of the mind, THEN you have to drop out the primary- > materialist or substantialist explanation of matter. > Fuch and Pauli and Wigner have defended already similar interpretation > for QM. > I think they are correct, except that, well Fuch explicitely, want a > singular physical universe. This can't work with COMP or even with a > vast hierarchy of weakening of comp. > > To sum up. Our problem is that I agree with you and Dennett that a > physical zombie cannot exist, (and for the same reason), but assuming > comp, there is no such thing as a physical thing, giving another > reason. The days where I decide to believe in comp, I don't believe > in physical things, be it zombie or people, in general. Those days I > don't believe that people or person are physical. A physical thing, > with comp, does not exist per se, it can only be a map of our personal > ignorance of the story we are in (a bit like an electronic orbital is > a map of the unknown computation story of the position of the electron > relatively to your measurements). > I understand that up to the "map of our personal ignorance" = "physical things" How does our uncertainity as to which histories we are entail phyisical things? Brent > > Do you understand that if comp is false, then arithmetical truth > contains (immaterial) zombies (because it contains already the > relative implementations of all solutions of Schroedinger equations > and variant, if only that for example ...)? > It contains fictions, if you want, but as precise as us to say, the > level of *description* of the quantum strings, again as a picture. Do > you see what I mean? > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
