Hello Bruno, > More exactly: I can conceive fake policemen in paper are not conscious, > and that is all I need to accept I can be fail by some zombie. > Thus I can conceive zombies.
Ok, but conceivability does not entail possibilty. I think philosophical zombies are impossible (=not able to exist in the real world), not inconceivable. > Developing this argument makes zombies logically conceivable, even, if > I would refute the claim that a zombie acting exactly like I would act > in any situation can exist. Accidental zombie can exist. It could > depend what we put exactly in the term zombie. Ok, I agree with that. >> and here you clarify: >> >>> If this were true, then the movie graph (step 8 without occam) would >>> not been needed. Arithmetical truth is provably full of philosophical >>> zombies if comp is true and step 8 false. Hmm - in step 8 you eliminate the physical universe, which is ok *grin* - but why would arithmetical truth be full of zombies with comp true and step 8 false -> physicalism true? do you mean because we could than program AIs which would behave "correctly" but would not be conscious? > So it is just a theorem in computer science: computations are encodable > (and thus encoded) in the (additive+multiplicative) relations existing > between numbers. Ok, I'm with you. > So, someone who does not believe in philosophical zombies, does not > need the step 8 (the Movie Graph Argument MGA), because arithmetical > truth does contains the computation describing, well, for example this > very discussion we have here and now. Ok, so I guess that would be my position *grin* - I think that all states have a form of mentality - maybe not full consciousness, but mentality. > For me the MGA is needed because I don't want to rely on the non > existence of zombie. Ok. What I still don't get is why you associate mental states only with _true_ statements. Why not with false ones? Would that not be more in line with a plenitude-like theory? False states could encode very weird psychic experiences (dreams for instance or whatever...) >> I follow you that 1st person is recoverable by a 3rd person number >> theoretic description - or better, OMs are - but how would a zombie >> come >> about? Can you give an example? > > > Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real > life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the > Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of > times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Agreed in principle (with my question of why only true sentences thrown in) >such a > computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would > constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies. Ok, I think it would not be a zombie - already once we accept _comp_ - maudlin notwithstanding; I think Maudlin saw his argument rather as causing a problem for _comp_ > If you define the zombies as having a "material" body, then it is I would say a zombie is a creature which behaves exactly like X but does not have mental states, but X has mental states. Best Wishes, Günther --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
