On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real > life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the > Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of > times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a > computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would > constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies.
I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular- automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is implemented in some physical way. In the standard view, believing in philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think that's logically impossible.) -- Kory --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
