On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the
> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of
> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a
> computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would
> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies.

I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to  
count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel  
Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't  
think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular- 
automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is  
implemented in some physical way. In the standard view, believing in  
philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for  
there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every  
physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think  
that's logically impossible.)

-- Kory

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