2008/11/9 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > Yes, I do see what you mean, and in fact I agree with you. The point I > was making was that most philosophers - including those like Dennett > who believe in the logical impossibility of zombies - believe that > (for instance) you would have to implement a cellular automata in > order for creatures within it to be conscious. If you were to argue > that they do therefore believe in zombies of a certain type, they > would just say that that's not what they mean when they talk about > zombies. And in fact, they're correct - "zombie" is a technical term > that philosophers have invented, and by their definition it refers to > *physical* things (or *implemented* computations) that behave > identically to conscious things but aren't conscious.
Bruno, as I understand him, does not believe that you need a basic physical world in order to implement a computation; rather, it is the computation that gives rise to the physical world. This is in step 8 of the UDA, probably the most counterintuitive and most difficult to grasp part of the argument. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
