2008/11/9 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> Yes, I do see what you mean, and in fact I agree with you. The point I
> was making was that most philosophers - including those like Dennett
> who believe in the logical impossibility of zombies - believe that
> (for instance) you would have to implement a cellular automata in
> order for creatures within it to be conscious. If you were to argue
> that they do therefore believe in zombies of a certain type, they
> would just say that that's not what they mean when they talk about
> zombies. And in fact, they're correct - "zombie" is a technical term
> that philosophers have invented, and by their definition it refers to
> *physical* things (or *implemented* computations) that behave
> identically to conscious things but aren't conscious.

Bruno, as I understand him, does not believe that you need a basic
physical world in order to implement a computation; rather, it is the
computation that gives rise to the physical world. This is in step 8
of the UDA, probably the most counterintuitive and most difficult to
grasp part of the argument.

Stathis Papaioannou

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