On Nov 9, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Bruno, as I understand him, does not believe that you need a basic
> physical world in order to implement a computation; rather, it is the
> computation that gives rise to the physical world.

That's also how I understand him. And, in fact, I believe something  
similar (if not identical). My point is that a staunchly anti-zombie  
philosopher like Dennett would still need convincing, and appealing to  
his (Dennett's) own anti-zombie leanings wouldn't be enough to  
convince him.

> This is in step 8
> of the UDA, probably the most counterintuitive and most difficult to
> grasp part of the argument.

Actually, I find it the easiest part of the whole thing to understand.  
But to echo something someone else said earlier in this thread, I  
think Bruno's arguments for step 8 could be shored up. As they stand,  
they wouldn't convince a philosopher like Dennett. But they should be  
able to. (In principle. In practice, philosophers are rarely convinced  
by anyone else's arguments on any issue.)

Maybe I still don't fully understand Bruno's position. If I were  
making the argument, his step 8 would be my step 1.

-- Kory

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