Hi Bruno,

>> but no! Then we wouldn't have a substrate anymore.
> Oh( That is not true! We still have the projector and the film. We can  
> project the movie in the air or directly in your eyes.

Ok I see now where our intuitions differ (always the problem with 
thought experiment) - but maybe we can clear this up and see where it 

> it is really something people have to meditate. I could have conclude  
> in the absurdity of MAT (with MEC) at MGA 2. It is hard for me to take  
> people seriously when they argue that the consciousness of Alice  
> supervenes on a movie of its brain activity. There is no causality,  
> nor computations, during the *projection* of the movie. 

If that is how you see MAT (you require causality) - then I would also 
agree -> MGA 2 shows absurdity.

> experience is related to ALL computations going through those states,  
> not to descriptions of those states which can been made and collected  
> in other histories. Locally it makes sense to ascribe *that*  
> consciousness when you have the mean to interpret (through some  
> universal machine) her computational states.

That is already part of your theory (UDA and all) (as I understand it), 
but not included already in COMP or in MAT.

> [Consciousness of (x,t)] is never [physical states] at (x,t)

For me, the above expresses the essence of (naive) MAT -> let's call it 

So, clearly:
NMAT: [Consciousness of (x,t)] supervenes on [physical states] at (x,t)

And on physical states only! Not on the causal relations of these states 
(block universe view).

Your argument goes like this:
> it is:
> [Consciousness of (x,t)] is always all computational states (in the UD 
> °) corresponding to that experience. (It is an indexical view of  
> reality).

And I share it IF we can show that MAT+MEC is inconsistent. But I am not 
convinced yet.

For me, the essence of MEC (COMP) is this:

COMP: there is a level at which a person can be substituted at a digital 
level (we don't have to go down to "infinity"), and where this digital 
description is enough to reconsitute this person elsewhere and elsewhen, 
independent of substrate.

NMAT additionally requires that the substrate for COMP be some 
"mysterious" substance, and not only a platonic relation.

My intuition tells me this can't be -> we have to drop either MEC or NMAT.

But MGA 3, when dropping the boolean gates, violates NMAT, because:
NMAT: [Consciousness of (x,t)] supervenes on [physical states] at (x,t)

And the physical states relevant where the _states of the boolean graph_ 
(the movie projector was just the lucky cosmic ray).

Do you have different definition for MAT? Do you require causal dynamics 
for MAT?

The problem with NMAT as I define it raises the issue as in the Putnam 
paper -> does every rock implement every finite state-automaton?

Chalmers makes the move to implementation, so introduces causal dynamics.

So, sophisticated MAT would probably be:
SMAT: [Consciousness of (x,t)] supervenes on [physical states] at (x,t) 
over a timespan delta(t) _if_ sufficiently complex causal dynamics are 
at work during this timespan relating the physical states.

Then I would say: MGA 2 (already) shows that SMAT+MEC are not 
compatible. No need for MGA 3.

For NMAT+MEC (which is problematic for other reasons) MGA 3 is not 

Would you agree with this?


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