Again a question for Bruno ;-)

There are certain arguments (Deutsch, Wallace, Greaves) that propose 
that they can derive probabilites (and the Born rule) from decision 
theory - although I am not convinced (see for instance Price 2008 -

Criticism notwithstanding, I think that Deutsch Et Al have made 
interesting inroads into the problem of probability and am optimistic 
that it will be solved. Everett is at least not worse off than other 
intrepretations concerning probability.

But I have a question concerning the UDA: here, we don't even have 
intuitive concepts of wave interference, decoherence etc anymore, which 
can account for different branch weights.

In a sense, I don't see how a computation could be "cancelled" by 
another one. Do you have intuitions of how to derive the Born rule from 
the measure of all computations? Why should some consistent histories be 
more probable than others? (there is of course the Quantum Logic and 
Gleason's theorem connection which we have discussed shortly) - but I 
don't see any _intuitive_ connection, of why there should by histories 
with different probabilities?

Best Wishes,

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