Again a question for Bruno ;-) There are certain arguments (Deutsch, Wallace, Greaves) that propose that they can derive probabilites (and the Born rule) from decision theory - although I am not convinced (see for instance Price 2008 - http://arxiv.org/abs/0802.1390).
Criticism notwithstanding, I think that Deutsch Et Al have made interesting inroads into the problem of probability and am optimistic that it will be solved. Everett is at least not worse off than other intrepretations concerning probability. But I have a question concerning the UDA: here, we don't even have intuitive concepts of wave interference, decoherence etc anymore, which can account for different branch weights. In a sense, I don't see how a computation could be "cancelled" by another one. Do you have intuitions of how to derive the Born rule from the measure of all computations? Why should some consistent histories be more probable than others? (there is of course the Quantum Logic and Gleason's theorem connection which we have discussed shortly) - but I don't see any _intuitive_ connection, of why there should by histories with different probabilities? Best Wishes, Günther --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
