Again a question for Bruno ;-)
There are certain arguments (Deutsch, Wallace, Greaves) that propose
that they can derive probabilites (and the Born rule) from decision
theory - although I am not convinced (see for instance Price 2008 -
Criticism notwithstanding, I think that Deutsch Et Al have made
interesting inroads into the problem of probability and am optimistic
that it will be solved. Everett is at least not worse off than other
intrepretations concerning probability.
But I have a question concerning the UDA: here, we don't even have
intuitive concepts of wave interference, decoherence etc anymore, which
can account for different branch weights.
In a sense, I don't see how a computation could be "cancelled" by
another one. Do you have intuitions of how to derive the Born rule from
the measure of all computations? Why should some consistent histories be
more probable than others? (there is of course the Quantum Logic and
Gleason's theorem connection which we have discussed shortly) - but I
don't see any _intuitive_ connection, of why there should by histories
with different probabilities?
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