Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote:
> 
>> I'm with Mike and Brent.
>>
>> Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff
>> violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you
>> can't go out of the system.
> 
> See my answer to Brent. Once A1 looks at itself in the mirror (and  
> thus A2 too, given the protocol). A1 sees MA1 and A2 sees MA2, and the  
> computation differs. It is like being duplicated in two identical  
> rooms. This change the (local and relative) measure, because if you  
> open the "box" in the room you will find zero or one, but not both.
> 
> 
> 
>>
>> And your remark that we should differentiate infinite identical  
>> platonic
>> computations confuses me - it seems to contradict unification (which I
>> gather you assume).
> 
> Not if you distinguish first person and third person. It is the third  
> person computations which gives the local relative probabilities, but  
> yes the stream of consciousness (first person) is the same. This lead  
> to a vocabulary problem like chosing the word "bifurcation" or  
> "differentiation" for computation which, at some point *becomes*  
> different.
> Consciousness is unique and immaterial. As such it resides in  
> "Platonia". Life, that is embedding in relative computaional histories  
> is what makes consciousness differentiate.
> 
>>
>> Measure can only be influenced by _different_ computations supporting
>> the same OM.
> 
> You are right, but different computations can be understood locally  
> and globally. The "computation of me up to Washington is different of  
> the computation of me up to Moscow, even when I am still in Brussels.  
> It is contained in the Y = II idea. 

This idea seems inconsistent with MWI.  In QM the  split is uncaused so it's 
hard to see why its influence extends into the past and increases the measure 
of 
computations that were identical before the split.

Brent

>Note that the same "vocabulary"  
> problem occurs with Quantum Physics.
> 
> Of course we still lack a definite criteria of identity for  
> computation. But we can already derive what can count as different  
> computations if we want those measure question making sense.

As I understand it your theory of personal identity depends on computations 
"going through" a particular state.  Intuitively this implies a state at a 
particular moment, but a Y=II representation implies that we are taking into 
account not just the present state but some period of history - which would 
correspond with the usual idea of a person - something with a history, not just 
a state.

Brent

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