On 11 Feb 2009, at 22:19, Brent Meeker wrote:

> This idea seems inconsistent with MWI.  In QM the  split is uncaused  
> so it's
> hard to see why its influence extends into the past and increases  
> the measure of
> computations that were identical before the split.

I got the inspiration from the MWI, and even from David Deutsch  
convincing point that conceptually differentiation-talk is less wrong  
than bifurcation-talk. But is is not simply, in QM, a consequence of  
the linearity of the tensor product?,  i.e. the fact that the state  
A*(B+C) is equivalent with (A*C)+(A*C), where A, B, C represents kets  
and * represents the tensor product.
Of course the price to pay, as Everett first noticed, is that the  
states become a relative notion, and the probabilities too, making  
RSSA obligatory in QM. With comp it is more subtle (but then Everett  
uses comp and missed or abstracted himself from this subtlety).

>> Of course we still lack a definite criteria of identity for
>> computation. But we can already derive what can count as different
>> computations if we want those measure question making sense.
> As I understand it your theory of personal identity depends on  
> computations
> "going through" a particular state.  Intuitively this implies a  
> state at a
> particular moment, but a Y=II representation implies that we are  
> taking into
> account not just the present state but some period of history -  
> which would
> correspond with the usual idea of a person - something with a  
> history, not just
> a state.

Absolutely so. It is the Darwinistic aspect of comp. A species with a  
lot of offsprings makes higher the "time life" of old gene.
Perhaps thats why it is said we should grow and multiply  :)



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