On 01 Apr 2009, at 11:30, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

> 2009/3/31 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> Hello Quentin,
> Le 30-mars-09, à 20:03, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
>> 2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>>> On 30 Mar 2009, at 17:03, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>> Hi,
>>>> 2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>>>>> Hi Kelly, and others,
>>>>> Well, thanks for your report. Did you smoke the extract? It  
>>>>> usually
>>>>> last for 4 minutes. It is amazing it did last so long with you,  
>>>>> I know
>>>>> only one case of an experience lasting 20 minutes. I am happy  
>>>>> you found
>>>>> your experience interesting. You can consult and discuss your
>>>>> experience, and those of others here:
>>>>> http://www.entheogen.com/forum/forumdisplay.php?f=135
>>>>> Now the real question is, does that experience helped in  
>>>>> providing, for
>>>>> example, an answer to my last remark to Quentin?
>>>>> I quote the question again. It is important concerning
>>>>> comp-immortality, and eventually how to derive physics from  
>>>>> computer
>>>>> science.
>>>>> I do think such a question is difficult, and show the weakness in
>>>>> identifying the self with personal memories, and this justifies  
>>>>> the
>>>>> necessity of the AUDA move, I think.
>>>>> Of course, if you enjoy dream-state-like, you can enjoy Salvia  
>>>>> without
>>>>> troubling yourself with hard metaphysical questions. Yet I would  
>>>>> be
>>>>> interesting if Quentin or Stathis, or anyone, could acknowledge a
>>>>> conceptual difficulty here.
>>>>> <<Hmmm...
>>>>> I ask you, and others, this question. What is the probability  
>>>>> "now",
>>>>> that you will find yourself in Washington and Moscow the 24  
>>>>> december
>>>>> 2009, when you are annihilated in Brussels, now, (17 March 2009)  
>>>>> and
>>>>> reconstituted in both Moscow and Washington the 18 March 2009,  
>>>>> say)?
>>>>> The problem is that the reconstitution machine did dysfunction in
>>>>> Washington, so that, from the 18 March 2009 up to the 20  
>>>>> Augustus 2009
>>>>> you (the you in Washington) suffered a  "total amnesia".  And  
>>>>> then,
>>>>> "you" recovered slowly and progressively from that through  
>>>>> adequate
>>>>> medication up to a total recall, the 23 December (and none of  
>>>>> yous did
>>>>> move from W or M).
>>>> Well I think all of this depends on the fact that your memories  
>>>> "come back". If it doesn't then I will not be in washington, cqfd.
>>> What if half of your memory come back?
>> Well, it would be a half me continuation... :-)
> Hmm... ":-)" indeed.
>> And in the setup explained here... Plain me continuation would be  
>> the one in Moscow... and Half me would be in washington.
> I am not sure this makes sense.
>> If me now could meet both of me plain and half ... I would  
>> certainly identify current me to be plain me.
> You can care about him more, but you cannot identify yourself with,  
> in the usual first person way.
> It is some another person, from your 1-point of view.
> Well, I'm / will be every continuation that have as past event  
> current me. So of course, in your setup I'll be the one that lost  
> his memory... but I'll also be the one that didn't (while none of  
> them will be the other, but current I (so me now) is a past I of  
> both). And for what I care, it's the only thing that's needed.

OK (but then it seems to me that to that the attempts to predict the  
shape of mechanist first person (quantum or not) immortality can't  
avoid the continuation with partial amnesia, which indeed males the  
notion of person a bit fuzzy (but not necessarily vague, fuzziness  
makes only the border vague).

> Well the day I'm you I'm no more me so it is a question of  
> definition of what I/you/we are, what is a person, what is an  
> individual, what is identity.

What about waking up, and remembering having had both lifes. The  
disconnectedness of the two lives guaranties consistency, and can be  
seen, from the point of view of the one waking up, as a relative  

> This can make sense. We already know that the "probabilities" can  
> "retro-propagate". I remain a bit skeptical, because I feel like I  
> am the owner of memories, not like I am those memories.
> The easiest self-duplication experiences show that we are not our  
> bodies. Thought experiment with amnesia, which I have banned form my  
> theses and publications, shows that we neither our memories. I can  
> understand that some would conclude we are nothing, but I think we  
> keep remaining the "universal person", the one described by the  
> third hypostases. That entity can be conscious, even if out of time  
> and space, indeed AUDA shows that it is the builder of time and  
> space. I thought enough time has to be created in order for  
> consciousness to operate, and it is here that salivia divinorum  
> seems to force me to revise that opinion. (I am amazed, and I am  
> sure of nothing, here. I push to the limit). This would answer a  
> question raised a long time ago on the list: how many person are  
> they. Answer: possibly one.
> Well no, there are more than one and it must be so on my definition  
> of what constitute a person (and it includes self memories/ 
> experiences). If you dismiss that as fundamental in a person then  
> yes... but it doesn't shed any light on what we are.

For being a person, what is fundamental is more akin to free will, and  
the ability to build memories, imo. Einstein at the age of seven is  
Einstein, and it is still Einstein at the age of 50, and the other way  
too. With time the memories "grows", inversing time is the amnesia  
path, the simpler way for backtracking. And it makes sense we can  
remember that we backtrack once we identify ourselves with something  
more stable than memories, something "observing" a more static pattern  
of relatively consistent memories.
I can adopt you definition of person, when consciousness (unique) get  
trapped in flux it differentiated into different persons, but reverse  
the diagram and you get the fusion "process", with some training you  
can identify yourself with an amoeba, and it looks SD can help to put  
yourself in the place of another, very different *in appearance*.
The Salvia Divinorum experience  seems to be a two way amnesic road:  
back here you can't remember who you are there, and there, you can't  
remember who you are here. The very experience comes from the fact  
that the amnesias are not perfect. Some who smokes Salvia can live it  
as "coming back on earth". Oh no! Not again ...Typical example of  
someone who got a strong amnesy from here to there, and privation of  
amnesy from there to here:

I think comp allows the two immortalities, you can stay in the Samsara  
as long as you wish, but you can go in the Nirvana with a bit of  
practice. "Going to Nirvana correspond to Plotinus' conversion I think.

'Who am I?" It is the favorite koan of Ramana Maharsi. Give me the  
answer, and I will give you the shape of your "immortality".  
Ultimately it is a private question.

>> not the one where I become you. The contrary is like the believer  
>> in reincarnation, if you don't remember your past live then it is  
>> the same as you didn't have any pas live and on a personal and  
>> selfish view, totally useless to the current live. What's the point  
>> to survive/reincarnate if there is nothing left of you..
> Loosing memories does not mean that nothing is left of you.  
> Especially if you keep consciousness.
> The you that keep consciousness is no more me, so for all practical  
> purpose it is really the same thing as saying I'm dead and a new  
> person is there.
> You can forget your past identity, and still keep anything for  
> having a personal identity. In particular the self-referential  
> motor.  In the salvia experience, I belong to those who does not  
> want really to come back. Sometimes memories ... well, I don't need  
> them all. It is useful locally, when you are young, but it can be  
> heavy too, especially when you are older. It is important for  
> history learning, and for not repeating errors, but it is like a  
> ladder, at some point it can be better to forget, and jump to  
> something else.
> Also, we forget all the time, many things. Do I die because I forget  
> some dreams this night?
> Well it depends the amount of what you forget and what you forget...  
> obviously forgetting what you had for dinner yesterday, dream you  
> had last night does not constitute a death condition... but  
> forgetting your life, your name, your friends, your previous  
> feelings, your knowing is like death.
> There must be some point in forgetting after which you 'now' is re


>> I don't call that surviving... I don't care if my body doesn't  
>> biologically survive... I care that *I* (my mind/memories/ 
>> experiences) survive.
> The problem is not what about we care, but how to compute the first  
> person indeterminacy in extreme situation. According to you, the  
> comp immortality or the quantum immortality makes sense only for  
> those continuations which keep all or most the memories. I think,  
> currently and without any certainty, that the notion of relative  
> "normal worlds" or relative "normal continuations will be prevalent,  
> possibly against our wishes.
> To take a not so funny example, suppose someone get Alzheimer, and  
> that at some time t, he forget most of his life events. Would you  
> say that from his own point of view, he does not feel sick and keep  
> its memory thanks to the continuations where rare (in Everett sense)  
> lucky quantum events prevent his disease to develop?
> No, but I would say that there exists (if QI is true) some place  
> where a "normal" continuation of him exists (at each point in the  
> disease till total oblivion), and that's enough.
> And if you want to know my next expectation in the following case:
> 1- next moment with full memories
> 2- next moment with half memories
> 3- next moment with no memories
> 4- dead
> I would expect from 1st pov to only end up in 1 or 2.

Your choice, but it has an impact on the physics possible.

> 3 and 4 are impossible from 1st pov. (this is an example, the next  
> possible moments should form a continuum).

4  is impossible, but I think 3 is possible (and even rich and  
interesting state of consciousness).  It could be the consciousness  
state of the arithmetical third hypostase, the universal soul, the  
universal (and self-unnameable) arithmetical first person, obtained by  
linking justification of arithmetical sentences with the truth of  
those arithmetical sentences: incompleteness provides a shift of logics.



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