On 31 Mar 2009, at 19:06, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Yet they assume we are our bodies; otherwise duplicating the body > wouldn't duplicate the self. We just bet on a level such that the self is incarnate in a digital way by the body. > Suppose the duplication were performed > this way. You get into a sensory deprivation tank and after and > hour or > so you are duplicated, along with the tank. Because you are still in > the tank you are not having any external perceptions. Would there be > two of you? Or would there only be two when one or both of you exited > the tank? before exiting the tank: there is one first person. two third person. After: two first person too. > > I think we need to distinguish different stages of memory. You can > certainly be yourself without long-term memories: memories of you > childhood or even of yesterday. Not forming any short term, ~minutes, > memories produces confusion and difficulty in functioning but one can > still recognize the personality. My father had Alzheimer's and that's > how he was; although in the early stages of Alzheimer's the person > tends > to remember with clarity events of their youth. But there is also > very > short term, ~second, memory which allows us to perceive the continuity > of music and our surroundings. Without that, I think it would be hard > to even be conscious. This is what I am doubting now. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
