On 31 Mar 2009, at 19:06, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Yet they assume we are our bodies; otherwise duplicating the body
> wouldn't duplicate the self.
We just bet on a level such that the self is incarnate in a digital
way by the body.
> Suppose the duplication were performed
> this way. You get into a sensory deprivation tank and after and
> hour or
> so you are duplicated, along with the tank. Because you are still in
> the tank you are not having any external perceptions. Would there be
> two of you? Or would there only be two when one or both of you exited
> the tank?
before exiting the tank: there is one first person. two third person.
After: two first person too.
> I think we need to distinguish different stages of memory. You can
> certainly be yourself without long-term memories: memories of you
> childhood or even of yesterday. Not forming any short term, ~minutes,
> memories produces confusion and difficulty in functioning but one can
> still recognize the personality. My father had Alzheimer's and that's
> how he was; although in the early stages of Alzheimer's the person
> to remember with clarity events of their youth. But there is also
> short term, ~second, memory which allows us to perceive the continuity
> of music and our surroundings. Without that, I think it would be hard
> to even be conscious.
This is what I am doubting now.
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