On 31 Mar 2009, at 19:06, Brent Meeker wrote:

> Yet they assume we are our bodies; otherwise duplicating the body
> wouldn't duplicate the self.

We just bet on a level such that the self is incarnate in a digital  
way by the body.

> Suppose the duplication were performed
> this way.  You get into a sensory deprivation tank and after and  
> hour or
> so you are duplicated, along with the tank.  Because you are still in
> the tank you are not having any external perceptions.  Would there be
> two of you?  Or would there only be two when one or both of you exited
> the tank?

before exiting the tank: there is one first person. two third person.
After: two first person too.

> I think we need to distinguish different stages of memory.   You can
> certainly be yourself without long-term memories: memories of you
> childhood or even of yesterday.  Not forming any short term, ~minutes,
> memories produces confusion and difficulty in functioning but one can
> still recognize the personality.  My father had Alzheimer's and that's
> how he was; although in the early stages of Alzheimer's the person  
> tends
> to remember with clarity events of their youth.  But there is also  
> very
> short term, ~second, memory which allows us to perceive the continuity
> of music and our surroundings.  Without that, I think it would be hard
> to even be conscious.

This is what I am doubting now.



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